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Summary 
The thesis examines the emergence of anti-psychiatry since the early 1960s, 
addressing two questions: 
1. Why did anti-psychiatry emerge at this time? 
2. How influential is anti-psychiatry today? 
Anti -psych i at ry was found not to consist of one i dent if iab Ie set of' proposa Is, 
but a shifting package of views. One factor remains consistent across 
versions of anti-pýychiatry: criticism of medicalisation of mental disorder. 
Anti-psyr, hiatry emerged during the 1960s for iwo reasons: 
a) Psychiatrists had adopted positivistic conceptualisations -of human 
disorder, which reduced psychiatric patients to 'malfunctioning machines'. 
Anti-psychiatry restored the patient's subjectivity to the centre of 
psychiatric practice. 
b) The mid-twentieth century saw the expansion of state planning and a reduced 
emphasis upon individual liberty. Anti-psychiatry was part of the counter- 
culture, which criticised the welfare' state as a machine for producing 
'normality'/conformity. 1960s Anti -psychiatry was more libertarian than 
Marxist. 
By the 1970s, anti-psychiatry divided into two distinct forms: radical 
psychotherapy and Marxist anti-therapy. Versions of Marxist anti-therapy fai I 
to propose alternatives to therapy which are not themselves therapeutic or 
paratherapeutic. This problem derives from excessive reliance upon Szasz's 
libertarian critique which is flawed. 
Anti-psychiatry is less influential today; having suffered from academic 
criticism and failed to offer solutions to the problems posed by 'community 
care9. It competes with critiques which are pro-democracy, rather than anti- 
medicine. Italian reforms provide one possible model. MIND's mental health 
campaigns are democratically rather than anti -psychi atri call , y*based. 
The user 
movement includes both anti -psychi atri c users and democratically-minded ones". 
Pemocratisation of mental health provision is complicated by the continuing 
need for expert professionals and some compulsory treatment, and by problems 
inherent within the user movement. However, democracy rather than anti- 
psychiatry now offers the best basis for political critiques of psychiatry. 
Ann Claytor 
Department of Law- 
University of Sheffield 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
1. Aims of thesis. 
The aim of the thesis is to chart and explain the emergence and development 
over the past three decades of a group of ideas loosely termed 'anti- 
psychiatry'. Specifically, two questions will be addressed: 
a. Why did this pariicular set of ideas emerge at this. pariicular moment in 
the history of Western psychiatry? 
b. To what extent are these ideas still influential in current thought? 
Anti-psychiatry is basically a position of.,, extreme opposition to medically 
based theories of and treatments for mental disorder, particularly (but not 
solely) when these are administered without the patient's consent. - Theorists 
associated with anti -psychi atri c positions7 have-usually,, but not. always, 
regarded themselves as politically left-wing-, and have argued that mental 
disorderand its treatment oughtto be approachedfrom an explicitly political 
perspective. This emphasis upon the value-laden and political nature of 
psychiatric theory and practice is associated with criticism and' rejection of 
positivistic forms of science (positivism is discussed fully in Chapter 2). 
The term 'anti-psychiatry' is usually associated with the work of R. D. Laing, 
David Cooper, Thomas Szasz, Thomas Scheff, Erving Goffman and sometimes Michel 
Foucault (for example, Sedgwick, 1982). 
For the purposes of this thesis I have assumed the fol 1, owing propositions to 
be characteristic of the anti-psychiatric attitude'. These pr6posit. ions are 
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referred to throughout the thesis; for example, as 'Proposition 1, Proposition 
2' etc. 
1.1 Mental illness is a mythical concept, invented by doctors as a pseudo- 
scientific basis for the control and coEwcion of deviant peopl'e., 
1.2 Psychiatry is a form of social control which perpetuates the social and 
political status quo, and is therefore Oernici60s. 
1.3 Mental distress is caused by social oppression, rather than by biological 
or psychological malfunction within the individual. 
1.4 Mental distress shoLild not be treated by doctors. ', because it has no 
t 
physiological basis. . 11 
1.5 A schizophrenic experience can be a useful process of self-discovery, and 
people should be assisted through the experience rather than have their 
symptoms suppressed by medical forms of intervention. 
1.. 6 All psychiatric hospitals should be closed as soon as possible, ending the 
compulsory hospitalisation of patients, and breaking the influence of the 
medical profession over the provision of mental health care. 
1.7 Electro-convulsive therapy (ECT) should be abolished, because it is both 
harmful and fails to address the causes of distress. 
1.8 Psychotropic medication should be abolished, because it is both harmful 
and fails to address the causes of distress. 
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1.9 Compulsory treatment ought to be abolished, because individuals should 
never be compelled to receive medical treatment against their will. 
1.10 All institutional psychiatry is coercive, because until the threat of 
compulsion is removed from people who choose not to co-operatd, no patients 
can be said to be in receipt of treatment as a result of genuine free choice. 
1.11 Individuals should be held responsible for'their actions at all times, 
even if they are mentally disordered, because to regard'a person as not 
responsible for their actions is to deprive that person of a fundamental 
aspect of their humanity. 
It should be noted at this stage that. thi*s complete constellation of ideas is 
not in fact associated in its entirety with 4ny of the theorists named above. 
Each named theorist has at some time adhered to some of the opinions, but, to 
the extent that the constellation as presented does represent an identifiable 
attitude towards psychiatry shared by some 'People-, it is one which has been 
created by a somewhat uncritical amalgamation of the ideas of these theorists. 
As will become apparent throughout the thesis, the named theorists originated 
from within quite different philosophical and political traditions, and the 
attempt to integrate their ideas in an uncritical fashion leads to fundamental 
contradictions within the anti-psychiatric stance as a whole. 
The anti -psychi atri c position is neither the first nor the only attempt to 
bring a political critique to bear upon psychiatry. Psychiatry has been 
subject to suspicion and challenge throughout its history; for example, 
earlier this century, Kingsley Davis (1938) attacked the mental hygiene 
movement of the 1930s on the grounds that it reoresented no'more. than an 
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attempt to spread and enforce middle class values in the name of health. 
However, anti-psychiatry does constitute a particularly extreme and 
comparatively widespread opposition. to psychiatry emerging at a time when 
psychiatry appeared to be increasingly accepted as a bona fide branch of 
twentieth century medicine. Its history and continuing influencb are subjects 
well worth examining. 
2. Methodology. 
2.1 Method of analysis. 
The disciplinary background of this thesis might be described as historico- 
sociological. The material presented is'historical in ihe sense that -I have 
sought to present and explain the emergence qf anti-psychiatry as a series of 
events unfolding over several decades. However, the material is also 
sociological in the sense that I have attempted to produce a theoretical 
account-of the development of political ideas in relation to psychiatry and 
anti-psychiatry during this period, appealing to two different but 
complementary forms of explanation for the eVolution of. anti -psychi atri c 
i-deologies. 
2.1(i) Logical, or 'a priori', progression of thought. 
This form of explanation assumes that argument is essentially rational. Ideas 
and opinions are assessed in terms of their internal consistency. When 
inconsistencies are found, attempts are made to reframe the argument until it 
exists in a form which is internally consistent. Theory progresses in this 
fashion. Purely theoretical analysis of this form*will be included. in this 
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thesis. I shall chart how anti-psychiatric arguments have been challenged, 
their inconsistencies revealed, and, as a result, new forms of argument have 
been produced; for example, Chapter 4 addresses an internal contradiction 
within anti-psychiatry which is finally resolved by acknowledging a political 
dimension to general medicine as well as to psychiatry. I 
2.1(ii) Chapges in ideology in response to material conditions, or 'a 
posteriori' revisions of ideology resUlting 'from unforeseen outcomes of 
ideological positions. 
Ideas do not emerge solely as a result of logical progr6ssion. They-become 
influential at particular times because they address the historical conditions 
existing at those times in ways which appear satisfactory or appeal-ing to 
particular social groups. I shall relate tt)e emergence of particular ideas 
to the historical conditions within which they -became especially appropriate; 
for example, a recent decline in the influence of anti-psychiatry amongst 
academics is related in Chapter 8 to increasing disenchantment with the 
reality of 'care in the community'. 
2.. 2 Data 
My approach to data collection is similar to that of 'grounded theory' (Glaser 
and Strauss, 1968). That is, theoretical formulations were not specified in 
advance, and hypotheses derived and tested. Rather, theoretical formulations 
grew out of the process of data collection,. and the kinds of data collected 
were dictated by the theoretical framework as it developed. Thus, iss-ues and 
concepts were constantly being developed as the research progressed. 
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The thesis is based largely upon qualitative data, as a qualitative approach 
was most appropriate both to the aim of theory construction, and the nature 
of the material under investigation. . 
Rose (1982: 130) points out that theory- 
building research is generally based upon qualitative data, and theory testing 
research upon quantitative data. This thesis matches that gOneralisation. 
In addition, the nature of the thesis being developed made a qualitative 
approach particularly. appropriate. As Rose (1982: 129) comments: 
the major successes of the (qualitýative fleldwork] approach seem 
to be in research ... where the focus of the inquiry is the 'here 
and now' of group dynamics, the ideology or world-view of the 
group, or a specific process or experience. 
This thesis is centrally concerned with the development of a particular form 
of ideology. 
In Bryman's (1988: 10) terminology, my selection of a qualitative methodology 
was technical, rather than epistemological. The type of data presented in 
this thesis requires an analysis of the assumptions and processes of reasoning 
of the individuals concerned. Such data could not be quantified in a manner 
which would allow me to address the questions with which this thesis is 
qoncerned. 
Naturally, this limits the conclusions which can be drawn from the data; for 
example, I am able to state that anti-psychiatry is an important influence 
upon the thinking of individuals of importance within the 'user movement' as 
discussed in Chapter 9, but I am not able to indicate what percentage of 
service users fully understand or adhere to anti -psychi atri c views. Answering 
that kind of question would involve conducting further quantitative research; 
for example, by means of a large scale survey of psychiatric service users. 
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The thesis is based upon two sources of data. Much of the material presented 
is the product of library-based research methods. Library-based searches were 
made for relevant material published during the last 3-4 decades. This 
material is fully referenced throughout the thesis, but includes: 
Published books and papers by the major theorists associated with 
anti-psychiatry, as named above. 
Critiques of the work of these theorists in books and journals. 
Existing accounts of the history of psychiatry. 
Research studies from Journals of psychiatry and psychology. 
Newspaper reports. 
'Underground' press magazines, particulary those published by 
anti-psychiatric groups. 
Parliamentary debates. 
Material produced by pressure groups and organizations which have 
adopted an anti-psychiatric stance. 
The thesis refers also to material drawn from interviews conducted 
specifically for the purposes of this thesis. 
2.2 Interviews with professionals and service users known to be critical of 
mainstream psychiatry. 
These interviews were conducted for two purposes. Firstly, they enabled me 
to obtain in systematic form the opinions and arguments of people already 
known by me to be critical of psychiatry. I was able to request clarification 
from people whose published views seemed ambiguous or unclear. Some of my 
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interviewees had not published their opinions, and for them this was my sole 
source of data. This data also enabled me to compare different interviewees' 
answers to similar questions. Secondly, I used the interviews to gather 
additional historical information from my interviewees, adding. an oral 
historical dimension to the thesis. Generally, therefore, the i. hterviews 'Were 
conducted in two parts. I began with a series of personal historical 
questions, Oesigned to elicit information about the int*e'rvieweels past 
involvement with anti -psychi atri c groupt and theorists, the extent of their 
reading in the area* of anti -psychiatry, and any other. information to which 
that interviewee was particularly likely to have access. There then followed 
a series of standard interview questions designed to elicit -the opinions of 
the interviewee about a range of 'anti -psychi atri c statements' based upon the 
constellation of ideas outlined at the beginning -of thi's chapter. 
The interviews were semi -st ructu red; that is, they were based upon an 
interview schedule which specified which opinions were to be discussed during 
the course of the interview, derived from the. characteristically anti- 
psychiatric propositions listed in Section .1 of this chapter. However, 
interviewees had much freedom to expand upon their views, and introduce such 
qther perspectives as they themselves found relevant. Thus, although all the 
interviews include material in relation to similar subjects, the precise 
content and ordering of the interviews varied considerably. 
These interviews lasted between about 60 and go minutes. The, majority were 
tape-recorded, except where interviewees objected, or the interview was 
conducted by telephone. Tape-recorded interviews were transcribed in full. 
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The interviewees were selected by the technique of 'snowballing'; that is, 
initial contacts were made by me with individuals whose opinions I already 
knew to be appropriate to the thesis.. I then asked these interviewees to name 
other people who they thought it would be appropriate for me to interview, and 
contacted these people. In this way I generated a sample of 13 'intervieviees. 
The technique of snowballing does not, of course, generate a statistically 
representati. ve sample, - People contacted tend to remain within a limited 
social network, which increases the peobability of their sharing similar 
views, and decreases the variety of opinion within the sample. In one sense, 
this was unimportant for my purposes. I needed and chose a technique which 
allowed me to pre-select people whose opinions I could predict would be 
critical towards psychiatry. In another sense, the technique was problematic 
since although I wanted all my interviewees to share a dritical viewpoint, I 
did want to perceive enough variation in theýr opinions to be able to compare 
different arguments. The interviews themselves constitute evidence that I did 
manage to include a wide range of radical opinion. Also, I am able to compare 
the range of opinion contained in my interviews with that revealed by my 
library-based research. I am confident that all the major categories of 
opinion derived from the library-based research are also. apparent in the 
interviews. 
The list of interviewees presented below includes a local co-ordinator of the 
National Schizophrenia Fellowship (NSF), which is a somewhat conservative 
organization not generally noted for adopting a radical political critique of 
psychiatry. My justification for including the NSF interview is that the co- 
ordinator requested that the NSF viewpoint should be heard, and I al-so felt 
that the interview offered an interesting comparison with the views of my 
other interviewees. 
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Interviewees (interview tape-recorded unless otherwise stated): 
Dr Aaron Esterson - this was a purely historical interview conducted with a 
colleague and contemporary of R. D. Laing. No interview schedule* is presented. 
Interview also included Mary Esterson, who worked with David Cooper at Villa 
21 (see Chapter 3). 
Dr S. Ticktin - prý6fessional involved in the promotion olý alternatives to 
psychiatry, and colleague of David Cooper. One of the founders of 'Asylum' 
magazine, a publication intended to promote democracy' in the psychiatric 
system, which ori ginated in Sheffleld. 
Dr D. Hill - clinical psychologist, Director., of Camden MIND, and opponent of 
medical psychiatry. Author of The Politics of Schizophrenia (1983). 
Prof. F. A. Jenner - Professor of Psychiatry at Sheffield University and 
personal friend of R. D. Laing. One of the founders of 'Asylum' magazine and 
proponent of the Italian reforms in Britain (see Chapter 6). 
Mike Lawson - service user and vice-chair of MIND. Interview not recorded, 
because conducted by telephone. 
Peter Campbell - service user and secretary of Survivors Speak Out. 
The co-ordinator of a local branch of the National Schizophrenia Fellowship. 
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Two service users involved with a local branch of the National Schizophrenia 
Fellowship. Interviewed separately. 
Two service users involved with a local group affiliated to Survivors Speak 
Out. Interviewed together. Interview not recorded because of their 
objections. 
Social worker attached to an Afro-Caribbean mental health pressure group based 
in Sheffield. 
Data from these interviews is not presented in one body within the thesis, but 
has been integrated into the text wherever appropriate. Quotes from 
interviews are clearly distinguished from material taken from written 
sources. 
The schedule for the semi-structured interview is included in Appendix I of 
this thesis. 
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PAG ; 
NUlVI RIN-G 
AS ORIGINAL 
Chapter 2 Psychiatry by the 1960s 
Anti-psychiatry acquired its initial popularity during the 1960s within a 
particular psychiatric and social context, and in order to understand its 
emergence it is necessary to comprehend that context. This chaoter servos as 
a historical introduction, outlining the salient characteristics of psychiatry 
by the 1960s, and psychiatry's relationship with broader social and political 
values of that era. 
1. Organic-ism in medical psychiatry. 
j 
TITe pfredarriinarTt thearetfcal- approacft within mainstream mecttcal psychtatry by 
the early 1960s was orgarficist. That ts'to say., most pSiychiatrists believed 
thatthe sertuua t1laesses which theytreated., would eventually be demonstrated 
to result from gross and identifiable disease processes of the brain (for 
exam-ple, Staf-ford-Clark-, 1963J. Thts beltef waa in part the result of the 
nature of the patient population with which-Most psychiatr-tsts worked. Most 
psyGhta-trfsts worked w-ithia the large old purpose-butlt tas-tttuttons, wfttch 
housed a huge number of chronically ill patients whose conýition had been 
ýjteadtly decl-InIng LTver a period of many years. The extent of such patients' 
deterioration, combined with the inability of any form of therapy to restore 
theim to ordfnary liVing, indicated tLy most prracttttaners tile eXtSteITce of a 
slow but irreversible disease process. Many of these patients were psychotic, 
an-d had beea givea the spectftc dtagaosts of schtzophrenta. Hays (1964: 45) 
reported that schizophrenia was the commonest reason for long-term 
hasptt-al isat-iGn. 
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The belief that serious mental illnesses would eventually be demonstrated to 
result from organic diseases of the brain had been encouraged also by the 
confirmation in 1913 that the symptoms of general paresis were the final stage 
of development of syphilis as it affected the central nervous system.. General 
paresis accounted for a sizeable proportion of asylum inmates'at that time. 
Warner Jauregg's discovery in 1918 of a method of treatment for syphilis 
strengtheneq confidence in the efficacy of medicine to treat insanity by 
physical methods. 
Belief ih organicism was supported further by appeal to the types of therapy 
used by medical psychiatry, which were primarily physiologically based.. Prior 
to the 1950s, insulin coma therapy, electroconvulsive therapy (ECT) and 
leucotomy were hailed as great advances in treatmeni (Clark, 1964: 4-5). 
During the 1950s, what has been hailed as the 'pharmacological revolution' 
(Jones, 1972: 291) began to transform psychiatry with the advent of the 
phenothiazines, or major tranquillizers. The major new drug, chlorpromazine, 
was developed in France by Rhone Poulenc in 1950, and available in England as 
Largactil by 1954 (Unsworth, 1987: 259). The-major tranquillizers were the 
fi rst group of drugs to appear to exerci se any soeci fic ef f ect on the symptoms 
of schizophrenia, rather than a general sedating effect on functioning as a 
whole. Subsequently, the impact of the major tranquillizers upon*the symptoms 
of schizophrenia has been part'icularly important in producing apparent support 
for speculative physiological theories of schizophrenia. The 'dopamine 
hypothesis' asserts that drugs which relieve the symptoms of schizophrenia 
exercise an inhibitory effect upon the dopaminergic system in the brain, which 
suggests that schizophrenic symptomatology results from a chemical imbalance 
of this system; for example, Carlsson and Lindquist (1963). This line of 
reasoning was buttressed further by apparent similarities betwe'en the. effects 
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of amphetamine overdose and the symptoms of schizophrenia; for example, 
Angrist, Lee and Gershon (1974). However, empirical research has failed to 
identify dopaminergic abnormalities An schizophrenic patients (Birchwood et 
al, 1988: 47-56). The thought process by which the dopamine hypothesis was 
produce. d can be compared to arguing that headaches are a resýlt of aspirin 
deficiency on the basis that aspirin cures headaches. 
2. Psychological and social theories in'psychi atry. 
Rose (1986a) has suggested that, although theories within psychiatry had 
become increasingly organically based by the latter half of this century, in 
fact there has never been a time since ýsychiatry's ýinception when 
psychiatrists rejected entirely the. influence -of psychological and -social 
factors upon mental illness. 
In the early decades of the twentieth century, when 'organicism' 
in psychiatry was in its heyday, medicine w. a s already- 
establishing a social terrain for -its operations. (Rose, 
1986a: 45) 
Throughout the twentieth century, the extent of psychiatrists' attention to 
s. ocial and psychological phenomena in relation to mental health has -increased 
immensely. During the 1950s, there is substantial evidence of psychiatrists' 
interest in non-organic factors. 
2.1 The critique of the institution 
Within the mental hospitals, psychiatrists' inability to treat effectively 
serious forms of mental illness was not presumed_, to be entirely the 
consequence of scientific ignorance of chronic' disease processes. Awareness 
is 
was developing of the negative therapeutic impact of the institutional 
environment itself. Barton's (1959) Institutional Neurosis argued that much 
of the chronically disordered behaviour of long-term mental patients, which 
was commonly regarded as symptoms of their primary psychiatric disorder, was 
in fact the result of institutional living. He argued that, 'institutional 
neurosis, the syndrome resulting from exposure to institutional life, was a 
psychiatric. condition jn its own riýht. Goffman's (1962) Asylums provided a 
graphic account of life in an American' mental 'hospital, arguing that much 
pathological behav. 1our' was in fact a comprehensible coping response to the 
conditions of institutional life. These books represent the culmination of 
a dissatisfaction with the location of provision of psych*iatric care -which had 
been developing since the early decades of the'century. 
The deleterious social and psychological effects of the mental hospitals had 
been used actually to buttress the claims of psychiatry to possess scientific 
medically based expertise for the treatment of mental disorder. Prior to the 
Mental Treatment Act 1930, it was argued that psychiatrists' abilities to 
treat and to cure were not being used to their-potential effect because their 
benefits were being outweighed by the negative'effects of the institutions.. 
For psychiatry to be truly therapeutic, it was necessary to transform the 
institutions into properly medical hospitals. By the 1950s, and the passage 
of the Mental Health Act 1959, the prevailing view was that long-term 
institutional isation of any form was harmful. Patients would be far more 
effectively treated if they were not subjected to institutional isation, but 
as far as possible retained their status as ordinary members of society. The 
socially therapeutic effects which had once been ascribed to the asy-Tums in 
the early days of their existence now began to be ascribed to the community, 
and the policy of care in the community was born. 
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2.2 Psychoanalysis 
The theories of Freud had a substantial impact upon mainstream psychiatric 
theory. This influence was greatest in America, but is also apparent in 
British psychiatry. 
Psychoanalysis is based-upon the theory that all human behaviour is motivated, 
but that the majority of motivation takes plac6*at an unconscious level and 
is not accessible t6 consciousness. Unconscious motivation . can, however, be 
inferred from clues revealed'in people's conscious experience and behaviour; 
for example, slips of the tongue, jokes, dreams and' neurotic symptoms. 
Unconscious motivations are almost invariably' sexual, within Freud's very 
broad definition of what constitutes sexuality, and havetheir origin in early 
childhood experience. Mental pathology is the result of intrapersonal 
conflicts arising out of these unconscious motivations. Freudian theory 
places pathology along a continuum from normal through neurotic to 
psychotic. 
1 Relief from neurotic symptoms -can be attained by interpreting 
the unconscious motivations in the li-ght of consciousness, through 
psychoanalytic therapy, thus allowing resolution of conflicts. Psychotic 
! ýymptomatology is viewed as the result of conflicts whose origins -date back 
to the earliest years of life, before a secure sense of self in relation to 
others was formed. Because of their very limited ability to form 
relationships with other people, or their primary narcissism in Freud's terms, 
psychotic patients were not thought by Freud to be suitable for psychoanalytic 
psychotherapy. Psychoanalysis developed as. a therapy for patients with those 
comparatively less severe forms of mental disorder termed neurotict. which 
would not ordinarily result in long-term institutional-isation in a mental 
hospital. 
I "I 
Therefore, psychoanalytic therapy was from its earliest days most commonly 
available on a private, fee-paying, contractual basis, rather than within 
mainstream public services. However, a major triumph for psychoanalysis in 
terms of its acceptance into the psychiatric mainstream occurred during World 
War 1, when psychotherapy was applied to the problem of shel 1-sbbck, and found 
to be considerably more effective than physiological approaches 
(Brown, 1961: 56). 
The British Psychoahýlytic Association pursued psychoanAlysi sin the somewhat 
purist and dogmatic fashion of which mainstream medical psychiatry was ýighly 
suspicious. In 1920, Dr Crichton Miller founded the *Tavistock Clinic in 
London, with the intention of promoting a more 'eclectic and practical use of 
psychoanalysis within thepsychiatric ma: instream The 7avistock wasi. 
one of the first out-patient clinics ip Great Britain to provide 
systematic major psychotherapy on the basis of concepts inspired 
by psychoanalytic theory for out-patients suffering from 
psychoneurosis and allied disorders ýqho were unable to afford 
private fees. (Dicks, 1970: 24) 
By 1939, the Tavistock was prestigious enough to be given . res ponsibility for 
the co-ordination of army psychiatry during World War 11. 
In 1948, the Tavistock joined the newly formed NHS. However, within the new 
financial climate of welfare delivery, the-Clinic's pre-eminence was short- 
lived, as it became apparent that funding for psychotherapy was not to be a 
priority. Dicks (1970: 138) reports that by 1950: 
The whole problem of the value (and economics) of psychotherapy 
was once again under very considerable nationwide, scrutiny. The 
overall psychiatric trend was back towards priorfty for 
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psychosis, and hence the new and rapidly developing physical 
methods to be given in psychiatric in-patient units. This put 
psychotherapeutic theory and training into the shade. 
2.3 Behaviour therapy 
Behaviour therapy was. -the invention of the comparatively new and rapidly 
expanding profession of psychology. Baýing thdi'r practice upon the learning 
theory approaches 'of J. B. Watson and B. F. Skinnpr, behavifourally oriented 
psychologists assumed that pathological behaviour was the product of 'faulty' 
or maladaptive learning. The 'cure' for pathological behaviour was -therefore 
to substitute 'correct' learning. For behaviourists, learning was 
conceptualised as a highly mechanistic pýocess. - An organism, be it person or 
animal, learns by being repeatedly exposed., to positive or negative events 
associated with particular pieces of behaviour, and thereby becoming 
conditioned to respond to its environment in a patterned and predictable way. 
Behaviour therapy consists of systematically chang ing the patient's, pattern 
of behaviour by changing the pattern of reinforcements; that is, rewards and 
punishments. A patient should be given 'positive or negati. ve reinforcement' 
for correct pieces of behaviour, and punishment for incorrect pieces of 
behaviour. This would result in the patient acquiring new, normal and 
adaptive patterns of behav'iour. 
2 
Inp ract i ce, behav i ou r the rapy, 1i ke psychothe rapy gene ra 11 y, was rese rved for 
milder, neurotic conditions, the psychoses. continuing to be the province of 
medical psychiatry. However, behavioural theory was applied. on an 
organizational level to the management of hospital wardp, by the principles of 
token economies (for example, Ayllon and Azrin, 1968). 'Healthy' be-haviour, 
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such as dressing oneself, would be rewarded with tokens which were 
exchangeable for privileges or luxuries, such as cigarettes. On a more 
individualistic level, elements of behavioral theory could be incorporated 
into the day-to-day pattern of patient care; for example, nurses-might be 
taught not to pay attention or respond to the delusional 'content of a 
patient's beliefs, as this would positively reinforce the symptoms, making 
them more persistent... 
2.4 Expansion of mental health related professions thrpugh6ut welfare. 
Paralleling the rapid development and expansion of psychology as a profession, 
a range of psycho-social interventionist welfare services was attaining 
prominence by the late 1950s. Social Work was -becoming established as a 
profession, and basing its rationalp upon an individualistic, 
psychoanalytically-derived theory of social -intervention. Psychological 
services were becoming widely available; for example, through the education 
system, the prison system, and in the -workplace. Services offering 
psychological ly-based assistance for a range of mild forms of disturbance and 
sub-optimal performance were becoming increasingly common across a variety of 
sites of delivery. 
In summary, it is true to say that hospital based medical psychiatry, 
concerned with serious and often psychotic forms of disorder, was becoming 
increasingly organic in orientation by the 1950s. However, organic theories 
were not expanding to the exclusion of psychosocial schools of thought. In 
fact, at this time the expansion of psychology and psychoanalysis as academic 
fields was resulting in more varieties of relatively mild psychological 
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disturbance being catalogued and targeted for treatment by new groups of 
mental health professionals. 
3. Positivism as the dominant philosophy of science. 
The range of non-organic aspects of psychiatry described above demonstrates 
that psychiatry was not an ent irely organicist discipline durfng this era, but 
that its organicist aspects co-existed alongside a range of alternative and 
supplementary views'about the likely origins and best tre. atme*nt of psychiatric 
conditions. However, by the 1950s the various 'psy professions' (Castel et 
al, 1982) involved in the treatment of mental disorder'tended to share the 
common epistemological framework. of positivism-. What is probably the most 
consistent and uncompromising account of 'the theory was provided by Alfred J. 
Ayer's (1971) Language, Truth and Logic, first published in 1936. Ayer 
emphasized that scientific knowledge must be empirically based in order to be 
accepted as proper knowledge. He insisted that empirical. research must not 
be contaminated by 'metaphysics'; that is, by explanatory concepts which are 
not themselves directly observable, but are hypothesized to explain events 
which are directly observable. Metaphysics would thus inclwde references to 
free-will, agency, mind, and so forth. Since even causation cannot be 
directly observed, but only inferred, Ayer insisted that 'causation' should 
be redefined to mean 'constant conjunction'. 
In nature one thing just happens after another. Cause and effect have 
their place only in our imaginative arrangements and pxtensions of 
these primary facts. (Ayer, 1976: 181) 
Ayer's account of 'logical positivism' is probably the most tightly and 
narrowly defined instance of this school of phi loso0hy. The t6rm positivism 
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is generally used more widely and less precisely than this to refer to a range 
of basically empiricist views of science. As Bryman (1988: 14) comments: 
0 even among more. sophisticated treatments of positivism a wide range of 
meanings is likely to be discerned. Different versions of positivism 
can be found ... Even where there is a rough overlap among authors on- the 
basic meaning of the term, they rarely agree precisely on its essential 
components. 
Bryman identifies five essential component's of*oositivism: 
(i) The belief thdt the methods and procedure's of natdral science are 
appropriate to social science. 
(ii) Only phenomena which are 'observable' in the sense of 'being amenable to 
the senses' can validly be warranted as knowledge. 
(ii) Many accounts of positivism suggest that scientificknowledge is arrived 
at through the accumulation of verified facts, Theory expresses and reflects 
the accumulated findings of empirical research in the form of 'laws'. 
(iv) Scientific theories form the backcloth to empirical research in the sense 
that hypotheses are derived from them - ustially in the forms of postulated 
causal connections between entities - and then subjected to empirical test. 
(v) Positivism rejects values as having any roleý to play in 5cientific method 
in two senses. Firstly, the scientist is to be completely objective and 
purged of any values which mIght undermine objectivity. Secondly, a sharp 
distinction is to be drawn between scientific issues and statements, which 
deal with and express facts, and normative issues and statements, which deal 
with and express subjective opinions. 
Positivism was presented as an account of how natural science -ideally 
operates, and why it is so successful, and thus, by extension, a prescription 
of the standards to which human sciences such as psychology 6hd psychiatry 
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should aspire. In fact, positivism does not constitute a good explanation of 
how any science works. Kuhn's (1962) The Structure of Scientific Revolutions 
argued convincingly that science is. not merely-a process of accumulation of 
observable data points, but depends for progress upon periodic revolutions in 
whole areas of theorising in order to make bbtter sense of th6 data points; 
for example, the shift in physics from the Newtonian paradigm to the 
Einsteinian, In fact, -observation can only take place withi n the context of 
a theory, which systematically orders' and defines the observations into 
meaningful patterns. However, despite their limitations, by the late 1950s 
positivist-derived approaches were endemic in psychiatry and psychology. The 
reason for this was that human scientists were aware* of the success and 
prestige of natural scientists, and wanted their own fields -of enquiry to be 
included within that category. In order'to legitimate their demand that they 
be ascribed equal status alongside natural science, they perceived that what 
was necessary was to demonstrate that human -science shared the methods of 
natural science. Since the predominant form of philosophy of science 
available at that time was positivism, emulating the natural sciences was 
widely regarded as synonymous with adopting positivist approaches. As human 
scientists adopted the methods and philosophy which they regarded a. s 
4ppropriate to a mechanistically conceived natural science, this had the 
unfortunate effect of producing explanations of human behaviour in terms which 
were crudely deterministic. Many of the concepts rejected as metaphysical by 
positivists are precisely those which, tn every day usage, we apply to 
understanding human beings; for example, motivation, ethics, meaning, agency 
and purpose. Once human science was purged of these concepts, human behaviour- 
was regarded as essentially similar to the behaviour of molecules, and to be 
explained in causal, mechanistic and deterministic terms. 
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In fact, the influence of positivism was not equally evident across all the 
various mental health related disciplines. The purest attempts to put 
positivism into practice were found amongst behaviourist psychologists. This 
group of psychologists acquired their name as a result of having decided to 
I imit psychology to the study of what is public and observable; that is, overt 
behaviour rather than internal psychological processes and subjective 
experience. . 
Their aim was to break complex patterns of behaviour down- into 
smaller and simpler chunks, and observe ýonsistbntly appearing relationships 
between these chunks and external environmental stimuli. It was hoped that 
all behaviour, normal and abnormal, would be reducible to chains of stimulus- 
response associations. A leading proponent of behavi6urism, B. F. Skinner, 
produced a fictional 'blueprint' f4or a behaviouristically designed utopia, in 
which 'unscientific' concepts such as justice and freedom would be replaced 
with social control by positive and negative, reinforcement (Skinner, 1948). 
Organicism in psychiatry did not derive- directly from positivism, as 
behaviourism did, but was readily accommodated to positivist demands. 
Interest in 'metaphysical' thoughts and ideas being experienced by the patient 
w. as neglected in favour of the search for observable physical events to which 
the disorder could be reduced, and which could be physiologically treated. 
The aim of psychiatrists was perceived as being to identify behaviour which 
was abnormal in form and structure and reducible to organic states, an aim to 
which consideration or understanding of the content of behaviour. or experience 
was irrelevant. 
Psychoanalysis was very ambiguously positivistic. Freud had believed that he 
was founding a new science, and had been very concerned to justify his 
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practices by reference to the standards of science. Psychoanalysis had been 
presented by him as consisting of objectively observed phenomena which offered 
a total explanation of human behaviour, couched in very mechanistic and 
deterministic terms. However, psychoanalytic explanatory constructs, such as 
the notions of id, ego and superego, are all metaphysical concepts.. Theý are 
hypothetical structures or processes within the individual's 'psyche' which 
are not directly observable, but are postulated as theoretical constructs 
which explain the observed phenomend. Al*so, psychoanalysts rejected 
experimental method' as a means of testing their hypotheses, and based their 
findings entirely upon the case study method. Positivist methodologists demand 
that scientific evidence must be based upon controlled experimentation to be 
valid. Post hoc theorisations and. explanations, * no matter how convincing, are 
not thought to be admissible. Thus-, ps*ychoanalysis wds probably the least 
positivistic approach common within mental., health practice at this time. 
However, Freud's own scientistic attitude and insistence that his theories 
were to be understood mechanistically and deterministica, lly bequeathed to 
psychoanalysis certain positivistic t-endencies. More recently, 
psychoanalysis' less positivistic tendencies have been rediscovered and 
expounded (see Chapter 5). 
Therefore, although positivism was not uniformly adopted in its pure form, its 
standards of science were enormously influential before the 1960s in three 
respects: limitations on the kinds of explanation considered acceptable in 
human science; neglect of consideration of problems of value; and the position 
of the client in relationship to mental health practitioners. 
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3.1 Types of explanation viewed as acceptable in human science. 
Scientific explanation came to be regarded as synonymous with mechanistic, 
causal explanation. The notion of behaviour as motivated rationally began to 
be regarded as meaningless, and explanations couched in terms! of intent or 
purpose regarded as hopelessly unscientific. For example, a psychologist 
writing for. the Journal- of Mental Science beljeved: 
It has been shown that the iddas' of 'responsibility and of 
punishment, derived from a backgroun d of outmoded "body-mind" 
dualism and theological "free-will", subserve (sic] no useful 
purpose and that, on the contrary, they obscu're c1arity. of 
thought and obfuscate issues of practical human importance. The 
feeling of "free choice" and the awareness of "alt6rnative" paths 
of action have been interpreted as P. roperties peculiar to the 
human symbolic system and not to the external universe. 
In a world of science, based on determinism, the old ideas of 
1. responsibility" and "punishment- should be discarded. 
(Macdonald, 1955: 717) 
This has the effect also of blurring the distinction betwee. n behaviour which 
is believed to be pathological and behaviour which is simply deviant. If no 
behaviour is freely chosen by a rational agent, then any behaviour which i's 
perceived as undesirable can be regarded as both deviant and pathological. 
The way is open for psychological theories, of criminal behaviour to propose 
forms of diagnosis and 'therapy' for criminality. For example. Grendon, the 
psychiatric prison which opened in 1962, adopted a therapeutic community 
rationale for the 'treatment' of anti-social behaviour. Similarly, a 
rationale was created for mental health professionals to target, research and 
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'treat' a range of mild forms of deviance via social work and education al 
interventions. 
3.2 The problem of value freedom. 
Positivists were very concerned to exclude from science issues of value and 
ethics. Mpýsurement and experimentation must, take as- their* object publicly 
observable and verifiable entities, whith, do not depend for their existence 
upon the particular viewpoint of one investigator. Questions of value are not 
empirically decidable, and therefore cannot form part of any scientific 
investigation. Psychology and psychiatry became Very -*concerned -with 
demonstrating the objectivity of their investigations; for example instruments 
such as psychometric meas6res of intelligence were created. Through frequent 
use, established statistical norms could be dprived for whole populations with 
reference to a particular test. A measure had then been created which was 
objective in the sense that all psychologists who used that instrument would 
have data which was comparable. Once a comtýon definition of abnormality had 
been agreed, in terms of statistical deviation from the average, abnormality 
could also be discussed with some degree of certainty that all psychologists 
Vere discussing the same research object. Therefore, research on intelligence 
could be regarded as objective and value-free, and the problem'of value had 
been removed from the field of enquiry. 
However, attaining consensus does not constitute achieving value-f reedom. The 
problem of value is controlled, rather than removed. A concept such as 
intelligence is a social ly-def ined and value-laden concept. Agreeing on 
standards for its measurement does not make it less so. This is plainly the 
case if we observe how judgements of abnormality ard- made. and Vie consequences 
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which they have for the individuals concerned. Intelligence is normally 
distributed throughout the population. That is, most people cluster around 
the average score on an intelligence test, with a small number of people 
placed very high and very low. People who score very low are req arded as 
abnormal, and treated as a problem. People who score very high are regarded 
as unusual, but not abnormal. This decision is not scientific, but is based 
upon a soci4lly produced consensus. This problem has been illustrated here 
with reference to the field of intelligdnce testing. However, it has been a 
problem for psychology and psychi atry generally;. for exampýle, psycMatrists 
have been very concerned to produce standardised diagnostic categories to 
ensure comparability of findings between cultures and soc'ieties. But reaching 
a consensus about a definition in order to standardise diagnosis does not 
indicate t. hat the concept defined am*ounts to- a value-free object for 
scien. tific research. 
Again, an additional effect of the refusal to consider explicitly problems of 
value has been the blurring of the distinction between pathology and deviance. 
Rather than question why a piece of behaviour-is regarded as pathological or 
deviant, human scientists working within positivistic assumptions tended t. o 
ýiccept the behaviour as a naturally occurring category and proper object for 
scientific investigation. Thus, homosexual behaviour amongst men changed from 
being the object of criminal law to being the object of psychiatric 
investigation as a form of pathology without question as to the assumptions 
3 involved in regarding homosexuality as an illness. Similarly, 
rebelliousness amongst women who were di. ssatisfied with their socially- 
allotted role could be regarded as a form of pathology solely on the basis of 
their deviation from the role of wife and mother, which was 'normal' for women 
during the 1950s (Friedan, 1963). 
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3.3 Relationship between client and Professional. 
The implications of positivism for human sciences which have been discussed 
so far have been of a theoretical nature; that is, they have suggested why 
positivistic methodologies produced knowledge of limited value' in the ffelds 
of psychiatry and psychology. The third implication of positivism is 
practical, and refers to the effect of positivism upon'the way a professional 
regards a client. 
Positivism teaches that scientific knowledge can only be attained by 
maintaining an attitude of objectivity and detachment feom the problem being 
considered. over-involvement will almost certainly lead to subjective biases 
being introduced. The correct stance for' a clinic-ian attempting to apply the 
scientific discoveries of psychiatry or psychology is therefore one of 
clinical detachment. The assumption is that the scientist is a person who, 
by special training, has learnt a particularly pure method of observing the 
world, at which she is now an expert. The-client, who is most often a lay 
person, has not acquired this expertise- and is probably not very well 
educated. Therefore, the client has nothing to contribute. to the exchange.. 
He is present solely in the capacity of object of scientific scrutiny, whose 
symptomatology and pathology will be diagnosed and treated by' the -expert'. 
Clearly, this is not an approach which would tend to encourage professional 
empathy with the client's predicament or needs as defined by himself. 
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4. Improving social status and increasing influence of psychiatry as a 
profession. 
Much of the material which has already been presented in this chapter is 
relevant to a discussion of the increasing status of ', rhenta. 1 health 
professionals as a whole throughout the first half of this century. Medical 
psychiatry w. as claiming-to have made theoretical advances in the understanding 
of some f orms of mental disorder. Practical a6&nces were also being claimed 
in the form of physiological treatments, whose efficacy was, it was argued, 
being hindered only by the institutional context within which psychiatry was 
compelled to work. Psychology, psychoanalysis and related professions- were 
expanding rapidly, and extending the field of mental health intervention into 
a range of new fields. Psychiatry and psychology were increasingly successful 
in legitimating themselves as bona fide scignces by positivist standards of 
science. The purpose of this section is to demonstrate the level of success 
which psychiatrists and psychologists had achieved in promoting their 
disciplines and achieving support for their ends amongst educated lay people. 
At the end -of 
the nineteenth century, psychiatry had been the object of muc. h 
$uspicion and distrust. The nineteenth century wave of curative-optimism, 
which had resulted in the establishment of purpose-built asylums throughout 
Britain, had collapsed. The asylums were overcrowded with deteriorating 
patients who were not expected to leave. The asylum system had become plainly 
carceral, rather than therapeutic, providing fuel for the popular belief that 
mental disorder was associated with violence and dangerousness, and that 
mental patients needed to be kept locked away for the benefit of the -general 
public. A series of scandals, in which sane persons -had been improperly 
incarcerated in asylums, had increased distrust of psychiatry. 'the Lunacy Act 
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1890 had been passed, severely curtailing psychiatrists' freedom to 
hospitalise and treat patients. Specifically, admission to an asylum was 
permitted only upon certification by. a magistrate. Psychiatry was not at that 
time widely regarded as a credible branch of medicine. 
Throughout the first half of the twentieth century, this view of psychiatry 
was systematically reversed, as psychiatrists and psychologists exploited the 
advances they claimed to have made, worked towards closer integration with 
other health servi6es, and promoted the benefits which thei r disciplines had 
to offer. The main thrust of the mental health lobby's argument was that 
psychiatry did now have a proper scientific basis, and 'the legal restraints 
upon its practice were in the contemporary context merely handicapping its 
ability to help needy people. Legal restrictions prevented them from treating 
patients early, at a time when chronic deteri * oration could still 
be prevented. 
The stigma involved in the legal process of admission to an asylum contributed 
also by discouraging people from presenting themselves for treatment 
sufficiently early for effective treatment to be possible. The very existence 
of the asylum system, separate and distinct from the rest of the health 
services, was itself stigmatic enough to make 'people reluctant to enter as 
mental patients. The provision of an adequate psychiatric service depended 
upon the separation of psych'latry's therapeutic function from the custodia: l 
function of the asylums. A major triumph was achieved in 1930, with the 
passing of the Mental Treatment Act (MTA). Section 20 of this Act stipulated 
that asylums would henceforth be referred to as mental hospitals. - Provision 
was also made within the Act for voluntary admission to a mental hospital in 
cases where the prospective patient was able to make an application in -writing 
(MTA 1930 s. 1). 
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In 1948 a closer relationship between psychiatric services and general medical 
services was facilitated by the establishment of the National Health Service. 
For the first time, psychiatry was. placed within the same administrative 
framework as the rest of medicine. Psychiatrists were themselves arguing for 
still closer integration of psychiatry into general medicine, A. nd suggesting 
not only that psychiatry had scientific knowledge with which to treat mental 
disorder, but that psychiatric and psychological knowledge could be of benefit 
to medicine as a whole. Harris (1955) deVoted his Presidential Address to the 
Royal Medico-Psychological Association to 'The Contribution of Psychological 
Medicine to General Medicine'. He referred to the importance of emotion in 
the etiology and treatment of many physical symptoms and the n: eed to take into 
consideration 'not only the local pathological process, but the patient as an 
individual and how he reacts to his illness' (Harris, 1655: 9). Furthermore: 
Psychology should not be regarded as a., part of the speciality of 
psychiatry, but as a basic subject in the medical curriculum as 
are anatomy and physiology, which should be taught to students in 
order to enable them to gain the fullest possible knowledge of 
the human individual. (Harris, 1955! 9). 
The continuing existence of separate institutions for mentally disordered 
patients was a major barrier to the full integration of psychiatry and 
medicine. From the 1950s onwards it was increasingly assumed by politicians 
and service praviders that psychiatric treatment in the future would not be 
provided in separate institutions, but would be provided in purpose built 
acute psychiatric units within the grounds of local general hospitals. These 
units would not provide long-term care, because the purpose of a modern 
hospital is not to provide social care, but medical treatment. Whatever non- 
medical care was necessary would be provided within the community by the newly 
created welfare services. The old mental hospitals'would becom-e' redundant as 
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their existing patient populations died or were rehoused elsewhere. This 
perspective is reflected in Enoch Powell's 'watertower speech' to the National 
Association of Mental Health, delivered in 1961, in which he challenged the 
apparent permanence of the mental hospitals, which appeared: 
isolated, majestic, impervious, brooded over by the 
'gigantic 
water-tower and chimney combined rising unmistakable and daunting 
out of the countryside. [Quoted in Unsworth, 1987: 26ý] 
The Mental Health A. ct (MHA) 1959 was created with, the assumýtion that future 
mental health provision would be based upon a policy of care in the community. 
It was both the first new piece of mental health legislAtion-since -1930-, and 
the first to offer explicit support for the new policy. However, the MHA is 
better known for the radical changes 'it introduced 'into the process of 
admission to hospital. The willingness.; of Parliament to enact this 
legislation is itself an indication of the social approval which mental health 
professionals had attained amongst educated lay people. The Lunacy Act 1890 
had been passed with the intention that its- provisions for certification of 
patients entering asylums would constitute- civil safeguards, preventing 
wrongful detention. The MHA reflects the beli'ef of Parl'iament, during the 
late 1950s, that wrongful detention by doctors was a less serious or probable 
threat than was failure to receive treatment for a treatable mental disorder. 
Voluntary admission, introduced by the Mental Treatment Act 1930, was 
abolished and replaced by informal admission, under which provision a patient 
could admit themselves to a psychiatric facility with no more formality than 
was necessary for admission to any other medical facility. The vast majority 
of patients who had previously been involuntary became informal. Compulsory 
or formal admission no longer required the signature of 'a magistrate, or any 
other civil official. Admission to hospital for most formal -patients would 
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be obtained on the authority of tW6 doctors, one of whom must be a 
psychiatrist, plus either a relative of the patient or a social worker. 
Unsworth (1987) classifies the difference between the provisions of the Lunacy 
Act and the MHA 1959 as representing a transition from a legalist approach to 
mental health legislation to a therapeutic approach. That i's, the Lunacy 
Act's sole aim was to protect the liberty of people who were not insane. It 
played no ro. le in ensuring provision would be made, or-would 'be adequate, for 
those who were in fact in need of treatment or 'tare. The MHA was not passed 
primarily with a view to protecting liberty. It assumed mýdern psychiatric 
practice to be benign, humane and scientific, and not a serious threat to 
civil liberty. Its intent was to ensure that treatmerit and care-would be 
available to those who might require it with as little bureaucratic 
interference as possible. ' 
The level of confidence in psychiatry which the MHA reflects can also be seen 
in the reports and Parliamentary debates which preceded the act. Prior to the 
legislation being drafted, a Parliamentary Royal Commission, headed by Lord 
Percy, was created to report on the existing state of mental health 
legislation in England and Wales. The subsequent report, ' the Percy Report, 
Was published in 1957. The commission was evidently swayed by the-claims of 
psychiatrists to have made great advances over the previous half century, as 
it concluded: 
Disorders of the mind are illnesses which need medical treatment. 
Great progress has been made during the present cen. tury in 
developing methods of treatment for many forms- of mental 
disorder. Even when the disorder cannot be completely cured, it 
is often possible for the patient to live a happy and useful life 
in spite of some continuing mental weakness. (Percy Repb'rt: 5).. 
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Similar confidence was expressed both'in the House of Commons and the House 
of Lords. A major contributor to the debate was Edith Summerskill MP, herself 
a medical practitioner, who felt: 
the public is not aware of the modern methods of treatment such 
as electro-conclusive therapy, insulin treatment, and 
improvements in psychotherapy, which have not only revolutionized 
our attitude to mental treatment but have, indeed, provided cures 
for people who would in the past have been' 'regarded as hopelessly 
insane. (HC debates, 5.73: 45) 
Speaking in the House of Lords, Lord Taylor commented: 
This revolution has not come about as the result of the-processes 
of law, but as the result. of advances in medical treatment. 
There have been a'staggering. series of advances in physical. 
treatment, and I have no doubt that those advances will continue. 
(HL debates, 216: 704) 
Some caution was expressed about the extent of expertise which was being 
attributed to medical practitioners, and the power which the proposed 
legislation would allow psychiatry to exert over patients. ' Reservations were 
expressed particularly with respect to the new diagnostic category of 
psychopath, which was to be given legal recognition in the Act. ' The concept 
of psychopathy. was revolutionary in that it was defined neither in terms of 
impaired intelligence dating from childhood-, nor in terms of gross changes in 
function in adulthood. Its symptoms were quite simply persistent anti-social 
conduct. This diagnosis is a very clear example of the expansion of 
psychiatry beyond its traditional, seriously disordered patient group, and out 
of its traditional asylum-based locus of delivery, into new forms of deviance 
and disorder, in this case the prisons and criminal *deviancy. The best known 
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objections to the inclusion of psychopathy in the act are those of Baroness 
Barbara Wootton in the House of Lords: 
the medical profession carries. a very high prestige in the world 
today, and there may be a tendency to attribute to persons who 
are learned in medicine a wisdom in all spheres which they would 
be the first to disown... 
I see. the creation of this new categor. y of psychopaths a's one 
stage in a very important social 'development which seems to me 
characteristi'c of our. age; that is, the encro4chmýnt of the 
science of medicine into the province which was formerly reserved 
for morals. (HL debates, 216: 717-8) 
Others did not perceivE; the powers to be gi. ven t. !3 doctors over the 
'psychopathic patient' as problematic, and I, ndeed welcomed them as evidence 
of scientific and social progress. Edith Summerskill, who expressed general 
enthusiasm about the Bill, thought if anything the problem of psychopathy 
should be still more firmly handled. 
Now, I am glad to say, many prison officials and many -judges are 
beginning to appreciate that those who- are so afflicted are 
distinctive types, emotionally and instinctively unstable, -who 
have no more power to control their conduct than the epileptic 
can control his fit. It seems to me that the whole problem of 
psychopathy is not tackled with the necessary conviction and 
firmness, considering the huge number of people involved. (HC 
debates, 573: 50-1) 
Dr Reginald Bennett's contribution to the debate around psychopathy is 
particularly interesting as it reflects a total lack of concern for the rights 
and liberty of people who might be diagnosed psychopathic, and an interest 
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solely in the medical control of a potentially deviant group of persons. Dr 
Bennett was not even confining his comments to people who had broken the 
criminal law, as he thought: 
We ought to try to get them before they are criminals, and before 
they are labelled with a far worse stigma than mental' illness. 
(HC debates, 573: 74) 
Many of the comments reproduced above, pArticulArly in support of the concept 
of psychopathy, ref lect the impact of positivism upon psychiatry, as discussed 
in section 3. Deterministic theories and a refusal to consider issues of 
value in psychiatric theory produce a situation where thd distinction between 
mental disorder and social deviance becomes increasingly blurred. Medical 
approaches are extended to include forms of behaviour which are not overtly 
disordered, but simply deviant. The thiro impact of positivism is also 
present, in the lack of awareness of, or interest in, the potential patient's 
view of her circumstances. Dr Bennett's contribution above constitutes a 
particularly clear example of the way in whiýh positivistic approaches regard 
the patient as an object for scientific- intervention. To propose that 
individuals should be identified and subjected to treatment. oin the basis that 
it is believed that they might possibly become criminal in future constitutes 
a negligent attitude towards the rights of individuals which, in a Western 
liberal society, is quite unacceptable. However, Dr Bennett's attitude 
towards psychopaths is only an extreme example of a more general disinterest 
in the patient's viewpoint which is exhibited throughout the, debates. Dr 
Summerskill plainly regards psychiatric patients as entirely helpless in the 
absence of expert assistance: 
Often a nurse is attracted to nursing because of her maternal 
instinct, and in the mental hospital she can, indeed, --express 
37 
that maternal instinct in a verY fine and noble way, because the 
patients there are, in fact, her helpless charges. (HC debates, 
573: 46) 
The primary exception from this attitude towards the patient it found in' the 
contribution of Dr Donald Johnson, who expressed by far the greatest 
sensitivityfor the feelings of the patient, and is worth quoting at length: 
At the risk of continuing in hereýy, I maintain that no-one can 
give us betteF criticisms of what is wrong than the paiient, even 
when the patient, as occasionally he does complains. After all, 
there is nothing like being at the receiving end. *.. 
We are united in this House this afternoon in our anxiety to take 
thd stigma out of mental illness. ' In this-proceýs we can start 
now, because if there is one thing mpre than anything else on 
which the mental patient and the ex-mental patient feel they are 
stigmatized it is that they are discredited people, that no-one 
will believe them, no-one will listen to them and give them 
facilities for putting their case.... 
Their complaint is, first, the attitude with which they are 
regarded by those they meet in the institution when they enter 
it. Coming from the outside world as they do, and being not 
always dull people but frequently especially sensitive people, 
they feel that very strongly. (HC debates, 573: 83) 
It might be regarded as strange that both the most and the least, paternalistic 
contributions to the debate were contributed by MP's who were also medical 
practitioners. However, the difference between Dr Johnson and Ors Summerskill 
and Bennett is that Dr Johnson was speaking as an ex-mpntal patient. 
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5. Implications of the provisions of the Mental Health Act for the doctor- 
patient relationship. 
Donald Johnson's speech to the Commons during this debate highlights a 
contradiction within the intentions of the legislators. Traditiona: lly, 
psychiatrists had treated people who had been declared insane and therefore 
incompetent.. Such people were expected to be removed to an asylum against 
their will, and be kept there and treated without consent until such time as 
the doctor declared"them fit. to leave. Therefore the a$yluýs constituted an 
institutional context within which the patient-inmate could be treated as an 
object without reference to her own expressed interests. Her very-presence 
in the asylum indicated that she could not determine her own. best interests, 
and that the psychiatrist was the appropriate expert to decide when she had 
been restored to her right mind and could be released into the freedom of once 
more pursuing her own interests. Thus, the asylum system was one within which 
positivist approaches to behaviour could flourish without-contradiction. 
However, the aim of the MHA was to place. psychiatry within a similar 
institutional context to general medicine. Patients withi'R general medicine 
qhoose to enter into treatment in hospital, and are free to choose to leave 
treatment. If they do choose to leave, this action is not generally 
interpreted as. being itself the consequence of the illness for which they were 
initially admitted, as a general physician does not normally expect his 
diagnosis to extend to casting aspersions upon the patient's st4tus as a free 
agent. However, a psychiatrist is explicitly concerned with the personality 
and behaviour of the patient as a whole. Thus, within the context of 
psychiatry, a patient might be deemed to have entered hospital freely as an 
informal patient, but his subsequent decision to leave might be interpreted 
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by the psychiatrist as itself evidence of pathology, and he might then be 
discouraged or even prevented from leaving on the grounds that his mental 
condition prevented him from really understanding what he was doing. Indeed, 
during his stay in hospital, any behaviour or demands which the medical staff 
regard as undesirable might be interpreted as further evidence of illness; and 
disregarded or punished on those grounds. Particularly within a positivist 
approach to. psychiatry, within which the emphasis- is placed upon the 
I 
psychiatrist as recognised expert and thle patient as object of intervention, 
it is likely that the patient's attempts to operate as a free agent will not 
meet with a great deal of sympathy from the medical staff. Thus, a 
contradiction is likely to become apparent between the patient's belief that 
he has entered hospital as a matter of choice, and the psychiatrist's belief 
that because the patient is in hospital 'he cannot realTy be thought capable 
of free choice. 
That members of Parliament contributing to the debate preceding the passing 
of the MHA were not aware of the importance of this contradiction is apparent 
from many comments made during the debate and-quoted above. Provisions for 
informal and formal admission are regarded primaýily as means of ensuring that 
psychiatrists have easy access to patients needing treatment. It is not 
expectedthat patients will havegood reason to arguewith their psychiatrists 
about the nature of the treatment on offer. Only DonaldýJohnson appears aware 
that admission to hospital as either an informal or a formal patient has 
implications for the patient's credibility as a person worth listening to. 
Given the existence of this contradiction between the theoretical and legal 
status of the majority of psychiatric patients subsequent to the 1959 -MHA and 
their actual status in the eyes of mental health professionals, the emergence 
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in subsequent years of a movement of patients and ex-patients determined to 
improve their status within the services is unsurprising. 
6. Psychiatry in relation to the social and political climate of the 1950s. 
The improvement in the status of psychiatry and related professions during the 
twentieth century did not take place in isolation from broader social and 
political change. In fact, the fortunes of psychiatry at this time can be 
related directly to a more general shift in social and political philosophies 
during the period. 
In the nineteenth century, classical liberal ideology exercised an important 
influence on the development of the relationship between state and society, 
although the Victorian period was also characterized by increasing 
interventionism in areas such as public health and factory conditions. During 
the first half of the twentieth century, however, the emphasis shifted towards 
progressive or 'the new' liberalism. 
Classical Liberalism had its roots in the thought of philosophers such as 
J. S. Mill, whose aim was to lay out rationally the extent and limits of liberty 
which could be allowed to the individual, and thus to define the point at 
which the state could legitimately intervene in the activities of the 
individual. The purpose of this exercise was to defend the liberty of 
individuals against the encroachment of the state. The Lunacy Act 1890 has 
in fact been interpreted as a classical liberal reaction to burgeoning 
collectivism. Unsworth (1987: 145) has characterised the New Liberalism as 
attempting: 
to reconcile the essential Liberal devotion to individual freedom 
and a state limited by the rule of law, with a new perception of 
social interdependence and the need for principles of social 
reciprocity and collective responsibility to order political 
priorities. 
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The basis of the New Liberalism is to be found in twentieth century confidence 
in modern civilisation's ability to build a scientifically planned social and 
economic system which would work for the good of all. It involves a 
compromise of the classical liberal demand for individual negative Tiberty in 
the interests of a greater collective good. The new confidphce in social 
planning was shared also by more Left Wing groups, who did not share the 
Liberal conqern for the liberty of the individual at all, but were entirely 
collectivist in outlook; for example, * the FAbian Socialists, who were 
supportive of the project for a planned society to the. extent of advocating 
eugenics before World War 11. By the post-World War 11 era, a large measure 
of consensus had been reached about the form which a planned social-system 
ought to take, and the plans were -in place for the development of the Welfare 
State. The bulk of the ýelfare State legislat-ion was . passed by the Labour 
Government of 1945-51. The Mental Health., Act 1959 represents the final 
building block in the creation of a comprehensive system of welfare. 
Fabian Socialism was resolutely pro-interventionist, and saw the role of the 
state as being the promotion of the well-being of society as a collective 
unit. The New Liberalism had compromised its all'egiance to i. ndividual freedom 
ýy conceding the need for a sizeable input of centralised social. -planning. 
The result was that the welfare state legislation as a whole reflected a 
concern not only for the needs of the individual, but for the needs of society 
as a whole; for example, it was necessary fcrr workers to enjoy a minimum level 
of wealth and medical care, not only for their own benefit, but to enable 
Britain as a whole to compete effectively in industry with its competitors 
abroad. It tended to be assumed even by Liberals that in a properly-planned 
society there was no conflict between the good of the individual and the good 
of the collective, and specifically that there would'be no circu'm*stanres where 
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pursuing the good of the collective would result in serious injustice in terms 
of the good of individuals. Unsworth (1987: 231) refers to the 1950s as 
characterised by: 
the dominance of a consensual reformist optimism that society was 
becoming more humane and civilized and that this progressive 
social enlightenment would foster uni linear development in social 
Pol i cy. 
This political consensus that the society being created Would be the most just 
and desirable possible for everyone in it also had the effect of ensuring that 
dissent from that prevailing belief would not be taken 'seriously. -Adequate 
provision of welfare for all was expected to herald the end of -class conflict 
and social injustice. Consequently it'was expected ihat the grou'nds for 
political dissent, activism and discontent. ý had been removed. People who 
refused to be contented, and continued to engage in political activism, could 
be regarded as not merely nonconformist, but as irrationally and 
pathologically deviant. Just as criminality was being increasingly defined 
by mental health 'experts' as pathologyj extreme political dissent was 
categorised in the same way. An example can be found in the Proceedings of 
the British Student Health Association (1963) (quoted in Madison,, 19721: 
One is struck very ýorcibly by the external appearance of 
students with regard to hygiene, clothing and C. N. D. badges. You 
only have to look at them to tell they are unstable. 
However, this era of apparent political stability was, by the late 1950s, 
already drawing to a close. Clarke et al (1975) have suggested that the 
illusion of stability rested upon three very fragile -pillars: affluence, 
consensus and embourgeoisement. It lasted only as long as did 'those pi I lars. 
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Increased affluence, measured in absolute terms, was undeniable during the 
immediate post-war era, although relatively the economic position of the 
classes remained virtually unchanged. But by the end of the decade, the boom 
was drawing to an end and Britain was entering a period of seemingly 
irreversible economic decl-ine in terms of its position in world'markets. ' The 
Conservatives maintained power by a series of give-away budgets, which 
preserved their own popularity at the expense of long-term economic security, 
unti Ia Labour Government was finally returned in' 1964. By then, the economic 
growth which had characterised the immediate post-war period had slowed 
dramatically. The funding necessary for the comprehensive welfare policies 
which had been promised was no longer available. Cýossýparty political 
consensus was similarly short-lived. Consensus had been formed around the 
provision of welfare. Conservative commitment to welfarepolicies constituted 
co-option of territory which had previously been distinctively that of Labour. 
Without a distinctive platform, Labour lacked a clear alternative to offer to 
the electorate and offered broad support to Conservative government policies. 
Likewise, working class voters, Labour's natural electorate, both supported 
the new welfare state values and enjoyed increased wealth. The bases for 
intra-societal conflict appeared for a time to have been. removed and the 
working classes appeared to be undergoing a process of embourgeoisement, 
actually becoming more middle class in outlook and aspiration. But -this 
apparent embourgeoisement was itself merely the product of affluence and 
consensus, and dissolved as the boom ended, and funding for welfare became 
less and less adequate. By the early 1960s, mainstream political divisions 
were again becoming apparent. 
Cultural forms for the expression of dissent already existed in pockets by the 
early 1960s, and emerging dissent built upon these foundations. The youth 
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culture had begun to emerge during the 1950s. Since the War, age had been 
emerging as a more visible form of social division than class. Full 
employment and high wages resulted in. young people being materially better off 
and enjoying more independence than at any time previously. New industries, 
such as the music industry, began to target youth. Early youth sub-cultures 
emerged during the 1950s among working class youth, in the form of groups such 
as the Teddy. boys. These groups offered young. people a distinctive identity 
and sense of group membership. Clarke et al (1973) have suggested that these 
mainly working class* groups served a sociological function ior their members 
in enabling them to deal meaningfully with the contradictory demands inherent 
in the roles they were expected to play. Specifically, 'working class youth 
experienced heightened expectations of their place in society, whilst in 
reality social inequality continued -to exist. - During the 1960s, the youth 
culture began to include more middle class. ý groupings, in the form of the 
counter-culture and the hippies, who used such groupings to express their own 
dissatisfaction with their society. 
Young people were also important supporters of protest movements which emerged 
during the late 1950s. The most important such movement was, the Campaign for 
N. uclear Disarmament (CND), formed in 1958. Bogdanor and Skidelsky (1970: 13) 
have commented: 
Both C. N. D. and the 'Teddy boys' , in their highly 
dissimilar 
ways, were a foretaste of the new power of youth to fascinate, 
alarm and disrupt adult society, as well as being early symptoms 
of an alienation from the meritocratic, technological goals of 
the affluent society. It was, above all, the arrival of youth on 
the political stage that marked the beginning of the end of 
consensus. 
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Movements had existed since the dropping of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki in 1945 to protest against the rapid proliferation of nuclear 
weaponry amongst the western nations.. However, a number of factors caused the 
issue to draw widespread public attention by the late 1950s. The Suez crisis 
of 1956 caused general alarm. Also, Britain was stating her Willingnes's to 
use nuclear weapon in case of attack by the USSR whilst acknowledging her own 
inability tq cope in case of nuclear attack. Medical evidence was growing on 
the effects of radiation. In 1957, J. B. Priestle'ý published an article in the 
New Statesman expre . ssing support for unilateral disarmameni (Taylor, 1970). 
C. N. D. was formed in January 1958, and the first Aldermaston march took place 
at Easter 1958. C. N. D. rallies during 1958 produced the largest crowds in 
Trafalgar Square since V. E. day, giving an indication of the level of popular 
support the movement attained at the-end' of this-most ýuiescent of decades. 
C. N. D. did not achieve its goal of preventing the escalation of the nuclear 
arms race. Taylor (1970: 250-1) has commented: 
C. N. D. never evolved from being a movement of emotional and moral 
protest 
[But] although its success was partial and its momentum lost 
after 1961, C. N. D. brought some fresh' air into . 
6e stuffy 
atmosphere of British politics ... But its importance lies in, the 
fact that it became a liberation movement of the younger 
generation. 
Also in evidence during the 1950s was a cultural phenomenon which would 
provide a springboard for middle-class counter-cultural youth protest during 
the 1960s. This 'movement' was made up of the writers and philosophers who 
attracted the label 'Angry Young Men'. Their work constituted an aggressive 
rejection of the values of post-war society. Cooper* (1970) dates the movement 
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from the publication of John Wain's Hurry on Down in 1953. However, it 
reached its apex towards the end of the decade with publication of Colin 
Wilson's The Outsider-(1956) and the. first performance of John Osborne's Look 
Back in Anger (1957), from which the phenomenon derived its name. - 
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The novels and plays of the 'Angries' presented an entirely negative critique 
of the materjalism, snobbery and self-seekingof the affluent society, without 
offering any kind of positive alternativb. For'dxample, John Osborne's Jimmy 
Porter is a man at war with a world which he finds triyial, superficial and 
hypocritical. Cooper (1970) regards this anger as directed against an 
effeminate society, and suggests that the Angries' often savage treatment of 
women is an indication of this -basic stance. ' However, the rejection of 
bourgeois affluence does not connote a' commitme-nt to'an alternative; for 
example, Marxism is not favourably viewed..., 
The absence of any positive critique amongst the novelists and playwrights is 
rectified by Colin Wilson's (1956) The Outsider. For Wilson, the problem is 
that society is dominated by the three outlooks of Materialism, 
- 
Humanism and 
Rationalism. For Wilson, these three outlooks ebtail a catasýrophic limiting 
qf man's potential. 
the problem is a metaphysical one. It is a problem of' man's 
consciousness. Man is sick, in 'despair', because at present his 
consciousness is limited, and lacks all intensity... 
[The Rationalist conception of knowledge] fails to reallse that 
the knowledge to be gained from such methods is only a fraction 
of freal' knowledge, which requires 'intuition' and 
'involvement'. (Cooper, 1970: 269-70) 
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The Outsider of Wilson's title is the rare and creative man who has not become 
trapped within the limited consciousness of Western society, but has 'seen too 
much and too deep' and 'f or whom the. wo rl d as most men see it is a1ie and a 
deception' (quoted in Cooper, 1970: 270). The broad social and political 
solution to society's problems is revealed by Wilson in his' second book, 
Religion and the Rebel, in which he proposes that the 'outsiders' should be 
entrusted wi. th leadership of society for the benefit of all. ' If t: hose people 
of lower consciousness who do not share'the outsiders' vision object, their 
objections are to bii dismissed. The outsiders are to remain* in power even if 
this entails the deception of the mass of the ordinary people. The vision is 
based upon the existentialist tradition, dating back to Nietzsche, with-whom 
Wilson is very impressed. It is in places highly authoritarian, totalitarian 
and very unpleasant. As Cooper (1970: M) points out, ' The Outsider--is: 
little more than a much needed potppurri of the writings of 
thinkers of a certain ill-defined tradition - the anti- 
rationalist and nihilist-cum-existentialist-cum-mystical. 
The Angries' books express a dissatisfaction with the affluent, 
technologically sophisticated and non-visionary nature of. Wýestern society. 
This is expressed in more sinister form in a number of the science fiction 
novels which became popular during the post-war era. Orwell's 1984 (1949) 
presents a vision of a future in which society is almost perfectly engineered 
by an omnipotent state working for the 'col 1ýective good'. However, the vision 
is not of a Utopia, but of a nightmare world in which individuals have no 
option but to believe whatever the state tells them and obey its dictates. 
Huxley's Brave New World is a fictional account of a culture in which 
technology produces absolute conformism. In the context of the position of 
psychiatry within the technological society, a particularl"y interesting 
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example of this genre is Kesey's One Flew Over the Cuckoo's Nest (1962), a 
fictional account of patients' life in a male psychiatric hospital. The 
novel's hero, McMurphy, is admitted to the hospital having pleaded insanity 
in an attempt to avoid a prison sentence Once admitted, he becomes the 
rebel 1 ious catalyst who sti rs his fel low inmates into a new sen5b of thei e own 
capacity for self-determination. In response, the hospital staff arrange for 
McMurphy to be subjected to brain surgery, thus. defusing his capacity to break 
the hospital's grip on its patients. A Oarticularly interesting facet of the 
novel is the point at which McMurphy discovers *that all of his fellow patients 
are 'voluntaries' and could in theory leave the hospital whenever they chose. 
They are not kept there by physical restraint, but by their own inability to 
resist the authority of the doctors and nurses. The extent to which the legal 
status of psychiatric patients is meani*ngful or-important is a theme with 
which anti-psychiatry has been greatly concerned. 
In conclusion, although the consensus of political opinion during the 1950s 
appeared to point to an increasingly stable, -affluent and controlled society, 
in which conflict would not occur, in fact numerous factors indicated that 
this stability was largely illusory. The edonomic base upon which the 
qonsensus rested was itself less stable than was believed, and by the early 
1960s the affluence which had promised abundant funding for welfare and the 
end of class conflict was at an end. Existing minority protest movements and 
cultural critiques began to gain popular audiences. These protest movements 
and critiques were concerned with challenging the fundamental basis on which 
post-war society had been built: the ideals of consensus, adjustment, and 
reasonableness. Psychiatry, as one of the technologies for the promotion of 
consensus, adjustment, and reasonableness would shortly find its new-found 
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status under serious attack, and this attack would achieve itself achieve 
remarkable prominence in the emerging counter-culture. 
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Footnotes to Chapter 2 
I. In fact, absolute normality never occurs. We are all neurotic to a 
greater or lesser extent. 
2. This description is intended to be a simplified presentation of behavioral 
therapies as practised before the 1960s. Behavioral therapy as it exists 
today combines behaviourist approaches with cognitive elements in a far less 
mechanistic fashion, and is a highly effective treatment for disgrders *such 
as phobic states. 
3. Finally, in 1973, the- American Psychiatric Association dpcided that 
homosexuality was not a- form of mental illness, by process of a majority vote! 
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Chapter 3 Emergence of New Approaches within Psychiatry 
By the early 1960s, approaches to psychiatry were emerging which challenged 
the positivist consensus. 
1. Social psychiatry and the therapeutic community 
Social psychiatry was an outgrowth of mainstream psychiatry, and not anti- 
psychiatric. However, at the time of its emergence it was perceived as quite 
radical and threatening to psychiatry as traditionally practised. it 
constitutes the first attempt during this era to link psychiatry and politics 
in an explicit fashion, being -based in 'anti-Fascism and a democratic- 
communalist response to totalitarian, values' Unsworth (1987: 263-4). Social 
psychiatrists argued that the causes of pathology in the individual were to 
be found not in the internal processes of the individual, be they conceived 
as psychological or physiological, but in his social relationships. Therapy 
for the- individual must, therefore, involve treating his immediate social 
relationships and, ultimately, the kinds of relationships characteristic of 
society as a whole. This involved challenging the commonly accepted Yalues 
and standards of society. Maxwell Jones (1968: 30) described Social Psychiatry 
as: 
an 'elastic' concept, to include all social, biological, 
educational, and philosophical considerations which may come to 
empower psychiatry in its striving towards a society which 
functions with greater equilibrium and with fewer psychological 
casualties. 
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Probably the best known form of Social Psychiatry is the therapeutic community 
(TC), associated especially with Maxwell Jones. 
1 Jones derived his theory of 
the TC from his experiences as an army psychiatrist during the war. He was 
placed in charge of a psychosomatic unit studying 'effort syndrome', a 
disorder characterised by symptoms such as pain over the heart reg'ion, 
breathlessness, pýlpitation, postural giddiness and fatigue, arising 
fundamentally from psychological rather than physical causes. Therapy 
involved explaining to patients how fheir symptoms arose, and teaching 
techniques whereby they could be brought under the patient's control. Staff 
shortages meant that the only practical way in which the educative comp onept 
of treatment could be implemented was by delivery of a didactic' lecture. 
Jones discovered that the most effective teaching took place when patients 
became involved in a two way interaction involving- doctors and other patients 
in discussion. Patients were more. than happy to become involved in teaching 
the skills they had acquired to other patients, and this appeared to have a 
therapeutic effect for both educators and educated. By the end of the war, 
Jones was convinced that the interaction taking place amongst patients could 
be promoted as a powerful therapeutic tool. Specifically, patients and staff 
alike benefited from examining in daily community meetings what they were 
doing and why they were doing it (Jones, 1968). 
After the war, Jones organized a treatment unit for British ex-prisoners of 
war returning from prison camps, which he ýan as a 'transitional community' 
according to principles formed within his psychosomatic unit. The success of 
this venture prompted the Ministries of Health, Labour and Pensions to 
initiate a treatment unit for 'social misfits' under his direction. This was 
initially known as the Industrial Neurosis Unit, Belmont Hospital, later 
changed its name to the Social Rehabilitations Unit, and in 1959 became a 
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separate hospital, the Henderson Hospital. At Belmont, - Jones developed his 
theories about the therapeutic potential of community to extend beyond the 
immediate therapeutic environment ex-perienced by the patient, and to include 
the social organization of the hospital as a whole (Jones, 1968: 18. ). 
The fundamental principle underlying the philosophy of the TC in its final 
developed form was the-breaking down of hierarchies within the hospital and 
the democratisation of the therapeutic pýocess. ' *Everything which happened in 
the hospital was to'be regarded as potentially an -opportunity 
for therapeutic 
intervention. Everyone on the ward was both potentially a therapist and 
potentially a patient. This democratic and egalitarian Approach was put into 
practice by means of regular meetings of the whole ward, staff and patients, 
during which any person's behaviour or any issue on theward could be raised 
for discussion. Decisions were to be made ýy open discussion and consensus 
within the group of patients and staff. The aim was to encourage patients to 
achieve higher levels of insight into their behaviour, and to learn new and 
more effective ways of functioning in socie-ty. 
A distinction between the theory of TC and anti -ýpsychi atry is that TC did not 
question the attribution of pathology to the patient. That is, it did not 
consider at all the view expressed in Proposition 1 of the anti-psychiatric 
attitudes listed in chapter 1, that mental illness is a myth. It traced the 
roots of the pathology to the society within which the individual lived, and 
to some extent redefined the location of the pathology as existing within the 
society as a whole rather than solely within the individual. The therapy 
experienced by the individual was intended to be a contribution not-only to 
his own well-being but to the transformation of society as a whole in the 
direction of more democratic and less authoritarian' ways- of functioning. But 
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TC did not share the view of anti-psychiatry that the concept of mental 
disorder as an internal characteristic of the individual was a 'myth'. 
However, TC did offer something of a challenge to positivist conceptions of 
psychiatry in that it tempered the view of the psychiatrist as expert, and 
redefined the relationship between psychiatrist/professional 4nd. patieht as 
a more equal dialogue, to which the patient was expected to contribute. 
It is notable that Jones did not work with acutely disturbed psychotic 
patients. The ward at Belmont was intended to provide. the'rapy for patients 
who had been diagnosed psychopathic. It aimed to provide the kind of 
community within which anti-social behaviour could be systematically 
eradicated by publicly challenging it and training patients in more pro-social 
forms of behaviour. Two points are noteworthy here. Firstly, the notion of 
the TC constitutes a form of the psychiatric faith in the therapeutic power 
of community which was also driving the move towards the policy of care in the 
community throughout mainstream psychiatric practice. Although Jones actually 
worked with specialised communities within hospitals, the ultimate goal of 
Social Psychiatry was to transform the whole_- of society into a therapeutic 
community designed for the promotion of mental health. -Secondly, Miller 
(1986) has identified the extent to which the opposition of psychosocial 
therapies to strictly medical approaches to mental disorder has resulted in 
an expansion of mental health interventionism, such that the main endeavour 
of psychiatry is ceasing to be cure. Instead, psychiatry is becoming a 
prophylactic endeavour whose object is the whole of society, and whose aims 
are those of normalisation in the name of a high standard of mental health. 
The focus of Jones upon patients who attracted the dubious diagnosis of 
psychopath would suggest that TC was more closely related to the project of 
normalisation rather than the traditional aim of cure. 
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The view of TC as a technique of normalisation, rather than a genuine attempt 
to democratise psychiatry, is born out by accounts of TC as it was put into 
practice. The level of democracy achieved within the TC's was not great. 
Jones' own comments reveal the limitations of what was achieved; and the 
extent to which medical staff retained control. Within Belmont, ' alýhough'most 
meetingswere open to staff and patients, the staff continued to hold separate 
meetings for staff onl. y,. Jones justified this practice by the argument that 
patients need to feel that staff membeýs' problems are not overwhelming in 
order to be able to trust staff to deal competently with patient needs. He 
foresaw that it would be necessary to continue to hold staff meetings 
separately 'until such time as community techniques have'reached the point of 
perfection when patients can safely be told the whole truth' (Jones, 1956). 
A continuing distinction was therefore being made between staff, who needed 
to be shielded from the danger of being reve. aled to patients as incompetent, 
which would undermine their therapeutic authority, and patients, who were 
expected to be incompetent and to look to the staff for guidance. It is of 
interest that Jones views the ongoing need ýor this distinction of roles as 
a technical problem which wi 11 be solved rather than a political problem which 
will be negotiated. For Jones, democracy is a'therapeutic. tool rather than 
a fundamental political right. 
A similar perspective emerges from Rapoport's (1960) account of Belmont; for 
example, Rapoport points out that staff and patients do not define patients' 
problems in the same way. 
Patients' complaints are seen [by staff] as manifestations of 
underlying problems of personality organization, and are re- 
defined in socio-psychiatric terms. (Rapoport, 1960) 
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In other words, ultimately patients do not define their own reality: doctors 
define it for them. Similarly, in evaluating the effectiveness of the 
treatment, Rapoport favours, the doctors' judgements over those of the 
patients: 
While the doctors are the principal enthusiasts for _t'he Unit 
methods, they are also the most sophisticated in clinical 
experience ... Accordingly, we shall rely on the doctors' rating of 
improvement rather than on the 'patients', which seem to be 
coloured with wishful-thinking. (Rapoport, 1960). 
In conclusion, the TC approach does represent a more politically aware and 
less straightforwardly positivistic approach to psychiatry-than was common 
during the 1950s. In particular, TC-questioned to some extent the values of 
society at large, and approached. the patient within the context of those 
values, rather than assuming that the goal of psychiatry was to adjust the 
individual to fit into society as it exists now. However, TC failed to 
address-fully the political issues posed by iraditional psychiatric practice. 
Democracy was promoted in theory, but not fully implemented in practice. 
Patients remained very much constrained within staff-defined limits, an. d 
patients' subjective views of their own circumstances continued to be 
secondary to the 'expert' opinions of staff. In fact, TC actually extended 
the range of aspects of the patient's life in respect of which staff could 
claim expertise, defining the patient's entire social existence as legitimate 
territory for therapeutic intervention. In addition, TC was not intended by 
Jones to cater for the needs of acutely disturbed patients, but for forms of 
socially deviant behaviour on the borderline between mental health and 
criminal law. TC was at the spearhead of the expansion of psychiatry into 
milder forms of social disturbance, with the aim of'normalisatl: on rather than 
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cure, whilst leaving the type of provision available for psychiatrists' most 
disturbed patients largely unmodified. 
2. Non-positivist Psychotherapeutic Approaches 
By the late 1950s, a number of schools of psychotherapy had come into 
existence which rejected the positivist scientism of both psychoanalysis and 
behaviourism, and aimed to offer alternkives. these alternatives 
originated in America, they were influenced powerfully by the European 
existentialist philosophy popularised during the post-war period by Jean-Paul 
Sartre. Existentialist philosophers reject the causal, ' mechanistic view of 
human beings associated with pos-itivism. Instead, people-are regarded as 
beings whose fundamental nature is to form themselves through choices and 
actions. The value of life for the existentialist is to be found in the 
pursuit of authenticity; that is, the state of having freed oneself from the 
falsehoods and illusions which separate a person from the pursuit of her true 
self. -The philosophy tends towards both nihilis m and heroism. Nihilism 
results because the truth for existential-ism is that there is no meaning 
inherent in the human condition. Life has only the meaning which human being. s 
give to it. But a kind of heroism is manifested when a person succeeds in 
giving his life authentic meaning in the face of bourgeois pressure merely to 
conform (Macquarrie, 1973: 32-33). 
In Europe, psychoanalysis and existentialism were being synthesized in the 
work of therapists such as Ludwig Binswanger. In 1958, May, Angel and 
Ellenberger published Existence: anew dimension in Psychiatry and Psychology, 
which included an english language translation of Binswanger's celebrated case 
history of Ellen West, a young anorexic - patiený who committed -suicide. 
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Binswanger interpreted the woman's disorder not in terms of unconscious 
dynamic forces which determined her behaviour, but in terms of her pursuit of 
meaning and authenticity in her own life, and her ultimate decision to bring 
her life to an end. 
In America, existeptialism was a major influence upon the new schools of 
humanistic psychotherapy which were developing. The'founder of humanistic 
psychotherapy, Carl Rogers, criticized 'traditi'onal psychotherapy for being 
concerned only wi th the alleviation of the patient's symptoms, and the process 
of readjusting the patient to society as though he was a malfunctioning 
machine. Rogers argued that the focus of therapy ought not to -be the 
resolution of problems, in respect of which the therapist was thought to have 
some technical knowledge. Instead, the focus ought to be upon the client as 
a whole person, striving to form an identity and find meaning in life. The 
problems which the client brought into therapy ought not to be regarded as 
isolated symptoms to be eradicated, but rather, in the context of the client's 
whole self, as opportunities for growth to realized. As such, the patient 
ought to be at the centre and in control of -the therapeutic process, actively 
exploring and developing his own identity and r'ole in life.. The role of the 
therapist was to provide the correct kind of relationship with the patient 
within which such psychological growth and development could take place. 
Rogers believed that this relationship should be characterised by three 
attitudes of the therapist towards the Client. The therapist should be 
genuine with the client, show him unconditional warmth and acceptance, and 
exercise empathic understanding of the client. The existence of these three 
attitudes on the part of the therapist is, for Rogers, the most important 
condition for successful therapy (Fonagy and Higgitt, . 
1984: 88-89). 
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Although influenced by existentialism in his view of the fundamental nature 
of humans, Rogers' theories do not reflect the more negative and nihilistic 
aspects of the philosophy. Rather,. his view of human nature was extremely 
optimistic. He believed that humans are born essentially good, -with the 
potential for immense psychological growth, but that this potential is wa'rped 
and damaged by the relationships they experience as they grow up. The 
therapist can provide -a 'corrective relationship', characterised by the 
unconditi onal warmth and acceptance which has been missing from earlier 
relationships, within which-the client can realise the potential which has 
been frustrated since birth. 
The humanistic therapy movement includes a range of widely-known therapists 
who share Rogers' belief that it is the basic nature' of human beings to 
develop and realize their potential. Fritz Perls conceptualized such growth 
as the increasing realization of wholeness and unity of the personality. 
Abraham Maslow wrote in terms of the ultimate human need for 'self- 
actualization', or the realization of one's true potential. 
3. Thomas Szasz 
The early 1960s witnessed the beginning of the long publishing career of 
Thomas Szasz. Szasz is the first theorist to be discussed here who attracted 
the label 'anti-psychiatric'. Szasz was (and is) a psychiatrist working in 
private practice as a psychodynamically-oriented psychotherapist in America, 
and Professor of Psychiatry at the University of Syracuse. In 1960, he 
published an article in The American Psychologist entitled The Myth of Mental 
Illness, followed by a book of the same name (Szasz, 1972), elaborating his 
arguments. The basic thesis of the work is, as the title indicates, that 
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mental illness is a myth (see Proposition 1 of the 'anti -psychi atri c 
attitudes' listed in Chapter 1). That is to say, the states of mind and 
behaviour which psychiatrists identify and treat as mental illnesses cannot 
constitute illnesses at all in any meaningful sense of the term. - Illness 
means organic malfunction of the organs of the body. As the ýinq is ndt an 
organ, it cannot be said to be ill, other than in the metaphorical sense in 
which we might call a. joke 'sick'. The states which we identify as mental 
illnesses are simply examples of deviant'behaviour and belief which break the 
norms for conduct in our society. Szasz goes on to argue that the myth of 
mental illness has been created and perpetuated to provide a pseudo-scientific 
justification for the state to detain forcibly individuals whose behaviour it 
does not like, but who cannot be detained under the criminal law. Even 
individuals who apparently volunteer -for state-provided ýsychiatric treatment 
cannot be genuinely regarded as voluntary patients as long as the threat of 
compulsion can be used if they refuse to co-operate voluntarily. Szasz 
proposes that state-provision of psychiatric care for 'mental illness' ought 
to cease. He suggests instead a 'game-playing' model of human interaction in 
which social transgressions are approached quite explicitly as deviations from 
the rules of a social game. Individuals ought to be free to enter into a 
contractual relationship with a therapist in order to improve their 
effectiveness at playing such games. Individuals who do not enter into such 
a contractual relationship ought to be subject to the powers of criminal law, 
if their behaviour is criminal, and left alone if it is not. Szasz (1973) 
elaborated the analysis further, comparing the status of psychiatric patients 
in the twentieth century to that of the 'witches' and 'heretics' persecuted 
for their views in earlier periods of history. Since the early 1960s, Szasz 
has published a prolific output of journals articles and books developing his 
thesis. The basic premises of his argument remain unchanged. 
59 
Szasz is the originator of many of the views which were identified in chapter 
1 as characteristic of anti -psychiatry, notably the views that mental illness 
is a myth (Proposition 1), psychiatry- is a form of social control (Proposition 
2), compulsory treatment ought to be abolished (Proposition -9), and 
individuals ought to be held responsible for their own behaviouý at all times 
(Proposition 11). However, closer scrutiny reveals that Szasz's psychiatric 
agenda is not radical -i-n the sense of being politically progressive. Szasz 
objects not only to compulsory psychiathc treatment provided by the state, 
but to any form of state provided psychiatric treatment. at al I. One side of 
the Szasz 'myth of mental illness coin' states that involuntary psychiatric 
patients are victims of state oppression. The other side states that 
voluntary psychiatric patients, and those who use the insanity defence to 
avoid the penalty of the law, are mal-ingerers, and that, ' in this case, --we the 
tax-payers are the victims. Szasz's blueprint for the future of psychiatry 
is a straightforward plea for a free-market approach to provision of 
psychiatric care. Therapy is to be based upon a contract between client and 
therapist, where the therapist provides the care which the patient approves 
and for which the patient pays. Szasz does -not object to people pursuing 
their own myths, provided they can and do pay for them. 
Szasz's argument constitutes an entrenched restatement of the classical 
liberal position which was so severely undermined during the first half of 
this decade. He believes that the only values worth pursuing are individual 
freedom and responsibility for self. Anything which weakens the promotion of 
individual freedom and responsibility is a bad thing, and a particularly bad 
thing if the tax payer is to be expected to pay for it. Sedgwick (1982) has 
described Szasz as an intellectual descendant of Herbert Spencer, the American 
philosopher best known for his application of the evolutionar'Y' principle of 
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selection of the fittest to human society. Szasz is best viewed not as a 
progressive in the field of mental health, but as a reactor against the 
growing tendency to state-controlled provision of welfare, which characterised 
the first half of this century in both the United States and Britain (see 
Chapter. 2). The incorporation of Szaszs ideas into Left 'Wing. political 
critiques of psychiatry is at the root of many of the problems which 
characterise anti-psyr-hriatry. 
4. Sociological critiques of psychiatry. 
The 1950s and 1960s saw not only the rapid expansion of 'social science as an 
academic discipline, but also the production of new and more critical 
approaches to social science. Much sociology had tended to be positivistic 
in the sense of accepting social ly-def ined concepts uncritically as valid and 
scientific objects for research. For example, Durkheim's 1897 classic study 
of suicide had relied on official statistics for rates of suicide in 
populations (Durkheim, 1951). However, suicide is not a naturally occurring 
category of behaviour, but one which is constructed by members of a particular 
society as a result of assumptions about motive, social desirability and so 
forth. That is, the decision that a person's death will be recorded as 
suicide is the result of a series of value judgements. Fluctuating rates in 
official data will be affected not only by changes in the 'real' rate of 
suicide, but by changes in the definition bf suicide, the standards used to 
judge when it has taken place, and the readiness of coroners Ao reach that 
verdict. A similar problem exists for psychiatric epidemiology generally. 
The rate of a particular psychiatric disorder in a population depends not only 
upon 'real' fluctuation, but upon factors such as 
-changes 
in how mental 
illness is conceptualised, and willingness of' individual's to- present 
61 
themselves for diagnosis. A good example of this is the decision of the 
American Psychiatric Association to stop categorizing homosexuality as a form 
of mental illness, taken in 1973. - This decision resulted in a dramatic 
decrease in the prevalence of 'sexual deviation' in the population simply as 
a result of the changed definition. This decrease was slightly'offset bV the 
creation of a new qategory of 'disorder', 'sexual orientation disturbance', 
to be applied to gay, men and women who are disturbed by their sexual 
orientation (Davison and Neale, 1982: 363). This new category might itself be 
expected to fluctuate over time, as the experience of feeling disturbed about 
one's sexual orientation is undoubtedly linked to the way society at large 
views one's sexual orientation, which would change as dresult of the APA's 
own decision. 
There had been some earlier critic. ism by sociologists of the use of concepts 
such as 'mental hygiene' to justify social control of working class 
populations; for example, the work of Kingsley Davis (1938). In America 
during the post-war years, sociologists began to become increasingly concerned 
to question categories of social behaviour produced within other disciplines. 
Forms of deviance theory, such as symbolic interactionism, or labelling 
theory, emerged as a technique for questioning the process by which labels 
came to be attached to particular pieces of behaviour. Deviance theorists 
approached the object of their enquiries by 'bracketing off' the 'real nature' 
of the behaviour in question, and investighting instead the process by which 
that behaviour came to be defined as deviant, and the consequences of that 
label for the deviant person. They recognised explicitly that deviance is not 
a universally applicable category, but one which is constructed in different 
ways by particular societies at particular times. 
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Edwin Lemert (1951) argued that deviant behaviours, including mental disorder, 
were merely culturally unusual behaviours which met with socially and 
culturally formed disapproval and - sanctions. The social reaction and 
sanctions played a part in shaping and actually perpetuating and increasing 
primary deviance. Labelling theory was most powerfully aýpli, ed to* the 
situation of psyýhiatric patients by Thomas Scheff (1966). Scheff 
hypothesized that: 
1. Residual rule breaking arises from fundamentally diverse 
sources (ie. organic., psychological, situations of stress, 
volitional acts of innovation or defiance). 
2. Relative to the rate of treated mental illness the rate* of 
unrecorded residual rule breaking is extremely high. 
3. Most residual rule breaking is "denied" -and is of transitory 
significance. .1 
4. stereotyped imagery of mental disorder is learned in early 
childhood. 
5-. The stereotypes of insanity are continually reaffirmed, 
inadvertently, in ordinary social interaction. 
6. Labelled deviants may be rewarded for playing the stereotyped 
deviant role. 
7. Labelled deviants are punished when they attempt the return to 
conventional roles. 
8. In the crisis occurring when S residual rule breaker is 
publicly labelled, the deviant is highly suggestible and may 
accept the label. 
9. Among residual rule breakers, labelling is the single most 
important cause of careers of residual deviance. 
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Goffman's (1962) perspective is similar to that of Scheff in so far as Goffman 
attempts to comprehend asylum inmates' strange behaviour as a comprehensible 
response to the roles they have been a-llocated, rather than as a manifestation 
of internal pathology. 
Scheff has become w. idely accepted as one of the founders of anti -psychi at ry. 
The view that mental illness, and the various diagnostic categories included 
under that generic title, are 'only labelý' is traceable to Scheff's labelling 
theory. However, the question must be raised of the extent to which Scheff 
intended his theory to be proposed as an absolute alternative to psychiatric 
theories, rather than as a more critical commentary upon psychiatric self- 
confidence. Certainly, Scheff (1966) appears to place great emphasis upon the 
role played by the labelling process in continuation 'and exacerbat-ion of 
deviant behaviour, stating 'Labell. ing is the. single most important cause of 
residual deviance. ' However, in his first hypothesis Scheff proposes a list 
of possible causes of residual rule-breaking, including organic and 
psychological sources. Therefore it would appear that, although Scheff views 
deviance as primarily a matter of social attribution, he does acknowledge that 
behaviours which become labelled deviant might have an identifiable cause.. 
Certainly, by the mid-1970s, Scheff was attempting to distance himself from 
the anti-psychiatric position. 
Although. I had hoped that my work might have some effect on 
psychiatry, my primary purpose was 'not related to psychiatric 
theory or practice 
the purpose of a purely sociological model is not to replace the 
psychiatric perspective, but to serve as a corrective to the 
exclusive emphasis of the medical model on, ' the isolated 
individual. (Scheff, 1975: 254-255) 
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. In the 2nd edition of Being Mentally Ill (1984) Scheff amended his view that 
'labelling is the single most important cause of careers of residual deviance' 
in favour of the view that labelling is 'among the most important causes'. 
5. Early work of Laing. I 
The name most commonly associated with anti-pýychiatry in Britain is that of 
R. D. Laing. However, Laing's written work was' produced over a period of 
several decades, and does riot form one complete and inteýnally consistent 
whole. In fact, his work can be divided into three fairly distinct phases. 
During 1955-1964 he pursued a basically orthodox, although quite innovative, 
psychodynamic approach to psychiatry. Between 1964 and about 1970 he was 
publishing the work and advocating. th6 forms oLf pradtice which are most 
readily identified as anti-psychiatric. From 1970 until his death in 1989, 
he was practising as a psychotherapist, with an interest in rather fringe 
approaches, such as the exploration of pre-birth experience and the promotion 
of natural childbirth. This section will deal with the first phase of his 
thought, which was pre-anti-psychiatric. . Laing's interests at this time 
derived from two main sources. Firstly, he was-interested'in' the application 
of existentialist philosophy to psychiatric disorder, and particularly the 
integration of existentialism with psychoanalysis. Secondly, he was very 
interested in social psychiatry and the therapeutic uses of community. 
5.1 Existentialism and Psychoanalysis 
Laing began his career as a psychiatrist with the British Army, where he 
completed his national service between 1951 and 1953. Already, he had a keen 
interest in those philosophers who offered' an alternative to a 
65 
positivistically conceived 'technosociety' during the 1950s; for example, 
Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Husserl, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche (Laing, 
1985: 89). Subsequently, Laing worked as senior registrar at the Southern 
General Hospital, where Glasgow University's Department of Psychological 
Medicine was based. Here, he was attached to Ferguson and Rodger's Ward, 
which was psychoanalytically oriented. He met Aaron Esterson (co-author of 
Sanity, Madness and the -Family, 1964), who shared his interests in philosophy, 
and particularly existentialism. Indeed, Aaron Esterson (interview) recalled 
Laing and himself as being the only two people there who shared an 
existentialist view of psychiatry, and the belief that orthodox psychiatry was 
damaging people. In 1957, Laing moved to London to tike up a post - at the 
Tavistock Clinic and to undergo four years of training at the Institute of 
Psychoanalysis. Esterson moved also to take up a post at a hospital in 
London, and he and Laing began the joint research which would form Sanity_, 
Madness and the Family. 
Laing began to publish his work on psychoanalysis and existentialism in 1957, 
beginning with a paper entitled An examinat-ion of Tillich's theory of Anxi-ety 
and Neurosis. In 1959, The Divided Self was published, a book which Laing had 
begun writing in Glasgow. Laing described his intention in this book as 
being: 
to make madness, and the process of going mad, comprehensible ... 
A further purpose is to give in pTain English an account, in 
existentialist terms, of some forms of madness. (Laing, . 1965: 9). 
The Divided Self advocates a novel approach to understanding psychosis. Laing 
approaches psychosis as resulting from an attempt by the patient to solve an 
existential dilemma. In his view, the psychotic person is someone who fears 
other people because they pose a threat to-her continuing existence, not in 
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the sense that they are a threat to her actual life, but in the sense that 
they threaten her being. Specifically, the psychotic person fears that others 
threaten her existence as a separate, person because she experiences them as 
wanting to engulf her, to depersonalise her, or to cause her to -implode. 
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The psychotic person employs avoidance strategies which takd the form of 
constructing what Laing identifies as a schizoid personality; that is, the 
person defends her 'real self' by keeping it hidden, and relates to others 
only through a folse self system co6structed for public presentation. 
However, one's 'true self' is able to develop and thrive only in and through 
interaction with the outside world. Kept from interacting with that world, 
it becomes increasingly unreal and lacking in substance. Laing arguesýthat 
psychosis results when, eventually, the 'true self' becomes so divorced from 
reality that it is based entirely in-fantasy. If-the false self system then 
breaks down, and the true self begins to appe. ar, the person appears in a state 
of psychosis; that is, completely out of touch with reality. In addition to 
his use of existentialist terminology, Laing adapts concepts from mainstream 
British- psychoanalysis; for example, his not: ion of the 'false self system' is 
derived fromWinnicott's work. The Divided Self is notable as a presentation 
in popularly accessible form of some of the ideas of Briti. sh psychoanalysts 
working on the nature of psychosis, a form of psychological disturbance in 
whose treatment organicist medical psychiatry held an increasing monopoly. 
The aim of The Divided Self is to make madness and the process of going mad 
comprehensible, and Laing succeeds in providing a clear account of the 
experiences and anxieties of the psychotic patient in a way which has been 
recognised and appreciated by many people. The Divided Self aims to render 
the behaviour and experience of psychosis comprehensible, not through the 
characteristically esoteric codifications of psychoanalytic theory, but 
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through the same processes of understanding which we would apply to any piece 
of 'normal' speech or behaviour. Laing acknowledged an important debt to 
Freud, as the first person to attempt to make sense of the apparently 
incoherent utterances of psychosis. However, he considered that even Freud 
had approached his patients from a standpoint of alienation Arid difference, 
rather than from ope of sympathy and understanding. 
The greatest psychopathologist has been Freud. Freud was a hero. 
He descended to the 'Underworld' ahd met there stark terrors. ' He 
carried with him his theory as a Medusa's head which turned these 
terrors to stone. We who follow Freud have the benefit of the 
knowledge he brought back with him and conveyed to us. - He 
survived. We must see if -we now can survive without using a 
theory that is in some measure -an 1. nstrument- of deýence. (Laing-, 
1965: 25) 
It is perhaps Laing's willingness to take seriously at face value the 
viewpoint of his patients which is his real legacy to the user movement within 
mental health services today. 
But Laing's belief in the readily accessible 'meaningfulness of all huma. n 
behaviour, has also proved to be a highly problematic aspect of hip work, even 
at this early stage. In The Divided Self, although Laing attempts to make his 
patients' behaviour comprehensible, it is apparent that he continues to regard 
it as nonetheless pathological. Schizophtenia is still regarded as a bona 
fide diagnosis, associated with particular psychological and, psychodynamic 
difficulties which take place within the patient. Laing appears to have 
rejected an organic 'disease' theorisation of schizophrenia, but still-adheres 
to the concept as an identifiable syndrome of psychodynamic disorder. 
However, even at this early stage, Laing's reform'ulation of - psychoanalytic 
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theory through a marriage with existenti aI ism was being subjected to criticism 
from within the psychoanalytic establishment. 
For psychoanalysis, mental pathology is explained in terms of unconscious 
conflictswhich come to beexpressed through thesymptom format*1,6n of neuroses 
and psychoses. Neurosis is believed to stem from conflicts formed 
comparatively late in childhood, after the development of a coherent sense of 
self, capable of interacting rationallý in relation to reality and other 
people. Thus neurosis does not impair globally the structure of personality, 
but manifests itself in comparatively isolated forms of symptomatology. 
Psychosis, on the other hand, is believed to stem from a much earlier-period 
of childhood, when the infant was still at a. stage of 'primary narcissism',. 
and unable to interact or form relationships with -other people. The symptoms 
of psychosis reflect the state of the person., trapped within her own world of 
phantasy, unable to relate to those around her. Psychoanalysis identifies the 
rational thought processes of the mature ego, capable of interacting with 
others, as 'secondary process'. The primitive processes of the unconscious, 
as expressed in dreams, are 'primary process' 7 and essentially non-rational. 
Whilst the neurotic patient's symptoms are expressions of primary proces. s 
thought, the majority of the neurotic's conscious thought is secondary 
process. However, the psychotic patient is thought to be trapped entirely in 
aworld of primary processthought, with no meansof interacting realistically 
with other people. Thus, psychoanalysis diftinguishes neurosis from psychosis 
on the basis of a distinctly different pattern of symptomatology. For Freud7 
his interpretations were not a defence against relating directly to his 
patients, but an acknowledgement that their speech and behaviour had to be 
interpreted to make any sense in terms of rational secondary process conscious 
thought. Therefore, in refusing to accept the -classical psychoanalytic 
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framework for the interpretation of psychosis, Laing weakened the distinctive 
psychoanalytic theory of psychosis, and surrendered that in psychoanalysis 
which explained why psychotic patients are so incomprehensible. Freeman 
(1961: 80), reviewing the book for the British Journal of Medical Psychology, 
criticised Laing for committing himself to a theory 6f . 
psychbsis 
indistinguishable from that of neurosis, and dismissed Laing's claim that: 
the concepts of clinical psychiatry, and Freud's psychoanalysis 
are inadequate for the task of understanding the nature of the_ 
mental disturbance and for appreciating the patient's unhappy 
state. This is a claim for which there is not -the slightest 
justification. 
Brierley (1961: 291) in the International Journal of Psychoanalysis viewed 
Laing's ideas as falling within the boundaries of psychoanalytic theory, but 
cautioned against too radical a rejection of the basics of Psychoanalytic 
theory. 
Subsequently, however, Laing's work took him 'in precisely that direction., 
towards more drastic reformulations of psychoanalytic theory which would 
render it compatible with existentialism and phenomenology; for example, the 
emphasis within Sartrean existentialism upon free will and action does not 
coincide with the emphasis of Freudian 'psychoanalysis upon unconscious 
determination of behaviour. Laing began his second book, The Self and Others 
(1961) with a re-examination of the psychodynamic theory of the unconscious 
with the aim of rendering it more consistent with existentialist philosophy. 
Within Laing's reformulation, unconscious experience becomes that which a 
person does not communicate either to other people or to himself. Unconscious 
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processes contain those things which an individual has yet to work out about 
himself and admit to himself. The irreducible strangeness and irrationality 
of the unconscious as it breaks into consciousness in the state of psychosis, 
as conceived in classical Freudian terms, is very much absent. Psychotic 
experience is regarded as highly comprehensible in commonsense, terms. 
The Self and Others (1961) offers the basis for a theory of the' origins of 
psychosis.. In The Self and Others, Lain'g traces the origins of psychosis to 
early childhood and familial. relationships, basing his a. rgunient upon the work 
of American psychoanalytic theorists who had been studying the dynamics of 
families of psychotic patients. Laing and Esterson were partipularly 
influenced by Bateson's theory of. the 'double bind' (Bateson, Jackson, Haley 
and Weakland, 1956). Aaron Esterson . (interview) recalled that the di.: scovery 
of the Bateson et al double-bind paper was very important. to the way his and 
Laing's work progressed. The theory is discussed at some length in The Self 
and others. - 'Double bind' denotes a particular pattern of familial 
communication, which is maintained over arf extended period of time. This 
pattern takes the form of, a 'primary negative. injunction' of the form 'don't 
do that or I will punish you', accompanied by a 'spcbndary negative 
Injunction', which conflicts with the first, and ispresent at a more abstract 
and covert level. There should also exist a 'tertiary negative, injunction", 
which prevents the victim of the double bind from simply leaving the 
situation. Laing (1971: 146) provides an example of such a situation: 
A mother visits her son, who has just been recovering from a 
mental breakdown. As he goes towards her 
(a) she opens her arms for him to embrace her, and/or 
(b) to embrace him 
(c) As he gets nearer she freezes and stiffens. 
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(d) He stops irresolutely. 
(e) She says, 'Don't you want to kiss your mummy? ' - and as he 
still stands irresolutely 
(f) she says, 'But dear, you musn't be afraid of your feelings. ' 
Bateson et al and Laing argue that there is no way in which to respond 
rationally in such a situation. Repeated exposure to this kind of scenario 
will systematically undermine one's capacity to deal with reAlity*, resulting 
in behaviour which appears increasingly bizarre and outlandish, and ultimately 
results in a diagn'osis of psychosis. However, closer examination of the 
behaviour seen in context reveals it as a wholly comprehensible response to 
an impossible social situation. 
In Sanity, Madness and t. he Family (1964) Laing and Eýterson applied their 
conclusions about family dynamics and psychqSis to a sample of eleven female 
inpatients at the London hospital at which Esterson was employed. The purpose 
of this study is somewhat obscure. The method employed was to take lengthy 
tape-recordings of discussions during whicK a psychiatrist was present with 
various combinations of family members, w-ith or without the patient. The 
patients' 'psychotic' symptoms and experiences could then bp reconsidered not 
in isolation, but in the context of the communication network of the entire 
family. Laing and Esterson claimed to have demonstrated that'much of. what 
patients said and did was a comprehensible response to the familial situation 
within which they lived. However, it is unclear what conclusions the reader 
is expected to draw from this claim. Laing and Esterson state that they 
regard schizophrenia as a hypothesis, rather than as a proven clinical fact. 
They reference Szasz's The Myth of Mental Illness as part of their 
justification for this belief and they state that the purpose of the 
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publication is not to argue a psychodynamically based theory of the origins 
of schizophrenia. 
Inferences about experiences that the experiencers themselves 
deny, and about motives and intentions that the agent himself 
disavows, present difficulties of validation that do not Ariýe at 
that phenomenological level to which we have restricted 
ourselves. (Laing and Esterson, 1970: 26) 
They do, however, promise that late'r ' publ'i*Cations will include more 
psychanalytic perspectives upon the material. 
Neither is their purpose to argue for a theory of familý pathology, - in which 
the patient is merely the symbol and embodiment*of a pathology which involves 
the entire family system. 
The concept of family pathology is. 4.;, we believe, a confused 
one. (Laing and, Esterson, 1970: 22) 
Laing and Esterson claim that this work constitutes an entirely -new and 
different approach to schizophrenia: 
We be 1i eve that the sh ift, of point of view that these dýscription 
both embody and demand has a historical siqnificance no less 
radical than the shift from a demonoloqical to a clinic al 
viewpoint three hundred years ago. (Laing and Esterson, 1970: 27) 
It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the studies are intended to 
provide evidence for what Siegler et al (1972) have termed a 'conspiratorial 
theory' of schizophrenia; that is, the claim that the 'psychotic' person has 
been allocated that diagnosis simply in the interests of other members of the 
family, and exhibits no distinctive pattern of distur. bance or pathology at 
al 1. 
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Some further light is shed upon this issue by Esterson's (1972) The Leaves of 
Spring. This comprises a more detailed account of the case of Sarah Danzig, 
one of the women included in Sanity, Madness and the Family. The volume 
presents a more detailed phenomenological account of the Danzi-9 family 
dynamics. Again, the emphasis is placed upon the coherence, when placed in 
familial context, of Sarah's apparently crazy statements. As promised in 
Sanity, Madness and the Famil_y, more psychQanalytic interpretations are 
included. However, these interpretations are not interpretations of the 
content of Sarah's psychosis in the classical psychoanal. yti6 sense. They are 
predominantly interpretations of how other family members relate to Sarah in 
terms of their own phantasies; for example, her parents' behaviour is 
interpreted by Esterson as their responding to theirdaughter as a potentially 
incontinent bowel (Esterson, 1972: 117). 
Finally, Esterson concludes with a discussion of his conclusions about the 
nature of psychosis. He considers that: 
A person subjected to prolonged and intense rpystification may be 
driven crazy or frantic as if crazy if he is placed in a position 
in which he can no longer maintain a feýasible identity. This 
happened to Sarah Danzig and the others labelled schizophrenic 
described in Sanity, Madness and the Family. (Esterson, 
1972: 253) 
The distinction between being crazy and bleing frantic as if crazy is then 
developed. 
There is, of course, considerable difference between being 
labelled mad, and being mad. Some labelled schizophrenics are 
mad by any criterion that I know. While some, in my experience, 
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are not, but have been mystified into believing that they are. 
And some have been driven frantic as if they were mad. 
And even the mad ones are not necessarily mad in the way they are 
said to be by those who label them. (Esterson, 1972: 261-2). 
In summary, it appears that for Esterson the root problem is that positivistic 
psychiatry fails to distinguish people who are really mad from people who are 
merely either the focus of a familial conspiracy or being driven frantic by 
their family. Laing and Esterson's phdnomenol*6gical approach appears to be 
intended as a device for rectifying this situation by identifying those 
patients whose behaviour makes sense when placed in familial context. The 
approach is, therefore, a conspiracy theory approach, ih so far as-it claims 
to demonstrate that the patients studied by Laing and Esterson were the 
victims of a kind of conspiracy, albeit 'one which was largely unconscious in 
a psychodynamic sense. However, according.; to Esterson the authors did not 
intend to imply that there are no people who are really mad. Interestingly, 
neither does Esterson intend his work as an argument against all 
classifications of madness. 
Nor is it an argument against all forms of classifying mad 
persons. Classification is necessary as'the analytic moment of 
the dialectic, but it should be on the basis of understanding 
their existential problems, not on the basis of assuming they are 
suffering from a clinical one. (Esterson, 1972: 266) 
The primary difficulty which is now posed by Laing and -Esterson's 
collaborative work, as viewed by Esterson (1972), is the problem of how those 
who are 'really mad' are to be distinguished from those who are the victim of 
a familial conspiracy. This problem is particularly aggravated by the notion 
that some people who are 'really mad' have been dri'ven mad by fheir families, 
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and are therefore still victims of some kind of conspiracy, and that all 
people who are 'really mad' must in any case be approached in existential 
terms. This problem would be eased had Laing and Esterson chosen to present 
case studies of some of these patients who turned out to be 'really mad', 
which would allow the reader to draw some kind of conclusions 'about how* the 
3 
authors define 'rea. 1 madness'. In fact, not only are such case studies not 
presented, hut Laing and Esterson (1969: 14) have argued that: 
Surely, if we are wrong, it would be easy to show it by studying 
a few families and revealing that schizophrenics really are 
talking a lot of nonsense after all. 
But Esterson's own stated viewpoint would suggest that hd himself thinks that 
at least some schizophrenics 'really are talking a lot of nonsense'. 
Sanity, Madness and the Family appears to represent the culmination of this 
direction of Laing's thought in a fully fledged conspiracy theory. Laing and 
Esterson's stated position towards the concept of schizophrenia is ambivalent. 
They do- not reject the possibility of schizophrenia as an identifiable 
syndrome, but they do elect to ignore it. 
we ... described the family relationships phenomenologically. 
Neither organic pathology, nor psychopathology, nor for that 
matter group pathology... is assumed to be or not to be in 
evidence. This issue is simply bracketed off. (Laing and 
Esterson, 1969: 19) 
However, the thrust of the presentation is such as to lead one to believe that 
such pathology has not only been 'bracketed off', but has ceased to exist for 
the researchers. The case histories are presented in a fashion which 
highlights the function served for the whole family pf having one of its 
members identified as the patient and admitted to hospital. The 'patient' is 
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recast as victim of a family conspiracy, albeit one which is largely 
unconscious. 
In short, the attempt to marry psychoanalysis to existentialism fails, - as the 
distinctive contribution of psychoanalysis to the understanding of psychosis 
is ultimately sacrificed in the interests of promoting the existentialist 
emphasis upqn freedom,. choice and rationality. 
The publication of ýhese three of Laing's early works prpcedý the development 
of anti-psychiatry as a popular political outlook. It must be asked to' what 
extent they already embody some anti -psychi atri c assumptions. This -is a 
difficult question to answer unequivocally. Arguably, neither Laing nor 
Esterson argued overtly that schizophrenia does- not exist as an identifiable 
disorder, but only that some people who have. been diagnosed schizophrenic are 
more the victims of their social and familial nexus than of any internal 
organic or psychological pathology. However, Laing and Esterson's work 
suggests that they are confident that the majority of clinical diagnoses of 
schizophrenia are made in respect of persons whose behaviour is potentially 
entirely comprehensible in the light of their familial context. In relation 
to these patients, Laing and Esterson are agreed that schizophrenia is a label 
applied by doctors in collusion with families for purposes of social control, 
and that mental illness is a myth justifying social control. Although the 
'anti-psychiatric phase' of Laing's work- does represent an identifiable 
transition from this earlier body of work, the seeds of many ideas which are 
associated with anti-psychiatry were already in place by 1964. 
5.2 Social Psychiatry and the Therapeutic Community 
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Much space has been devoted here to Laing's attempt to unite existentialism 
and psychoanalysis, and the difficulties which that was already producing, by 
1964, in accounting for the pathologically disordered behaviour which attracts 
the label 'schizophrenic'. As was noted at the beginning of this-chapter, 
Laing's work was based also upon the theories of social psychiatry and-the 
therapeutic community movement. His interest in the potential of community 
was demonstrated as eýa-rly as 1955, in a report of a social psychiatric 
research project conducted on a chronic-Ward at Glasgow Royal Mental Hospital 
(Cameron, Laing and McGhie, 1955). Laing and his colleagues arranged for a 
group of patients on the female refractory ward to be exposed daily to a more 
stimulating social environment, where they had the opportunity to become 
involved in various kinds of occupations and to interact with each other and 
with nursing staff. The patients showed marked improvements and lost many of 
the features of chronic psychosis (Cameron et, al, 1955: 1386). The phi I osophy 
behind this experiment plainly shows allegiance to social psychiatric 
approaches, with the authors concluding that 'the most important therapeutic 
element-in the environment is the people in-it' (Cameron et al, 1955: 1384). 
In London, Laing and Esterson continued to pursue together'cln -interest in the 
therapeutic potential of communities. They had set up a study group on 
existentialism and psychiatry, and during the early 1960s were contacted by 
David Cooper, a psychiatrist who had recently arrived in London from South 
Africa. Cooper was then employed at Belmont Hospital, although not on Maxwell 
Jones' ward. Subsequently, Cooper moved to Shenley Hospital in, London, where 
he set up the 'Villa 21 ' experiment. Laing, Esterson and Cooper believed that 
Jones' therapeutic communities constituted an immense step forwards for 
psychiatry, but were limited in that they continued to. be 'overly controlled 
by their staff. Mary Esterson (interview) recalled visiting the therapeutic 
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community run by Pippard at Claybury in about 1964, which was a well-known 
example of the therapeutic community ideal in practice. 
We were just raising our eyebrows at each other at what was going 
on. There were these community meetings of the whole community, 
staff and patients, which was run by the chief male nurse. [a] 
psychiatrist would come along and there were various sub-meetings 
after%lards including the staff meeting. And the meetings all 
went in a very conventional way, ahd afterwards we got to talk to 
the nursing staff and. they were beside themselves with all the 
usual complaints about the psychiatrists, complaints about the 
patients, complaints about the system. It was exactly the same 
old [set-up] which had all been disguised. 
Aaron Esterson (interview) added: 
The other influence in this country wa. s Maxwell Jones at Belmont 
with his psychopath unit. Now that was supposed to be another 
place where people were being treated with a democratic system. 
But that was fairly closely controlled. 
Cooper set up a therapeutic community at Shenley, which became known as Villa 
21. The outcome of this experiment is described in Psychiatry and Antiý 
Psychiatry (1970). Mary Esterson worked at Villa 21 and was able to supply 
additional historical detail. Villa 21 was considered a very radical project, 
as it aimed to offer therapy to young first-time admission male schizophrenic 
patients without use of drugs, but with careful structures of group meetings 
and group therapy. Within 1 to 2 years of its having been established, Cooper 
was given authority to select his own staff, and took the opportunity to 
promote a nurse called Frank Atkin from staff nurse to charge nurse. Mary 
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Esterson identified Atkin as having provided much of the impetus behind the 
development of Villa 21. 
Frank was listening to the ... music behind it, if you like, and 
actually started to play to that tune... If we are going 
t. 0... abol i sh the staf f -pati ent conf 1i ct. .. 'Let's do i t! lCome on, 
let's do it. The tradition in mental hospitals is for patients 
to work, keep the-place nice and tidy, and polish the floors. It 
keeps them out of mischief and ybu get 'a nice tidy ward that 
everybody's pr oud of. -And we said, if there's no... staff-patient 
dichotomy, how can I tell Joe Soap to get on and polish the 
floor, or even to wash the dishes. Everybody must . do it together 
or it doesn't get done, and the answer of course was that it 
didn't get done, because what we had was a group of... adolescent 
males who too had problems and who had probably never washed a 
dish in their lives anyway. But at the same time that kind of 
atmosphere was good for people. It didn't offer enough support - 
the people were very disturbed - but it didn't take anything 
from them either. It didn't undermine them, and it was 
real ... People sat up all night around the fire talking, - talking 
about families, talking about issues, talking about the theory of 
schizophrenia and so on. 
The Villa 21 experiment was, predictably, A source of controversy within the 
hospital as a whole. 
Female nurses locked up their... young female patients for 
instance. You never saw them walking around the hospital, and 
the reason was Villa 21, all these wild young men... the hospital 
was terrified. These were ... madmen who were'not being drugged, 
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who were being given no drugs whatever, and they were being 
allowed to roam free. 
Laing, Esterson and Cooper were becoming increasingly aware that 'working 
within the NHS set very narrow constraints upon what they, 'were able to 
achieve, and began to examine the possibility of building communities outside 
the NHS whe. re they would be free to put their ideas into practice. The 
Philadelphia Association (PA) was set up as a trust to manage such 
communities. Esterson (interview) identified the 'blueprint' for such a 
project as being derived from a community in Israel which he had visited. 
This community was run along the lines of a kibbutz. * The patients ran 
everything: the ambulance, the administration, 
- 
the kitchen and the restraint 
section. The only staff were the psychiatrist and-one social worker. In 1965 
the PA leased Kingsley Hall and the first and best-known PA community was 
established. 
The plans and development of Kingsley Hall up to the time of its. opening 
belong within the early phase of Laing's thou-ght, the period of involvement 
with existentialist and phenomenologically based forms of psychotherapy. 
However, events at Kingsley Hall itself will be discussed in the -following 
section, on anti-psychiatry proper, as the total history of the project falls 
most naturally within that context. 
6. Laing and Cooper and the beginnings of antipsychiatry proper. 
During the early 1960s, alongside publications in acadeTic journals and books 
published by Tavistock Press, Laing was producing an. increasing'volume of work 
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directed at a broader cross-section of the population, particularly on the 
burgeoning counter-cultural soft-Left. His adaptation of Sartre's views on 
series and nexus to apply to family. dynamics, which formed the theoretical 
basis of Sanity, Madness and the Family, was summarised in a paper for-the New 
Left Review in 1962. In 1964, he contributed a further paper to the New -Left 
Review, and in 1965 he published in Peace News and the Psychedelic Review. 
Laing was thus becoming -well-known as a psychiatrist sympathetic to broad Left 
ideas, an d prepared to connect his views'about psychiatry to tho se ideas. He 
was beginning to pýesent his psyc hiatric ideas in the pont6xt of a broader, 
if rather vague, political critique of Western societies. However, his ideas 
were also developing in a wholly new direction, which was very distinctively 
counter-cultural. 
The counter-culture which was developing and becoming increasingly popular 
towards the middle of the 1960s was based around the rejection of conformity 
and the promotion of individuality, particularly the validity of individual 
subjective experience. LSD was a fairly newl-y discovered drug, which produced 
changes in consciousness, and was widely believed to result in a heightening 
of consciousness. During the early 1960s it was'not yet illegal, and provided 
9pportunities for many people to experience new, and apparently profound, 
psychological/spiritual 'trips'. Aldous Huxley and Timothy Leary had been 
promoting these benefits in the United States. Parallels had been drawn 
already between LSD induced experience and-the symptoms of acute psychosis, 
with some researchers wondering whether schizophrenia might be explained by 
brain chemical changes similar to those artificially induced by LSD. For a 
person who found LSD use beneficial, a related conclusion might be that 
schizophrenic patients were quite fortunate to be -able to experience 
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fnaturally' states of consciousness which had to be chemically induced in 
other people. 
Similarly, the rejection of conformity, and of notions of normality, was 
producing a tendency within the counter-culture towards libertArianism. . The 
emphasis upon immediate and direct experience produced a rejection of deferred 
gratification and planning for the future, in favour of maximising experience 
in the present. Together, these two sdts of Values tended to result in a 
rejection of rationally thought out behaviour, in fayour of spontaneous, 
instantaneous behaviour. Madness could be regarded as the epitome of the 
rejection of rationality and the embracing of uninhibited, liberated action. 
At this point, Laing produced a new theory of psychoticexperience, in which 
schizophrenic symptomatology was no longer to be regarded as a problem, but 
as one stage in a natural psychic healing process. The schizophrenic patient 
was to be regarded as having embarked upon a journey of self-discovery, 
exploring uncharted areas of 'inner space". According to Laing, medical 
psychiatry mistakes the external signs of this journey for the symptoms of a 
disease process, and intervenes to terminate it'. However, * Jý the person was 
allowed to live through the experience, complete the journey and return to 
ordinary experience in her own time, she would experience a form of natural 
healing and personal transformation. 
Parts of The Politics of Experience (1967) refleýt these views; for example: 
Instead of the mental hospital, a sort of re-servicing factory 
for human breakdowns, we need a place where people who have 
travelled further and, consequently, may be more lost than 
83 
psychiatrists and other sane people, can find their way further 
into inner space and time, and back again. (Laing, 1967: 105-6) 
Laing's production of this set of ideas can be explained almost entirely in 
terms of the influence of the counter-culture. Sedgwick (1972: 34-5) has rioted 
that the introduction of Laing's new views was both sudden and confident. 
They were presented to. predominantly non-medical audiences, through the media 
of left wing and counter-cultural publitations'cýnd events. Sedgwick noted: 
Laing's presentations before medical audiences have continued in 
the vein of his pre-1964 theorizing: he does not 'usually try to 
tell doctors and psychoanalysts that their schizophrenic patients 
are super-sane voyagers into aeonic time, . (Sedqý4ick, 1972: 35)- 
Sedgwick (1972: 39), speculating about the reasons for this sudden change of 
direction in Laing's thought, concludes that the 'psychedelic model' must be 
regarded as a logical progression out of Laing's previous views. Discussing 
The Bird of Paradise (1967), which is presented by Laing as the account of his 
own journey into inner space, Sedgwick speculates about the' nature of this 
experience, and concludes that it is too coherent to have resulted from a 
personal breakdown. He notes that Laing himself rejected the suggestion that 
the experience was induced by LSD. However, there is ample evidence that 
Laing was deeply involved in the use of LSD during the early 1960s, and this 
undoubtedly had an effect upon the progression of his ideas at that time. 
Similar, but not identical, ideas are found in Cooper's Psychiatry and Anti- 
Psychiatry (1970). Cooper falls short of making an i. dentification between 
madness and true sanity. He does not suggest that' the mad are really sane, 
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and vice versa. However, he comes close to this position, suggesting that 
madness may be closer to 'true sanity' than the state which most people accept 
as 'normal'. At this time, Laing and Cooper agreed that Western societies' 
definitions of madness and sanity are themselves a fundamental part of the 
problem. They differed about the nature of 'true sanity'. Laing. appeaes to 
regard it as a state which can be approached as an individual via psychosis. 
Cooper believed it could approximate to psychosis, but that madness is 
ultimately not a route to sanity. This *difference perhaps reflects Cooper's 
greater commitment to macro-. -politics and the pursuit of fundamental social 
change. For Cooper, sanity could never be the product of simple individual 
transformation. The whole of society must be transform6d. ' 
The development of Kingsley Hall ref-le cts very clearly the counter-cultural 
progression and change of direction on the part of Laing and, to some extent, 
Cooper. For Aaron Esterson, Kingsley Hall was a great disappointment. He 
attributed its failure to the publicity which accompanied its opening, and its 
continuing association with popular, counier-cultural lifestyles and the 
promotion of 'dropping out' as a way of life-. Aaron Esterson (interview) said 
that Kingsley Hall had only functioned as a commu'nity for psychiatric patients 
for a very brief period. In fact, it only ever housed two residents-who could 
be classified as psychiatric patients, and it was doubtful whether one of 
those would have been diagnosed schizophrenic. He considered the project to 
have been 'spoiled by the publicity', ' which had resulted from its 
identification from the very beginning as a centre for the counter-culture. 
Mary Esterson and Aaron Esterson believed that the ethos had resulted in the 
romanticisation of serious psychiatric disorder. Mary Esterson recalled 
working with a party of fi lm students at Kingsley Hal 1, -and being shocked to 
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discover that one of them was disappointed at being informed that she was not 
schizophrenic. 
(At] that time, among the intelligent young people .... that was 
the exciting thing to be. Laing had made it exciting, sound 
exciting to be schizophrenic .... when you get somebody with apoor 
sense of their own identity, and you feed them the idea that it's 
exciti. ng to be s-chizophrenic, that there's something very, very 
special about being schizophrenic; you have them turning up in 
droves saying me too, me too. And that's what you got. 
Aaron Esterson commented upon the connection between Laing's ideas and the 
culture of the period. 
It had become 'fashionable?. You have to remember this was a 
time when the '60's were taking off with drugs. ' Cannabis was 
being smoked.. And being mad was; part of the thing. 
And ... LSD ... was started with Metzner and Alpert. 'Tune in, turn 
on, drop out. '... everybody wanted to drop out ... This was 
1964... being mad was a way of dropping out. All these things 
were coming together. 
Laing and Aaron Esterson appear to have begun to disagree with one another 
from this time, both about Laing's increasingly romanticised conceptual ization 
of schizophrenia, and about his use of LSD as a means of mimicking the 
psychotic 'trip'. 
I've never called myself, and I've always rejected the term, for 
me, anti-psychiatry.... I'm against. coercive psychiatry, I'm 
against the medical model of psychiatry. I do not regard 
schizophrenics at the fount of all wisdom.. - That being 
schizophrenic or being mad immediately puts you in touch with a 
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superior wisdom... I disagree with any implication of that in 
Laing's work ... The main thing that we ... diverged over was the use 
of drugs... I regarded LSD as a useful adjunct to be used 
carefully at times... Laing used to dish it out quite 
indiscriminately. 
The best knjown product- of Kingsley Hall is Mary Barnes, Barnes and Berke's 
(1973) account of Mary Barnes' time as*a resident of Kingsley Hall between 
1965 and 1968. The''account has often been taken as a descrI . ption of Laingian 
therapy in practice; for example, Szasz (1976). However, in fact Barnes and 
Berke had a private therapist-patient relationship, in' which Laing was not 
involved. The account is relevant to Laing's work in so far as Barnes was 
resident at Kingsley Hali, and Berke's approach was influenced by Laing. 
.1 
Barnes came to live at Kingsley Hall at the age of 44, following numerous 
admissions to psychiatric hospitals throughout her adult life. At Kingsley 
Hall, she was given freedom to experience and explore a total disintegration 
of her adult personality and regression to -infantile modes of functioning for 
as long as she felt this was necessary, and to 'emerge when. she felt ready to 
do so. She passed through a period when she insisted on being fed by Berke 
from a baby's bottle, and smeared faeces on the walls of her room. Finally 
emerging from her regressed state, she discovered some talent for painting, 
and her finger paintings were exhibited publicly. The story of Mary Barnes 
has been used to justify the validity of the Laingian approach., However, the 
account has not escaped criticism. Szasz (1976) argued that Mary Barnes' 
recovery owed less to anything therapeutic about her relationship with Berke 
than to the simple change in status which her new-found fame afforded her. 
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Mary Barnes was reinflated, and inflated herself, with self- 
esteem. A crucial aspect of her relationshi. p to Laing, Berke, 
and Kingsley Hall ... lay in her transformation from 'paranoid 
schizophrenic'... into 'gifted painter'... 
This is very touching. But it is hardly a conceptual*or moral 
breakthrough in treating children, psychotics, or others who need 
encouragement and-are easy prey for flattery by superior pe'rsons 
on whom they are dependent. (Sza. ýz, 1976: 10) 
Mary and Aaron Esterson offered similar criticisms. 
there were no patients except the famous and ubiquitous Mary 
Barnes, who did her own I ittle take over bf the place. And then 
she became, God he . lp her, she became the. star . 'patient. She 
played a very determined part in making herself the star patient, 
but there were people around who -ought to have known 
better ... they knew what allocating roles of that kind did to 
people and here it was happening, yod know, like somebody from 
Bedlam, somebody that people came from thousands of miles away to 
see. A spectacle, a woman who was Nnning around in the 
altogether and smearing faeces on the walls. 
Another well-known event associated with the anti-psychiatry of this era was 
the Dialectics of Liberation conference hel'd at the Roundhouse, Chalk Farm in 
summer 1967 (Cooper, 1968). This event owed more to Cooper than to Laing, and 
aimed to draw explicit connections between the micropol itical analyses, with 
which the British 'anti -psychi at ri sts' were concerned, and macropolitical 
analyses of world events. The speakers at the congress were radical 
psychiatrists and political activists of international repute, including 
Gregory Bateson, Herbert Marcuse, Lucien Goldman and Stokely Carmichael. 
I have referred to this period, the latter half of the 1960s, as. the time 
during which 'anti -psychiatry proper' emerged. The use of the'term suggests 
that an identifiable constellation of ideas emerged at that time which can be 
categorised. as anti -psychi atri c. It is the case that Laing and Cooper shared 
views at that time which justify treating 'them as co-founders of an 
identifiable school of thought. Both had come to share the view that medical 
psychiatry was not in essence therapeutic, but was a tool for the maintenance 
of the status quo by the suppression of any individual subjectivity which 
threatened the status quo (ProposAtion 2 of the 'anti -psychi atri c attitudes' 
listed in Chapter 1). Psychiatry was'viewed as a set of techniques for 
suppressing dissent and creating conformity. 
., 
The phrase 'anti -psychiatry' was 
coined by David Cooper to denote the alternative approach which was being 
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developed through experiments such as Villa 21 and Kingsley Hall. However, 
within the broad consensus which Laing and -Cooper shared about the problems 
associated with medical psychiatry, there. existed disagreements about the 
nature and significance of psychosis and' the appr*Qpriate response, 
particularly with respect to the political analysis of the problem. The views 
of Laing and Cooper cannot be taken to be identical. SpecificaTly, Laing did 
not adhere to a political analysis as explicitly worked out or as thoroughly 
Marxist as that of Cooper. That is, Cooperwas more committed to proposition 
3 than Laing. Cooper did not share Laing's view of psychosis as a form of 
natural healing. That is, Laing was more committed to proposition 5 than 
Cooper. These differences became more publicly apparent during the early 
1970s, as the counter-culture disintegrated, and the anti-psychiatric group 
based around Kingsley Hall broke up. Laing and Coopbr's attitudes towards the 
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more Szaszian anti -psychi atri c propositions (propositions 1,9 and 11 ) is less 
clear. Laing quoted Szasz in support of the approach to schizophrenia 
presented in Sanity, Madness and the Family, and Cooper quoted him in 
Psychiatry and Anti-Psychiatry. However, the quotes are not extensive, and 
both Laing and Cooper expressed minimal interest in the deb, ate aeound 
psychiatry and the law. Szasz (1976) commented upon the British-based group 
of anti -psyphi atri sts'. disinterest- in the legal status of thei'r own patients. 
These developments will be dealt with ih Chapter 4. 
I 
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Footnotes to Chapter 3 
1. A less well-known therapeutic community approach was being developed 
contemporaneously with, but independently from, Jones' work by Tom Main of the 
Tavistock. Main's work was more psyr-hoanalytically-based than that of Jones. 
It resulted in the establishment of the Cassel Hospital as a therapeutic 
community. 
2. In fact, these are all common existential fears experienced by most people 
at some time. The psychotic person is distinguished by having organized her 
whole life around avoidance of these possibilities. 
3. As things remain, those women patients who are studied are never reported 
to have spoken or behaved in a way which'would indicate how even they came to 
be diagnosed schizophrenic in the first place. As Sedgwick (1972: 26) has 
commented, nowhere in the interviews recorded in Sanity, Madness and the 
Family do any of the research subjects speak in a fashion which would lead one 
to suspect they might be in any way psychologically disordered. Rather, the 
contributions of the 'schizophrenic' women are presented as lucid and sane by 
comparison with the behaviour of their families. 
4. The term 'anti-psychiatry' has been commonly assumed to denote a simple 
opposition to psychiatry;. for example, Szas'Z J-1976) rejected the term as 
applied to his own work because it suggesfed that he rejebted everything which 
psychiatrists do which, as a practising psychiatrist, lie found patently 
absurd. However, Cooper (1974) has claimed : that the term-was never intended 
to be used in that fashion. 'Anti' was not used to imply opposition, but to 
imply an absolute alternative, as in the phrase 'anti-art' to denote Dada. 
A similar parallel might be 'anti-Pope' to denote an alternative Pope to the 
established head of the Roman Catholic church. Although 'anti-' does denote 
opposition to the mainstream, it is in the sense of (creative alternative to' 
rather than 'abolition of' the established figure. However, during the 1970s 
Cooper was distancing himself from all forms of 'therapy, including those 
proposed by his ex-colleagues in the Philadelphia Association, and proposing 
exclusively political solutions to- the problem of mental disorder. Cooper's 
stance of opposition to all forms of therapy is'discussed f. urther in Chapter 
4. 
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Chapter 4 Developments in British and American Anti -Psychiatry, 1970 
Onwards 
The Political Environment of the Early 1970s 
In chapter 3, it was noted that anti-psychiatry in Britain derived from 
several roots. Laing, - Esterson and Cooper's early work was based within 
mainstream psychiatric practice, albeit at the fringes of that practice, 
deriving from existentialist psychoanalytic approaches aný the theory and 
practice of the therapeutic community, as popularized by Maxwell Jones. 
However, as the 1960s progressed, the British group acqu7i red Anfluences from 
diverse sources which were viewed sympathetically by the counter-cultural 
soft-left of the late i960s. Thus t. hey came- to be influenced by the 
libertarian views of Thomas Szasz, a libertarian reading of labelling 
theorists such as Thomas Scheff, and by various counter-cultural influences. 
Laing was mainly influenced by notions of changed consciousness, derived from 
psychedelic and Eastern mystical experiences. coo per's views on psychiatry 
were increasingly derived from Marxism. By the late 1960s, it is probably 
appropriate to regard the position of the British group as being less that of 
the vanguard of avant-garde approaches to psychiatry, and more that of gurus 
of the soft new-left generaily. Although overtly claiming to address the 
problems of psychiatry, Laing and Cooper were mainly engaged in addressing the 
personal and political problems of the counter-cultural middle-classes. It 
was not so much that psychiatric problems were being politiqized, as that 
politics were being reinterpreted within a framework which viewed the capacity 
for psychosis as paradigmatic of human freedom, and psychiatry as paradigmatic 
of all the ways in which the modern capitalist state represses and suppresses 
the capacity for freedom. 
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The belief of the counter-culture was that political transformation could, and 
would, result from personal transformation. If sufficient people underwent 
the LSD experience, adopted Eastern approaches to meditation and 
consciousness, were allowed to complete the voyage of psychosis, *a'nd by a 
variety of means transformed their consciousnesses, then revo*16tipn woul'd be 
produced. This pol. itical outlook informed the events and 'happenings' of the 
late 1960s. . 
The belief that one could alter, society by a sheer effort of 
wi 11 -power I ay behi nd the events of May 1968 1n France as much as behi nd 
Timothy Leary's attempts to-cause the Pentagon to levitate in America. 
Needless to say, the strategy failed. The revolution did not take place. The 
result was a swift reappraisal of the counter-cultural strategy, which now. 
fragmented in two distinct directions. On the one-hand, the counter-cultural 
young generation abandoned its claims to radicalism. The examination and 
transformation of consciousness ceased to be expected to lead to social 
transformation, and became an end desirable in itself. The new therapy and 
human potential movements abandoned by and large any pretence to be aiming to 
improve the general lot of mankind, and -restricted themselves to a more 
limited role of improving the well-being of their clients and providing A 
pseudo-religious framework for those who perceived their primary problem as 
being a lack of meaning in their daily existences. On the other hand, the 
failure of the counter-culture resulted in a sweeping rejection of that whole 
approach and demands for a return to a more ? )rthodox Marxist theory of society 
and promotion of macro-political revolutionary solutions. Therefore, a 
distinction was made increasingly between those people whose ideas were 
genuinely Left wing, and those whose ideas in fact amounted to no more than 
a bourgeois, privileged demand for individual freedom of subjectivity and 
consciousness. Friedenberg (1973) criticised: 
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The confusion... of those who lump together as left-political 
quasi-revolutionary compeers persons who criticise society 
primarily because it alienates people from themselves and their 
capacities for growth, and critics who complain primarily. of 
society's gross inequalities [which] has caused a great'deal of 
difficulty in the past few years. It seems to be straightening 
out, now, with t-hose who are most disturbed by alienation and 
repression becoming increasingly 'stigmatized as reactionary by 
political ac6vists and sel f-styled revolutionaries. ' (51-2) 
Friedenberg's comments appear to refer to both the American and the British 
developments. Turkle (1979) describes similar devblopments in . French 
politics. The failure of the student-led protests of May-June 1968 to produce 
radical change in French society led to a'reassessment of the Left's political 
critique. Turkle notes that the student ano, intellectually dominated French 
'gauchistes' had never had the support of the traditional French Communist 
Party, who refused to take their activities seriously. After 1968, the 
gauchistes themselves were compelled to analyze their own failure. However, 
Turkle (1979: 73-4) considers that the French gauchistes were more successful 
than the American counter-culture supporters in preventing their political 
stance form degenerating into individualistic self-indulgence, and that this 
success rested upon the gauchistes ability to turn to structuralism for the 
basis of a new form of political critique, which could embrace effectively 
both the individual subjective and social, levels of politics. 
The realignment of political life amongst French intellectuals will be 
examined in more depth in Chapter 5, where the emergence and impact of a new 
critique of psychiatry, derived from structuralist and post-structuralist 
thought, is examined. Here it is sufficient to note that Europe and America 
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were both, by the early 1970s, witnessing a crisis of confidence of the 
counter-cultural New Left. As British anti-psychiatry had emerged within the 
context of the philosophies of the New Left, and had not only supported, but 
been supported by, counter-cultural humanistic political approaches, this loss 
of confidence had implications for the future of British ahti-psychiatry. 
This chapter charts the fragmentation of British and, to some extent, American 
anti-psychiatry during the 1970s. 
2. Emerging Critiqu'ý of the British Anti-psychiatrists. 
Contemporary with the demise of the counter-culture as 'a serious political 
force came the publication of a large amount of material criticizing the work 
of Laing and his co-workers in the Kingsley Hall - projeýt. The crux of the 
criticisms revolve around the contradictions.. Anherent in the theory which the 
British group had produced to justify its practice, and in particular the 
contradictions within the writings of Laing. 
The origins of Laing and Esterson's early thought in existentialism were 
discussed in Chapter 3. It was also obseNed that existentialism and 
psychoanalysis are problematic when taken in combination, because the emphasis 
within psychoanalysis upon the irrational determination of behaviour is at 
odds with the emphasis within existentialism upon freedom of choice and the 
ability of the individual to act. Emphastsing the schizophrenic patients' 
capacity for meaningful and comprehensible action led Laing and Esterson to 
produce a conspiratorial model of schizophrenia, in which the patient's 
behaviour was regarded as entirely comprehensible and reasonable when. viewed 
within the context of highly disturbing family relationships. The families 
studied were viewed as having chosen, unconsciouslý, to identi . fy one. member 
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as insane rather than address their own irrational behaviour. The patient was 
thus not sick, but the victim of a familial conspiracy, albeit one which was 
not consciously formulated. For Laing, the subsequent production of a 
psychedelic model of schizophrenia was merely one step beyond -regarding 
psychotic behaviour as meaningful to regarding it as purposive And. leadin'g to 
psychic healing. 
However, logically, if psychosis is a' freely' 'chosen path with growthful 
potential for the individual, all that ought to be needed by the psychotic 
individual is a policy of non-intervention. If the psychotic person is simply 
left alone to get-on with it, they will eventually emerge from the psychosis 
into a new, more fulfilled and authentic state of being. Such a stance would 
indeed with the approval of Szasz, -who"is opposed to 'coercive psychiatric 
interventions, but is quite happy for people, to purchase or not purchase any 
form of assistance they wish, provided it is not used upon them against their 
wishes and not funded by the state as a legitimate branch of the discipline 
of medicine. (The contradictions inherent within Szasz's own position will 
be examined later in this chapter. ) But this- is not the position which the 
British-based anti -psychi atri sts adopted in practice. What. Laing and his co- 
workers actually did was to acquire premises where people who continued to be 
labelled psychotic by doctors could go in order to receive a new and 
supposedly more effective form of psychotherapeutic treatment for their 
psychosis. There is a basic contradiction 'between the British-based group's 
statement that schizophrenia is a label, whose only purpose is. to -legitimate 
social control and the suppression of individual freedom, and their claim to 
have discovered the only valid way to treat this condition. 
96 
This contradiction was nicely expressed by Siegler, Osmond and Mann (1972) who 
originated the analysis of Laing's approach in terms of a psychoanalytic 
model, a conspiratorial model, and a psychedelic model, all three models being 
present to some extent in The Politics of Experience. They conclude that: 
Laing's conspiratorial model is an account of how he' týinks ' 
schizophrenics are presently treated; his psychedelic model ... is 
an acCount of how he thinks schizophrenics ought to be treated. 
His psychoanalytic model, which seems to have crept into the book 
by mistake, is an account of what he actually does. (112) 
A critique based upon a similar analysis of the contradictions within the 
British group's work is found in -a celebrated article which Szasz wrote 
for 
the New Review (Szasz, i976). By. the mid-1970s, Siasz, who had always 
considered himself to be politically non-Margist, had begun to take exception 
to the way his ideas were being used by the British-based group to justify 
Marxist critiques and interventions. He produced the New Review article in 
order to distance his own work from the British developments. Szasz's own 
position is made quite clear. He objects to legal coercion and state funding 
for psychiatry, and advocates the adoption of 'a free market in contractual 
therapy. He describes British anti-psychiatry as a completely different sort 
of approach, amounting to an inversion, rather than a rejection, of the values 
of traditional psychiatry. He finds a total lack of interest in the arguments 
he had proposed around coercion and medi cal'mysti fi cation. Instead, he finds 
a practice which continues to revolve around the concept of schizophrenia. 
'Schizophrenic patients' are now classed as victims of the contemporary 
capitalist economic system. He suggests that it would be considered immoral, 
in the anti -psychi atri sts ' 'Marxist Utopia', for such victims to be able to 
purchase therapy by use of wealth. But they can purchase therapy by use of 
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suffering. The rest of society is expected to produce the funds necessary for 
such therapy to take place. Thus, in Szasz's view, his demand that all human 
beings should be treated as free moral agents at all times (expressed in 
Proposition 11 among the 'anti-psychiatric attitudes' listed in chapter 1) is 
not met. The anti -psychi atri sts' patients are being treated as tpecial cases, 
more deserving than anyone else, on the basis of their socially inflicted 
suffering. . 
Anti-psychiatry consists of no more than an inversion of the 
values of medical psychiatry, because w*hilst medical psychiatry identifies 
'schizophrenics' in order to denigrate them morally by comparison with 
tnormal' people, anti-psychiatry identifies 'schizophrenics' in order to exalt 
them morally by comparison with 'normal' people. Laing and his co-workers are 
still identifying a group of people who 'need' special treatment to be 
provided at the expense of everyone else. All they haVe achieved is to use 
Marxist ideology to remove the stigma from.. needing such treatment. Their 
claim that mental illness is a myth (Proposition 1, Chapter 1), borrowed from 
Szasz, is contradicted by their claim that psychotic patients need some form 
of special facility and treatment. 
Szasz produced a plethora of examples drawn from the work of the anti- 
psychiatrists to illustrate his claims that Kingsley Hall was just another 
medical institution and that the anti-psychiatrists were all 'self-declared 
socialists, communists, or at least anti-capitalists and collectivists' 
(1976: 2). Placing to one side his aversion to left-wing rhetoric, Szasz's 
critique amounts to a claim, like Siegler et al's, that there is an 
unbridgeable gulf between what British anti-psychiatry said during the 1960S 
and what it actually did. 
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3. Developments among the British Anti-Psychiatrists, 1970 onwards. 
The criticisms discussed above suggest that there was a major contradiction 
within the position which the British-based group of anti -psyc-hi atri sts 
adopted during the late 1960s. This is the contradiction betweeh stating'that 
mental illness is only a label, and stating that persons who receive that 
label still need and deserve some form of specialised help. As the counter- 
culture failed to produce any major ýe-strufturing of society, and the 
political Left subsequently fragmented into an individual isiical ly oriented, 
libertarian group and a more traditionally Marxist group, the contradictions 
within the anti-psychiatric position became more appar6nt. The effects of 
this split are well illustrated by the different paths chosen by the British- 
based group of anti-psychiatrists after about 1970. 
By the 1970s, the majority of the British group had allied themselves with 
radical therapists within the broader movement critical of medical psychiatry. 
Esterson had left Kingsley Hall and the Philadelphia Association at an early 
stage, having taken exception to the turn events took as Kingsley Hall became 
established as a centre for the counter-cultuee, and continued to practice 
privately as a psychotherapist. Laing left Britain in 1971 to -travel to 
Ceylon to practice Theravada Buddhism. Bharati, the Chairman of the 
Anthropology Department of Syracuse University, New York, informed Sedgwick 
that Laing: 
has virtually broken his bridges with things British- and 
psychiatrical ... 
He does not have any plans whatever to return to Europe ... Nor to 
write anything - though in a somewhat vague manner he indicated 
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that, if he ever writes again, it will be from the viewpoint of 
meditation consummated. (Quoted in Sedgwick, 1972: 46) 
In fact, Laing had returned to England by 1976 and resumed chairmanship of the 
Philadelphia Association. He also continued to publish. However, his 
publications now took a markedly different turn. Any explic ,iIt or 
impTicit 
macro-political comment vanished as he concentrated his efforts upon 
presenting i. n poetic form the tangles of communicatiory, misunderstanding and 
mystification in which human relations are enmeshed (Knots, 1972) and pursuing 
the importance of pre-birth experience (The Facts of Life, 1977). He 
continued in practice as a private psychotherapist, as is depicted in the 
BBC's documentary 'Did you used to be R. D. Laing'. Claude Steiner and-Spence 
Meighan interviewed Laing in 1974 for the Ame*rican publication 'Issues in 
Radical Therapy' (Steiner and Meigha-n, 1975), and foun8: 
I felt that neither R. D. Laing nor Ju. tta (Laing's wife] opened 
their hearts to us and that their responses were guarded and 
almost suspicious. In retrospect, it seems that they saw us as 
representatives of the Radical Left, which we weren't, and with 
which R. D. Laing seems to have a quarrel. (Steiner and Meighan, 
1975: 4) 
Joseph Berke left the Philadelphia Association in 1970, taking with him Morton 
Schatzman, and founded the Arbours Association. The concept of the Arbours 
Association derived from Kingsley Hall, but it was set up withý the intention 
of attracting less publicity and providing more professional structure for the 
benefit of bona fide clients. Berke's (1979) description of the work of 
Arbours indicates the extent to which the philosophy underlying the new 
project is derived from the philosophy of Kingsley Hall, as practised in the 
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much-celebrated case of Mary Barnes (Barnes and Berke, 1973). Berke (1979) 
prefaces the book: 
This book is about.. people ... who seem impelled to retreat from 
all outer concerns into an inner world of space and time removed 
from all usual constraints and prohibitions. It has been my 
repeated observation that this journey and the experiences 
associ. ated with it are not inherently harmful. They can provide 
an opportunity for personal growth and development, as well as 
collapse and chaos. (. 11) 
However, Berke is keen to point out that he is not advocating psychosis as 
liberation. Although the experience can be productive, it remains an 
extremely painful one for the person who goes through it, and persons in a 
state of psychosis require an extens-ive 'amount-of sympa: thetic care. 
(T]he transformation of the psyche is. inot fun. Those who have 
entered the breakdown phase may do anything to have it stopped, 
even to the extent of yielding responsibility for their lives to 
complete strangers. (12) 
At this stage, Berke was opposed to physical remedies, whose aim he regarded 
as being to suppress an experience which would produce its own psychological 
healing if it was allowed to run full course (see Propositions 5,7 and 8, 
chapter 1). However, the approach remained within the broad field of orthodox 
psychotherapy. Berke viewed himself as a therapist faced with suffering 
people whose pain he wished to help to alleviate. There was no exaltation of 
the psychotic patient as prophet or revolutionary. This impression is 
confirmed by material included in the Arbours Newsletter between 1973 and 
1976. In 1973, plans were reaching fruition for the Arbours to begin -its own 
training programm in psychotherapy, and to accept social work students on 
placement. Berke's aversion to the extreme politiý isation of"psych. iatry is 
101 
revealed in his review of Phil Brown's Radical Psychology (Berke, 1974). 
(Brown's book is examined more closely later in this chapter. ) Berke is 
sharply critical of the direction taken by the Radical Therapist magazine 
under the editorial rule of Brown. 
Under his direction the magazine was sharply politicized. More 
and more articles appeared about anti-imperialism and fewer about 
psychQlogical practice. Regarding the latter, what article*s did 
appear were boneheadedly black poiqer, re'd power, gay power and 
anti-power power... 
If you can put up with Brown's introductions which are militantly 
anti-psychological (i. e. anti the psychological approach) antir 
capitalist and anti-male chauvinist, there is a lot of good stuff 
in the book. (37) 
By 1986, Arbours had established a crisis centre and three long term 
therapeutic communities in London (Berke, 1987). The aims of Arbours were 
regarded as similar to those with which the project had begun; that is, the 
provision of a space where people could go through the crises in which they 
were involved. However, Berke's description. of the crisis centre in 1987 
reveals a very orthodox and structured psychotherapeutic approach. At that 
time, three resident therapists lived at the crisis centre permanently, and 
people who came to live with them came as their guests. Ref6rral to the 
project came mainly from psychiatrists, general practitioners, social workers 
and other professionals, although self-referral was also acceptable. When I 
visited the crisis centre on an open day in 1989, one of the therapists was 
keen to emphasize that the project was no longer 'radical'. It presented 
itself as a humane and respected psychotherapeutic option within a range of 
services in the local area. 
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This summary of the destinations of ex-Kingsley Hall supporters indicates the 
extent to which Laing and his co-workers had become integrated into a movement 
which was anti-psychiatric in the sense that it rejected extremely coercive 
medicalised psychiatry, but was not anti-psychotherapy, anti-therapy or even 
anti-coercion per se. This group appears to have inteýpreted Szasz's 
statement that mental illness is a myth to mean that the attribution of 
organic states to mental pathology is mythological, rather than that 
pathological mental states are themseWes mythological. This is born out 
further by the responses of this group of people to Szasz's (1976) New Review 
article. Esterson simply disowned the whole Kingsley Hall project, 
dissociated his own work in Sanity, Madness and the Fcýmily from the anti- 
psychiatry movement, and applauded Szasz's critique. 
The damage this movement [ie -anti-psychiatry] has done to the 
struggle against coercive, traditiona), psychiatry is enormous. 
And Dr Szasz, who has played the leading part in the struggle, is 
to be congratulated on his critique. It is quite devastating in 
its accuracy and quite extraordinarily comprehensive. (Esterson, 
1976: 13) 
Redler, writing on behalf of the Philadelphia Association, repudiated any 
involvement of any member of the PA with anti-psychiatry. 
Neither Laing nor any current member of the Philadelphia 
Association Ltd. of which he is chairman has considered or called 
himself an 'anti -psychi atri st' or part of an 'anti-psychiatry' 
movement! (Redler, 1976: 13) 
He claimed that Laing had repeatedly stated that he was not an anti- 
psychiatrist, but a physician and a psychiatrist. The PA is not opposed to 
'psychiatric relations between consenting adults' and Is even not opposed to 
compulsion being used on rare occasions. 'Neither taing nor any other member 
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of the PA is a self-declared or apparent socialist, communist, etc' (1976: 14). 
Most residents paid for their own time at Kingsley Hall, and those who did not 
were resident at a lower cost than would have been incurred had they been 
hospital in-patients. 'There is no 'idealisation of insanity' in Laing's 
writing, lectures, practice or that of the PA' (1976: 15). 
,I 
Berke (1976: 21 ) referred to the confusion over the precise meaning of the term 
anti-psychiatrY: 
This term has been used to den6te: A)' criticism of organic 
psychiatry -''theory and practice; B) criticism ot any non- 
contractual intervention by one person against another in the 
name of psychiatry; C) several alternatives to traditional 
psychiatric practice especially as developed in London by Drs 
R. D. Laing, D. Cooper, A. Esterson, M. Schatzman, L. Redler, myself 
and others; D) politically radical (usual 1 y- left-wing) 
alternatives to psychological interventions and as articulated in 
Europe and the United States... since the 1960s ... Dr Szasz ignores 
these differences, for he has generally -applied 
the term as 
articulated in category 'D' towards. individuals who hold 
positions W, tBl or 'C', but not 'D'. '(21) 
it is noticeable here that the position which Berke explicitly sets aside is 
the overtly political option which rejects all interventions. He went on to 
state -that he 
had long since ceased to describe himself as 'anti -psychiatry', 
finding the term unhelpful. 
The sole member of the Kingsley Hall group who appears to have rejected 
therapy entirely in favour of a political solution is David Cooper. - Cooper 
left the PA in 1971, having been an inactive member since 1968 (Redler, 1976) 
and travelled to Argentina. Ticktin (1986) recalled meeting' Cooper at a 
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conference in Canada at this time, at which he was making it apparent that his 
relationship with his British-based colleagues was over, and that the reason 
was that he did not consider British anti-psychiatry to be sufficiently 
political. Ticktin pointed out that it was in fact Cooper who had coined the 
phrase 'anti -psychiatry', and that his views had always been markedly 
different from those of Laing. 
He made it clear that he had left England, left the Ph'iladelphia 
Association, and was no longer collaborating with Laing and co. 
The latter, he said, was on a spiritual trip. He., Daýid, was on 
a political one. (Ticktin, 1986: 15) 
By 1974, Cooper had virtually severed all his links with his former col-leagues 
in the Philadelphia and Arbours Associations. He had renounced psychotherapy 
for political reasons ana 'was wont- to 'say at the tiffe that there were no 
personal problems, only political ones' (Tipktin, 1986: 15). 
Cooper was at this time continuing to write and to publish, his work being 
based on a form of existentialist-Marxist political theory; for example, the 
following statement taken from The Death of the Family (1972): 
If we are to talk of urban guerilla -warfare as the decisive 
strategy in first-world countries we- have to recognize a 
multiplicity in the weaponry that people might use. Molotov 
cocktails certainly have their place in a significantly organized 
student-worker rebellion, organized anti-crimes such as looting 
shops and burning anti-popular i-nstitutions obviously are 
dictated by the objective context of a black-ghetto rebellion. 
In 1974, Cooper was invited to speak at a meeting on alternatives to 
psychiatry in Portugal. Through this meeting, Cooper was introduced to Franco 
Basaglia, the Italian psychiatrist and founder of Psi. chiatria Democratica; 
Robert Castel, the French post-modernist critic of psychiatry'*influenced by 
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Foucault; and Felix Guattari and Gilles Deleuze, who had recently published 
their book Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. Cooper settled in 
Paris where he lived until his death in 1986, and became part of the French 
Intellectual milieu following Foucault and Lacan, which will be described in 
Chapter 5. 
Cooper was the only member of the Kingsley H411 group whose views were not 
represented among the replies to Szasz's (1976) attack in the New Review. 
However, he was referred to by the other correspondents, who personally 
disowned any Left-wing implications which may have appeared to inhere i'n the 
Kingsley Hall project, which were now represented as the' sole responsibility 
of Cooper. Redler commented: 
Dr Cooper, a former member ... was responsible for the introduction 
and popularisation of this term (anti7psychiatry] over the last 
decade. Much of the attack on Laing and the PA is based on 
I 
Cooper's writing. (Redler, 1976: 13) 
Berke wrote also: 
Dr David Cooper first employed 'anti-psydhiatry'. Dr Szasz has 
not, to the best of my knowledge, sought to ascertain who,. if 
any, of Dr Cooper's former colleagues, share some or any of his 
current beliefs, but has simply used the existence of a previous 
working relationship to attack present and quite different 
practices. (Berke, 1976: 21) 
It is in my view not reasonable to hold Cooper solely responsible for the 
negative aspects of British anti-psychiatry. Laing did produce material which 
encouraged the romanticisation of psychosis as a prophetic spiritual state, 
and linked psychosis by implication with the LSD 'trip'. Esters'on (interview) 
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was very much of the opinion that Laing was responsible for events at Kingsley 
Hall and the failure of that project. Laing appears to have repudiated much 
of his work during the 1960s at l. ater dates; for example, David Reed reports 
being told by Laing that he felt he knew less about psychosis in the 1970s 
than he had as a young doctor first beginning his career (Reeýd, 1977: '69). 
Clare (1989) in his obituary of Laing stated that Laing in his later years 
retracted many of his earlier views, as indicated by an appearance on Clare's 
radio programme In the Psychiatrist's Chair: 
He readily agreed that were he ever to become severely 
depressed ... he would expect someone like myself to prescribe 
anti-depressants and he certainly would take them*. It seemed a 
remarkable turn-about ... and-I personally found it difficult not 
to feel that Laing iooked back-on many of his previous positions 
with considerable doubt and even regrpt. 
However, it is probably true that Cooper was mainly responsibl e for the more 
radical politicisation of psychiatric prActice and disorder, being the 
theorist who linked psychiatry most firmly with capitalism viewed through 
Marxist theory. Although Laing and Esterson were prone to borrowing concepts 
from Marxist theoreticians when they found such a practice helpful, neither 
of them seem ever to have declared themselves Marxists in the sense of 
advocating socialist revolution in the very explicit way which Cooper was to 
do. Esterson and Laing seem to have found Sartre's existential ist-Marxist 
concepts useful for analyzing family dynamics, but when the political climate 
demanded more organised and larger scale collective political action, both 
retreated swiftly into a position of advocating critical but rel. atively 
orthodox forms of psychotherapy. Thus, when Kingsley Hall broke up at the end 
of the 1970s, Laing and the bulk of the British' group retu'rned to their 
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basically apolitical starting points. Cooper at that point abandoned therapy 
entirely in favour of politics. 
In this way, both Cooper and the main group finally evaded the -central 
contradiction of anti-psychiatry: how can you claim both that'Wental illness 
is a mythical construct and a label devoid of real content, and that you have 
discovered. a, superior treatment for it? Laing and those connected with the 
PA and Arbours Association during the'1970s 'e'vaded the contradiction by 
adopting an explici . ýly psychotherapeutic approach to mentai distress. They 
regarded mental illness as mythical only insofar as the term implies that 
problematic psychological states are reducible to pathological organ-ic. states 
within the individual, whilst regarding pathological mental states as 
themselves real . Cooper adopted an approach which was Whol ly pol itical , and 
which viewed psychiatric symptoms as legitimaýe responses to capitalist social 
structures and all forms of psychiatry as attempts to individualize the 
problem and mystify the sufferers. Both psychiatry and the 'symptoms' of 
tmental-illness' would cease to exist in a socialist society. 
4. Radical Psychotherapeutic Approaches Among' Mental Health Professionals 
Beyond the 'British Anti-Psychiatrists'. 
The British anti-psychiatrists had, during the late 1960s, maintained an 
uneasy position somewhere between a total, denial of the reality of mental 
disorder and the promulgation of a new form of therapy for mental disorder. 
By the early 1970s, this position had broken down into, on the one hand, a 
clearly psychotherapeutic position and, on the other, a clearly Marxist anti- 
psychiatric position ("anti -psychi atri c" now in the sense of an opposition to 
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all forms of psychiatric or psychological therapy). A similar divide is found 
emerging amongst the broader group of radical professionals at this time. 
Baruch and Treacher (1978) are amongst those professionals advocating a purely 
psychotherapeutic approach to be adopted within the psychiatri'd system 'as a 
whole. A common tool of opposition to medical treatment in psychiatry is the 
historically based critique, which presents the history of psychiatry in such 
a way as to demonstrate that medicalisdtion of the discipline was not the 
result of scientific progress, but of power-grabbing by doctors (for example, 
Scull (1982)). Baruch and Treacher present such a critique of psychiatry as 
a medical specialism, and propose the replacement of 'medical and organic 
therapies with psychotherapy. -Baruch and Treacher's preferred form of 
psychotherapy is not, however, classical psychoanalysis or any of the 
psychotherapies practised in contemporary psychiatric institutions. They 
advocate a form of psychotherapy founded upon principles derived from growth 
movement ideas, associated with therapists such as Carl Rogers, Fritz Perls 
and Abraham Maslow (see also chapter 3). This therapy will be based around 
principles such as relating to patients as whole human beings, being aware of 
the therapist's influence upon the patient, and treating the client as an 
equal partner striving to make sense of his world and his behaviour (Clare and 
Thompson, 1981: 39). 
The derivation of ideas from the growth or human potential movement is a 
common theme amongst advocates of this form of psychotherapeutic "anti- 
psychiatry", reflecting the increasing popularity and influence of this school 
of thought in Britain. In 1969, Quaesitor was set up in London to develop and 
promote the growth movement and human potential in this-country. Quaesitor 
offered services such as Rogerian encounter therapy, body massage, 
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transactional analysis, psychodrama, eastern meditative approaches and gestalt 
(Clare and Thompson, 1981: 69-70). Brandon's (1977) account of his involvement 
with therapy groups through Quaesitor leaves one with the impression of a 
movement whose political commitment was entirely abstract and theoretical, 
with no practical implications at all. The political philosoptly appears to 
have amounted to a belief that it is necessary to change one's own 
consciousness before embarki ng on the more ambitious task of transforming 
society. In practice, Brandon's own Consciousness never appears to have 
reached the point where he felt ready to start on soc. ietj. His period of 
therapy appears only to have transformed his existence to the extent that by 
the time he left the group he was teaching social work rather than practising 
it, and his marriage was greatly improved. (Although this may be due to the 
fact that it was being i6olved with -the'Quaesitor form of therapy which was 
threatening his relationship with his wife, a. nd the act of leaving therapy was 
itself of benefit to that relationship). Some of the practices witnessed by 
Brandon during his involvement with Quaesitor are disturbing to say the least. 
Exercises within the groups resulted in occUrrences such as one group member 
breaking down and saying to his image in a-mirror: 
You're such a great big fat slob ... Why "don't you 'get wise to 
yourself? Afraid of being hurt? 
- 
You great stupid thick twit, 
you're not worth hurting. You're too stupid to be' hurt. 
(Brandon, 1977: 31) 
It is difficult to imagine what is supposed to be therapeutic about this 
example of public humiliation. Brandon himself found his first, experience of 
working in the group so traumatic that: 
one week later, just the thought of going to the group made me 
feel physically sick. I had a dazed week of going about my 
social work tasks in an automatic manner. (1977: 10) 
110 
However, he did return to the group, and despite descriptions in his account 
of situations which would strike many people as patently untherapeutic and 
undesirable, he never reached the conclusion that the sorts of "therapy" 
offered at Quaesitor might be described as anything from self-indulgent to 
clearly harmful. 
In fairness to the radical therapy movement, it should be noted' that there 
were in existence other radical forms of therapy which were not only less 
extremely distressing in their tactics than Quaesitor, bu*t demonstrated a 
rather more serious commitment to political change. In 1974, a group of 
twenty-three men and women formed as a collective to do therapy together under 
the name Red Therapy. (Boynton and Young, date unknown) Red Therapy adopted 
many of the assumptions ind techniques which underpin the growth movement. 
However, Boynton and Young stressed that the, difference between Red Therapy 
and organisations such as Quaesitor was political. Members of Red Therapy had 
experience of growth centres, and had encountered difficulties over political 
issues such as sexism and authority. They-were s eeking a form of. therapy 
which would encompass their political views (Boyton and Young, date 
unknown: 25). 
Another way in which Red Therapy differed from Quaesitor was that its groups 
were leaderless. This decision was taken because group members felt that it 
was important for them to retain control over the ways in which they were 
changing their lives. However, it should be emphasised that. Red Therapy's 
decision to do therapy in a leaderless group did not cons titute a rejection 
of the role of the professional expert psychotherapist. The skills and 
knowledge of professional therapists continued to be recognised. Boynton and 
Young (date unknown: 25) argue that leaderless therapy resembles"" selfr-health' 
ill 
(sic) groups, in which the aim is not to reject the knowledge and skills of 
doctors, but to share the knowledge they possess amongst lay people. 
A lot of what we have learnt about the techniques of do-ing 
therapy has come from some people doing professional gro, ups., We 
try to share this knowledge with each other. (25) 
An interesting development at this time', related to the rapid expansion of 
feminism taking place during. the 1970s, was the emergence of therapy which was 
not only politically radical, but specifically feminist. The Women's Therapy 
Centre, established in 1976, offered a professional psych6therapy service from 
a feminist perspective (Orbach and Eichenbaum, 'date unknown). In 1975, two 
women members of Red Therapy left to-forth a feminist self-help therapy group 
for women (Ernst and Goodison, 1981). Like. Red Therapy, the group used ideas 
and techniques derived form the growth movement (although now Ourged of 
patriarchal aspects), but was leaderless. Again, the leaderless nature of the 
group was seen to have positive advantages Oolitically, in helping people to 
realize that they have capacity to help themsel-ves without turning to experts. 
Also, leaderless groups were felt to offer mo*re scope for *challenging the 
Status guo (Goodison, 1981: 12). 
But, again, this preference for a leaderless group does not involve a 
dismissal of all forms of professional psychotherapy or psychotherapeutic 
expertise, but- merely the institution of another service within the 
psychotherapy movement as a whole. Goodison (1981: 12) acknowledges that 
although training is not necessary to do self-help therapy, 'some experience 
of professional therapy of whatever kind certainly helps'. She envisages that 
for some people self-help will be an adjunct to profe, ssional therapy. For 
women who are extremely distressed, self-help is presented as having nothing 
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to offer, as the support offered would be inadequate, and a person in such 
distress would be unable to honour her commitment to offering reciprocal 
support (Goodison, 1981: 12). 
Radical therapies derived from growth movement principles continue to exist. 
The Women's Therapy Centre is still open as a source of politically aware 
professional counselling and therapy for women. Forms of self-help therapy 
now include co-counselling, which is regýrded as*a helpful means of obtaining 
psychological suppo'rt without the power relationship of. proýessional therapy 
or counselling. In co-counselling, two people undertake to offer one another 
counselling on a reciprocal basis. Following training in basic counselling 
skills, such as listening and reflecting, the two parties meet on a regular 
basis for a set length of time. For half the timej one ai: ts as counsellor and 
the other as client, and for the second half the roles are reversed. Thus, 
both are able to receive support on a reciprocal basis. 
Thus, the radical therapy movement includes-a range of services derived from 
human potential theories and practices. These. practices vary in the depth of 
their political commitment. The purer forms of growth movement practices, 
such as Quaesitor, are in fact virtually purely apolitical. They locate 
responsibility for individual well-being and fulfilment entirely within the 
individual's personal control. They differ from conventional psychotherapy 
in being much more vaguely expressed pseudo-religious techniques, aimed 
primarily not at people with serious problems which might merit orthodox 
psychiatric intervention, but at people who are already functioning within 
the 'normal range' and who wish to increase their 'personal potential'. The 
growth movement has also influenced independent groups, such as Red Therapy 
and the Women's Therapy Centre, which display a political commitment of a 
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quite different order. These groups are committed explicitly to the view that 
many people's psychological problems are not due to pathology which emerges 
from within the individual, but to socio-politically inflicted stresses which 
impact on the individual's state of psychological well-being. The purpose of 
therapy is not only to alleviate distress but to equip the client to alter the 
socio-political order in such a way as to prevent the stress recurring. This 
viewpoint could be vi. ewed as a variant of social psychiatry, individual 
problems being related to broader social' structures, but still recognised as 
individual problems which can be addressed with some validity at the 
individual level. 
This viewpoint would probably not be found 'threatening by many medical 
psychiatrists, who would readily agree* that psychiatýic difficulties are 
sometimes the result of intolerable social sýress, and that mental ill health 
is related to poverty and socio-economic status. There would probably be two 
points at which medical psychiatry would wish to take exception. Firstly, it 
is a somewhat sweeping generalisation to assbme that all forms of psychiatric 
disorder can be explained solely in terms of -psychological responses to socio- 
political injustice. To believe this is a statement of political belief, not 
act. Secondly, there is a lack of real evidence that the forms of 
psychotherapy used by the radical therapists have any real impact on the 
clients who volunteer for them. There is certainly no evidence to suggest 
that they have any long-term impact at*all upon the sorts of serious 
psychiatric disorders which would attract a diagnosis of psychosis. Most 
psychiatrists would take exception to the, view that the whole of medical 
psychiatry ought to be discarded in favour of the adoption of a narrow range 
of poorly researched approaches of dubious efficacy for the main group of 
their patients. However, in reality radical. therapý practices 'do not, tend to 
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impinge greatly upon the practices of mainstream psychiatrists. Criticism of 
the radical therapy approach has been offered less by the psychiatric 
profession than by radicals who are both critical of medical psychiatry and 
who have adopted an absolute anti-therapy stance. 
5. Radical Rejections of all forms of Therapy 
The position which considers itself to bd politi'dally radical and rejects all 
forms of therapy on . such a basis corresponds to that adoptea by David Cooper 
during the early 1970s. This position takes literally the view that mental 
illness is both a myth and a label used by the state to control deviance which 
threatens the status quo (see Propositions 1 and 2 among the anti -psychi atri c 
attitudes listed in chapte .r 1). To some extent, people who hold this position 
regard the category 'mental illness' as copsisting entirely of behaviours 
which do not handicap the 'sufferer', but are distressing and challenging to 
everyone else. However, such people also frequently acknowledge the extreme 
suffering of some people whose distress is labelledmental illness. They then 
argue that this suffering is not a symptom of some pathological condition 
within the individual, but a comprehensible response to op*pre'ssion inflicted 
upon the individual by the capitalist social system (Proposition 3 in Chapter 
1). The only legitimate strategy to end this suffering is one which ends 
capitalism. 'Radical' forms of psychotherapy are viewed as a trivial attempt 
to limit the suffering which the oppressed experien ce under capitalism. Also, 
they tend to individualise suffering by appearing to place the causes of 
distress within the individual sufferer, and to imply that the remedy may also 
be found within the individual psyche. At best such therapies are merely a 
distraction from the central task, which is to produce socialist revolution. 
At worst, they contribute to the process 'of mýstification' which. tells 
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distressed people that their problems are the product of their own 
maladaptation. 
For a comparatively pure example of the rejection of all forms of therapy on 
political grounds, I will examine the American publ i cation, ' Rough Times, 
formerly The Radical Therapist, as it developed under the- editorial collective 
influenced heavily by Phil Brown (and already discussed earlier t his chapter 
in reference to Berke's review of Radiýal Psyýholoqy (Brown, 1973)). The 
political position of Rough Times was presented clearly by the paper's 
collective editorial board, and included statements linking the psychiatric 
system to capitalist oppression, which must be overthrown by-revolution, and 
claiming mental illness to be a myth. 'Radical therapies' were not awarded 
privileged status, but viewed as part of the problem td be abolishedý 
"Alternative" and "hip therapies" must be exposed as part of the 
system rather than as anti-establishment forces. The new trend 
in wide-scale therapy and encounter-, etc. typically involves 
"hip" professionals or would-be professionals who retain their 
oppressive attitudes as well as high fees. Such 'people offer 
rip-off, cooling-out, individualistic diversions to meet the 
problems caused by oppressive social conditions. (Rough Times 
Collective, 1972: 2) 
In 1973, Brown (1973) published a collection of papers entitled Radical 
Psychology which purported to represent the. political position of The Radical 
Therapist\Rouqh Times. This volume is interesting in terms of the. use it 
makes of the work of the British anti -psychi atri sts, , papers by whom are 
included in the collection. Brown assumes throughout that the-ýork of Laing, 
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Cooper, Esterson, Barnes, Szasz, Goffman and Scheff is all essentially 
supportive of his own Marxist revolutionary position, although he acknowledges 
that none of these authors has, in the papers included, provided a Marxist 
analysis as thorough-going as his own. Specifically, these authors*lack 'a 
well-defined class analysis of mental illness and psychiatric commitment' 
(Brown, 1972: 5) and need to 'go further into revolutionary situations' (Brown, 
1972: 65-66)ý 
Brown (1973a: 19) reviewed Esterson's The Leaves of Sprinq and likewise 
concluded that it constituted a Marxist methodology, on the justification that 
the book included a section on the theory and method6logy, 'of dialectical 
materialism as applied to psychology. He then criticized Esterson for 'still 
trying to rescue Freudianism and patch it onto Marxism'. Whilst it is the 
case that Esterson's explanatory tools arq. borrowed from Marxist theory, 
nowhere does he advocate that the solution to the Danzig family's problems is 
socialist revolution. When Brown criticizes Esterson for not taking his 
analysis that far, he is criticizing him for-not adopting a position which he 
never intended to adopt. Esterson is a committed psychotherapist. It is 
Brown who is trying to push him, and the otheý British ariti-psychiatrists, 
into the role of Marxist revolutionaries. 
Brown's (1973) Radical Psychology rejects all forms of therapy. Discussing 
attempts to combine Freud with Marxism, he-writes: 
the two are incompatible - Freud was the apostle of bourgeois 
values of sexual repression, delayed gratification, and social 
control. (188) 
However, his contempt is not reserved solely for traditional forms of 
psychotherapy. He is suspicious and dismissive aldo of the exýansion during 
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the 1970s of those new forms of therapy which claim to have abandoned the 
abusive aspects of traditional psychotherapy: 
The traditional stigma attached to going to a therapist is gone, 
but that is about the extent of it. "New" forms of therapy 
differ little from older ones, except in that they *at-e more 
publicly known, and often appear as innovative and "open". 
As a, whole, therapy co ntinues to maintain the traditio nal'view 
that emotional problems are interhal to the person, or at best 
are a functio .n of interpersonal relationships, but thk they are 
hardly ever based on social living. (481-2) 
6. The Legacy of the Marxist Anti: --psychiatric Approach in the 1980s. 
This Marxist anti -psychi atri c approach continues to be influential in the 
contemporary era in the work of David Hill. Hill's (1983) The Politics of 
Schizophrenia offers a critique of the concept of schizophrenia, in which Hill 
argues that the use of this concept is unscientific and invalid, and continues 
to occur only for purposes of social control.. He concludes that: 
whether the relationship between 'mental illness' and certain 
oppressed groups is explained by 'social causation' or by 
'labelling theory' matters little once we realize that both 
exploitation by a capitalist economy and discrimination by mental 
health professionals are expressfons of the debilitating 
structure of our society. (258) 
Hill (interview) attributed a great deal of influence to the work of Laing in 
the formation of his own position, although his is a view which I would 
suggest goes considerably beyond the position which ýaing himself adopted 
throughout most of his working life. 
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I was a psychology student myself at the time, when I first read 
Laing. He was the first person in psychology who made any sense 
to me whatsoever about why people engage in unusual behaviours 
and experience feelings that are more extreme than other people, 
and do all the things that were and still are labelled as 
mentally ill and schizophrenic and so forth. So I do think that 
Laing'. s set of Yiews ... is probably the most valuable s6t of 
writings, set of books, in the whole of psychiatry... in terms of 
individual people who. have written in the field. of psychiatry 
there's no question he's the greatest influence in my work. 
Hill also emphasized that his views were not only the product of theories he 
had read, but of personal experience as a psychologist. His view of Szasz is 
particularly interesting. ' He commented'that he -initially valued Szasz, far 
more than he does now. This was due to hi. s realisation of the extent of 
Szasz's libertarianism. 
He takes a libertarian view which is almost a freemarket 
view ... His conclusions are that all of-psychiatry is all right so 
long as there's no coercion involved, so long as everyone has a 
completely free choice. He suffers from-an illusion. i*n my view 
of a thing called free choice. 
However, Hill continues to praise Szasz's critique of the concept of mental 
illness. 
I valued his critique of the concepts of mental illness. He's 
extremely good at taking apart the logical construction of 
psychiatry and dismantling it and showing there is no basis 
logically or factually to psychiatric theories. I've come to 
differ from him quite radically in a political sense. 
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Hi 11 is himself whol ly opposed to al 1 the current major medical treatments for 
mental disorder: surgery, drugs and ECT, (see Propositions 7 and 8, Chapter 
1) believing that none of them addresses the real nature of mental disorder, 
and that all are seriously damaging. He considers that medical or organically 
based theories of disorders such as schizophrenia will never'be established 
because such 'illnesses' are heterogenous concepts. 
It is like looking for a genetic predisposition to being a member 
of the Labour Party or a 'member' ' of the Church of 
england ... schizophrenia involves nearly every broken social norm 
that is not covered by the law. And it certainly involves 
opposites of behaviours. 
Hill was very specific as to what -he meant in claiming that mental illness is 
a myth (Proposition 1, Chapter 1): he meant that the 'Conditions which are 
labelled as various forms of mental illness are psychological and not organic. 
They have no medical basis, and individual constructs such as schizophrenia 
have no reliability or validity. However, he emphasized that the experiences 
which cause people to be labelled schizophrenic are real and frightening. He 
identified psychiatry as being primarily a. form of social control, and one 
which serves to disguise the real nature of psychiatric distress. 
It is a convenient way, the diagnoses and the drugging of people, 
is a convenient way to explain away and dismiss a massive amount 
of humaný alienation and despair and distress. Which if we looked 
at the real causes, in my view thle real causes, would have 
enormous political consequences in two ways. First of. all we 
couldn't hide away the failure of the current political system to 
meet human needs, we would have to address the fact that there 
are literally hundreds of thousands of people who are living 
miserable lives... it's a propaganda value... But the . other 
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function is much more direct - it silences people. It silences 
women at a rate of two to one. 
Hill was clear that 'almost all of what is labelled ... what comes under 
psychiatric diagnoses I would say is socially induced'. 
Hill shared Szasz's views on responsibility, believing that people should be 
held responsible at all, times for their behaviour (Proposition' '11, Chapter 1), 
on the grounds that to deny responsibility is 'cruel and dehumanising. For 
Hill, to be classed as non-responsible is to be classed as a non-human being. 
Hill's position on freedom and responsibility appears to be somewhat muddled. 
He denigrates Szasz for 'suffering from an illusion of *a thing called 'free 
choice' (above). He himself believes that individuals are trapped and limited 
by capitalist society. And yet he believes that it is dehumanising to decide 
that an individual was not responsible..; for behaviour in particular 
circumstances. Hill's contradictory position 'appears to stem from a failure 
to realise that Szasz's critique of mental illness is not reparable from his 
political views. The Szaszian position as a whole ts irreducibly libertarian. 
Ftill's views are placed systematically within the context of his. own belief 
in the possibility and desirability of socialist revolution. Ulýimately, the 
only valid approach to 'mental illness' is a fundamental restructuring of 
society, which would remove the social ihjustices and problems which he 
believes are at the root of mental distress. However, working, during an era 
in which socialist revolution appears increasingly unlikely, Hill finds 
himself compelled to make some concessions towards therapy for distressed 
people in the present. Hill (1983: 235) argues: 
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In light of how hopeless and depressing it can be to hold on to 
futopian' visions of the future when those in power seem so 
i ntent ... on maintaining the status-quo... it is easy to understand 
attempts to find gratification in helping distressed individuals 
to get back on their feet and, somehow, to carry on. I have 
known such satisfaction in my own work as a therapist. 
This tendency for some- form of therapy to reappear in co6temp6rary anti- 
psychiatric practice will be returned 1: 6 later'in this chapter. 
More thoroughgoing rejections of therapeutic interventions are found in the 
work of several contemporary American writers, whose potition is wholly and 
consciously libertarian, rather than Marxist. These arguments are derived 
directly and uncritically . from Szasz's views. American"'ex-therapist Jeffery 
Masson (1990) states: 
once we give anybody the right to decide who or what is normal 
and abnormal we have abdicated a fundamental intellectual 
responsibility (to repudiate the vbry idea of making such 
distinctions) and we should not be surprised when it is 'misused' 
by people who come from a different psychiatric orien: tation. It 
cannot but be misused. (298) 
Masson does not claim any influence from Laing or British anti-psychiatry. 
In fact, he includes Laing within the radical therapy tradition whose work he 
dismisses (pp 267,270 and 282). His writings resemble in many ways those of 
Szasz, with their emphasis on individual liberty. They do not offer any 
Marxist theory at all. However, although Masson does not lay claim to a 
feminist perspective in his work, he has acknowledged a debt to American 
radical feminist groups, which would seem to indicate a. preparedness to adopt 
apolitical agendaas partof the solution to the problbmof psychiAtric distress. 
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A further and very clear cut American example of the continued refusal of 
therapeutic options in any form is found in Chamberlin (1988). Chamberlin 
rejects totally what she terms 'mentalism'; that is, discrimination on the 
grounds of mental state, analogous to racism, sexism, heterosexism. In 
Chamberlin's view, any attempt to offer therapy of any sort constitutes 
mentalism. Like Masson, Chamberlin is critical of the 'radicalism' of anti- 
psychiatry, but adopts-in fairly complete form the critique of Szasz. Her 
proposals are libertarian. Also like Masson, ' Chamberlin acknowledges the 
influence of feminism, particularly in her promotion of 'consciousness- 
raising' as an alternative to therapy. For feminists, consciousness-raising 
constitutes a tool for increasing individual women's awareness of ways in 
which they are oppressed by patriarchal society on a day-to-day basis. 
Similarly, in the context of anti -psych i atry, consciousness-raising is. a tool 
for increasing the awareness amongst psychiatric patients and psychiatric ex- 
patients of ways in which they are oppressed by 'mentalism' on a day-to-day 
basis. 
The explicit contribution of feminism to the anti-psychiatric debate will be 
examined in more depth in the next section of this chapter, 'section 6. 
These three contemporary theorists, Hill, Masson and Chamberlin provide 
interesting contrasts. As a socialist, Hill is committed to the view that 
individual freedom is not the goal. He is-left struggling to reconcile two 
views: a rejection of the encroachment of psychiatry on individual freedom, 
and the view that the individual in a capitalist society needs some form of 
help, at least until after the revolution, when socialism will have led to the 
abolition of distress. Masson and Chamberlin, on the other hand, have 
rejected the overtly socialist analysis to which 'Hill is coýiMitted, which 
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states that the need for assistance will be dramatically reduced once we have 
a socialist state. What is left is then Szaszs explicitly libertarian 
philosophy, but now with the proviso. that one ought not to request help even 
on a contractual basis. Masson and Chamberlin are thus finally more 
libertarian than Szasz. These three theorists exemplify the continuing 
attempts of contemporary anti-psychiatrists to offer people assistance for 
conditions which they claim have only mythological status, without resorting 
to something that looks very like psychidtry. Gdnerally speaking, once these 
theories are examined closely, all are found to contain within them an 
argument for returning to something which resembles a form of therapy, whether 
or not it is defined as therapy within the terms of the'theory. 
7. Feminist critiques of Psychiatry 
Before I examine more closely the claims of these theories to have rejected 
a therapeutic approach to psychiatric distress, I will examine the impact of 
feminism upon critiques which theorize psychiatry as a form of social control . 
I have already noted that both Masson and Chamberlin acknowledge the influence 
of American radical feminism upon their thought. The feminist interest in 
psychiatry is not recent, but can be dated back at least as far as the 
emergence of Marxist critiques during the early 1970s. The earliest detailed 
study of psychiatry and gender oppression is Phyllis Chesler's (1972) Women 
and Madness, first published in America. The form of argument in this book 
resembles closely that of Brown's critiques of psychiatry and psychology, 
discussed above, with the sole difference that the thesis that psychiatry is 
fundamentally an instrument of class oppression is now replaced with the 
thesis that psychiatry is fundamentally an instrument. of gender oppression. 
Otherwise, the argument is identical. Chesler assumes tfiat psychiatry 
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oppresses women in two ways. Firstly, it labels as 'mental illness' any 
behaviour which deviates from the traditional role, thus compelling women to 
conform to the social straitjacket which is the only existence patriarchal 
society is prepared to allow them. Secondly, when the stress involved in 
struggling to conform to this social role causes a woman to b. eeak down, ' her 
distress is also labelled mental illness, reducing her state to a pathological 
process within the woman, rather than an understandable 'response to an 
unlivable situation. This version of a 'social causation hypothesis 
resembles Proposition 3 among the anti -psychi atri c attitudes listed in Chapter 
1, where the social oppression involved is specifically identified as gender- 
related oppression. Thus, psychiatry oppresses both by labelling and by 
social causation of distress. The impossibility of women gaining any real 
understanding or properly therapeutic assistance in a patriarchal culture is 
illustrated with reference to the past and present practices of psychiatry, 
including a critique of the work of the British anti -psychi atri sts. Laing is 
criticised for failing to realise the importance of gender for understanding 
properly the situation of the patients presbnted in Sanity, Madness and the 
Fami-ILY (Chesler, 1972; 91-96). Cooper misunderstands the role of the body in 
female oppression, and fails to analyze the humiliation to which women are 
&ubjected. Failing to understand the oppression of women, he romanticizes 
madness (100-1). Szasz is more sympathetically reviewed, but ultimately 
castigated for believing that private therapy on a contractual basis is 
possible in a culture where female submission and sacrifice is deeply 
conditioned (106). 
A particularly virulent feminist attack upon all forms of therapy is found in 
the work of Mary Daly, who is one of the American radipal feminists who have 
influenced the thought of Masson. Daly (1979) regards all - iherapy as an 
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inherently male pursuit, and believes that to allow women to practice as 
therapists is no safeguard against oppression, but merely involves the 
extension of the grip of patriarchy.. 
Since the age of the Holy Ghosts is a time of Dionysian boundary 
violation, it is predictable that the mantle of male m6t'herhood 
will be shifted to the shoulders of more and more women deemed 
worthy. by Dionys. ian men ... the downward spread of therapy itself 
inevitably renders it more accessible as a* respectable occupation 
for upwardly mobile women in male-monitored, society.:. 
the Thoroughly Therapeutic Society must not only castrate 
potential witches as victims/patients. It must craftily con some 
of its stronger potential deviants into the role of -unwitting 
token victimizers, in the name-of Feminist Therapy . (280) 
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Elaine Showalter's (1985) The Female Malady, a study of women and madness in 
English culture, presents a thesis which is in essence identical to that of 
Chesler; Showalter's criticisms of Britisti-based anti-psychiatry are more 
detailed and lengthier than those of Chesler,. but are essentially the same. 
Laing created a typically male role for himself as the hero\saviour of a group 
of patients, never seriously considering the import of the fact that-all these 
patients were women, on whose behalf he continued to speak. Berke's approach 
to Mary Barnes was constrained by his continuing to work within a sexist 
psychoanalytic theory. Cooper abused his female patients sexually (Showalter, 
1985; 247). 
The most recent addition to the collection of feminist accounts of psychiatry 
is Jane Ussher's (1991) Women's Madness: Misogyny or Mental Illness? This 
book. is particularly interesting because in it the'author expresses. her own 
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feeling of helplessness, as a mental health worker, faced with the gulf 
between the academic anti -psychi atri c critiques of psychiatry and gender 
politics, and her working experience of women needing and expecting help. 
Finally, Ussher left her employment as a clinical psychologist because she 
could not reconcile her day-to-day practice with the academi6'work on Which 
she was attempting to base it. She examines at length the history of 
psychiatry and misogyny, and then proceeds to, examine also the critiques of 
psychiatry which have emerged, both ahti-psyChiatric and feminist. Her 
conclusion is modest, but interesting. 
I am not going to offer a recipe for happiness, a formula for 
alleviating distress, for treating madness, becauýe there is no 
one formula. Each woman is-different. Each woman's pain has its 
own history, its own roots - and its own solutio6... 
... there are many solutions. In reality, we need them all. Each 
individual woman may benefit from a different group of solutions. 
(297-8) 
Ussher solves her dilemma by opting for a pragmatic solution: to offer each 
woman what seems most helpful and appropriate in her Andividual case.. 
However, she fails to produce a theoretical solution to the contradiction 
which exists between theories which argue that all psychiatry is oppressive, 
and the existence of large numbers of women in need of psychiatric assistance. 
8. The radical anti-psychiatric dilemma analyzed. 
There is much in. the Marxist, feminist and other social control-based theories 
of psychiatry to be recommended, both in accounts of 
_how 
mainstream medical 
psychiatry has embodied value judgements of an' oppressive" nature, and 
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particularly in the critique of the 'radical' therapies. Examples can be 
found scattered throughout the 'radical' literature of the 1970s of highly 
pertinent comments on what passed as alternative therapy; for example, Penn 
(date unknown: 29) chastised Humpty Dumpty, the Radical Psychology magazine for 
offering therapy as a universal prescription for all ailments', serious' and 
slight, underpinned by no theory except 'a vague self-congratulatory ideology 
which could be paraphrased as "I feel therefore it is" '. Penn proposes, as 
a differe nt alternative to medical psych'iatry, hOn-individualistic solutions 
to be pursued through community work, thus identifying herself to some extent 
with support for the Marxist anti -psychi atri c solution of widespread 
restructuring of society. 
Rou, qh Times (1972) published the fol-lowi'ng anonymous parody of Fritz Perl's 
famous 'Gestalt Prayer', now retitled 'The Getsmart Prayer': 
I do my thing, and you do your thing. 
I am not in this world to live up to your expectations 
And you are not in this world to live-up to mine. 
You are you and I am I, 
And if by chance we find 
Our brothers and sisters enslaved 
And the world under fascist rule 
Because we were doing our thing .- 
It can't be helped? 
To turn to a more recent example, Masson's (1990) critique of psychotherapy 
is problematic in that it constitutes a sweeping and"nihilistic rejection of 
all forms of therapy, with no positive suggestion as to. what might be offered 
as an alternative. But prior to this conclusion', the book'presents much 
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factual material cataloguing abuses of psychotherapy in America which deserve 
serious consideration by practising psychotherapists. 
However, the flaw which characterises all these theories, despite their 
sometimes pertinent critiques of both orthodox and radical fornis of therapy, 
is that political critiques such as the ones discussed above fail to suggest 
alternatives which are either better, or practical. Ultimately, it is Utopian 
to imagine that the level of psychidtric distress existing in western 
societies can be treated in a laissez-faire fashion, pending the socialist or 
feminist revolution which will remove the cause of the distrest. All critics 
must ultimately address the problem of need in the presbnt. 
And many of the critics discussed above have opted finally, however 
cautiously, for the existence of some form of radicalised psychotherapy. 
Among the Marxists, David Hill (1983) accepts some forms of therapy as 
potentially beneficial at least in alleviating distress pending the 
revolution. Chesler (1972: 112) was critical -of the real i ty of rad i cal. therapy 
as it usually turned out in practice, pointing. out that radical clinicians are 
not 'hot headed nihilistic extremists', but mainly young,. white, male and 
middle-class, with more ideals than power to bring about change. But she 
confessed that: 
The ideas and alternative structures'of a "radical" or feminist 
psychotherapy both excite and disturb me. (113) 
Most of the theorists discussed here, however, shy away from advocating any 
I, form of intervention under the title 'therapy'. Their solutions are what 
Ussher (1991: 205) te rms 'para-therapeut-ic pro'posals', which - include 
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consciousness raising, crisis intervention, or social and practical support 
such as is found in women's refuges or community interventions. 
Mary Daly (1979) believes in the possibility of properly woman-centred 
provision of some sort. It transpires that: 
I am not saying that genuinely woman-identified counselling 
cannot and does not take place, ndr am I denying that, given the 
state of aliýnatinq structures in which we live, týhere is an 
urgent need for drop-in centres and other places for women to go 
in crisis situations. My criticism concerns therApy as a way of 
life, as an institutionalized system of creating and perpetuating 
false needs, of 'masking and ' maintain-ing depression, of 
focusing/draining women's energy through fixation upon periodic 
psychological "fixes". (280-1) 
Chamberlin (1988) emphasises repeatedly that therapy is to be avoided at all 
costs, but consciousness-raising is absolutely-essential to alternative mental 
health projects in order to prevent the resurgenýe of mentalism. Chamberlin's 
insistence on the need for consciousness-raising is particularly interesting, 
because it provokes the question: how do you define therapy? An interested 
lay-person would probably find it difficult to distinguish between a group 
therapy session and a consciousness-raising session. Perhaps the primary 
distinction would be that consciousness-rai sing has a more explicit political 
agenda and therefore involves more systematic and overt forms of 
indoctrination. However, whether this is the case or not, it would appear 
that at this point the distinction between therapeutic, and para-therapeutic 
interventions has become blurred to the point where' it constitutes a semantic 
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quibble. If one puts aside the political justification for the label used, 
and examines the practices as they occur on the ground, it becomes 
increasingly difficult to believQ that what is being offered is a non- 
'therapeutic intervention for a condition which cannot be identifi ed by a 
label. Mental health services, however, radical, non-mddicalised or 
collectively organised, continue to exist for the benefit of a minority of the 
population who experience particularly acute psychological distress. Their 
purpose is to alleviate the distress. The group of people who require such 
provision constitute an identifiable, and thus potentia. lly "labelable' group 
of persons, even if the only label we choose to apply is 'person in acute 
crisis'. Thus, the majority of people proposing an 'entirely political- 
structural analysis of mental health are doing so only in theory. In practice 
they are advocating the provision of some form of mental" health service. The 
service proposed may be somewhat different in kind from that advocated by the 
radical therapy lobby, but it forms part of the same range of services. 
Like the radical therapy approach, it tends to produce a similar sort of 
response from psychiatrists. Many psychiatrists are aware that some of the 
conditions they come across are primarily psychological and social in origin 
and causation. They are aware that all the conditions they come. across are 
affected to a great extent by social stress and poverty. They welcome any 
form of service which will help to alleviate such conditions. But they regard 
it as a statement of faith, not fact, 'to adopt the position that all 
conditions can and ought to be treated by purely psychological or social 
means. They will resist any implication that the input of psychiatry ought 
to be replaced by that of either psychotherapy or social work. 
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This section has examined attempts over the last twenty years to uphold the 
claim that mental illness is a label applied for purposes of social control, 
and, therefore, that all forms of psychiatry and psychotherapy ought to be 
abolished. It has been argued that this attempt has run aground because of 
a contradiction inherent within the argument. This contradiction is that, 
logically, if mental illness does not exist, then it ought to be sufficient 
to release the patients from the hospitals and do no more. However, in 
practice, whenever this has been attemoted by persons who have themselves 
worked in mental health, the level of real suffering being experienced by 
psychiatric patients has been such that the critics of medicine have felt 
compelled to offer some assistance to sufferers in 'the , present.. The 
assistance offered has only constituted an attack upon medical psychiatry to 
the extent that it has amounted to -a replacement of medical provision for 
distressed people with psycho-social provisipn, even where workers have made 
it clear that they do not consider what they are offering to constitute 
therapy for illness. 
Therefore, attempts to implement Szasz's view-that mental illness is a myth 
have tended to produce new forms of psychiatric practice,. rather than the 
abolition of psychiatric practice. It is my belief that the explanation for 
this paradox is to be found within the contradictions of Szasz's own argument. 
The following section will present a theoretical analysis of contradictions 
within Szasz's views. 
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9. Critique of Szasz's views on psychiatry and mental illness: a theoretical 
interlude! 
Szasz (1960,1972) claimed that illness was by definition an entirel-y organic 
phenomenon. Disorders of the mind are not organic, or tit least ' not 
demonstrably so, and it is therefore incorrect to regard mental disorders as 
illnesses, other than when 'illness' is used raetaphorically, * in the sense of 
a sick joke. Related to this claim was a'further assumption that attributions 
of physical illness'are objective and do not involve value juýgements, whereas 
attributions of mental illness are subjective and do involve value judgements. 
Szasz regarded this as true in two senses. FirsMy, he considered 
attributions of physical illness to be objective in the sense that they left 
no room for differences of opinion -between physicians'. All doctors could 
readily agree when a person had, for example., tuberculosis because there was 
an identifiable viral infection. This was not the case with, for example, 
schizophrenia, where there was plenty of room for disagreement and no one 
identifying symptom to which appeal could be made. Secondly, Szasz regarded 
physical illnesses to be objective in that -they do not carry implications of 
moral disproval or blame. TB is something which simply happens to one, not 
something which one does. In the case of mental illness, however, the 
symptoms are not something which happens to one, but precisely'things which 
one does. The symptoms of mental illness are inseparably enmeshed in the 
question of agency. Szasz considered it to be vital to a person's status as 
a human being that agency continued to be attributed, and that a person's 
actions were not interpreted as the result of a disease process. His demand 
for mental illness to be accorded its properly mythological status was 
basically a demand that disease processes ought not, to be confused with 
morally meaningful actions. 
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However, Szasz's rigid division of medicine into the physical, objective and 
caused, and the mental, subjective and freely chosen had been systematically 
criticized by the early 1970s. 
a) Distinction between value-free physical conditions and value-laden mental 
ones. 
The fundamental flaw underlying Szasz', s critique is his adoption of the 
position that genehal medicine is underpinned by obje. ctive ascriptions of 
pathology, whereas diagnosis in psychiatry is an entirely subjective affair. 
Consideration of the reality of practice in general medicine reveals. this 
distinction between general medicine and psychological medicine to be highly 
problematic. 
Friedson (1970) provided a comprehensive sociological analysis of medicine as 
a profession. He addressed the question of illness as a form of social 
deviance. This issue had been approached earlier-by Talcott Parsons, in the 
late 1950s, in his investigation of the sick role. Parsons had argued that 
medicine operates as legitimater of the sick role, being thb. ihstitution which 
has socially ascribed authority to arbitrate when a person may adopt the sick 
role and become a patient, and when a person must relinquish the sick role, 
and adopt his ordinary position within society. Friedson extended Parsons' 
analysis to examine the role of the medical profession not only in declaring 
when a person can legitimately adopt the sick role, but in determining what 
conditions shall count as illness and what shall not. He argued that 'by 
virtue of being the authority'on what illness "really" is, medicine creates 
the social possibilities for acting sick'_ (Friedson, 1970: 205-6). Doctors 
determine what is normal and who is sick in the same, way that jLfdges determine 
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what is legal and who is innocent, and priests determine what is holy and who 
is profane. 
Friedson acknowledges that attributions of sickness are not purely arbitrary, 
but are based upon some existing physical or mental state which is itself 
real . However, the declaration that any particular state is an example of 
illness is n. ot an objective statement of fact,. but a judgement, depending on 
a particular set of values. The group'within-western societi es which has 
achieved the status*of sole determiners of illness. is the meaical profession. 
Doctors have succeeded in achieving this status at the expense of all the more 
traditional forms of healer. The status enables doctors' to approach iI lness 
not only from the point of view of the health and wellý-being of their 
patients, but with an eye to preserving'and extending 'the jurisdiction and 
status of the profession. Doctors' judgements of illness are, therefore, not 
merely not objective in the sense that they require a negative evaluation of 
whatever is to be defined as illness, but also not objective in the sense that 
they tend to be at least partially a function-of the medical profession's self 
interest. 
The jurisdiction that medicine has established extends far wider 
than its demonstrable capacity to "cure".. Ahe medical profession 
has first claim to jurisdiction over the label of illness and 
anything to which it may be attached, irrespective of its 
capacity to deal with it effectively, (251) 
Friedson's analysis is developed in highly polemical form by Illich (1975), 
who attacks the function of medicine as not merely irreducibly moral in 
character, but also irreducibly political. He argues that the expansion of 
the highly technologised profession of medicine in the west' is actually 
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causing more distress than it is alleviating. It is achieving this by the use 
of unnecessary technical interventions, the medicalisation of normal phases 
of life such as pregnancy and old. age, and the increased reliance upon 
medication. In addition, it is encouraging the destruction of traditional 
cultural ways of making sense of sickness and death, which are superseded when 
westernised concepts of technological medicine take over, and is thus 
undermining ýthe capacity of people to cope with naturally oc'Curri . ng forms of 
distress in a meaningful way. Illich calls for'the deprofessionalisation of 
health care, restoring responsibility for well-being to the individuals whose 
well-being is at issues, and affirming a commitment to technologically simple 
measures and preventative strategies . 
The analyses of Friedson 'and Illich bear some resemblaýce to that of.. Szasz, 
who insists that state provision of psychiatric treatment is not a value free 
enterprise, but functions as a form of social control. What Friedson and 
Illich add to Szasz is the discovery that this social control dimension does 
not exist because psychiatric practice is 6ssentially different from other 
forms of medicine, but because it is essentia-lly the same. The realization 
of the flaw in the distinction between objective physical illnesses and 
subjective mental ones was applied to the critique of anti-psychiatry quite 
swiftly. Clare (1976: 3) dismissed Szasz's argument that disea: se must mean 
bodily disease as 'semantic gymnastics', and argued for an eclectic but 
basically medical approach tomental illness. Amore detailed and interesting 
application of the critique is found in Sedgwick (1982). Sedgwick notes the 
failure of all the radical thinkers discussed in this book (Goffman, Laing, 
Foucault and Szasz) to address the question 'what is illness? ' 
The immanentists of anti-psychiatry have accomplished the feat of 
criticisinq the concept of -mental 
i1 lness without ever ekamining 
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the (surely more inclusive, and loqically Prior) concept of 
i 11 ness. They have focused a merciless lens on psychiatric 
treatment, detailing its foibles, its fallacies, and its 
destructiveness towards human self-respect, while at the same 
time maintaining a posture of reverent myopia towý, Ms, the 
chemical, surgical and other therapeutic procedures that are 
directed by doctors against the many, targets of the human 
organism that lie outside the ýrey and' white matter of the 
cerebrum. (27) 
I 
In Sedgwick's view, what unites the theorists reviewed in his book is a quite 
legitimately mounted attack upon positivist methodology in psychiatry,. united 
with a wholly unjustified assumption that positivism in general medicine is 
appropriate (Sedgwick, 1982: 26). Once 'this error is Corrected, and it is 
conceded that positivism is a fallacious epistemological theory throughout 
medicine, the distinctive platform upon which Goffman, Laing, Foucault and 
Szasz were believed to stand disappears, and the irreconcilable differences 
between-the writers emerge. (See chapter 2 -for ad iscussion of positivism. ) 
The failure of the radical critics to address the issue of positivism in 
medicine generally produced the two further errors into which these theorists 
fell: dualism and an over-emphasis on free will. 
b) Dualism. 
The distinction between conditions which are physical and condit. ions which are 
psychological necessarily involves an assumption of dualism, because it 
involves the assumption that it is possible to define some states in wholly 
physical terms and some in wholly psychological terms to begin with. 
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There is, perhaps, one sense in which such a division is possible. one can 
begin from the non-dualist position that conscious processes and physical 
brain processes must be related. One can then assume that this relationship 
is analogous to the relationship between computer software and -computer 
hardware. A computer is subject to two distinct forms of falilt, hardware 
failures and software errors. Hardware errors are caused by gross mechanical 
failures in. the machinery which drives the qomputerý Such' fa6lts can be 
identified and corrected by engineers oporating'at a purely mechanical level. 
Errors in software, 'however, are of a fundamentally diffpreni order. They are 
failures of programming which occur when a computer is mechanically 
functioning correctly. Although the programme relateS to. the mechanical 
functioning of the computer and is not independent of it, one -cannot correct 
a programming error with the mechanical'help of an engineer. One must look 
for the assistance of a computer programmerýto find and correct the fault. 
Similarly, with respect to human cognitive functioning, one can describe some 
faults as being due to failures of mechanism, that is to gross and 
identifiable changes in brain function, siuch as those which result from 
tumours or epilepsy. Such conditions are amenable to mechanical surgical and 
medicinal intervention. Other faults may be compared to programming errors, 
Qccurring at the level of psychological or cognitive error, and involving no 
gross change in brain function; for example, some phobic states. 'The solution 
to such difficulties may be to enlist the assistance of the psychological 
equivalent of a computer programmer, the psychotherapist. (I am glossing over 
the problems of value which are involved here in order to produce a clear 
epistemological discussion of the mind\body problem. ) As the computer 
programme is dependent upon the computer hardware, so al I conscious events are 
dependent on brain processes. 'Pathological ' psychological events must depend 
on 'pathological' brain processes in the sense that they must depend on some 
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brain process, and if the psychological event is deemed pathological then in 
some sense one might argue that the brain process which underpins it is 
pathological. However, this pathology is not identical with gross mechanistic 
forms of pathology. The judgement of pathology is derived solely-from the 
'software' level, without reference to the actual underlying bý, Ain, proces'ses. 
In fact, there is reason to believe that it is not possible for particular 
psychologicell events, normal or pathological, tD be identified with particular 
brain processes. To attempt to achieve that would be analogous to attempting 
to reconstruct a computer programme by looking at the computer hardware. 
Although related, the two dimensions arQ of a quite different order. The 
belief that all psychological processes will eventually bb reduced to physical 
ones, and manipulable at that level, is a reductionist science fiction 
fantasy. The necessary relationship-of Consciousness t6 brain process is of 
epistemological rather than practical importance. In this sense, the 
distinction between conditions which are physical and conditions which are 
psychological is sustainable. 
However, the picture is more complicated than-this. The comparison between 
the functioning of a computer and that of a 'human being. works solely by 
analogy, which finally breaks down. In the case of a computer, the hardware 
and software are purely man-made and mechanical, and' completely 
distinguishable in so far as what one does to the software has no effect on 
the hardware. There is substantial evidence that in the case of humans, 
psychological processes do have direct impact on physical processes in a way 
which is not fully understood. But it is apparent that, for example, the 
psychological experience of anxiety has hormonal and other bodily consequences 
which impact on the actual gross physical functioning of the nervous system. 
There are no psychological conditions which do not have bodily repercussions, 
139 
and equally no bodily ones which do not have psychological repercussions. 
Thus, dualism with respect to types of ill. ness cannot ultimately be sustained 
by appeal to the computer analogy. The distinction between 'physical' 
conditions, which can legitimately be termed illnesses, and 'psychological', 
ones which cannot, cannot be sustained. 
c) The probl. em of free. will - freedom versus meaningfulness? 
The radical critique of psychiatry during the 1960s a. ssumýd a distinction 
between physical illnesses which were objectively identified, and 
psychological illnesses which were subjectively identified. -' It went on to 
assume that physical processes are. properly described and explained in causal, 
mechanistic terms, but that psychologicaT processes are properly dpscribed in 
terms of free will and action. It i-s perhaps-., this assumption which has caused 
the most problems for the critique and brought' it most unfailingly into ill- 
repute. It is the over-emphasis on the capacity of individuals to-act freely 
which characterizes Szasz as right wing and Tibertarian. It is the same over- 
emphasis on freedom which allowed Laing and Cooper to neglect the suffering 
of psychosis and to regard it as a valid and valuable psychological or 
political trip. And it is the over-emphasis on voluntarism which has resulted 
in all radical mental health workers struggling to reconcile the freedom of 
suffering individuals with their need for some kind of therapeutic or welfare 
based help, as described throughout this chapter. Some light can be shed on 
the fallacy of the argument by returning to the computer analogy outlined 
above in relation to the critique of dualism. 
The functioning of a computer at the level of programme,, rather than hardware, 
cannot be reduced to causal mechanisms. 'Computers process information 
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rationally and produce conclusions which are determined by the processes Of 
logic, not by the processes of a steam engine or a chemical reaction. In one 
sense computers 'think' in a process. which perhaps resembles to some extent 
the way in which human beings think. They process information,. extract 
meaning from it, within the terms of existing programmes,,, and produce 
conclusions. Cognitive psychologists base their work upon this assumption 
when they atýempt to mo. del human cognitive processes by -computer afialogy. The 
interesting point about the computer analogy here is that although computers 
'think', they do 6ot exercise free will. The output df a computer is 
determined by a combination of the information which is fed into it wit h the 
existing structures for information processing. In the functioning of a 
computer, it is possible to witness a rationally functioning system which 
clearly does not act free'ly. 
Again, it would be unwise to push the computer/human analogy too far. 
Computers are not creative. They are only able to carry out functions which 
human beings have programmed them to carry"out. The remarkable feature of 
human beings is their capacity to produce infinite quantities of new ideas and 
meanings. It is this feature more than anything else whi. ch compels us to 
Wieve in our own freedom and agency, in the face of the inability of 
philosophy to make sense of the metaphysical notion of free will. However, 
the computer analogy does show how our common daily existences might be made 
up to a vast extent of behaviour which is meaningful, but arguably not free, 
being determined by the available information and constru. cts, and our 
limitations of understanding. Here can be. found the beginnings of a theory 
of human behaviour which could regard pathological behaviour as pathological 
and not freely chosen, whilst continuing to regard it as meaningful. It may 
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also provide a pathway into an analysis of problems of value in psychiatry 
which is not reducible to a straightforwardly libertarian approach. 
10. Two British examples of critiques of psychiatry which attempt to 
distinguish meaningful behaviour from voluntaristic behaviour., 
The possibility of separating freedom from meaningfulness 'was explored by 
Ingleby (1981). Ingleby addresses the anti -psythi atri c work of Laing and his 
colleagues' and Szasz's analysis of the concept of menial illness, and 
identifies these as 'normalizing' approaches; that is, they operate by 
assuming that *the piece of behaviour in question would be normal if seen in 
its appropriate context. He argues: 
The normalizing approach exaggerates the extent towhich rational 
free-will operates in psychiatric cond, itions; they are not just, 
as Szasz would have it, 'problems of living' , but a breakdown of 
the problem-solving ability itself. (Ingleby, 1981: 60) 
He then. argues that a simple opposition of -free-will and determinism is not 
tenable. What is needed is an approach which attributes meaningfulness to 
human behaviour, without necessarily assuming that the behavjo'ur is rationally 
chosen or fully understood by the agent from whom it originates.. Ingleby 
identifies psychoanalytic theory as one tool which such an approach might 
adopt. He particularly favours Lacan's reading of Freud, with its 
structuralist emphasis upon the unconscious and its relationship to language. 
(The work of Lacan and the origins of structuralist and POSt7structuralist 
critiques of psychiatry will be discussed in more depth in chapter 5. ) 
A similar critique of anti-psychiatry is provided by Coulter (1973). Coulter 
set out to examine from a theoretical aspect contemporary compýdtinq theories 
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of schizophrenia, the classical form of madness. He examined evidence for 
schizophrenia as an (organic) disease process, as an experiential product (for 
example, Bateson et al, 1956), and vi. ewed from a phenomenological perspective 
(for example, Laing, 1964). He concluded that none of these approache s brings 
us any closer to discovering what schizophrenia really is. Organic theories 
fail because their proponents persist in claiming unwarranted objectivity and 
generality for concepts. such as schizophrenia, Reactions agý'inst positivist 
organicism have not constituted an impr6vement'since: 
0 
Psychogenic and sociogenic positivism have. also b. een involved in 
the framing of contrived and logically inappropriate frameworks 
of conceptual ization, and some studies of this type have required 
an illicit redefinition of insane persons as more or less 
desperate strategists presenting themselves as insane for 
ulterior purposes. The phenomenological intervention of the 
Tavistock clinicians has only succeeded in obscuring a number of 
critical issues... by confusion and polemic, and this has 
undoubtedly hindered the development of non-positivist. ic 
alternatives to orthodox psychopathology. (112) 
Coulter suggests, by way of remedy, that sociological approaches 'to mental 
illness cease to concern themselves with the 'true nature' of mental illness 
or madness, and turn instead to examining the process of insanity ascription; 
that is, why do some people come to be regarded as insane? What values are 
being expressed in our ascriptions of mental illness? This inyolves a shift 
away from consideration of what is really going on inside the psychiatric 
patients' heads, and onto what is going on with. in psychiatry. It involves an 
examination of the derivation of our cultural standar, ds of rationality and 
competence, an ascription of insanity being above 'all else a 'judgement that 
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an individual is not competent in terms of the cognitive capacities necessary 
to negotiate his or her own culture successfully. The role of the sociologist 
vis a vis mental illness is therefore entirely that of researcher of values. 
Coulter emphasises that this position in no way constitutes a rejection of 
medical psychiatric practice, theory or research. It is a crit, ical exerdise, 
but one intended to be constructive and complementary. 
I am in no sense to the need for research which could 
prove practically useful in helpihg suffering people. Much of 
what I have 'said has- purchase at the level of thý logic of 
theoretical research programmes, and in no way detracts from the 
pursuit of psychopharmacology and humanitarian psychiatric 
practice. I am persuadedý however, of the epistemologically 
critical position of a science of psychopathology which appears 
inevitably bound up with inappropriate conceptual izations of 
mental disorders. (161) 
I have included a presentation of Coulter's critique here because I. believe 
that it represents an important step forward in critical approaches to 
psychiatry. Coulter does not become involved in arguments about whethe. r 
psychological symptoms can legitimately be termed illnesses, or whether they 
are reducible to organic conditions, or whether all actions ought to be 
assumed to be produced by free agents. He asks the question, why do we decide 
some people are mad, and locates the answe*r squarely within discourse about 
comprehensibility and rationality. 
Both Ingleby and Coulter, in somewhat different ways, locate the problem for 
psychiatry as being psychiatry's definition of rationality and competence. 
Ingleby perceives the solution as being the constriuction of theories which 
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explain the meaning of behaviour which is irrational and incomprehensible when 
viewed in common-sense terms. He sees psychoanalysis as the theory most 
likely to form a basis for that kind of approach. Coulter addresses the issue 
from the opposite side: he does not ask 'how can we explain irrational 
behaviourV but 'how can we justify our own standards of rationality? ' Irf the 
following chapter, I shall examine critiques of psychiatry which have emerged 
from France since the mid-1960s, and which are. usually termed structural ist, 
post-structuralist, or post-modernist in' outlook. These are critiques which 
have addressed themselves quite explicitly to the nature of reason and 
rationality. They have viewed psychiatry as an attempt to impose rationality 
at the micro level, upon individuals, and at the macro 1. evel; upon the wholie 
structure of society. These theories provide a different kind of political 
critique of psychiatry from that offered -by anti-psychiatry, and one which is 
becoming increasingly influential in this country. 
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Footnotes to Chapter 4 
1. This argument will be returned to in Chapter 9 on the-user movement. 
I 
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Chapter 5 The Impact of Structuralism and Post-structuralism on Anti- 
Psychiatry 
Chapter 4 concluded with a brief summary of new forms of political approach 
to psychiatry proposed by Coulter (1973) and Ingleby (1981). Coulter's views 
originate from within the intellectual school of ethnomethodology (Taylor et 
al , 1973). Ethnomethodologists rejected the positivism of mainstream 
sociology and deviance theory, in favour of an approach derived from 
phenomenology which prioritised the commonsense understanding and explanations 
of ordinary people. Thus, ethnomethodologists such as Coulter were concerned 
to elucidate everyday conceptions of rationality and comprehensibility, 
without relating these to 'grand theories' or appealing to concepts such as 
deviance, norms and structures. 
Ingleby, whilst sharing Coulter's interest in the issue of rationality as a 
source of social values, draws explicitly upon structuralist and post- 
structuralist theorists. He proposes as the basis for his new approach to 
mental disorder a version of psychoanalytic theory which draws heavily upon 
Lacan. Ingleby's work is thus a comparatively early (in terms of British 
thought) instance of the influence of the largely French intellectual schools 
of structuralism and post-structuralism. These schools of thought have become 
Increasingly influential as a tool for criticising both contemporary 
mainstream psychiatry and anti-psychiatry, and offering an alternative 
political critique to that proposed by anti -psychi at ry. The purpose of this 
chapter is to describe the origins and content of structuralism and post- 
structuralism, particularly in relation to the work of Jacques Lacan and 
Michel Foucault, the two theorists most relevant to psychiatry. The impact 
of these theorists on British thought will also be examined. 
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1. Emergence of structuralism and poststructuralism. 
Structuralism and post-structuralism are problematic terms to define, 
particularly since those about whose work they have been used have been 
reluctant to apply labels to themselves. The four major 'structuralist 
theorists have been identified as Claude Levi Strauss, Louis Althusser, 
Jacques Laca. n and Michel Foucault. However, Fjoucault in particular has been 
assiduous in disowning the label of strUcturali§, t (Merquior, 1985: 13-15). 
f 
Foucault is perhaps better classified as a post-structuralist theorist, and 
Merquior (1985; 13) does accredit him with the joint leadership, with Jacques 
Derrida, of post-structuralism, However, the papers contained in 
Featherstone's (1988) coilection of- commentaries on pbst-modernist --social 
theory do not refer to Foucault with any frequency or in any depth. The major 
theorists emerge as Lyotard, Derrida, Baudrillard, Rorty and Barthes. 
Certainly, there are clearly identifiable differences amongst the approaches 
of all these theorists, and especially betwben them as a group and the more 
coherent and structured writings of Foucault. Foucault is perhaps best 
approached as occupying a somewhat problematic position. situated on the 
dividing line between structuralism and post-structuralism. Indeed, Merquior 
(1985: 13) has described post structuralism as: 
the love-rhate relationship with the structuralist mind which came 
to prevail, in Parisian culture, from the late 1960s on. 
Structuralism derives from the deep concern which developed from the early 
twentieth century onwards within philosophy with the nature of language. 
Classical philosophy had assumed that language was the. unproblematic medium 
through which truth could be expressed. - Twentieth century' thought was 
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occupied with analyzing the nature and limits of linguistic expression. In 
England, Wittgenstein's early work, expressed in the Tractatus Logico- 
Philosophicus, focused upon defining. the limits of what could meaningfully be 
expressed in words. His theories were of immense importance. for the 
development of logical positivism and the ejection of metaphysical theori'sing 
from science. The linguistic theorist who became central for the development 
of the continental sobool of structuralism was Ferdinand de Saussure. 
Saussure is generally accredited with' the foundation of the science of 
semiotics, the study of sign-systems. His contribution was ihe establishment 
of an approach to language, and indeed all systems of meaning, which was non- 
referential. A referential theory of meaning is one whidh assumes that words 
(and symbols generally) refer to objects which exist 'out there' in the 'real 
world'. Saussure approached words and symbols as referr**lng to concepts which 
are themselves expressed in words and symbq1s. He proposed that the basic 
unit of analysis of his new science would be the sign, which is made up of the 
signifier (the word or symbol which signifies) and the signified (the concept 
which the signifier signifies). It is of- the utmost importance that the 
signified is a concept, and not a 'real' object. Because of this, Saussure's 
approach assumes that language is a completel'y enclosed,. self-referential 
system. The aim of linguistics is no longer to theorise the relationship 
between words and objects, but to comprehend systems of meaning as unified 
systems which operate according to rules and principles which are internally 
specified. These rules and principles are the structures which determine and 
limit what can be expressed in language, and what developments are possible 
in language. They are the universal necessary attributes of all human forms 
of expression. The aim of this approach to language is not to determine the 
truth of what is expressed in sign systems, but to comprehend the internal 
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rules which govern the production of communication within the given sign 
system. 
The structuralists adapted Saussure's approach to language to the-study of 
social systems generally. Ehrman (1970: ix) views structuralism as a method 
of analysis before being a philosophy. It is a technique for identifying 
combinations of formal-elements to reveal their logical coherence. Applied 
to the sciences of man, it is firstly cý Way of'studying language which was 
subsequently generalized to study a wider range of sysiems of meaning. 
Broadly speaking, of the four main structuralist thinkers who were identified 
above, Levi-Strauss applied the structuralist method t6 the study. of other 
cultures, Althusser applied it to the analysis of capitalist and socialist 
societies, Lacan applied it to the unconsýious, and Foucault applied it to the 
historical development of political, scientjfic and philosophical thought. 
Politically, structuralism is a profoundly pessimistic form of thought, 
because it emphasizes deeply unconscious-, inevitable and deterministic 
structures which limit the extent of possibility of change in social 
structures. For this reason, structuralism in -France during the early 1960s 
existed in a state of opposition with the gauchistes of whom the French New 
Left and counter-culture consisted. The gauchistes based their analysis upon 
Sartre's Marxist existentialism, which was a humanistic form of philosophy 
emphasising the capacity of humans to exert choice and to control and change 
the irci rcumstances. The gauch i stes a1 so rega rded themse 1 ves as, in oppos iti on 
to the traditional forces of the academy, which were seen as preventing change 
and operating to uphold the social status quo. Structuralism was regarded as 
the bastion of the traditionalist academy (Turkle, 1979: 71-72). 
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The gauchiste attempts to bring about revolution and major social change by 
mass action culminated in the events of May-June 1968, with a series of 
strikes, sit-ins, occupations of factories and institutions, and civil 
disobedience. However, the activity was short-lived and France returned very 
rapidly to its previous state of order. Following the failure, to produce the 
expected revolution, a more conciliatory relationship between structuralist 
and the May. activists. began to be forged. Turkle (1979) ha's suggested that 
the gauchistes were faced with the nedessity 'of explaining the failure of 
their own actions. '' They had been brought face to face. wit1h the real isation 
that they were in fact limited in their capacity to produce social and 
political change by exertion of will. In the United States, the faflure of 
the counter-culture had produced a similar dilemma. Turkle suggests that 
America, lacking a radical intellectual tradition, had lapsed into the 
politics of self-indulgence, the pursuit of * ; 
individual psychological change 
becoming an end in itself, rather than a necessary facet of social change (see 
chapter 4 for political critiques of the counter-culture/Growth movement). 
However, the French gauchistes were able to turn to structuralism as a tool 
for theorising the inability of individuals, -even acting en masse, to bring 
about change. Simultaneously, the structuralitts themsel*v. es began to adopt 
A more conciliatory position towards the gauchistes. In particular, they 
ceased to emphasize the intransigence of the structures which they had 
uncovered, and began to imply that they purpose of uncovering structures was 
to be able to change them. Foucault was-rapidly adopted by the Left, and 
showed himself willing to offer support to Leftist programmes of social 
change. 
In the years after May, Foucault became something of a hero to 
May veterans. His work on the asylum, on psychiatry, on prisons, 
on medical repression, became central to their newly de"veloping 
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interests in the politics of medicine and madness.. And Foucault 
did far more than meet existential humanism halfway by making a 
very substantial concession to voluntarism. Two years after the 
1968 events, he suggested that in his work the whole point. of 
finding structures (which he had always presented as immutable) 
was to be better able to be rid of them. (Turkle, 1979: 77-78) 
It is at the point at which structuralisrd 'begins to acknowledge the 
impermanence of th6'structures which it uncovers that strucfuralism begins to 
transform itself into post-structuralism. As structures become malleable, the 
notion of a structure begins to decay. The hope of bding able to theorise 
social systems as internally consistent entities, whose change can be 
accurately described, controlled and predicted. gives way to the notion of a 
system which is inherently chaotic and incomprehensible, embodying a host of 
transient purposes and values. As the structures which supposedly underpin 
the unconscious are seen to be impermanent and shifting, the notion of 
personal identity ceases to have any meaninj beyond an illusion. The hope of 
using social theory to improve the lot of mankind or to produce a more just 
or rational society ceases to be thinkable. Thi-s is the ki'nd 'of outlook which 
pharacterizes post-structuralism in the work of thinkers such as Derrida, 
Baudrillard and Rorty. Typically, the notion of the individual self or ego 
is considered to be entirely illusory. Individual subjectivity is approached 
as a channel for language and meaning over which the individual has no 
control. The idea that a person speaks is replaced by the organism as a 
channel through which language itself speaks. Truth ceases to be defined in 
terms of a correspondence between what is said and reality, and is. instead 
theorised as correspondence of what is said with the self-referential rules 
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of the language game; that is, truth is. defined as a matter of social 
convention. Thus, everything becomes analyzable in terms of ideology. The 
distinction between science and art. breaks down completely, as both become 
fields of rhetoric with their own internal rules. As a result, the pursuit 
of both truth and progress become meaningless. The function of post- 
structuralist social commentary is to provide an ironic commentary upon 
contemporary ideology. and the notion of truth itself. Macro theories of 
society, such as Marxism, become unthint(able. Revolution is now a matter of 
localised resistance to attempts to impose any totalisea structure upon 
society. 
Ryan (1988: 559) has provided a useful summary of the sorts of concern which 
typify postmodernist and poststructurali'st work: - 
0 
Postmodern is to art what poststructuralism is to philosophy and 
social theory. The two came into being at about the same time, 
with postmodernism emerging in the late 1960s, as structuralism 
was moulting into poststructuralism. - It is the name for a 
movement in advanced capitalist culture,. particularly in the ares 
- literature, the pictorial and plastic arts, music, performance 
and video art, etc. - that emphasizes reflexivity, i rony, 
artifice, randomness, anarchy, fragmentation, pastiche and 
allegory. Cynical regarding the progressivist dreams of 
modernism, which hoped to shape the cultural world in the image 
of technology, industry and science, postmodernism is re$olutely 
ironic regarding the enabling myths of art, culture, society and 
philosophy. In philosophy, it exposes the concealed mechanisms 
that produce conceptual meaning, and in art, it puts on display 
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the hidden workings of artistic production, demystifying its 
pretensions to expressive truth. 
Social theory of this form is clearly highly ambivalent in its political 
implications. Its refusal to accept as inevitable the status quo and its 
associated,. 'truths' 9-ives post-structurali! ým a superficial *veneer of 
radicalism. However, the refusal totheorise rationally, and the insistence 
upon irony, rhetoric . and ideology as appropriate tools for aýproaching social 
problems, results in an approach which can be anti-rational, nihilistic and 
devoid of positive proposals. Merquior (1985: 16) suggests that the appeal of 
post-structural ism lies in the need of left wing'academics to find an approach 
which preserves their radicalism in the face of the' general failure of 
traditional left wing politics. He comments, of Foucault: 
A discourse on power and on the power of discourse - what could 
be more attractive to intellectuals and humanities departments 
with an increasingly entrenched radii. al outlook, yet who have 
also grown sick and tired of the trad-itional pieties of left 
revolutionism? 
Bauman (1988) has argued that post-structuralist theories tell us more about 
academics than about social change. Traditionally, the function of academics 
has been twofold. The minor role has been to assist the ruling group within 
society in its control of other groups by the provision of infqrmation which 
would make this possible. However, Western. societies no longer control their 
members by predominantly repressive means, as the majority of theirmembers 
have succumbed to the seductive powers of liberal democracy and consumerism. 
The second and major role of academics has been to act aý' arbiters of 
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aesthetics and morality, setting out to define the parameters of the 'good 
life' and how these might be attained. However, during the twentieth century, 
the very belief in the value of academic theories in all these areas has been 
eroded. Increasingly, we live in a democratic and consumer-based. society, 
where judgements of aesthetics and morality are regarded as matters of 
individual taste, constrained only by the necessary negotiations to ensure 
that we do not trample. each other to death in ; the pursuit of *our own personal 
preferences. Increasingly, the insistence that' one form of art is inherently 
better than another or that one set of morals is more correct than another, 
is giving way to the belief that any such insistence is ethnocentric and 
intolerant. Thus, the major function of the intellectual has been rendered 
redundant. Bauman points out that intellectuals enjoy more freedom of speech 
now than at any other time in the past. But they enjoy ýhis freedom of. speech 
precisely because they are no longer a thre4t, having been deprived of their 
claims to dispense absolute truth. Post-modernism, which is the response to 
this realization, consists of a 'falling upon oneself' (Bauman, 1988: 218) that 
is a turning of the tools of one's trade- back upon one's own interests. 
Academics in the social sciences are now most heavily concerned with examining 
and criticising their own assumptions, without 'interest in what the impact of 
their work will be upon society at large. As Bauman comments: 
Release from the often burdensome social duty sociology had to 
carry in the era of modernity may be see by some with relief - as 
the advent of true freedom of inte-llectual pursuits. It is, 
indeed, an advent of freedom - though freedom coupl, ed with 
irrelevance: freedom from cumbersome and obtrusive interference 
on the part of the powers that be, won at the price of resigning 
the freedom to influence their actions and their results. if 
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what sociology does does not matter, it can do whatever it likes. 
(230) 
To the extent that post-modernism does have anything to say to contemporary 
society, Bauman sees its role as being to embrace as a conscious choice the 
aims which modernism embraced as logical conclusions: 
the possibility of a reaspn-led improvement of the human 
condition; an improvement measured in the last-instance by the 
degree of human emancipation. (BAuman, 1988: 231) 
The purpose of this section has been to describe the development of post- 
I 
structuralism as a general philosophical approach and to pl. ace it- within a 
context in which its emergence can be understood. The intellectual lineage 
of structuralism and post . -st ructu ral-i sm 'has been -t raced f rom the 1i ngu i st ic 
theories of the early twentieth century. Sqme indication has been given of 
their content and the reasons for their contemporary academic popularity 
during the 1980s and 1990s, years which have seen a consensus develop 
throughout the western world, and some of the former communist world, as to 
the desirability of liberal democracy and market economics over academically 
theorised socialism. The following section will consist Of a more detailed 
consideration and critique of the ideas of Lacan and Foucault, and-how these 
have influenced the politics of mental health in France and Britain. 
2. Jacques Lacan 
Lacan is the academic figure most responsible for the rehabilitation of 
Freudian psychoanalysis as a respectable theory for Left-wing theorists to 
espouse. Freudianism had long been regarded by the Left. as a bourgeois theory 
which promoted the adjustment of 'disturbed' individuals tO* contemporary 
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social norms in the name of therapy. Lacan offered a route by which Freud's 
theories could be interpreted as socially and politically subversive. Lacan's 
version of psychoanalysis was markedly at odds with that espoused by the 
International Psychoanalytic Association. His views, and his refusal to 
abandon his practice of offering unusually brief therapy sessiohs to clients, 
resulted in his resignation in 1953 from the Societe Psychanalytique de Paris, 
the only officially recognised analytic society in France. Consequently his 
membership of the International PsychoanAlytic Association was deemed also to 
have lapsed. Lacan was vehemently opposed to both the 6io-deterministic 
interpretation of Freud and the American school of 'ego psychology'. Uniting 
Freud's psychoanalytic insights with Saussurean linguiýtics, he produced a 
structuralist account of psychoanalysis which emphasised the importance of 
language and the unconscious for understanding human culture. Lacan was able 
to pursue his unorthodox version of psychoanalysis for some years before the 
disapproval of the international psychoanalytic community was fully expressed. 
This was largely due to France's status until the 1960s as a psychoanalytic 
backwater, whose theorists and practitioners did not receive a great deal of 
attention. The centre of development of psychoanalytic theory was regarded 
as the United States. Lacan was able to develop his ideas comparatively free 
from the attention of the notoriously dogmatic international psychoanalytic 
community for several decades. As Turkle has commented: 
Jacques Lacan (is] an "indigenous heretic" whose structuralism 
and linguistic emphasis were resonant with the French Cartesian 
tradition ... Lacan denigrates "humanistic" philosophy and 
psychology that treat man as an actor who wills his action and 
instead sees man as a submitting object of processes that 
transcend him... 
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The Lacanian paradigm is structuralist, emphasizing the 
individual's constraints rather than his freedoms; it is poetic, 
linguistic, and theoretical rather than pragmatic and tends to 
open out to a political discourse which raises questions beyond 
the psychoanalytic. French intellectual life is among the most 
ideological and politicized in the world, and Lacanism's strong 
political valiance helps to mark it as "French indigenous". 
(Tu'rkle, 1979: 49-50) 
Lacan developed his theories over a period of five decades, and his views are 
extremely complex even to those familiar with psychoanalytic terminology and 
discourse. Here, I shall confine mygelf to 'describing those aspects of 
Lacanianism most important for understanding the theory"S appeal to the Left. 
2.1 Lacan's view of the ego. 
Lacan's earliest difference with international psychoanalytic opinion, was his 
view of the ego. The prevalent view of the. ego was that proposed by the 
largely American 'ego psychologists'. This schobl of thought regarded the ego 
as the psychic structure which was the focus of the patient's capacity for 
health. The ego is the psychic structure which operates according to the 
treality principle'; that is, it mediates between the individual's desires and 
phantasies and the 'real world' outside, forming rational plans as to how the 
individual's needs can most realistically be met. Psychological disorder 
-results because the ego is constantly being bombarded by the blind instinctual 
demands of the id and the harsh ethical demands of the super-ego, which must 
be either met or repressed out of consciousness. For ego psychologists, the 
solution is to strengthen the ego, increasing its capacity to stand up against 
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the demands of id and superego. This view corresponds well with the 
traditional American view of society, which is highly individualistic and 
emphasises the capacity of the indi. vidual to progress and achieve greater 
control over her own life. It is a view which Lacan rejected totally. 
From 1936 to 1949,. Lacan explained his view of the formation of the ego in 
what he termed the 'looking glass phase' (Lacan, 1966). (ýnglish language 
translations of Lacan's most important 'writin4s can be found in Sheridan's 
(1977) Ecrits: a selection. ). The looking glass phase is th*at period of very 
early development when the young child first begins to acquire a sen I se of 
itself as a being separate from other beings, and to form a sense of its own 
identity. This identity is formed from a process of observing the reactions 
of others to its own behaviour; that- is, ' by observing fts reflection-An the 
mirror of other people's reactions.. Thus, thp child's identity is inseparable 
from the identity ascribed to it by others. In other words, the-child's ego 
is created in a state of alienation. It is necessarily a structure which 
consists largely -of unconscious projections -and denials, and which is almost 
wholly unable to distinguish between its-own desires and those of other 
people. According to Lacan, the ego achieves an'illusion of coherence through 
the resolution of the Oedipus complex, and the consequent attainment of the 
capacity to symbolise, but it remains throughout a person's life'an extremely 
fragile and treacherous structure. It is therefore extremely foolhardy for 
an analyst to imagine that the ego represents a sound ally for the purposes 
of a therapeutic alliance. 
The significance of this view for the Left wing is that it offers a 
theoretical basis for rejecting the bourgeois view that liberal democracy, 
with its emphasis upon the freedom of the indiVidual, represents social 
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progress. As was noted above, the view of the ego psychologists fits neatly 
with the traditional view of 'the American dream': achievement through 
individual effort. If Lacan is correct, then no amount of individual effort 
can yield full insight into one's own behaviour, and the increased rat ionality 
which we regard as evidence of progress is a myth supported by the ever-fickle 
ego. The concepts of rationality and individual freedom are in fact 
politically. expedient. fictions. This is a view to which I shall return 
shortly in examining the work of Deleuzb and Guattari. 
2.2 The importance of linguistics for psychoanalysis. 
Bowie (1991: 45) obserVes that by-the 1950s LaQan had: 
reached an impasse in his rewriti'ng of the Freudian account of 
the ego, having created a new theoretical edifice that was often 
only fortuitously connected to psychoanalysis as a therapeutic 
method ... He needed a new theoretical position that could be q 
linked robustly to the clinical work-of psychoanalysis and that 
would explain and justify his own methods as a clinician. 
He created such a position by wedding his psychoanalytic insights to the 
methods of Saussurian linguistics. His new position is described fully in two 
4 papers: The function and field of speech and language in psychoanalysis. 1953, 
and The agency of the letter in the unconscious since Freud, 1957 (Lacan, 
1966). In Freud's own work, two distinct forms of theory can- be found 
existing in some degree of tension. Some of his writings, particulary his 
later works, adopt a clearly bio-deterministic concept of the human mind, in 
which psychic energy is channelled and operates according to principles which 
seem to have been borrowed from hydraulics. However, his early works, notably 
The Interpretation of Dreams (1976) and Jokes a: nd their Relation Ao the 
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Unconscious (1976), display a far greater interest in the nature of language 
and symbolisation, as revealed by the content of jokes, puns and day-time and 
night-time phantasies and dreams. Lacan chose to disregard entirely Freud's 
tendency towards bio-determinism, and to recast psychoanalysis wholly as a 
form of linguistics. He justified this as an attempt to purge'6sychoanalysis 
of errors into which it had fallen since Freud's discoveries: 
I cons i de rit to- be an u rgent task to ,di sengage f rom concepts 
that are being deadened by routine use the meaning that they 
regain both from a re-examination of their history and from a 
reflexion on their subjective foundations. (Lacan, 1966: 240 
trans. M. Bowie) 
He adopted the view that language is the context from which psychoanalytic 
concepts and discourse cannot be separated. Psychoanalytic concepts do not 
refer to processes which are non-lipguistic and take place Inside the client's 
psyche. The processes and the concepts are indistinguishable. Psychoanalysis 
then becomes a kind of language game in which the discourse of the client and 
the discourse of the therapist engage in creatiVe dialogue explor-ing the 
hidden meanings which operate at a level beloV consciousness. Lacan's. views 
on language and the unconscious are encapsulaied in the -phrase which has 
become a watchword for his disciples: 'the unconscious is structured like a 
language'. Unconscious proce sses are conceptualised as associative chains of 
signification. Analysis is the process by which these associative chains are 
explored and identified, links which have bbcome lost to consciousness being 
restored and made visible. Lacan has suggested: 
analysis consists in playing on all the many staves of the score 
that speech constitutes in the registers of language, and on 
which overdetermination depends, which has no meaning except in 
that order. (Lacan, 1966: 291 trans. M. Bowie) 
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Lacan's view of the relationship between language and the unconscious explains 
his own complex and frequently tortuously obscure form of expression. For 
Lacan, psychoanalysis is not a theory about the unconscious, but rather the 
conscious mind in direct dialogue with the unconscious. Therefore, the 
analyst needs to speak language of the same form as that undEfrstood by the 
unconscious, with full expression of the forms of word play with which the 
unconscious. is familiar. In essence, Lacan intends to bypass the conscious 
ego, and work directly on the unconscio6s. 
Like Lacan's view of the ego, his view of the importance of language for 
psychoanalysis gives his theories a particular appeal for'the political-ly Left 
wing. If a bio-deterministic reading of psychoanalysis is adopted then the 
theory does become conservative in effect, arguing thaý the existing-social 
order is finally the product of biology.; and therefore inevitable and 
unalterable. However, a theory which proposes that the unconscious consists 
of the fluctuating and shifting systems of meaning underpinning culture would 
seem to -imply the view that the unconscious i-S not determined, but potentially 
open to modification. Such modification might-be a tool for furthering an aim 
of macro-political and social change. 
Lacan's own views in this respect are somewhat unclear. As a structuralist, 
he would take the view that the structures which he was revealing were 
immutable and thus deterministic, even though the determinism would be 
cultural rather than biological. Nothing in his writings indicates that he 
did not take this view. Where his theories have been used to underpin 
explicitly political agendas for social change, this has been done. by his 
disciples rather than himself. However, Lacan was not. quick to reject such 
explicitly political usages of his work. TuWe (1979) has suggested that 
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Lacan allowed his ideas to be used to promote the Left wing political cause, 
relishing the publicity and popularity which this brought him amongst that 
group of people. For a time, Lacan's seminar was a central focus for 
fashionable Left wing thought, and for what Turkle has termed 'radical chic. 
However, Lacan successfully avoided becoming associated With, any overt 
political commitments of his own. The following section will examine the use 
which more overtly politically motivated disciples of- Lacan have made of his 
ideas in France. 
3. The influence of Lacan on the politics of psychiatry. 
Perhaps the best known application of Lacanian psychoanalysis to the politics 
of psychiatry is found in the theories Of Gilles- DeleUZe and Felix Guattari 
(1977) as expressed in Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, first 
published 1972. Deleuze and Guattari adopt-a position which Turkle (1979) 
calls 'naturalism', referring to the attitude of this group of people towards 
symbolic thought. For structuralist think6rs, man becomes human onl, y as and 
when he enters into the realm of the symbolic. That is, humanness is bound 
up inextricably with the acquisition of languaýge. Althusser described this 
process as: 
The extraordinary adventure ... transforming an animal born of man 
and woman into a human child. (Althusser, 1964-5: 97 trans. 
S. Turkle) 
As was observed above, Lacan also regards the acquisition of the capacity for 
symbolisation, at the Oedipal stage, as the point at which the -child's 
developing ego acquires a fragile illusion of unity and identity. The 
naturalists reject the view that symbolisation is necessary foý' humanity, and 
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regard the attainment of the capacity for symbolisation and subsequent 
entrance into society and structure as a tragedy. They argue that a return 
to the imaginary 'pre-Oedipal' state is necessary to end sociopolitical 
repression. Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, is 'a. diatribe 
against Oedipisation, a refusal of the moment when society enters 'man' 
(Turkle, 1979: 83). It is an attack upon psychoanalysts' acceptance and 
celebration. of the entry into the Oedipal order of society, including Lacan. 
But it is an attack which depends 'for its' coherence upon theorising 
Oedipisation along''Lacanian. lines. Thus, theoretically itý grows out of the 
Lacanian structuralist school of psychoanalysis. However, it is better termed 
post-structuralist, rather that structuralist becadse of Deleuze and 
Guattari's rejection of the permanence or necessity of. the structures 
identified by Lacan. 
0 
Deleuze and Guattari's approach produces an exaltation of schizophrenic 
experience. They extol the schizophrenic's direct and immediate relationship 
with her own desire, unmediated by the social constraints and alienation which 
symbolisation brings. They see this spontaneous expression of pure desire as 
avirtue from which political activists can profitably learn, and as qualities 
. which were much 
in evidence during the events of May 1968 in France. They 
propose that psychoanalysis be replaced by 'schizoanalysis", a form of 
psychoanalytic theory which rejects the inevitability and desirability of 
Oedipisation and celebrates psychosis as -a form of political action. This 
account depends upon Lacan's account of the formation and nature of the ego 
as a fragile and illusory structure. However, it takes that account much 
further, arguing for a total rejection and dissolution of the ego. 
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Deleuze and Guattari followed also Lacan's path of attempting to make their 
text a "'therapeutic" instrument' (Turkle, 1979: 148), the reading of which 
would directly impact upon and change the reader's experience. The very 
language in which it is written is designed to challenge and disrupt the 
reader's understanding of self and identity. They present A view of' the 
person as in no way unified or coherent, but as a fragmented collection of 
desi ri ng machi nes rel ati ng to one another ina constant state of f1 ux. The 
text is constructed in such a way as to'by-pass the illusory ego and impact 
directly upon these 'desiring machines' within the reader. Thus, the book is 
not merely intended as a theory, but as a tool for undoing the Oedipisation 
which Deleuze and Guattari regard as a characteristic peculiar to capitalist 
societies. It is itself therefore an instrument of revolutionary change. 
Deleuze and Guattari have been des. cribed as.; 'the R. D. Laing and David Cooper 
of French anti -psych i atry' (Turkle, 1979: 83). Their romanticised presentation 
of schizophrenic experience makes such a comparison superficially credible. 
However; Turkle identifies also the ways in which Deleuze and Guattari's 
celebration of the schizophrenic differs from-that of Laing. For Laing, the 
schizophrenic person is spiritually and morally -privileged over other people. 
For Deleuze and Guattari, the schizophrenic person is epistemologically and 
politically privileged (Turkle, 1979: 153). Epistemological privilege arises 
from the refusal to enter into the symbolic dimension. The schizophrenic 
continues to experience directly the flu)Zes of desire, unmediated by the 
symbolic mode of expression which flattens and distorts desire. - Political 
privilege arises because capitalism depends for its continued existence upon 
the triumph of the symbolic. Capitalism cannot tolerate the free -flow of 
directly experienced desire. Thus, the schizophrenic offers the most 
threatening challenge possible to the existing socio-political order., -Unlike 
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Laing, Deleuze and Guattari do not expect that the schizophrenic will embark 
upon this experience willingly or that she will ultimately be made more happy 
or fulfilled as a result of it. What is important is that the schizophrenic 
has resisted the way in which capitalism 'normally' controls our psyches. 
one approach to criticizing this form of anti-psychiatry is to examine the 
effects of the theory as it is translated into, practice. 1 
If this approach is 
applied to the theories of Deleuze and G6attari it becomes apparent that the 
theory does not have any very obvious implications for-psychiatric practice 
and is in fact rarely put into practice in any very meaningful sense. 
Poststructural ism tends to reduce issues of value and politics to a lingu'istic 
game, in which the fun that can be had with discourse becomes divorced from 
practical decisions. It is notable that Deleuze and Guattari's text does not 
offer suggestions for improving the lot in society of people who have actually 
been diagnosed schizophrenic. It is, rather, a tool for simulating the 
schizophrenic experience in people who have not been psychiatrically 
diagnosed, with the intention of reproducing the schizophrenic state of 
epistemological and political privilege in-oýhers. 
In their clinical practice also, the group of Lacanian psychiatrists working 
at the Cl inique de la Borde at cour-Cheverny, which included Guattari , did not 
seem to operate in a fashion radically different from that adopted by most 
medically oriented psychiatrists. They published a magazine, Cahiers pour la 
folie, which included work and visual art by psychiatric patients, and which 
offered a consistently poetic and artistic. view of psychiatric disorder and 
a glamorized account of life at a psychiatric clinic. But the Clinique de la 
Borde's therapeutic methods continued to be biassed heavily towards medication 
and electro-shock, as is the case in most mental hospitals. Also, the anti- 
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psychiatric leadership proved uninterested in supporting less glamorous grass 
roots campaigns for change, requiring serious political organisation; for 
example they failed to offer their support to student psychiatric nurses at 
Vi 1 lejuif, who had been sacked for publ icising conditions at thei r hospital , 
including a reproduction of the design of the keys to the hosýit4l's closed 
ward. Turkle concludes that: 
in the Parisian intellectual cont6xt much*of anti-psychiatry is 
really intellectual and social play. The sense of. anti psychiatry 
as play is reinforced by the romanticism of much of the French 
antipsychiatric movement. (Turkle, 1979: 155) 
Much of French anti-psychiatry is little more than 'radical chic' (Turkle, 
1979: 162). 
Deleuze and Guattari' proposals in Anti-Oedipus are open to criticism on 
theoretical grounds also. Deleuze and Guattari are committed to a politics 
of irrationality. They are proposing a reversion to a more 'natural' anarchic 
state in which the expression of pure desire will be -possible without 
mediation of reason to limit the negative affects of such freedom. The 
abandonment of rationality has, historically, rarely resulted in the reduction 
of Fascism, which Deleuze and Guattari envisage, but has more generally been 
associated with its rise. 
Even were such a total abandonment of reason judged to be desirable, it is 
difficult to envisage its ever becoming possible, as it would involve. -a mass 
reversion to a primitive pre-1 ingual state. Deleuze and Guattari 's notion of 
a kind of schizo-society is no more than a romantic and Arcadian pipe dream 
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of the kind associated with counter-cultural social theory (see Pearson, 
1975). The impossibility of abandoning rationality and reverting to a more 
fnatural' imaginary mode of existence is apparent in the limitations of 
Deleuze and Guattari's own text. Although it is intended to by-pass the 
symbolic and resonate directly with the imaginary unconsciouý, ip fact' the 
authors cannot avoid a large degree of conventional symbolic expression to 
make theirAdeas intelligible. Whilst rejecting the notion of truth as itself 
fascist, and claiming to promote the dir6ct experience of desire, Deleuze and 
Guattari in fact propose a. theory of schizophrenia whicý is symbolically 
expressed and at least implicitly presented as true; that is, that 
schizophrenia is characterised by the direct experien6e and expression of 
desire, and is the more natural-state of humans. The abandonment of the 
symbolic would not entail the adoption of a poetic and fragmented-use of 
language, as Deleuze and Guattari. appear to envisage. It would entail the 
abandonment of the use of language altogether. 
The work of Deleuze and Guattari exploits all the implications of 
structuralism and post-structuralism which-are most anti-rational. This is 
a theme to which I shall return in assessing the work of -Foucault later i. n 
this chapter. However, the work of Lacan has been used more productively to 
investigate the problems of value, power and politics which are embedded 
within our use of language, but without claiming to wish to abandon entirely 
the structures which the use of language to'communicate renders necessary, and 
which involve assumptions of rationality and truth. Such a use of 
structuralism and poststructuralism might acknowledge tacitly that language 
is a self-referential" game, whose relationship with the real world 'out there' 
in space is highly problematic. In theory, alternative grammars and forms of 
logic might one day come into use. But in the present, we are bound by the 
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structures of grammar, semantics. and logic which are all we have available, 
and it is impossible to imagine what an alternative grammar or logic might be. 
Thus, we are committed to an investigation of value, power and politics 
situated within the contemporary rules of the language game. Again, 'Lbft wing 
groups which have used Lacan's work for these ends have done-, go Vithout his 
explicit approval.. 
A radica 1 political groups which called itself Scription R ouge adopted 
Lacanian theory for use as a form of political consciousness-raising. Far 
from celebrating the disunity and fragmentation of personality outside 
capitalist control, Scription Rouge assumed that this disunity was itself 
solely a product of capitalism. 
Lacan's theory of the divided, - decentered ego does not describe 
something inherent in the human condition, but simply an artifact 
of capitalism ... Through analysis, the capitalist subject can 
learn that his crisis extends to the very deepest levels, and in 
so doing achieve a higher level of personal and political 
consciousness. (Turkle, 1979: 79) 
This approach involves an extension of the assumptions of Lacania. n 
psychoanalysis which Lacan himself would no doubt have regarded as 
illegitimate. He never considered the notion that the structure of the 
personality investigated by psychoanalysis was especially related to 
capitalist social structure. Indeed, the view that the unity of the ego could 
be restored in a socialist society might be regarded as a covert attempt to 
reintroduce the assumptions of the ego psychologists, whose views Lacan 
rejected, disguised by political gloss. However, it demonstrates a use of 
Lacanianism which is political whilst not anti-rationalist. Its politics 
reside in its questioning of the accepted values of contemporary society. 
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A similar use was put to the work of Lacan by French feminists. Feminists 
were rejecting the work of Freud as patriarchal at the same time as the anti- 
psychiatry's critique of psychiatry was being mQunted (for example, Friedan 
was published in the United States in 1963. ). Mitchell (19T4) deals 
specifically with the feminist rejection of Freudian psychoanalysis. 'She 
argues for the adoption of Freudian theory as a basis for a critique of how 
the feminine woman is -constituted within contemporary soc .i ety. Freudian 
theory is not to be read as prescriptivd of what a woman should be, as many 
feminists have assumed, but as descriptive of how women become what they are. 
The theory then provides the basis for a critique of society. Mitchel 1 's 
rehabilitation of Freud relies on the adoption of many ideas derived-from 
Lacan. Mitchell is a member of the Paris-based French. feminist group 
Psychanalyse et Politique, which- seeks to -bring' Lacanian-influenced 
psychoanalytic theory to bear on issues of feminism and femininity. 
it explicitly opposes what it sees as bourgeois and idealist 
tendencies within, largely, American radical feminism. it 
denounces radical feminism's rejectibn of. - psychoanalysis, but 
this does not imply ... an acceptance -of -the present patriarchal 
practice of psychoanalysis, nor of 'the many patriarchal 
judgements found within Freud's own work .... Their concern is to 
analyze how men and women live as men and women within the 
material conditions of their existence - both general and 
specific (Mitchell, 1975: xxi-xxii) - 
Mitchell draws upon Lacan's critique of the trivial ization and Americanization 
of psychoanalytic theory, with the result that the theory became increasingly 
used not as an instrument of subversion, but to bolster the status quo 
(Mitchell, 1975: 297). She also emphasizes. Lacan's theory of'*the ego as a 
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fragmentary and largely illusory construct which comes into existence as a 
result of the child's entering the symbolic mode, and society coming to dwell 
within the child in the form of the law of the father. Following Lacan's 
concern with language and meaning, Mitchell places her emphasis less- upon the 
physiol. ogical differences between the sexes than upon the mean, ing, w, ith w*hich 
those differences are endowed. 
3. Michel Foucault 
Foucault's first major text was Histoire de la Folie, published in French in 
1961 and available in an abridged -English translation in 1964 under the title 
Madness and Civilisation. The English translation w*as published by the 
Tavistock as one in Laing's series of books an psychiatry and existentialism, 
with a foreword by David Cooper. Thus it appears that Laing and Cooper 
thought that they recognised affinities between Foucault', s views and their 
own, although Foucault's profoundly anti-humanist stance fitted- somewhat 
poorly with Laing and Cooper's existentialism. The book did not become 
popular amongst French Left wing academics until the late 1960s, when it 
became a cause celebre in the years following 1968. Foucault's thesis in this 
book is that madness had not always been separated out from reason. There was 
a time, a 'Golden Age', when both 'Reason' and 'Unreason' were accepted as 
valid aspects of the human condition, arTd reason and madness existed in 
dialogue with one another. This state of affairs ceased with, the coming of 
the Enlightenment, and the dominance of reason. The mad were first of all set 
to sail the seas on ships of fools, which transported their unwanted cargo 
from port to port. Latterly, from the eighteenth century onwards, they were 
incarcerated in huge institutions built for that puirpose. Here . Unreason ýas 
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separated from Reason, margina 
between Reason and Unreason. 
Unreason, and talks about it. 
causes of madness, or mental 
nothing to say about its own 
hearing. Unreason has become 
I ized and confined. There is no longer dialogue 
Reason, the tool of the bourgeois, isolates 
There. is much theorising about the nature and 
i 11 ness. Unreason is denied speech.. It has 
condition which Reason would tegard as worth 
the object of Reason's monologue. 
Madness and Civilisation was initially 6dopted as another text of the 'anti- 
psychiatry movemeni', along. with the works of Laing, Cooper, Berke, Szasz, 
Scheff, Goffman and a host of other theorists who were for a time perceived 
as purveying a similar message. However, the starting 'point of Madness and 
Civilisation was in fact very different from that of any of the other 
theorists listed here. Foucault was -not 'interested in the cause or nature of 
the symptoms which lead to a person being label led mad or mental ly i 11 , even 
to the extent that he was uninterested in whether such people are biologically 
different from the sane. He was interested in the process by which during the 
Enlightenment Reason separated itself out -from Unreason, and proceeded to 
disempower and repress Unreason, depriving-it-of its voice. That is, he was 
interested in the values which the emergent profession of pSy6iatry espoused, 
and which the society in which psychiatry operates has accepted. 
Madness and Civilisation reads as a vitriolic rejection of reason and 
rationality. However, as Sedgwick (1982: 142) comments, -Foucault was himself 
later critical of his aims in writing the book. 
There is evidence that he has forsworn some of the larger, transi- 
historical ambitions of Madness and Civilisation. -More recently, 
he has remarked that in this book 'one ý4as still Close to 
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admitting an anonymous and general subject of history', and he 
has satirically repudiated the quest, explicitly undertaken in 
Madness and Civilisation, 'to reconstitute what madness might be, 
in the form in which it first presented itself to some primitive, 
fundamental, deaf, scarcely articulated experience'. 
However, as. Madness and Civilisation has become a received text amongst some 
of those who regard it as further fuel for* 'the argument for the total 
abolition of psychiatry, it -is perhaps as well to. note some of the historical 
criticisms which have been addressed to the book. Foucault preferred to base 
his work upon analysis of the broad sweep of histoýy, rather-thah its 
empirical details, and Madness and Civilisati-on is notable as a book in which. 
attention to details of historical - accuracy was part'icularly absent. As 
Sedgwick (1982) has noted, Foucault's portrait of an era when Reason and 
Unreason coexisted in a state of happy dialogue is an Arcadian myth. The Ship 
of Fools was a literary invention, not based on fact. The Age of Conf i nement 
did not- involve the incarceration of the mad in institutions recently vacated, 
by lepers. And many of the 'treatments', -such as cold water douches, which 
Foucault regards as being particularly the product of Enlightenment discourse 
about madness, and particularly appropriate in that period, in -fact have 
histories stretching back long before the Enlightenment. The belief. that 
insanity could be cured by the application of physical shocks is not one which 
emerged as a result of Enlightenment dialogues about Unreason. There is much 
in Madness and Civilisation to give cause for criticism. But, in spite of 
this, Foucault's approach to the politics of mental health contains much which 
is fresh and more promising than the dead ends into which the -radical 
approaches discussed in the previous chapter finally led. 
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In Les mots et les choses (1966) (translated into English as The Order of 
Things (1970)) Foucault developed an archaeological approach to the writing 
of history. The purpose of his work is no longer regarded as being to comment 
upon past events, but to chart the conditions of emergence of the-present. 
Foucault introduced the notion of the episteme: a systbrh of largely 
unconscious assumptions which are made across disciplines at a particular time 
in a particular cultural cont ext. In The Order of Things he demon'strated the 
presence across the fields of economicg, natuýal history and biology, and 
grammar and philology of similar assumptions during the classical era. The 
Order of Things is Foucault's most clearly structuralist book. Merquior 
(1985; 55) has commented of it: 
Foucault honoured the beartland of the tstructuralist 
revolution': the province of Sauss'ure, Levi-Strauiss, and Lacan. - 
In 1969, Foucault published his methodological' text, L'Archeoloqie du savoir 
(English translation The Archeology of Knowledge, 1972). This was intended 
to offer a critique and justification of ihe methods used in his earlier 
books, Madness and Civilisation, The Birth of the Clinic and The Order of 
Things. In fact, The Archeology of Knowledge argued for the abandonment of 
the concept of the episteme, and substituted a new explanatory concept: that 
of discourse as practice. He emphasized the distance between hi s own method 
and that of the structuralists: 
Structuralists are treated as more latter-day idealists. 
Nietzsche, by contrast, wins a widespread if largely tacit 
acceptance. In 1967 ... Foucault stated that archaeology owed more 
to Nietzschean genealogy than to structuralism. (Merquior, 
1985: 77) 
. 
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Discipline and Punish (published in French 1975 as Surveiller et punir: 
naissance de la prison, English translation 1977) represents Foucault's point 
of commitment to a' 'political' history of knowledge' (Merquior, 1985: 85). 
By this time, Foucault had redefined the role of the intellectual- from the 
viewpoint of the demise of the traditional view of theory. H&nceforth; the 
role of the intellectual is not to be to enlighten the masses by supplying 
theoretical. knowledge. - Instead, it is to undermine and capture authority. 
In the words of Merquior (1985: 85): 
Theory is not like a pair of glasses; it is rather like a pair of 
guns; it does not enable one to see better but td fight better.. 
Until this point, Foucauit's interest in power-, as expressed in'Madness and 
Civilisation, had been concerned primarily-with the repressive use of power 
to exclude and suppress. In Discipline and Punish, he introduced a positive 
understanding of power as not merely repressive (although that is frequently 
the case) but also productive and creati've. The discourses of society 
determine not only who is to be excluded and controlled, but also what kinds 
of people the members of a society become. Foucault's analysis is based upon 
Jeremy Bentham's design for the Panopticon, the archetypal enlightenment 
prison. The Panopticon consisted of a circular viewing tower surrounded by 
a circle of individual cells with the bars pointing inwards. The, warder, 
situated within the viewing tower, was In a position from which he was 
potentially able to observe any prisoner any of the time. The, viewing tower 
was designed so that the warder could look out, but prisoners could not look 
in. Therefore, a prisoner had no way of knowing when he was being watched and 
when he was not. Thus, from the prisoner's point of view, he was effectively 
being observed all the time, and would control his own behaviour . in accordance 
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with this belief. Bentham had designed an institution within which prisoners 
would learn to become self-disciplining with the minimum of input from the 
prison authorities. In fact, very few prisons were ever built accoýding to 
Bentham's design. Foucault uses the design as illustrative of what he sees 
as the typifying features of the Enlightenment approach to 8dcial control. 
He finds similar projects of discipline emerging in the army and the schools 
and the asylums. A pattern emerges of regimentation, examination, and an 
increasing expectation of self-discipli'ne bound not to the expectation of 
punishment, but to the expectation of more regimentation and examination. 
This is the era of emergence of 'technologies of the self', by which Foucault 
means all those techniques by which people are encourAged to reflect upon 
their own person and constitute their selves in a particular way. One learns 
through contemporary discourses to define and create oneself in accordance 
with those discourses. This process is the result not of a process of 
transgression and punishment, but of self-discipline in accordance with the 
expectations of societal discourses. In previous epochs, deviance was 
controlled by chains placed upon the deviant. The chains are now within the 
deviant. Locations of possible transgression are transformed into 'docile 
bodies' with the full co-operation of the potential deviant. 
Foucault's final work, the three part History of Sexuality, consisted of a 
continuing elaboration of the themes of power, discourse and technologies of 
the self, or techniques of the soul. The'emergence is charted of man as a 
fconfessing animal'. Western civilisations do not regiment and control sexual 
behaviour as previous civilisations have done. Rather, they regulate 
sexuality as a subjectively experienced aspect of personality. Through the 
repeated injunction of examine one's self and confess one's deviations and 
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desires, humans learn to constitute themselves as a particular sort of 
subject. 
Foucault's work has produced a variety of reactions. Foucault's English 
translator, Sheridan (1990: 225-6) celebrated Foucault as one, of the most 
important and original thinkers of the century, concluding: 
It is. difficult. to conceive of any thipker having, in the last 
quarter of our century, the influence that'Nietzsche exerted over 
its first quarter. Yet Foucault's achievement so faý makes him 
a more likely candidate than any other. 
Merquior (1985: 159), by contrast,. describes Foucault as: 
a central figure iý a disgraceful metamorphosis 'of continental 
philosophy. 
Certainly, there are problems within Foucault's analysis which require 
critical attention. Firstly, as was indicated above in relation to. Madness 
and Civilisation, Foucault's attention of the, accuracy of historical detail 
is frequently inadequate. Merquior (1985) 'has charted -the historical 
inadequacies of the work, and pointed out that the group of academics for whom 
Foucault has least appeal is professional historians, who find his methods 
shoddy. 
Secondly, the epistemological status of Foucault's work is problematic. He 
has been accused of sharing the anti-rationalist outlook which has been 
attributed to many post-structuralists; for example, Deleuze and Guattari, as 
discussed in section 2. However, Foucault's own attitude to rationalism is 
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less clearly apparent than that of Deleuze and Guattari. Merquior (1985: 160) 
is unremitting in his criticism of Foucault's attitude to rationality. 
The new skepsis, of which Foucault was the first master, has the 
'subversive cynicism'... of preaching irrationalism and intellec t- 
debunking highly placed in core institutions of the cultuýe it so 
strives to undermine: it constitutes an 'official marginality'. 
In its negativism it profits from this, without the least moral 
qualm. 
Leo Strauss 'used to say that in modern. times, t6 more we 
cultivate reason, the more we cultivate nihilism. Foucault has 
shown that it is not at all necessary to do the former in order -- 
to get the latter. 
For Merquior, the most fundamental and cynical flaw in Foucault's work. is his 
attitude towards the concept of truth (1985.: 146-7): 
Foucault is ... deeply suspicious of truth-claims; to him, every 
knowledge, even science, is a tool of the will to power. 
Foucault does not give up at least one truth-claim: that his own 
analytics of power is true... 
There arises a contradiction between the*truth critýe. ria stated by the 
theory (truth is might, not light) and the apparent claim of the theory 
to be itself accepted as true, reqardless of such criteria 
The critique of post-modernism and post-structural ism's rejection of reason 
has been taken up by the Frankfurt School of Critical Theory, notably by 
Jurgen Habermas. Habermas (1981) argued that the various forms of post- 
modernism were a form of attacks on modernity which had precursors in 
irrationalist and counter-Enlightenment theories, i9cluding the work of 
Nietzsche and Heidegger. He considered that postmod6rnism exhibits di. sturbing 
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kinship with fascism (Kellner, 1988: 263). Habermas does not defend modernism 
as a complete world view. He criticizes the 'aesthetic modernity' of the 
nineteenth century, which he concludes is now dead, but distinguishes between 
that and societal modernization, interpreted in the Enlightenment s-e nse of a 
process of cultural differentiation. Societal modernizatfoh entails' the 
development of autonomous criteria of rationality and universality in fields 
such as knoVledge, morality and justice. Habermas consider's that, in spite 
of the problems produced by the expans: ion of 'the technological-scientific 
world view, modernfty still has 'unrealized potential in increasing social 
rationality, justice and morality. ' (Kellner, 1988: 264). 
Foucault did at times consciously and del iberatefly identify himself with post- 
structuralist theorists who were blatant in their rejedtion of reason. For 
example, Foucault contributed the preface to.; the English translation of Anti- 
Oedipus, and offered his whole hearted support to this use of Lacan. In his 
preface to the book he wrote: 
Anti-Oedipus is a book of ethics ... H& does one keep from being 
a fascist, even (especially) when one believes oneself to be a 
revolutionary militant? ... one might say that Anti- 
bedipus is an 
Introduction to the Non-Fascist Life ... This art of living counter 
to all forms of fascism... carries with it a certain number of 
essential principles. 
These principles include rejecting the use of thought 'to ground a political 
practice in Truth'. In addition, one must not ask politics to restore the 
rights of the individual, since the individual is the product of power. The 
aim of the struggle against fascism must be de-individ. ualization (Foucault 
in Deleuze and Guattari, 1977: xiii-xiv). ConventionA lly, -de-ind-i'vidua-lization 
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is a process more commonly associated with fascism than with any struggle 
against it, lending support to Habermas' (1981) thesis that poststructuralism 
is itself a version of fascism. 
However, other interpreters of Foucault's work have adopted an Approach which 
casts Foucault as a questioner, rather than a rejector, of the power of 
reason. His. critique of the Enlightenment may, be taken not a's a r'ejection of 
Enlightenment principles, but as a turning 'back of the principles of 
Enlightenment upon themselves in order to examine whether ihe Enlightenment 
can withstand the power of its own scrutiny. For example, Gordon (1986: 271) 
draws a distinction between abandoning rationality a: s the lynch-pin of 
academic discourse, which is what. Foucault has on occasion been interpreted 
as having done, and turning rational sc*rutiny back up6n itself in a self- 
critical fashion, which is what Foucault in fýict aimed to do in Gordon's view: 
Esteem for the Enlightenment idea is one thing; unwillingness to 
scrutinize its sequels, on the other hand, itself a pious 
betrayal of its real meaning. (271) 
Gordon believes that such an interpretation of Foucault's work alters 
dramatically the use which can legitimately be made of it. . 
ýpecifically, it 
prevents the use of Foucault to bolster the arguments of social control 
theories opposing psychiatry. A social control theorist might argue that 
psychiatry is simply a pseudo-scientific tool for the control of deviance. 
Foucault has demonstrated that even rationality is merely a form of social 
control. Therefore Foucault supports the view that psychiatry is merely a 
form of social control which ought to be abolished. However, if Foucault is 
regarded as an explorer of the limits of rationality, then the question to be 
asked of psychiatry is how the discipline constructs its view of rationality 
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and whose values this rationality exists to serve at a particular time and 
place. In Gordon's words: 
The deviancy theorists who thought Foucault supported their 
positions were in fact inverting his argument... Foucault places 
the concept of deviance as part of the problem, not part of the 
answer, for a history of madness... 
To copcede the. existence of 'madness' as an anthropological 
quasi-universal arguably makes it'easier'to allow proper weight 
to the immenýely variable character and effect of whk Foucault 
called the 'experience of madness', a term intended here to mean 
principally the social experience of the treatmdnt of madness 
within a society and corresponding structures of general social 
experience. 
.0 
Gordon (1986) examines the emergence and role of psychiatry in Western liberal 
democratic societies and concludes that democracy and psychiatry are 
inseparable, mutually supportive social systems. This is a view to, which I 
shall return in future chapters, in reference to contemporary critiques of 
psychiatry whose basis is in democracy rather than anti-psychiatry. 
Notably, Habermas (1986) came to conclude also that the contradictions which 
existed within Foucault's work were perhaps more productive than otherwise. 
Habermas continues to believe that Foucault-s own accounts are deprived of the 
normative yardsticks which he would have to borrow from conventional concepts 
of truth. But he also suggests that the value of Foucault's work lies in: 
the seriousness with which he perseveres under productive 
contradictions. Only a complex thinking produpes instructive 
contradictions... Perhaps the force of this cýontradictioin caught 
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up with Foucault in this last of his texts, drawing him again 
into the circle of the philosophical discourse of modernity which 
he thought he could explode. (. Habermas, 1986: 107-8) 
In conclusion, the work of Foucault has been a source of great controversy, 
and perhaps epitomises in clear form 'the love-hate relationship with the 
structuraliqt mind which came to prevail, in Parisian culture, from the late 
1960s on' (Merquior, 1991: 13). Some commentators, for example Merquior, have 
rejected his work ''entirely. as dangerously ant. i-rati. onal'ist in outlook. 
However, an alternative reading of Foucault regards him not as a rejector of 
reason and preacher of anti-rational ism, but as a sober 'critic of the. limits 
of reason, and the political uses to which the Enlightenment ideal has 
frequently been put. For example, Gordon' reads Foucault ýs a commentator upon 
the values which modern societies have espoused, and the ways in which 
rationalism has been used to promote and enforce these values. This is a use 
of Foucault and postmodernism which may be a constructive basis for a 
political critique of psychiatry. 
An example of this use of Foucault's approach, i, n the contd)ýt'of French anti- 
psychiatry, is found in the work of Castel, Castel and Lovell's (1982) work 
on mental health expansionism in America. Castel et al use Foucault's concept 
of technologies of the self, and the dispersal of forms of discipline 
throughout society, to question the wisdom of the expansion of the 'psy' 
professions throughout America. They suggest that the anti -psychi atri c 
opposition to overtly coercive and medical. ised forms of social control has 
produced the supplementation of such techniques with a range of less overtly 
coercive 'psy' techniques for the production of docility. Such techniques 
operate with the full consent and co-operation of the subject', ' and can thus 
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expand unchecked throughout society. Castel et al question the innocence of 
such practices. 
5. Impact of Structuralist and Poststructuralist Theories on British Thought. 
5.1 The impact of Michel Foucault. 
Generally, the work of Foucault has had 9 greatije impact upon British thought 
than that of Lacan. - The use to which Foucault's. theories fiave been put has 
varied along the dimensions already discussed; that is whether Foucault is 
read as a poststructuralist prophet of unreason, or as aý theorist engaged on 
the more modest task of subjecting Enlightenment claims of rationality to 
self-scrutiny. Where Fo6cault has beed adopted. in pu-'re poststructuralist 
form, he has become a straightforward adjuncý to existing theories of social 
control. The mental health literature is full of examples of this use of 
Foucault to supplement existing social control theories; for example, Ussher 
(1991) quotes extensively from Foucault ih support of her argume. nt that 
psychiatry is, and historically always has -been, used to oppress women. 
However, she does not identify anything within Foucault's approach which might 
qffer a route out of her dilemma, which is the contradiction between academic 
feminist critiques of psychiaýry as social control and the reality of need for 
assistance amongst ordinary women (see also chapter 4). Rather, Foucault is 
quoted as simply one more theorist exposing, the pernicious political function 
of psychiatry. 
An alternative use of Foucault is to be found in Miller and Rose's The Power 
of Psychiatry. Matthews (1989) considers that Miller and Rose's (1986) 
reading of Foucault: 
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offer(s] a distinctly different theoretical approach and one 
which allows an understanding of social regulation which is not 
reduced to the operation of the state on one hand and avoids the 
vague generalisations which have become associated with the 
social control perspective on the other. .1 
Miller and Rose criticize earlier approaches to, the politics of psychiatry for 
being overly concerned with the repressive, 'cobrdive and institutional aspects 
of psychiatry. Anti-psychiatry was concerned largely with opposing the 
medicalisation of deviance and the application of physical treatments to 
deviants, frequently against their will. The attack on Osychiatry was based 
upon: 
The assertion that the object of psychiatric knowledge and 
technique - 'mental illness' - either did not exist as an 
objective phenomenon or did not exist as an illness appropriate 
for medical attention. (Miller and R6se, 1.986: 2) 
Such critiques did not deal adequately with' the reali . ty * of severe and 
4zrippling mental distress. Since the 1960s, Miller and Rose note that there 
has been a greater willingness to take seriously the problems of'the mentally 
distressed, but they consider that to approach the politics of psychiatry from 
this angle is fundamentally flawed. 
an analysis of the reality of mental distress cannot serve to 
establish what psychiatry is, or where it could or shoul. d 
go .... Rather than seeking to base our criticism-of psychiatry 
upon the truth of madness, these studies reveese the direiftion of 
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investigation; they suggest that it is more productive to take 
the reality of psychiatry rather than the reality of mental 
distress as the point of departure for our inquiries. (Miller 
and Rose, 1986: 3) 
Miller (1986) extends this critique to the critical sociologies of madness 
which emerged during the 1970s and theorised psychiatry as a form of social 
control serving the capitalist state. HO- regards Andrew Scull as the leading 
British proponent 6f this view. The approach is criti. cis6d for adopting a 
dogmatically simplistic understanding of what psychiatry is and does, based 
upon the assumption that its functions have not been modified at all since its 
emergence five hundred years ago (Miller 1986: 27-8). However, Miller 
considers that the important factor which has developed*out of the continued 
effort to make social control theories of psychiatry work is a refined 
understanding of the concept of social control. Miller notes that it is only 
recently that social control has become a term of scorn. In the writings of 
Ross and George Herbert Mead it was a term (if approbation. Miller discusses 
French historiographies of madness, primarily the work of Foucault and Castel, 
and the importance of social control as a positive notion' becomes apparent. 
He adopts the Foucauldian view that power is not merely repressive but also 
productive and constitutive. It is not the case that human beings consist of 
a potential 'real self' whose emergence to its full glory is hindered to a 
greater or lesser extent by repression from a powerful source, as was the 
scenario described by Laing. Rather, the self is the product, of discourses 
which are themselves the expression of power relations in society as a whole. 
As Miller and Rose comment, this is: 
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an analysis (which] would not view power as some kind of 
monolithic and malign presence, to which we must oppose ourselves 
and which we must strive to abolish. Rather, it would analyze 
the power of psychiatry in terms of what it makes thinkable and 
possible, the new objectives to which it allows us to aso, i're,. the 
new types of problem it allows us to conceive, the new types of 
soluti. on it inserts into our reality. (Miller and Rose, 19*86: 2) 
A further differenc6'between this account and the social Pont . rol accounts lies 
in their understanding of the source of power. For the social co'ntrol 
accounts, power is invested in the capitalist state, and 'operates to preserve 
the capitalist economic and social system. This 'Foucauldian' account sees 
power as not a-unitary phenomenon, -but' one which is dispersed throughout 
society, amongst different social groups and individuals. This power consists 
primarily of the ability to control the discourses which dominate a given 
society, and therefore to define reality, including understandings of 
selfhood. This account of psychiatry and -mental health is one which has 
achieved much popularity in recent years -in-academic circles. It is the 
reading of Foucault which underpins Gordoh's (1986) account of the 
relationship between psychiatry and democracy. 
5.2 The impact of Jacques Lacan. 
An example of the use of Lacanian psychoanalysis to found a. n alternative 
political critique of psychiatry to that offered by anti-psychiatry is 
illustrated by Ingleby (1981). Ingleby reiterated the critique of positivist 
approaches to mental illness. He then offered a critique of what he termed 
cnormalizing' interpretative approaches. He used this terrh" to refer to 
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approaches such as that of Laing and the British anti-psychiatrists, whose 
thrust was to reduce the apparent pathology of psychotic conditions, by 
demonstrating that such experiences and behaviour could make sense if 
approached within the framework of their proper social context. He noted that 
two key ideas in anti-psychiatry were the views that 'sick", ' behaviour is 
either a form of protest or a kind of self-cure. Ingleby considers these 
two views to be the weakest plank in the anti7psychiatric platfo'rm, and one 
which in fact was attacked most strongly by the Left (including Sedgwick, 
mitchell, Gleiss and Jacoby) as a romanticisation of the 'circumstances of 
mentally ill people. Ingleby argues that: 
the real point, surely, is, not that psychiatric problems lack 
political significance, but that they are not eff6ctive forms of 
social action. 
For the 'symptom as protest' view glosses over the differences 
between the kinds of behaviour that psychiatrists deal with, and 
conscious, socially intelligible and potentially effective forms 
of protest. (56) 
similarly, in the case of 'symptom as self-cure', 
If such symptoms are attempts at self-cure, they are neither 
deliberate nor effective ones. (57) 
Ingleby regards the problem with normalizing approaches as very obvious: 'if 
the behaviour is really intelligible in commonsense terms, why was it regarded 
as a psychiatric problem in the first place? * (Ingleby, 'i981: 6o) He 
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acknowledges that there are possible answers to this question in terms of 
ignorance and deliberate malice. However, he concludes that to explain all 
psychiatric diagnoses in these terms. constitutes 'a tall story'. There is a 
residue in most 'mental illness' which defies ordinary understand ing and 
empathy. 
The normalizing approach exaggerates the, extent to which rational 
free-will operates in psychiatric 'conditions; they are not just, 
as Szasz would have it, 'problems of living', but. a býeakdown of 
the problem-solving ability itself. (60) 
The problem is essentially that identified by Coulter (1973), in arguing that 
ascriptions of insanity are made by reas 
_0ý 
of cultural co9nitive incompetence. 
Ingleby identif ies the problem as being one -of trying to reconci le f ree-wi 11 
and determinism. Positivist accounts offer' a view of the behaviour of 
mentally ill people which is straightforwardly deterministic. Normalizing 
approaches counter this with an approach which simply opposes determinism with 
free-will. Ingleby argues for an approach which can transcend this simple 
opposition. 
What is required is a way of accounting for experience and 
behaviour in terms of meanings*, but not necessarily ones which 
are consciously appreciated either by the agent or his fellows; 
... What has to be replaced is not only the positivist myth of man 
as machine, but also what Marcuse calls 'the myth of autonomous 
man'. which interpretative theorists are equally prone to. 
(Ingleby, 1981: 61) 
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Ingleby proposes replacing the notion of the unity of the self with Freud's 
conception of man as 'fragmented, self-contradictory, and alienated from his 
own experience'. This will allow an. appreciation of the meanings hidden in 
mad' behaviour and experience to emerge without losing sight of the suffering 
and vulnerability which accompanies them. There follows an account of 
psychoanalysis which owes much to Lacan. 
Ingleby here provides a great step f6rward 'in the debate around anti- 
psychiatry, in ack . nowledging the distinction between. beýaviour which is 
meaningful and behaviour which is rational and effective. Thus, he transcends 
the problematic association between anti-psychiatry and right -wing 
libertarianism. However, he perpetuates the argument that a radical approach 
to psychiatry must be one which argueý that psychiatric theory must be 
psychological rather than physiological in i* ts forms of explanation. Mental 
illness must be a psychologically theorisable response to social conditions 
which is able to be rendered meaningful in Lacanian psychoanalytic terms, even 
though it is not classifiable as effectiVe and rational action. Thus, 
although he has been influenced by Coulter! s (1973) argument, that insanity 
ascription must be considered in terms of cognitive cornpetence, Ingleby 
continues to propose a theory of the origin and truth of mental disorder which 
is derived from psychoanalytic theory. It is not until the emergence of 
Miller and Rose's (1986) account of psychiatry, based upon a reading of 
Foucault which is not anti-rationalist, that anybody produced an account of 
psychiatry similar to Coulter's view; that is, that the key to understanding 
psychiatry is cultural cognitive competence. A political sociology of 
psych i at ry must add ress i tse 1f to the standa rds of rat i ona 1i ty ex i st i ng wi th in 
liberal democratic society (cf. discussion above of Miller and Rose (1986) 
and Gordon (1986). ) 
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In general, Foucault has been a more popular and influential theorist in terms 
of the politics of mental health in Britain than has Lacan. The main impact 
of Lacanian psychoanalysis has been in the field of cultural studies, where 
post-structuralist forms of psychoanalysis have been brought to bear. upon the 
analysis of texts; for example, Donald, 1991). 
6. Related Viewpoints in the Context of contemporary British Thought. 
An interesting viewpoint in the context is provided by Prof. jenner, Professor 
of Psychiatry at the University of Sheffield until 1992. Jenner's views do 
not appear to be poststructuralist in origin, but bear'some resemblance to 
that school of thought, and are. influenced by the work of Wittgenstein, 
another twentieth centuri philosopher who shared the 4phasis upon language 
as the embodiment of values. Jenner begp his psychia. tric career as a 
researcher into the biochemistry of mental disorder, an occupation which he 
continued into the 1970s. However, he already had a long-standing interest 
in more philosophical approaches to mental disorder, and what he described in 
interview as 'the philosophy of knowledge'. - Jenner knew Laing from the 1960s 
onwards and was interested in his ideas. Howev6r, his own *\ýiews differ quite 
substantially from those of Laing, notably with respect to the degree of 
freedom and responsibility which Laing was prepared to attribute to people 
regardless of their mental state. 
Laing it seems to me is really a follower of Sartre ... Sartre and 
Laing took the view that it's totally inauthentic to see man as 
not really free, it's predicated on this... (view] that they can 
be cowed by all sorts of bad faith or being -fooled and so on but 
there is a sense in which they are free'. to producii theIr 
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world ... I think [Laing's] concept of what is possible in terms of 
human freedom is wrong. 
He was similarly critical of Laing's insistence on the mystical -value of 
psychotic experience: 
He war? a mystic. really, he was always trying to find mystical 
answers to the nature of the univefte and'so on, and I think when 
he sees psycfiosis as a valuable mystical pxperi. ence I didn't 
think much of that. 
Although Jenner disagreed with those elements in Laing's work which he felt 
overemphasized the possibility of freed6m, he regarded 'this overemphasis on 
freedom as far more characteristic of and central to the work of Szasz, whose 
views he disagreed with on political grounds. 
Szasz has a right wing philosophy which on the whole I don't 
like. I mean he says that his views are necessary in order to 
preserve the American society, by which he's sort of ; saying that 
the individualistic capitalist enterprise of the jungle, real-ly, 
is the only basis on which human beings can live ... I' think 
there's an element in Szasz which lacks compassion. 
He also rejected on logical grounds Szaszs view that mental illness is a myth 
(ie. Proposition 1 of the 'anti-psychiatric attitudes' listed in Chapter 1): 
Sedgwick's criticism of Szasz.. I would accept that ... I would 
take the Wittgensteinian view that words. '.. have mea-riing In 
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context ... There's something unphilosophical about [Szasz's] 
failure to see the similarity of the concept of illness in mental 
and physical illnesses. But. even more than that, I would be 
rather sort of critical, I mean, I don't mind what you call the 
problems this person has in living... I'm more interested'in what 
we're going to do about it. 
Jenner's own views were similar to postsýtructuýalist theorists in reflecting 
an interest in how values are embodied in and expressed through language, and 
the extent to which 'reality' is a product of social consensus rather than 
direct experience. This was a view which Laing did not'share: 
I held a theory of course which is not really Laing, he used to 
push it on one side, that normality is.; always complicity really. 
What we call a normal person is a person-who's complicit with the 
norms of his society. 
He illustrated this by means of a metaphor, comparing society to a caravan 
travelling through the desert. If a group of people decide they don't agree 
with the way the caravan is travelling, and set off together in a-different 
direction, you have a sub-culture. But if one person leaves the caravan 
alone, then she disappears into the desert in isolation: 
My concept of this problem is really that we are almost. trapped 
in a sociological prison, it's a very historistic (sic] sort of 
view of the very limited nature of reality outside a historical 
position ... the problem with the schizophrenic is that at a very 
192 
fundamental level he tries to live out of it because it doesn't 
pay him to live in it, he doesn't see it pays him. 
Jenner was not impressed by the extreme anti-psychiatry of some user, groups. 
Asked whether he thought the user movement was fundamentally a'gti-psychidtry, 
he replied: 
Well, it is profoundly so, isn't it'. in *a way. Necessarily so, 
but a liftle stupidly so ... they're... friqhteneý of the 
psychiatrists in a way. 
However, he made an interesting point in relatIon to anti -psychiatric users 
seeking to abolish psychiatry, which-again relates to his poststructuralist- 
like view point. 
I tell the students that psychiatry is like a country in Europe, 
it's a product of socio-historical processes and battles between 
different professions and it now owns. an area which has been 
given it by society and it owns an area which is defined by words 
like mental illness, and then of course there's no defence of the 
borders of Luxembourg other than tradition. So I think in a way 
the users' group is out to abolish psychiatry, but doesn't 
realise of course that when you've got rid of the state of 
Luxembourg it still exists. What I mean by that is that the 
territory exists, the problems exist, the problems are real ... 
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I think the intelligent part of the user movement does realise 
what I'm saying. That there needs to be some sort of helping 
situation. 
Jenner supported far greater user-involvement in the managemen, t and delivery 
of mental health se. rvices than exists at present. * But in similar context, he 
expressed do. ubts about. the extent to which user, - i nvol vement was possible, and 
doubted whether a 100% user-run service Would be possible or desirable simply 
because of the exteht of handicap experienced by 4 propqrtion of psychiatric 
patients. 
You can dismiss psychiatry. .. even you can dismiss the word mental 
illness, but you can't dismiss the Whole problem. *That there are 
states in which human judgement is..; very damaged, you can't 
contract out of having the courage to say to some people I know 
I'm usually wrong and often wrong and I'm a human being and 
fallible but I'm pretty sure that you're in a bad way at the 
moment. 
i. enner's views about the problem of responsibility are also interesting. 
Jenner has little interest in abstract concepts such as responsibility or 
justice. 
On the whole my view is that if people are in the hospital 
violent or - these sorts of things should be dealt with by the 
police and society, and asking how much we're going to tolerate 
of this. The psychiatrist should only be asked can you stop it, 
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which is frankly not a matter of justice. I think justice is one 
of these illusory concept in a way. 
The question of responsibility arises for Jenner only insofar as he'regards 
it as untherapeutic for a patient not to be held responsible: 
To haye it said to you that you can't help it because you're ill 
is'anti-therapeutic. 
Ideally, he would wish to hold people responsible for their actions as far as 
possible, and to reduce the distinction between crimi6al institutions and 
psychiatric institutions. 
I think society has to decide what it's going to-do with its 
violent members really. On the whole I-am in favour of sending 
them to prison. But spending a lot of time making prisons humane. 
places and also of involving people therapeutically in them. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has examined thý origins and impact of structuralism and post- 
structuralism on the politics of mental health, with particular reference to 
the impact of Lacan and Foucault. Both thinkers have been found influential 
in providing the foundations for a new political approach to psychiatry. 
There ideas have been subjected to criticism, particularly at the point at 
which structuralist analysis mutates into post-structu, ralism, and the truth 
status of narratives which themselves purport to deny truth and rationality 
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becomes problematic. The problems inherent in such an approach become 
apparent when post-structural ism is used to argue against the use of knowledge 
in the service of social control. Social control critiques have a tendency 
to degenerate into a nihilistic rejection of whatever policy is proposed, 
leaving anarchy as the only tenable 'policy'. However, the wb. fk of Foudault 
-in particular has 1. aid the foundations for a new critique of psychiatry, the 
focus of which is now -removed from issues concerning the ýtrue nature' of 
mental illness, and is turned towardd a consideration of the political 
functions of psychiatry as a tech nology. A promising stari in this type of 
analysis has been made in Britain by Miller and Rose (1986). 
196 
Chapter 6 The Italian Experience 
1. Historical Account. 
The events taking place within the Italian mental health system' did not really 
begin to impact upon British thought until the mid-1970s. However, the 
background to the changes began far earlier, Auring the ea'l^ly i960s. The 
changes in Italy originate from the campaigning and reforming zeal of one 
psychiatrist, FrancO'Basaglia (1924-1980). Lovell and Scbepeý-Hughes (1987: 3) 
have asserted that 'the itinerary of the Italian psychiatrist, Franco 
Basagl ia... marks an epistemological break, and hence a' new- chapter An the 
contemporary history of European psychiatry. ' 
Firstly, to place the changes in Italy in coptext, the psychiatric system in 
Italy was extremely backward by European standards at the time when Basa§lia 
first went to work at Gorizia. The Italian asylums were then still regulated 
by the law of 1904, the Italian equivalent -of the English Lunacy Apt 1890, 
which allowed admission to an asylum only as a compulsory patient. The 
emphasis of this legislation was upon protecting society from those who were 
deemed dangerous by reason of mental illness (Tranchina, Archi and Ferrar, 
1981: 182). Not until 1968 did Italy pass the equivalent of the Mental 
Treatment Act (MTA) 1930 or the Mental Health Act (MHA) 1959, legislating for 
any form of non-compulsory admission and treatment at all. Thus, the 
situation in Italy was very different from that in Britain. The MHA in this 
country was passed as a result of liberalisation within- the psychiatric 
profession and amongst the educated public. It then became itself a target 
for the critics of psychiatry, who centred their critique of psychiatry upon 
the medicalisation and compulsory control of psydho-social cf6viance. The 
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British and American radical mental health movements both tended to launch a 
legalistically based 'anti-therapeutic state' backlash against the welfare 
state type legislation, based upon, an individualistic concept of negative 
rights. However, the Italian 1968 equivalent'of the MHA was itself the result 
of pressure for reform from the worker and student movements (Tranchina et al , 
1981: 183). The impetus of radical reform in Italy has subsequently tended to 
press for m9re changes- in the same directiorl: more collectively organised 
welfare 
ýnd national health services, and less formal legal control. The 
Italians have not idopted an individualistic defence of inaividual negative 
rights. The British MHA has often been regarded as a triumph for the power 
of psychiatry (for example, Baruch and Treacher, 1978: 4). The Italian law of 
1968 was and is received as a triumph for the radical opponents of psychiatry. 
In Britain, 'radical' psichiatrists are 'viewed with sonie suspicion by other 
mental health workers and service users. In., Italy, the changes were largely 
driven by radical psychiatrists. 
Basaglia graduated in medicine in 1949, ahd from then until 1961. held a 
position at the Neuropsychiatric Clinic of Padua. During this time, he 
embraced existential phenomenology as the onl)( existing alternative to the 
dominant organicism of Italian psychiatry. In 1961, he became director of the 
mental hospital in Gorizia. Here he found that, in practice, the 
phenomenological approach was inadequate in that it failed to address the 
reality of his patients' suffering (Lovell-and Scheper-Hughes, 1987: 7). 
However, Basaglia did not abandon phenomenol. ogy. He continued to approach his 
patients with a concern for their subjectivity which caused some cri. tics to 
accuse him of denying the existence of mental. illness. -But he was bleginning 
to search for more effective ways of helping his patieHts than the 
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individualistic therapies derived from existentialist and phenomenological 
analyses. 
During the 1960s, Basaglia visited England and was impressed by the work he 
saw being done by Maxwell Jones at Dingleton. The theory of the therapeutic 
community became the starting point for Basaglia's reform of the mental health 
system in Go. rizia. He. -and his colleagues at Gorizia began to institute an 
open door policy, involving two main changes in' the way the asylum was run 
(Lovell and Scheper-Hughes, . 1987: 13ff). Firstly, they cýeated paid work 
within the hospital. This gave patients a reason to leave their wards, and 
ended the stagnation and emptiness which characterised' life on the wards. 
such work was very different from the 'ergo-therapy' which had been practised 
previously, and had amounted to no more than the exploitation of patients as 
cheap labour. Secondly, Basaglia instituted.. the daily assemblea, a gathering 
of patients and staff. Such meetings were derived from the theory of the 
therapeutic community, but operated in ways which were quite different from 
a therapeutic community group meeting, - operating as a 'stage for 
confrontation', and avoiding the psychoanalytic interpretations which 
characterised the traditional therapeutic community meetin'gs (Lovell and 
Sicheper-Hughes, 1987: 14-15). 
The assemblee became part of a process of 'collectivization of responsibility 
for the consequences of behaviour'. That- is, through the large meetings, 
hospital patients and staff began to feel responsible for one another's 
actions and their outcome. All accepted that they had some responsibility for 
mutual care and support, and that no one individual was isolated form the care 
and intervention of the others. A good example of this occurred in 1968, when 
Basaglia was indicted for manslaughter after a patient he had"released into 
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the community murdered his wife. The assemblee refused to allow Basaglia to 
be held responsible, and accepted shared responsibility for the error of 
judgement. 
Already, by the late 1960s, the staff at Gorizia had moved far beyond* the 
therapeutic community techniques they had borrowed from England. The 
therapeutic pommunities-in En gland had never questioned their own'underlying 
power-structures and lines of authority. ' At G&izia, the operation of power 
was regarded as fu6damental to the institution as it had 'evolved, and the 
process of reforming the institution necessarily involved analysing and 
rendering explicit the power relationships which existed. Finally., Gorizia 
moved beyond the therapeutic community approach altogether, the second stage 
of Basaglia's reform being the total-abo'lition of-the ibstitution. 
In 1968, the group decided to begin to spread their reforms to other regions 
of Italy. The decision was timely because, as in the rest of Europe and 
Americaj the student and worker movement tWas at its height and promoting 
values which corresponded well with the -anti-hierarchical and anti- 
authoritarian nature of the Gorizian experiment (Lovell and Scheper-Hughes, 
1.987: 20). 
In Italy, students and worker occupied in protest not only factories, 
universities and schools, but psychiatric hospitals. It was an appropriate 
moment at which to be launching a movement for the liberation of mental 
patients. The publication of Basaglia's Instituti Negata in 1974 provided a 
further impetus to the spread of his ideas. 
200 
In 1969, Basaglia moved to Parma, where he began to recognise the necessity 
of working not only with the patients themselves, but with the community to 
which they were to be returned. The. community must be educated and assisted 
so that the people would be more than merely passively tolerant of the ex- 
patient population being moved into their midst. A further very practIcal 
problem was to Provide alternative provision to prevent those discharged from 
the hospital from becoming an added burden on already poor and struggling 
families. ' 
Also at this time, Basaglia's colleagues from Gorizia were moving to other 
cities to spread the work: Giovanii Jer vis to Reggio Emilia,, Agostino-Pirell 
to Arezzo. The city of Perugia had begun its own reform programm similar to 
that in Gorizia in 1965. In 1970. Perugia set up a network of 9 community 
health centres. Lovell and Scheper-Hughes., (1987: 26-7) observe that these 
community centres became increasingly psychotherapeutic in orientation, and 
that this highlights a divergence which emerged in the Italian movement 
between those who thought that psychiatric sUffering has a specific ity of its 
own which required specific interventions., and those who believed that a 
totally depsychiatrized model of welfare assistance was'mo*re appropriate. 
This division parallels the division noted amongst the British anti-psychiatry 
movement during the early 100s, with a split developing between those. most 
interested in new and radical forms of psychotherapy, and those interested 
primarily in social reform. It is a division which continues to exist in the 
contemporary British user movement, between those who regard, all forms of 
texpert' theorising and intervention pernic. ious, and those who argue that it 
can be helpful and non-coercive. Interestingly, Lovell and Scheper-i-H. ughes 
(1987: 27) argue that the two approaches are ideal types which are, in 
practice, far less divergent than may at first appear. They p6int out that, 
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although Basaglia and his followers never codified their approach to working 
with patients, they nevertheless clearly did follow a method of working with 
people which could be termed therapeutic. The distinction between 
psychotherapeutic and non-therapeutic interventions cannot be finely- drawn. 
Thus, Scheper-Hughes and Lovell appear to be arguing that there can be no 
professional intervention at all without some at least implicit expert theory 
of the causes and treatment of distress. Psychotherapy cannot be abolished 
as long as there are any professionals 'remaining at all. A similar issue 
emergeswithin those user groupswhich wish to see therapy abolished entirely. 
In practice, such groups tend to reinstate practices which are para- 
therapeutic, although this is not overtly acknowledged. ' (See Chapters 4 and 
9 for full discussion. ) 
The anti-institutional movement produced its most complete expression in 
Trieste. Basaglia became director of the Psychiatric Hospital of Trieste in 
1971. The movement here took place on two fronts, the hospital and the 
community. A new legal status was created, - that-of ospite or guest. This 
category consisted of those who were either unable or unwilling to leave the 
hospital. But as ospite they suffered none of the restrictions of civil 
rights or liberty which-they had experienced as patients. No treatment was 
mandatory. In addition, the hospital property was opened up as a resource for 
the whole local community. The traffic in Trieste was not one way, out of the 
hospital, but involved people coming and -going and the transformation of 
function of the actual bricks and mortar which remained of the. hospital into 
a centre for local arts and culture. The arts were used not only to give 
local people an. incentive to come into the hospital, but to illustrate the 
aims of the work being done and sensitize local people to the issues. 
Eventually, six alternative community mental health centres vý6re set. up to 
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provide care outside the institution. By the time Basaglia left Trieste to 
take over psychiatric services in Rome in 1979, the hospital was completely 
empty. 
In 1976, professionafs involved and interested in Basaglia's'work organised 
themselves into a political group which they named Psichiatria Democratica 
(PD), which translates. as Democratic Psychiatry. This group was involved not 
only in implementing actual reform withih the hospitals, but in lobbying for 
political support f6r the reforms. During the 1970s, the Lýft in Italy were 
concerned with issues of health and welfare. By 1977, most of the poli tical 
parties were drafting proposals for a national health s6rvice, within which 
the mental health services were -to be included, and which was to involve 
overall reform of mental health legislation along similaý lines to the reforms 
introduced throughout Europe in earlier decad. es and embodied in Britain in the 
MHA. However, before the legislation could -be passed, the Radical Party 
produced a petition calling for a referendum which, if passed, would have 
resulted in the total abolition of commitmdnt procedures and public mental 
hospitals without alternative community-based provision. In response to this 
threat, the Christian-Democrat Party supported by the Commu. nist Party pushed 
through legislation very quickly to avert the disastrous consequences which 
would ensue. This legislation was drafted in close consultation with 
Basaglia, and became Law 180. 
Lovell and Scheper-Hughes (1987: 35) note that the law was a compromise 
measure, although it did reflect some basic tenets of Basaglia's work, 
particularly the dismantling of the asylum system and the decriminalIzation 
and depsychiatrization of mental illness. Compromises included the retention 
of a form of involuntary commitment, and the exclusion of foren'sic hospitals, 
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private hospitals, and university clinics from its jurisdiction. The basic 
premise of Law 180 is that all psychiatric treatment and evaluation should be 
voluntary. New admissions to psychiatric asylums were frozen and all current 
and chronic patients were to be gradually discharged. In the -meantime 
existing hospitals were to be unlocked and their patients' 'civil rights 
returned to them. No new hospitals were to be built. Evaluation and 
treatment were to be provided in community facilities. Some crisis beds were 
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made available in local general hospitalt, but these were to provide no more 
than 15 beds, and compulsory hospitalization was not to last ýore than fifteen 
days, with judicial reviews required after two and seven days. ' The 
significance of the law is that its unambiguous goal is'the -total abolition 
of the state mental hospital system and, more importantly, that it recasts the 
relationship between law and psychiatry so that da ngerousýness is no longer the 
rationale for compulsory treatment and segregýtion. Law 180 destigmatises the 
psychiatric patient: mental illness is no longer treated as a special case of 
illness that allows for special violations of the patient's civil rights. 
'Commitment is no longer hidden behind ei medical mask and confounding 
psychiatric language and expertise' (Lovell and Scheper-Hughes, 1987: 35-6). 
Once in place, the law proved more difficult to implement than. had been 
expected. Opposition to Ba"saglia's work came from biodeterministically- 
oriented psychiatrists and classical psychotherapists. Hospital nursing staff 
joined the backlash out of fear of losing-their jobs. Ministers of health 
after 1978 repeatedly delayed full implementation of the law, cind offered no 
consistent leadership. By 1983, implementation of the law had been extremely 
patchy. Cities which had been advanced in reform prior to 1978, such as 
Trieste, Arezzo, Ferrara, and Perugia, had acted most completely in accord 
with the spirit of the law. In some other northern cities : §Uch as Genoa, 
204 
Turin, and Venice, deinstitutionalization efforts were underway, but progress 
was limited. In the South particularly the law had either not been 
implemented, or was applied in a solely negative manner, local authorities and 
service providers treating it as an opportunity to relinquish responsibility 
for the care of patients (Lovell and Scheper-Hughes, 1987: 37)ý' 
Lovell and Scheper-Hughes (1987: 38ff) consider that neglect, sabotage and 
incompete nce can explain only part of the problem of the failure of Law 180 
to secure reform. At least-some of the blame must be, placed on structural 
aspects of the law stemming from its origin as a compromise measure. Firstly, 
the only service that is specifically required to be pr6vided by law. is the 
Diagnosis and Treatment Unit (SDC), containi. ng a maximum of fifteen beds. 
Such units are generally locked and -heavily reliant upon medication -as the 
treatment of choice. This highly medicalizeo provision is quite contrary to 
the spirit and purpose behind the work of Basaglia and his colleagues. 
community services have not been mandated and therefore tend not to be funded, 
so that-the SDC is frequently the only place patients can fall back on in 
timeg of acute distress. In addition, the fifteen day limit on compulsory 
admission has been subverted by multiple readmissions Secondly, the 
legislation did not provide adequate regulations, mechanisms and funding for 
community alternatives, so that there is wide variation across the country in 
the level of provision different areas have found it possible or desirable to 
provide. Giannichedda (1989: 13) identities three different 'Italies', 
characterised by: the successful implementation of Law 180; north-European 
reformism (which retains a greater use of hospital wards); ýand the south of 
the country, where little has changed. 
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Tranchina, Archi and Ferrara (1981: 189-90) acknowledged some of the ways in 
which the law had still by that time not met achieved its objectives. They 
too noted the growing divide between the north and South of the country in 
implementation of the law. They identified the main problems as being a lack 
of community-based facilities, existing repression in many of the services of 
cure and diagnosis based in general hospitals, and administrative delays. In 
addition, they also identified flaws within the legislation, such as the 
failure to integrate criminal asylums within the reform, and the retention of 
some provision for 6ompulsory treatment. However, on a moýe positive note, 
they record also that the first year's statistics on the effect of th6 law 
showed a 17% decrease in number of patients in the hospitals, a 63% decrease 
in compulsory admissions, and a 34% decrease in voluntary admissions. Neither 
the number of suicides no .r the number of'admissions to*private clinics were 
found. to have increased. I 
By the mid-eighties, patients' families were emerging as a major new block 
critical of existing provision. Some, such-as the Association of Families, 
which is similar to the British national Schizophrenia Fellowship, were anti- 
reform and demanded that the hospitals be re-opened. Other§. d6manded that Law 
180 be properly implemented (Giannichedda, 1989: 13). The continuation of the 
reforms looks at present under quite serious threat. 
Franco Basaglia's widow, Franca Basaglia- (1988), to the extent that she 
conceded they had not been wholly successful, was unhesitating in attributing 
the failure of the reforms to deliberate political sabotage. 
the law is only being applied in a restricted way which 
emphasizes only one aspect, namely the abolition of butdat. ed 
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mental institutions by incorporating psychiatry into medicine. 
Any attempt to go further than this and call into question the 
established social order is condemned as an idealistic fancy. 
In fact a process of disaffection on the part of those goVernment 
forces which had favoured the reform has taken place. The reform 
which had required some very radical changes has consequently 
been left drifting. This disaffection has been increasing 
gradually where inaction and lack of resources for implementing 
the reform have been causing problems and difficulties in terms 
of local political consensus. (Basaglia, 1988: 276-7) 
2. Philosophy Underpinnin'q Basaglia's Wo'rk. 
The Italian reforms, and their theoretical justifications in the work of 
franco Basaglia, in some ways resemble British-based anti -psychiatry, and in 
other respects diverge in important ways from anti -psychi at ry. This, section 
will examine some of the points of similarity-and divergence. 
2.1 The influence of non-positivist philosophies. 
The Italian reforms emerged during the same historical period, the 1960s, as 
anti -psychiatry, and drew upon some of the same philosophical sources as Laing 
and Cooper. Ticktin (1991: 32) notes that the work of the Basaglias emerged 
at a time when anti-psychiatry was 'in vogue', and presenting a challenge to 
existing institutional and theoretical aspects of the psychiatric system, and 
the concept of mental illness itself. An important commonality between the 
leading British-based anti -psych i atri sts, Laing and Cooper, and Basaglia was 
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the origin of their approaches in phenomenology and existentialism. As Laing 
and cooper adopted a phenomenological existentialist analysis, as the only 
salient alternative to the prevailing positivism of both medical psychiatry 
and psychoanalysis during the 1950s, Basaglia also adopted phenomenology. 
Although by the early 1960s Basaglia came to realise the limitation! § of 
phenomenology, in terms of its limited awareness of the suffering involved in 
mental disorder, and -the need to take account of this suffering, his 
continuin 9 interest in the subjective reýlity of his patients, as opposed to 
the medical view of their condition, is a clear. parallel with the work of 
Laing and Cooper. 
Like Laing, Basaglia regards orthodox psychiatric diagnosis as a technique not 
for understanding one's patients, but for distancing oneself from them, to 
protect oneself from their disturbance. Basaglia sees the power relationship 
which ensues between patient and doctor as determining the course which the 
patient's illness will take. The doctor then uses his power not to learn more 
about his patients and their illnesses, but-to defend himself from them. A 
colleague of Basaglia, Maria Giannichedda (1988: 254) believes that: 
Drawing up a list of the symptoms merely acts as a screen between 
the psychiatrist and the patient allowing the psychiatrist to 
distance himself from the patient and the problems of his 
i 11 ness. 
The alternative to this unfortunate state of affairs is to acknowledge that 
the psychiatrist is a part of the patient's world, and that doctor and -patient 
exist in relationship. This view is similar to Laing'. s insistence that the 
patient's behaviour must be viewed within its proper social context, 
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Basaglia, like Laing and Cooper, recognises also the function which positivism 
plays in legitimising psychiatry's claims to objectivity. 
The concept of a causal connection between the phenomena, 
mechanistically determined by the natural sciences, flattbns and 
confounds the biological, psychological, and social elements of 
which every human- experience is constituted, by placing within 
parentheses the contradictions, Oresent at every level, that 
arise from the dialectic between individual and. organization. 
(Basaglia and Basaglia, 1987: 248) 
Jenner (1986: 5) notes that Basaglia was aware of the differences between post- 
war Italy, France, Britain and the USA, but that he' identified certain 
constants across these separate contexts, ingluding the conceptual isation of 
illness, and the failure to appreciate the meaning of suffering and the 
validity of the patient's subjective viewpoint. 
The work of the labelling theorists, Scheff -and Goffman, was also influential 
in informing Basaglia's view of the process by" which deviant behaviour and 
deviant individuals become institutional ised in societies which identify and 
exclude them. Again, labelling theory offers a critique of the positivist 
view which refuses to consider the questions of value implicit in psychiatric 
and medical diagnosis. However, as will be' seen, Basaglia did not subscribe 
to the view that labelling theory supports anti-psychiatry by explaining away 
the whole process by which an individual comes to be labelled as insane. He 
retained a belief in the reality and distinctiveness of unreason as a problem 
which confronts all western societies. 
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2.2 The critique of the institution 
Basaglia identified the institution -as the focus of psychiatry's function of 
excluding and marginalising distressed people. His critique of 'medical 
psychiatry was predominantly bound up with his critique of th6 institution. 
For him, diagnosis and institutionalism are closely related means of not 
relating to. one's patients as people. He was beginning from the point of 
challenging the institution rather than 'the medical profession per se. Where 
Basaglia challenges the power of medicine, it is as an aspect of the 
institution rather than as medicine itself that the challenge is issued. 
Basaglia has no fundamental argument with medicine. Hig objection-is to the 
alliance which medicine has formed with the judiciary through the institution. 
on the relationship between psychiatry and the judiciary*he comments (1980: 20- 
21 ): 
The governing norms have ... contributed, to a considerable extent, 
to forcing the development of psychiatric knowledge into certain 
channels, nearer to those of the state's judiciary apparatus than 
those of medicine. As is the case with the judiciary apparatus, 
it is the danger represented by deviant behaviour which i. s, the 
real object of psychiatry's attention. 
He considers that, throughout Europe, the : 5cope for psychiatry to develop its 
medical (ie. therapeutic) side was restricted by its forced association with 
segregation and containment. Basaglia continues in a vein which is highly 
sympathetic to the medical profession's efforts to free psychiatry from its 
unholy alliance with the judiciary in order to practice Psychiatry more 
effectively free of the institution. His critique--of the liberalisation of 
mental health law*ahd the 
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introduction of voluntary forms of hospitalisation is based on the conclusion 
that this doesn't make enough difference to result in the abolition of the 
institution, allowing medicine to fLilfil its proper role as therapy. 
The old norms governing compulsory admission 'to 
. 
the 
institution... are accompanied, though neither replaced nor 
modifi. ed, by regulations facilitating. voluntary or' 'informal 
admission ... in practice, psychiatMsts still operate within the 
limits of the-old ideology reaffirming its basic worih and only 
slightly mitigating its rigidity (for example, the very limited 
application of voluntary and informal admission)*. (Basaglia, 
1980: 24) 
He refers to the implications for. psychiatrýy itself of his attack upon the 
institution, and views the functions of psychiatry as a branch of medicine as 
having been 'dragged into the crisis of the asylum model'. Clearly, the 
implication is that the two are potentially separable, and psychiatry has 
within itself the possibility of becoming a politically benign practice. He 
objects to psychiatry because of what it has become throug . h. l'ts relationship 
with the institution. He does not object to what it could have been-and might 
yet become. 
Like Laing and Cooper, Basaglia's critique'of the institution was influenced 
by the burgeoning therapeutic community movement. He began by rooting his 
practice firmly in the belief that mental state was a product of social 
milieu. Giannichedda (1989: 13), who worked with Basaglia in Trieste, recalled 
that the first book which Basaglia instructed new colleagues to read was the 
history of the therapeutic community. Like Laing and Cooper, Basaglia 
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considered that the therapeutic community as proposed by Maxwell Jones 
remained too controlled and failed to tackle the central issues of psychiatry. 
As Jenner (1986: 5) has commented: 
Basaglia's reforms began with a conventional attraction to 
Maxwell Jones' concepts of therapeutic communities... (But] the 
therapeutic community movement was a subtle coercive device which 
didn't confront the society which is responsible, and which needs 
to be made therapeutic. in the broken homes and orphanages, etc, 
from which these people so often come. 
Basagl ia's response to the real isation that the 'therapeutic communities sti 11 
involved a great deal of control was very different io that of Laing and 
Cooper during the 1960s. Laing a. nd Cooper.. ; responded by leaving the state 
services and founding their own communities, within which the doctor-patient 
relationship could be as informal and unstructured as possible. At this 
stage, both believed that it was possible to-provide alternatives to existing 
services, and thus to challenge the medical system from outside. Basaglia 
came to believe that what was necessary wa§ to extend. the therapeutic 
community approach to the entire community. Working from within the 
institution, radical professionals must worktodismantle the institution from 
the inside, and reintegrate its residents into the general community. This 
would involve everyone - patients, professionals, and the general population - 
in reassessing their attitudes towards madness, unreason and illness. This 
viewpoint relates to the Marxist analysis of society which both Cooper and 
Basaglia shared, which sees macro-political change in the structures of society 
as the only means for ensuring real and lasting change. It was not a view 
which Laing seems ever to have held. Ticktin (interview) thought that PD: 
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very much responded well to David Cooper, they didn't respond so 
well to Laing ... they seemed to be very put off by Laing. 
For Laing in particular, humanism and faith in free action caused, him to 
believe that it was possible to stand outside the oppressive 'structureý; of 
society and fight them from a position of moral superiority. This risk of 
this approac-h was that. in practice it tended to produce elite alternatives to 
the central structure which ultimately' supplemented the system they were 
intended to replace. Such alternatives thus, if anything, extended the scope 
of mental health and psychiatric intervention, whilst leaving the most 
coercive and repressive structures untouched. BasagliA's determination to 
work within the system stemmed from his refusal to accept the individual as 
able to stand outside his . collectiveagro6p. For Basaglia, society exists not 
solely as something outside the individual, coercing his natural inclinations 
into a different direction. Rather society exists within all individuals, in 
the sense that all are inextricably involved in the rules and orderings. of the 
society-they inhabit. The individual cannot be isolated outside -societal 
rules and norms. Thus, to make any attempt to work from outside the 
institution is doomed to failure, because wher6er the indiviaual goes, he is 
inevitably involved in the society whose needs the institution serves. He is 
inevitably complicit to some ýegree. Reform of the institution must therefore 
involve reform of the whole society. 
This difference between Laing and Basaglia is apparent in an interview in 
which Laing and Basaglia responded to each, other's approaches (Basaglia and 
Laing, 1987). Basaglia referred to the debate as to whether one should work 
for change from inside or outside the institution. 
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The debate about whether to work inside or outside institutions, 
inside the system or outside, presupposes that inside and outside 
exist as clearly separate and antagonistic positions. Inside and 
outside are created as opposite and completely separate poles-by 
a social system that is based on divisions at all levels,. ' I. f. we 
accept this premise, we are already playing into the hands of 
admini. strators. . -Perhaps we should try, to work on uniting 
the 
inside and the outside, since in' reality they are constantly 
linked and it'is only the ideology of the inside and týe ideology 
of the outside that separates them.... In reality there is no 
total outside; it is assumed because it confirms thb existence-of 
a total inside. (Basaglia and Laing, 1987: 195) 
Laing, however, asserted his belief that the, distinction between inside and 
outside the institution was meaningful in terms of the level of radical action 
which is possible. He claims that it is possible to be a reldical outside the 
institution, because you have the freedom to do so, whereas within the 
institution you are restricted heavily by the. power structures. 
If Franco [Basaglia] thinks he can significantly change things in 
the direction he wants by remaining inside institutions, 'and he 
thinks that is possible, I respect his opinion and hope he 
succeeds with his intentions. I made'enormous efforts to do what 
I intended inside the system ten years ago, but there was, no -room 
to do it. I had a choice either to stay in the system, and try to 
accomplish what I wanted, without succeeding, or to get out. -I 
got out. Obviously. I didn't completely leave, because I still 
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hoped to influence the system from the outside. (Basaglia and 
Laing, 1987: 195-6) 
Lovell and Scheper-Hughes (1987: 202) whilst expressing sympathy for Laing's 
approach, regard it as very different form their own work'and that of 
Basaglia, and fraugpt with particular dangers associated with the failure to 
confront the role of the institution within social structures more widely 
considered. Specifically, Laing's 'alternatives', because they do not 
challenge the power of the institution directly, run the risk of becoming 
themselves institutional ised and failing to offer a continuing and effective 
challenge to the institutional mainstream. 
The difference between Laing's attitude* to psychiatrid reform and that of 
Basaglia is related to their different poli, tical commitments. For Laing, 
individual subjectivity is the central concern. For Basaglia, individual 
subjectivity is intimately related to the collective, and it, is the collective 
as such- which must be challenged. Lovell and Scheper-Hughes (1987: 194), 
discussing the difference between Laing and Basaglia, suggest that Laing tends 
to focus and concentrate upon individual subjective change,. whereas Basaglia 
tends to concentrate upon social transformation. Basaglia worked i. n 'reference 
to a more developed theory of the existing structures as related to, and 
existing in the service of, capitalism, and not open to attack and change 
other than from within. The attack 'upon the institution must be 
representative of, and take place alongside, an attack on the social 
structures in their entirety. 
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2.3 The absence of influence of Szaszian libertarianism upon Basaglia. 
A substantial difference between Laing and Basaglia (and ultimately Laing and 
Cooper) is the depth of Marxist analysis brought to bear upon psychiatry. 
Notably, Basaglia was not influenced by the views of Szasz. 'Pzasz places a 
high value on individual freedom and non-interference, which is wholly 
antithetical. to the collectivist spirit of the Italian reforms. Ramon 
(1983: 310) suggests that both Szasz and Illich's writings hav e had little 
impact upon the Itilian movement, because of their basically conservative 
beliefs and opposition to state intervention. 
The Italian critique of psychiatry. does not utilize Szaszs claim that 'mental 
illness is amyth' at all (Proposition 1* in the. 'anti -psychi atri c attitudes' 
listed in Chapter 1). Tranchina, Archi and, Ferrara (1981: 181), whose work 
originates from that of Basaglia, emphasize that they do not wish to deny the 
reality of what is defined as mental illness, but they do wa. nt to question its 
significance for the individual and for sodiety, and understand how it has 
reached its institutional destination. 
Qasaglia's rejection of the libertarian critique of psychiatry is-also seen 
in his understanding of the relationship between psychiatýy and , law. 
psychiatry and law have often been regarded as fundamentally at odds with one 
another because their forms of discourse are based upon apparently 
irreconcilable assumptions about human behaviour. Legal discourse assumes 
a high level of conscious, rational, free choice on the part of its subjects. 
psychiatry has usually tended to regard the capacity for free choice as a 
metaphysically derived myth, and to assume that all Oehaviour is causally 
determined. Thus, psychiatrists and lawyers have" often been * portrayed as 
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being in a state of conflict (for example, the trial of Peter Sutcliffe, where 
lawyers were perceived as wanting to hold him responsible for murders he had 
committed, and as being at odds with, psychiatrists, who did not). However, 
Basaglia regards law and psychiatry as having formed a contract with each 
another to exclude different types of deviance, which came fý be, portrýyed 
as threatening and dangerous. 
Illness, psychiatry, and the hoýpital 'were reduced to pure 
nominalism; illness became the dangerousness that-presumably has 
to be contained; psychiatry became a branch of law that punishes 
anyone suspected of dangerousness; and the hospital ' became a 
prison in which this presumed dangero'usness is segregated. 
Psychiatry became a science that is' born and-dies ihe very moment 
the contract between medicine and lawAs actualized. From that 
moment on, psychiatry sided definitively with law, hence with 
power, forgetting the subject for whom it exists, and whose 
suffering justified its very birth. (Basaglia and Basaglia, 
1987: 242-3) 
Basaglia regards the functions of law and psychiatry as having become 
confused, and needing to be separated from one another. It is the proper 
function of law to punish deviance. It is the function of psychiatry to heal. 
Thus, although Basaglia rejects, or rathet ignores, Szasz's argument that 
mental illness is a myth, he reaches by an alternative route Szasz's 
conclusion that compulsory treatment ought to be abolished (Proposition 9 in 
Chapter 1). Jenner (interview) referred to Basaglia's use of the law as 'sort 
of Szaszian'. But this statement disregards the point that for Basaglia the 
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individual is not placed in prison as an alternative to psychiatric treatment, 
but as an accompaniment. Jenner added: 
[In Italy) it's very difficult to get a psychiatrist to appear in 
cou rt ... what he will say much of the time is that the court must 
decide, the people must decide what to do with this sort of 
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behaviour. The function of a court is to protect the society. 
My function is to-look after the individual ... but if you send him 
to prison I will go on seeing him ... Thdre's a sense in which 
Psichiatria DI emocratir-a attacks the concept of jqstiýe, it says 
that prisons and police are for the protection of society, 
they're not a matter of justice. Whereas the Eriglish law has 
always and still has a great element of justice. (Jenner, 
interview) 
Basaglia had no clearly developed theory as -to the nature or etiology of 
mental disorder. He simply accepted it as a social reality that some people 
exist in a state of extreme distress which handicaps them. Although 5asaglia 
does not appear to have become drawn into the Anglo-American debate, inspired 
by Szasz, as to the existence or non-existende of mental. illness, he was 
interested in thevalue judgements which underpin all attributions Pf illness, 
and the tendency to neglect the social and political dimensions of many forms 
of ill-health. For example: 
Could Lombroso, upon entering the asylum at the beginning of the 
twentieth century, where he found vagabonds, derelicts, peasants 
who had migrated to the city, and victims of pellagra, all locked 
up together under the label of mental illness, have sorted out 
illness from misery the way Pinel did with dblinquency? "' Backed 
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by the thought of the Enlightenment, Pinel had the possibility of 
creating an institution for illness that left delinquency intact, 
because that scientific, humanitarian gesture did not disturb the 
relationship with misery that a separate segregation continued. to 
guarantee. 
But sLippose Lombroso, spurred on by the, social movements o. f the 
beginning of the century, instead'of recognizing pellagra as an 
illness, had , denounced it as having to do with hunder. Where 
could he have put this misery that was confused with illness? 
Would he have brought it back to the streets where it' had been 
banished so as not to be Osible? Who'Would have listened to 
him, if this process of sorting but presupposeý a social and 
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political response to misery? The libgral state is not inclined 
to give such a response, and misery remains confused with 
illness, whose face it takes on so that it can save the face of 
the liberal state. (Basaglia and Basiglia, -1987: 246) 
Thus, Basagl ia is not concerned with the notion' of mental i. 1 Iness as a myth, 
opposed to physical illness as a reality. He is concerned with the use of 
illness as a term attached to* all forms of distress, physical and mental, and 
which has the. effect of individualising the problem, placing it within a 
pathologised individual, rather than seekIng the' causes within the socio- 
political sphere. Jenner (1986: 4) has commented that 'Basaglia would not have 
denied the way in which the term 'madness'. is used, or a near synonym', but 
he would have challenged the view that mental illness or madness exists in a 
concretised form, separable from and predating in essence the society within 
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which it is to be found. Rather, our contemporary concept of madness emerged 
within the specific framework of industrial society. 
Basaglia makes it clear that he does not regard it as inevitable that 
psychiatry should be a matter of value judgements in any sense different from 
that of physical medicine. He argues that 'psychiatric diagnosis has become 
a value judgement' (Bas. aglia, quoted by Giannicbedda, 1988: 254, italics mine). 
If we now want to succeed in facing up to the patieýnt and the 
reality of his disorder, we must put 'illness', i e. its 
nosographic classification, to one side ... We have never faced up 
to mental illness, only denied it ... What'should be the sensible 
honest acceptance oý our own li-mitAtions is -actualýly transformed 
and fanatically divided into what we dq, understand and what we do 
not understand. The anxiety caused by our inability to 
communicate and understand must be calmed quickly by a process of 
label ling. This denies value to thd problem in question apd 
takes it out of its context. It is. precisely for this reason 
that the labelling process is so aggressive. (Basaglia, in 
Giannichedda, 1988: 254-5) 
We should seek. to return to the original meaning of 'therapy': 
a concept of treatment linked to provision of a service, in which 
the patient forms part of a reciprocal relationship with whoever 
is helping him. Therapy would then be based on the reciprocal 
nature of the relationship between both parties., - (Basaglia, in 
Giannichedda, 1988: 255-6) 
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In short, Basaglia approaches mental disorder as a social issue, rather than 
a medical one, but does not deny that mental disorder is properly termed 
illness. His Marxist analysis is, however, more subtle and sophisticated than 
a simple opposition between a labelling theory approach and a social causation 
approach would suggest. Mental disorder may be both simultaneously a 
distressing response to oppressive conditions, and a form of deviance which 
is threatenjng to the- capitalist mode of production. Psychiatry has 
traditionally taken on itself the role bf exclu*ding and marginalising this 
distress. The funcýion of a. Marxist based psychiatry is then to restore the 
distress to the community within which it originated, compelling the community 
as a whole to deal with its more vulnerable and disturbing members, and not 
allow them to be shut away and -forgotten. Tranchina, Archi and Ferrara 
(1981: 181) identify the fundamental elements of the MoVement for Democratic 
psychiatry as: 
tied to an ideal which sees human subjectivity as an inalienable 
fact beyond any therapeutic label or -institutional protection. 
But the condition for which this -subjectivity might assume 
greater significance is that it shoul'd not be reduced to 
individualism; instead, it should find its confirmation and power 
in the collective. 
It is Basaglia's belief that the exclusion and marginalization of mental 
distress which has resulted in our societies' institutions is, a product of 
capitalism. He was highly influenced by Hollingshead and Redlich's research 
on mental illness and class, with its revelation that mental illness i. s found 
overwhelmingly amongst the poor and disadvantaged. He developed a theory of 
the vulnerable underclass who were unable to ýurvive und-e*r the harsh 
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capitalist system, and whose resulting distress was then called mental illness 
and completely marginalised and isolated through hospitalization and 
institutionalization. 
The rules of social life make sense for those who are 'part. of 
this life, who find in it at least a partial response to their 
own needs. But fb r those who fi nd on 1 y, a conf i rmat i on of 'the ir 
exclusion, these rules represent *the language of violence and 
oppression. ' 
Jenner (1986: 4) has suggests that Basaglia would take tho- view that . 'too much 
human wretchedness had to be fitted into the new means of production'. That 
is, capitalism imposed its own standards of rationaliiy upon society, and 
dictated that it is unreasonable to be unwi., 11ing or unable to fit into the 
capitalist scheme. Therefore, people who do- not or cannot fit in must be 
abnormal or sick in some way. Basaglia takes the view that psychiatry as 
currently practised is complicit in supporting the power games of the ruling 
class. 
By making diagnoses and using various techniques, psychiatry 
plays a part in the power game of the ruling class whiioh has 
already established who has to pay and how, in order to maintain 
its own equilibrium. (Basaglia in Giannichedda, 1988: 257) 
Jenner (1986: 4) identifies Basaglia's rejection of the medicalisation of 
mental illness not as an attempt to underplay the suffering of psychiatric 
distress, but as an attempt to emphasize that inabil. ity to cope with the 
conditions of modern industrial society does not indicate a defiict wi. thin the 
222 
person, but a defect within the society. However, because Basaglia always 
recognises the reality of distress, his proposed solution is not simply to 
oppose psychiatry as irredeemably oppressive, but to reidentify the proper 
function of psychiatry as being to reintegrate and empower the oppressed and 
marginalised. 
2.4 The influence of &tructuralism upon Basaglia. 
I 
Basaglia's version of Marxism owes a great deal to structuralism, particularly 
to the early work of Foucault on the rise of the asylums (Foucault, 1967). 
It is Foucault's analysis of rationality after the Enlightenment which-allows 
Basaglia to develop a view of madness as a valid form of subjectivity without 
adopting a highly individualistic po-litics of subjectiVity. Madness - is not 
something to which any individual has a 'rigbt', but a quasi-universal human 
experience to which all societies need to respond on a collective basis. 
Since the Enlightenment, the response of Western capitalist societies has been 
to attempt to exclude madness by housing it-within institutions. The aim of 
Psichiatria Democratica is to restore madness to its rightful place within the 
community. This aspect of Basaglia's cdllectivist,. as opposed to 
individualist, approach is to be found in his attitude towards the voice of 
madness. Laing regards the psychotic voyage as an individual experience to 
be embarked upon by particular privileged individuals. Unreason is presented 
as a form of mystical adventure or coping or healing mechanism which 
particular people embark upon at certain times for particular purposes. 
Basaglia regards madness as something which exists in everyone alongside the 
capacity for reason. However, capitalism cannot cope with the power and 
unpredictability of madness disrupting its smoothly functioning system of 
production. So madness, with all its weakness, distress and v. ulnerability, 
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must be banished. It must not merely be offered no place in the rewards of 
production, but isolated, marginalised and removed from the system. Thus, for 
Basaglia, the de-marginalisation and de-institutionalisation of madness 
involves not merely restoring to the mad the right to live alongside-the rest 
of the community, but restoring to the community the right t6 own its, own 
madness, its own distress and oppression and vulnerability. Basaglia's 
argument is. based upon- the premise that society cannot rid itself of its 
madness by calling it mental iI lness and *inventi'ng technological 'cures' . It 
can only live with its madness, accommodating it, and alleviating the social 
factors, such as poverty and exclusion, which transform madness into misery. 
Basaglia and Basaglia comment: 
Science finally is concerned with an illness (about which it is 
totally ignorant, except for the nominalistic specifications it 
has given to it), contained in custodial and treatment 
institutions. But the nature of this illness and of these 
institutions, and hence the nature of the treatment and the 
custodial care that wi 11 be carried out -inside them, wi 11 remain 
closely tied to the relationship that' bourgeois rationality 
continues to maintain with misery. For it is the obligation of 
the institutions, through the mediation of illness, to contain 
and control this misery. (Basaglia and Basaglia, 1987: 241) 
These concerns of Basaglia's relate more closely to European structuralist 
thought than to the British anti-psychiatry of the 1960s. Basaglia's wish to 
restore madness to its rightful place within the community is redo-lent of 
Foucault's insistence that madness was not deprived of its dialogue with 
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reason until the industrial revolution and rise of capitalism. The Basaglias 
comment: 
Mental illness and the medical science that begins to deal with 
it are translated into one of the essential instrumentS, 'thýough 
which bourgeois reason, having become the dominant ideology, 
manages to face. t-he contradictions which belie it. Thus begins 
the slow separation between normal behaviour, which corresponds 
to the rationality of. power, and abnormal behav. iour, which is 
endowed with a rationality of its own that is not subject to the 
rules so foreign to it. (Basaglia and Basaglia, 1987:, '238. ) 
The emphasis upon irratio nality as central to the humari condition, possibly 
more central than reason, can also be related to Lacanian psychoanalytic 
ideas, with their emphasis upon letting the unconscious speak. Deleuze and 
Guattari's understanding of the revolutionary nature of psychosis as pure 
unoedipalised desire carries a similar message of*the impo-rtance of. madness 
for demonstrating the unreason and distress which is the universal lot of 
human beings disguised by a superficial veneer of rationality. 
Lovell and Scheper-Hughes (1987: 48) find in Basaglia's work 'a willingness to 
heed Foucault's early call to "give madness back its voice. " ' This is to be 
contrasted with the post-Enlightenment vieW of madness, characterised by: 
the ideologies that justify and mechanisms that produce and 
perpetuate the exclusion of all that is different in society. It 
is a difference that, since the beginning of the 
Enlightenment... is measured against reason ... With, the progressive 
rationalization of society... all that does not fit the goals of 
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capitalist production must be excluded. (Lovell and Scheper- 
Hughes, 1987: 227-8) 
6 
Referring to an encyclopedia entry on the subject of Madness and- Del, irium 
(Basagl. ia and Basaglia, 1987), Lovell and Scheper-Hughes (1987: '228), state that 
'the Basaglias read Foucault with a Marxist key'. That is, the Basaglias 
accept Foucault's account of the Enlightenment, as the era during which Reason 
and Unreason were separated, and Unreas6n became the object of surveillance 
and control . However, they develop this analysis further, relating the 
separation of Reason and Unreason to the requirements of capitalist modes of 
production. 
Basaglia observes that Psychoanalysis does acknowledge' the unreason-at the 
heart of normality, thereby ending the rigid., distinction between rationality 
and irrationality and leading to the blurring of 'the boundaries between 
normal and pathological' (Lovell and Scheper-Hughes 1987: 22.9). But this only 
takes place within the analyst's office, and outside the real realm of social 
conflict. Psychoanalysis does not therefore affect the roots of the 
separation between reason and unreason. In thewords of Basagiia and Basaglia 
(1987: 252-3): 
Freud broke the certainty of reason and introduced doubt into the 
discourse ... Unreason is inside us, it is part of our nature, not 
in the sense understood by an enlightened reason that would 
recognize it only in the moment in which it restrained and 
disarmed it; but in the sense that man is tragically harnessed by 
his own unreason ... 
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(Blut the practical conclusion arrived at by psychoanalysis is a 
different, subtler, and deeper form of mastery of the self, split 
between reason and unreason, dominated by whatever interpretation 
is made about this division. The circle closes: the door opened 
on subjectivity is now shut by the objectification of the self. 
Here Basagli-a and Basaglia seem particularly close to the perspective adopted 
by Lacan, that Freud's theory was initially highly radical and subversive, but 
was very quickly turned to the advantage of adaptationist psychiatry and put 
in service of reason. This perspective is perhaps adopted even more 
completely by Deleuze and Guattari (1977) in their qUestioning -of where 
psychoanalysis 'went wrong', and. their conclusion that the error is to be 
found at the very heart ýf the theory in' the acceptance of Oedipization. 
However, according to Basaglia, despite its domestication unreason will 
continue to make itself heard, and reason will strive to manage it in such a 
way as to defuse its potential power. The irrational will be experienced as 
a threat and contained, or recognised in the work of the artist and rendered 
safe and manageable within the category of 'art'. 
Just as the split of the self is resolved in the analyst's office 
and madness and misery disappear when locked away, the mad 
gesture of whoever breaks down the barrier of this rationality 
will be quieted by applause, in the museums and emporiums of Art 
in which its voice will be harnessed and neutralized. (Basag 1ia 
and Basaglia, 1987: 254) 
Basaglia and Basaglia call for: 
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[the liberation of] madness as the only "experience" that 
vindicates the right of irrationality against the madness of 
dominant rationality. (Basagl. ia and Basaglia, 1987: 254) 
s* Basaglia's determination to restore unreason to the communitie, from which it 
has been excluded d. oes not imply an anarchistic commitment to a society free 
of social control. Basagl ia recognises the need for order, 'a nd 
Lovell and Scheper-Hughes (1987: 45) acknowledge that Italy's 
deinstitutionalisat i on also creates a new circuit of control. But Basaglia 
believed that social control within a Marxist context would be fundamentally 
different from the situation within the capitalist contbxt. Social control 
would operate in the interest of the controlled, ' not for their exclusion, but 
to bring them and other people together i'n such a way thcýt they would support 
one another and face their problems togethe. r. (Lovell and Scheper-Hughes, 
1987: 48) 
Laing and Cooper's anti-psychiatry tended to adopt Szasz's assumption that 
what was necessary was to abolish the power of psychiatry, and restore the 
libertyof the individual, and that, combined with increased. toleration on the 
part of society at large, would be enough to solve the problem of 'mental 
i 11 ness' . Basagl ia regards the probl em of mental i 11 ness as one ýqhi ch is. real 
and exists independently of the existence of psychiatry as a means of dealing 
with it. His solution is not to abolish'the power of psychiatry, but to 
redistribute it so that the people who have previously been victims both of 
their own distress and of the psychiatric system are increasingly able to 
control both to their own advantage. 
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British critiques of psychiatry have tended to emphasise individual rights to 
f reedom and non-i nterf erence. MIND's campai gn to ref orm the 1 aw is an example 
(see chapter 7). The Italian reforms. are based not upon individual rights but 
upon collective solidarity, and regard individual rights as a bourgeois 
concern. Similarly, Basaglia's understanding of democracy is'dot. that which 
is enshrined in the concept of electoral democracy, in which decisions are 
made by representatives elected by the people. As Jenner (1986: 4) has 
observed, PD conceptualises democracy a. § the %Willingness to care for other 
people's evident needs. It -is a democracy based upon social responsibility 
rather than individual liberty. 
By 1979, Basaglia was ready to address the lack of identity which psychiatry 
faced as a result of his critique. His work had made it'apparent that he did 
not advocate the abolition of psychiatry., but its transformation into 
something completely different. What that was to be remained to be 
established. Basaglia himself saw this as a positive situation from which to 
begin. 
The need for a new 'science' and new 'theories' is part of what 
is inappropriately termed 'ideological void'. In reality this is 
the fortunate time when problems could start to be tackled in a 
different way. It is the time when we are obliged to really 
relate to anguish and suffering, beca6se we have been deprived of 
all the devices designed to protect us from recognizing. it. 
(Basaglia, in Giannichedda, 1988: 260) 
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Conclusion 
Basaglia's approach to psychiatry resembles that of British anti-psychiatry 
of the 1960s in some respects. Like the British anti -psychi atri sts, - Basagl ia 
is anti-positivist. He regards the 'objective' assessment ancr diagnosi's of 
patients as a means of distancing oneself from their subjective experience, 
and therefore as a way of not understanding the. real problem. He regards this 
as inextricably linked to psychiatry as aln institutional practice. In his own 
work, he regarded t, he subjectivity of the patient as centra). Also like the 
British anti -psychi atri sts, Basaglia's practice has grown out of social 
psychiatry, particularly the therapeutic community as developed by Maxwell 
Jones. This is an approach in which mental disorder is managed within a 
context which is explicit . ly recognised t: o be soci-al, and which for Basaglia 
is also recognised to be political. t 
Italian democratic psychiatry is, however, quite different. from the British 
work of- the 1960s in its political basis. - It is based upon a much more 
clearly theorised Marxism than was adopted -by any of the British anti- 
psychiatrists, with perhaps the exception of David Cooper during the 1970s. 
The individualistic rights-based critique of Szasz is not influent. Jal at all. 
Subjectivity is approached as a problem to be managed at a collective level. 
Individuals do not have a 'right' to be mad, but the collective has a 
responsibility for integrating its vulnerable and suffering members, and 
offering assistance in a way which does not invalidate their experience. This 
is a responsibility which Western capitalist societies have abandoned, as 
mental disorder has become conceived of as a threat to, and a waste -product 
of, capitalist forms of production dominated by rationality. The view of 
rationality and capitalism as inextricably linked, and c6mpell-ing the 
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separation and exclusion of unreason, is closely related to Foucault's 
structuralist critique of psychiatry. Basaglia's understanding of the nature 
of madness and the role of psychiatry in capitalist societies owes much to 
Foucault. 
This combination of ideas produces a radical approach to mental distress which 
is markedly. di f ferent. from anything which has been produced in* Britain or 
America. Where British and American 'ý radicaTs have retained a Marxist 
analysis, it has iended to. be one which uses a labelli*ng theory/social 
causation approach which is very anti -psychiatry. There has been very little 
theorising of a radical democratic approach such as that . founded by Basaglia. 
3. British evaluations of the Italian r6forms 
3.1 Positive evaluations 
Events in Italy have provoked great interest in Britain, especially. amongst 
those critical of current policies towards care in the -community. Anti- 
psychiatry was able to regard the hospital closure programme. as unequivocally 
aL good thing, as anything which reduced the coercive power of psyctviatry was 
conceived as desirable. However, the reality of care in the 'community in 
practice has caused much doubt to be cast upon the desirabi I ity of closing the 
hospitals per se, with no clear cut programMe of alternative services. Some 
commentators on the left have also become aware of the potential of the 
hospital closure programme becoming no more than a cost-cutting exercise for 
the Conservative administration, with which the far left has colluded by its 
own emphasis Upon individual freedom. (The care in the community debate in 
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Britain is dealt with more fully in Chapter 8. ) The Italian approach is 
perceived to have two advantages over the British approach. 
Firstly, it is perceived as being more attractive to the Left wing in 'that it 
is concerned less with the restoration of the individual to a stAte considered 
desirable by societal norms, and more with the recognition of individual 
vulnerability, and the need for society to accept responsibility for 
integrating its vulnerable members. There is' less emphasis on individual 
therapy, and more upon collective responsibility. That is, ýor the Italians, 
care in the community does not mean simply that patients live outside the 
hospital. It means that they are accepted as full members -of society-with 
access to the same facilities and possibilities as other members. Healing is 
considered as much a matter of reintegration into the community as individual 
therapy. 
Secondly, care in the community in Italy is associated with a different 
approach to treatment. In Britain, community care often seems no more than 
a change in where one lives in between doses. of. medication or brief admissions 
to hospital, the medical input constituting the' real treatment and any other 
services being social support. In Italy, social issues, such as poverty or 
isolation, seem more likely to be tackled as issues central to. the 
individual's distress and not merely attendant upon it. Great efforts are 
made to integrate the individual into the, community in order to ensure his 
continued well-being. Jenner (1986: 5) identifies Basaglia's approach as 
preferable to the English version of community care because England has 
succeeded only in moving the institutions into the community, whereas he 
perceives Basaglia as having produced the key to abolishing the institutions. 
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Consequently, the developments in Italy have been the focus of much attention 
on the part of mental health workers in Britain seeking a Left wing critique 
of psychiatry more powerful than that offered by anti -psychiatry. The depth 
of this interest is, indicated by the wealth of material already quoted'in this 
chapter, which has included both English language translations of ' the 
Basagl ias' own writings and accounts by sympathetic English language observers 
of the Italian experience. 
MIND has consistently promoted the Italian approach to community care in 
Britain. In 1984, MIND organized exhibitions and workshops held by 
Psichiatria Democratica in Britain, which publicized the Italian- changes. 
MIND has also included frequent updates on the situation in Italy in its in- 
house journals, MIND OUT and subsequently OPENMIND. Articles describing the 
changes favoutably have also appeared in., the social work publication, 
Community Care. Heptinstall's (1984: 18) article, which accompanied and 
commented upon, the MIND-sponsored exhibition by PD, concluded 'Clearly, 
there are lessons for Britain in the Italian experience'. Hanvey (1978: 24) 
was more cautiously complementary, but concluded that 'the fascination of 
observing a mental health programme which realises the politi cal analysis of 
psychiatric problems was a rare and unique experience'. 
The Italian psychiatric system has also been a central focus for Asylum, a 
magazine published at Sheffield University whose founders seek to promote 
democratic psychiatry in Britain. Asylum has published highly -favourable 
accounts of the reforms. Jenner (1986: 4) reported an exchange visit with 
Italian psychiatrists which 'inflamed my preoccupation with the legitimation 
of psychiatry. ' He describes Basaglia as 'the Italian Laing of that period, 
and in fact more influential in actually changi6g institutional . 1-ife'. 
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However, he also is cautious about the long-term impact of the Italian 
reforms, or their viability for this country. 
Asylum has also included an interview with Maria Giannichedda (1989)., *who had 
worked with Basaglia, and provided a highly positive account the reforms 
in Trieste, although she acknowledged the difficulties which had been 
encountered in applying Law 180 throughout the remainder of the country. 
Similarly, McCarthy (1985) concluded thAt the reforms had been a success in 
those parts of the country where they had been implemented, and a failure 
mostly only in those areas where they had been ignored. 
Bucalo (1989) produced an account. of a village in Sicily, reported in Asylum, 
where psychiatric services do not exist at all . Jenner'introduced the piece 
as claiming 'In many villages in Sicily. i the whole population accepts 
.. madness .., and the people manage to live together. ' 
Ticktin-(1991: 32) notes that: 
The professionals around ASYLUM were inspired by the -notion of 
'democratic psychiatry', as espoused by the work of Franco 
Basaglia and the group he initiated of the same name: Psichiatria 
Democrat. ica. 
Jenner (1988: 111) has adapted Basaglia's account of marginalization of users 
and providers to apply to Britain, and called for a new preparedness on the 
part of psychiatrists to engage with the political, moral and socioeconomic 
dimensions of their practice. Like Basaglia, Jenner. does not reject the 
paradigm of medicine as inappropriate for psychiatry, but poi nts out that 
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issues of value within Psychiatry are more contentious than those within 
general medicine. 
A leading proponent of the Italian reforms in this country is Shulamit Ramon. 
Ramon (1988: xiv) begins from the point of identifying the two alternative 
paths which care in the community in Britain can now take. 
We can use it as an opportunity' to create a new service and 
attempt to puý right some of the wrongs of the olct system. Or we 
can recreate the old system by establishing mini-hospitals and 
merely transfer the residents of the large hotpital to yet 
another institution. 
Ramon regards the Italian model as the inspi. ration Britain needs if it is to 
take up the first option, and use current changes as an opportunity. She 
identifies her own position, and that of the other contributors to her book, 
as not anti-psychiatric. 
We all believe that mental distress doet exist primarily as a 
personal experience of suffering and confusion within a speci-fic 
social context. It is very much the outcome of the combination 
of the personal and the social 
Because we believe In the existence of mental distress,, we-also 
believe that society has to respond collectively to its members 
who suffer from it. Put in other words, we are not taking an 
tanti-psychiatry' position, but a 'radical reformist ' stance. 
(Ramon, 1988: xv-xvi) 
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The papers in Ramon's book are grouped into pairs, each pair dealing with one 
aspect of psychiatric deinstitutionalization, one of each pair being 
descriptive of The British context, one of the Italian. The overal 1 
impression given is that changes in Italy are more favourably viewed than 
those in Britain. Davis (1988: 35), writing about user pdrspectives' and 
community care in Britain, notes that: 
Most medical, nursing and social sbrvices'staff retained in their 
hearts and minds the notion of consumers as damaged individuals 
who needed advice and management ... The consequences for consumers 
has been that most community-based prov ision has 'replicated the 
all too familiar relationships of institutional life.. 
The corresponding paper on Italy, by Giannichedda (1988b), noted the familiar 
variations amongst quality of service delivery in different parts of Italy, 
but wrote favourably of the impact of users in those areas where the reforms 
have been more completely implemented, and of ongoing efforts to stem the tide 
of reaction which is demanding a return to-the old system. 
A contribution from MIND Manchester Group states that the authors 'believe 
it is possible to create the foundations of a mental health service based on 
the principle. of human dignity and the right to personal autonomy' (MIND 
Manchester, 1988: 227). Aware of the somewhat utopian nature of their vision, 
they appeal directly to the success of the Italian reforms as, evidence that 
such a scenario is possible. 
For those people who are sceptical about the li. kelihood of the 
success of such a challenge we would point to the experTence of 
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Psichiatria Democratica in Italy, described by the Italian 
contributors to this book. (MIND Manchester, 1988: 227) 
3.2 Negative evaluations of the Italian reforms 
The Italian experiment has not met with unreserved approval in this country. 
A paucity of hard data on the results of the reforms has made objective 
evaluation difficult. Becker (1985: 254)'has argued in relation to Italy that 
'A few hard data ... are more useful than personal opinions, no matter how 
sophisticated these may be'. In the absence of such hard data, judgements 
have inevitable been based upon subjective accounts iliformed by-personal 
inclinations towards particular political ideologies. Critics have argued 
that adherence to politicil ideologies ha: s prevented British enthusiasts from 
appreciating the true extent of the problem. s being experienced by mentally 
disordered people and mental health professionals in Italy. 
The most outspoken critic has been Kathl'een Jones. Jones an d Poletti 
(1985: 347) have claimed that, at a time when Britain is at an impasse in its 
community pare programme, uncertain where to" proceed neA, the Italian 
, Qxperience is being used as a lever to keep events moving in the direction of 
more hospital closures. Jones and Poletti arranged for their own study. trip 
to Italy, to take in the whole country and form an impression of the state of 
services right across the nation. The impression they formed, particularly 
in the South, was that hospital closures were either not happening -. patients 
continuing to be admitted to the hospitals officially as 'ospi ti' (guests), 
but in reality as patients - or that patients were simply being dumped outside 
the hospital with no support and with resulting casualties and tragedies. 
They noted that: 
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Most accounts in the British professional press - the majority in 
nursing and social work journals - have presented the results as 
one of the great success stori. es of psychiatric history. (341) 
Jones a. nd Poletti (1985) were of the opinion that the law hqd been ru'shed 
through to save Italy from the catastrophe of a referendum, with no proper 
planning or. considerat-ion. They referred to highly col .o. ured anecdotal 
accounts of the plight of patients post-1978. 'These parallelled those pre- 
1978 accounts which'ýad preceded the referendum and caused pu*blic outcry about 
the state of the mental hospitals. However, the post-1978 accounts had been 
much slower to reach the British press. They claimdd that many -of the 
supposedly revolutionary changes in Italy were merely semantic, consisting of 
changes in terminology with no change. in conditions. A Tack of support-in the 
community was reported to have resulted in a sharp increase in the population 
of forensic hospitals and a mushrooming of private nursing homes (both these 
claims were disputed by De Girolama, 1985) 
Jones and Poletti (1985: 345) acknowledged the. lack of hard data on which to 
base their judgements and the difficulties of interpreting anecdotal evi. denceý 
but felt that 'nevertheless, some points seemed capable of empirica. 1 -testing'. 
on the basis of their experience in Italy, they concluded that the law 
operated very patchily, and the 'overwhelming consensus' was that it would 
have to. be changed. They found many 'hospitals still open, but very 
understaffed. In some areas patients were officially called ospiti -or guests, 
but this did not prevent them from being confined in locked wards or strait- 
jacketed. Because the hospitals were officially closed, no maintenance work 
was being carried out, there were no support services', and patients were 
wholly unoccupied. Large doses of drugs. were administered. .. 'Alternative 
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structures' , such as 'family homes' or 'villas' , resembled ordinary mental 
hospital wards so closely that Jones and Poletti often failed to realise they 
were supposed to be alternatives. Diagnosis and Cure Units were locked, and 
staff were finding it impossible to diagnose within 48 hours, let alone cure. 
The renewal of the detention order was a mere formality. Prývision became 
less as they went further South. 
I 
Jones and Poletti (1984) described condi'tions encountered in some hospitals: 
The male open ward is frankly a doss-house ... The men sit around 
and play cards and smoke - there is nothing else to . 
'do. They 
have no hope of a job. The only treatment is by heavy doses of 
psychotropic drugs, plus basic physical care, of which de-lousing 
forms an important part ... Some guests are in straitjackets or 
arm-muffs, one guest is strapped to his bed. (10) 
The need for constantly renewed seven day orders to keep patients in hospital 
involved a great deal of paper work, but the mayor tended to be. happy to sign 
a renewal with the minimum fuss or investigation. Workers, did not vi. ew the 
legislative changes favourably, verdicts upon Law 180 ranqing from 
"impossible" to "criminal" (Jones and Poletti, 1984: 12). 
Jones and Poletti (1985: 346) posed the qdestion 'Is the amount of misery 
caused greater or less than under the old system? ' They concluded that, 
although human misery is not measurable, they found much of what they had seen 
unforgettable. The absence of training facilities, which PD justified as a. 
policy of 'deskill ing' , meant that the situation was- unlikely to improve. 
They concluded that whatever lessons Britain sought to learn from the- Italian 
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experience, they were certainly not those being promoted by the pro-Italy 
lobby. Better lessons might include: 
Mental hospitals cannot be abolished by legislative action -and 
good intentions: they have a way of appearing in d, isgyise. 
Patients do not automatically become well if they are discharged 
from hospital -. they and their families. still need help. Ideas 
about de-skilling and the abandonrhent of'professional roles are 
not a substitute for good training programmes - they can only be 
utilised by relatively mature and well-trained personnel. Above 
all, political pressure-groups are not a subWtute for a 
broadly-based and well-informed mental health movement: there is 
much public education to be done, but not -by means of slogansi 
catch-phrases and horror pictures. (Jones and Poletti , 1985: 346) 
The pro-Italy lobby answered these criticisms by arguing that Jones and 
Poletti-had not seen the failure of Law 180, but the failure to implement Law 
180 (Tansella, 1985: 450). She needed to visit-Trieste to appreciate the real 
impact of reform when properly implemented (Ramon, 1985b. 208). Jones and 
Poletti had deliberately omitted Trieste from their first visit, feeling that 
enough had been written about services there for them to be justified in 
visiting other cities instead. However, they accepted the offer and visited. 
They acknowledged that services in Trieste were much better than services in 
other parts of . the country. However, they did have criticisms - of the 
services. Firstly, publicity had created the impression that Trieste had no 
in-patient services except for its 15 bed. Diagnosis and Cure Unit. This was 
240 
not true. Trieste had more than two hundred patients for whom no outside 
accommodation could be found, including some who were very deteriorated. This 
number included 48 patients suffering from senile dementia who were kept on 
a locked ward. In addition, there were 15 beds in an alcoholic unit, 20 beds 
for severely mentally handicapped young people, 40 beds in, 'a traditional 
university clinic, an unknown number of beds in a hostel, about 50 beds in the 
centres, and 8 beds in- the Diagnosis and Cure Unit. In addition to these, 
approximately 1/3 to 1/2 of beds in the city's public lodging house were 
occupied by patienis, and an unknown number of beds in priv'ate nursing homes 
to which patients over 65 were transferred. 
Secondly, the scope of the service was very li. mited, being targeted primarily 
at younger psychotic patients, and the containment of bi . zarre episodes. This 
might overlook the needs of 'quiet. ly deteriorating patients'. There is also 
no provision for the elderly senile, unless 'they were hospitalised before 
1980. And Trieste provides no regular programmed therapeutic activities. 
There is no use of psychoanalytic insights, no group therapy and no family 
therapy. 
More recently, other evidence has 9upported Jones' negative evaluation of the 
reforms as they have effected Italy as a whole. Palermo (1991) reported that 
between 1978 and 1983, commitments to psychiatric hospitals for the insane in 
Italy increased by 57.6%, the number of sbicides attributed to psychiatric 
disturbances increased by 19%, and the number of deaths due to psychiatric 
disturbances increased by 43.5%. However,. Palermo's conclusions have been 
questioned by two commentators on his work. Wilkinson (1991) referred tc 
three other recent publications which: 
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are written bY Ital ian authors, take distinct medical 
perspectives, are based on empirical observation, and seem to 
provide information of sufficient reliability and validity for 
worthwhile contemplation. (557) 
In the light of Bollini and Mollica (1989), Wilkinson (1991; 557) concluded 
that the Italian reform has successfully generated a psy'chiatric system 
without asylums, but that these services'are somewhat deficient in failing to 
reach those with ýhe most disabling disorders and parts*of the country, 
particularly the South. In the light of Crepet (1990), Wilkinson (1991; 558) 
concluded that 'the quality of mental health care provided 'in Italy-is, to 
generalise, unacceptable. ' And-in the light of Tansella (1991), which 
examined services in one particular area, that of -South*Verona, he concluded 
(Wilkinson, 1991: 558) that the reforms there.; had been fairly successful. He 
suggested that, 'four uncomplicated and familiar messages emanate from the 
Italian experience', derived from Tansella and Williams (1,987). These were 
that transition to community care cannot be achieved simply by closing 
hospitals - alternative structures must be pro. vided; efficient functioning of 
community based services requires both professional and political and 
administrative commitment; monitoring, planning and evaluation of services was 
vital; and the successful implementation of community care depends to a great 
extent upon the input of general practitioners. He noted Italian interest in 
modifying Law 180, but expressed the diffiCulties in achieving this owing to 
the peculiarities of the Italian system of law-making. 
Craig (1991), the third commentator, referred explicitly to: 
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what [Palermo] sees as inevitable consequences of the enactment 
of a political ideology in the absence of either the economic or 
societal infrastructure to translate the ideal to functional 
reality. (559) 
However, he noted that Palermo did not consider the reforms to have failed 
everywhere (559). He -criticised Palermo for failure to substantiate his 
opinions with up-to-date empirical data*, writing, 'we have little more than 
an opinion based more on personal frustrations than on fact' (559). His 
conclusion is particularly interesting: 
The debate is not really about whether cqmmunity-based treatments 
can work, but rather about whether *the results obtýined by highly 
committed pioneers can be obtained in ordinary health service 
delivery. (560-1) 
This comment is of interest because it relates to the crux of the debate, 
which is the interaction between the evidence for the Italian reforms in terms 
of their practical results, and the perceived viability of the Marxisý 
ideology which has been the inspiration behind the results. The 'empirical 
findings are scarce, and tend to be often anecdotal. They constitute also a 
very piecemeal view of the country as a whole. They are thus difficult to 
interpret in an unbiased fashion. However, broadly speaking the conclusion 
seems to be that PD have achieved much in the North of Italy in instituting 
a workable system of care in the community, but that the south remains 
extremely backward and the situation there may actually have deteriorated as 
a result of Law 180. PD argue that the failure is not theirs, but is the 
fault of the people responsible for failing to implement the law. Those who 
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are more suspicious of the ideology which is the driving force behind PD would 
dismiss this argument on the grounds that it was highly predictable that the 
law would fail, because the level of ideological commitment and faith 
generated by PD is a rare phenomenon and cannot be expected to last. Not 
everyone can be expected to share PD's analysis of the situaiion, or iheir 
enthusiasm for cor. recting it. The level of commitment, both financial and 
emotional, required by, PD was not possible on a nationwide level. This 
appears to be the kind of concern wýich has led Jones consistently to 
emphasize the failures of the Italian reforms, rather than their successes, 
and to attribute the successes to particularly fortuitous local circumstances. 
Equally, those on the Left, who believe a Marxist society to be possible and 
desirable, emphasize the successes of the reforms, and attribute their 
failures to political ill-will and sabotage. 
Thus, the main aspect of Jones' disagreement with PD is now revealed as 
ideological. Jonesbelieves that mentally ill peopleare marginalised because 
they are unable to function in mainstream society without a great deal of 
support and management. No amount of rhetorjO: or education will make their 
integration into society significantly easier. PD believe that whatever the 
source of the problems of the mentally ill, these are aggravated to a great 
extent by poverty, marginalisation and isolation which are the result Of 
capitalism. They believe it is possible to fashion a society which will 
integrate its mentally disturbed members ýs full members. This belief is 
informed by Marxist theory, which Jones finds unpalatable and -unbelievable. 
For Jones, mental disorder is most profitably approached as a problem for 
particular individuals rather than for the community as a collective. - 
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Jones suspicion of the Marxist underpinnings of the movement had emerged by 
1985, when, referring to Basaglia's paper delivered to the Fourth 
International congress on Law and Psychiatry (Basaglia, 1980) she wrote: 
Much of Basaglia's paper is frankly difficult to follQW. , 
The 
combination of neo-Marxist grand theory and Italian-in- 
translation makes for some curiously opaque sentences what 
exactly did he mean by "the homoloýation of the individual" or "a 
hypothetical scale of coincidence between juridic norms and 
psychiatric technique"? (Jones, 1985: 342) 
However, the full force of Jones rejection of the Marxist ideology is revealed 
in Jones and Poletti (1986: 147): 
Behind the innocent and frolic radicalism, there are more serious 
political implications. We did not wish to enter into 
ideological debate, but most issues 17n Italian life are highly 
politicised, and we were repeatedly told that it was impossible 
to divorce the practice from the ideology 
The same phrases were used so frequently in discussion that we 
came to the conclusion that this was a closed system of thought, 
insusceptible to rational argument..,.. 
The Trieste experience appeals to the non-rational side of the 
human mind. Demands for liberty, equality, and fraternity stil-1 
create resonances and enthusiasms, powerfully, 'reinforced by 
symbols and slogans of a highly imaginative kind. But these 
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points stand out: first, the demand is for total acceptance; 
analysis and questioning are swept aside or treated as evidence 
of adherence to 'the medical model' or extreme Right-wing 
pol i tics. There are also rigidities of thought on the Left. 
(147) 
This suspicton of the Marxist ideology underpinning PD is apparent in many of 
the more cautious or negative appraisals 'of Italy*'. Becker (1985: 259) referred 
to the feeling in o, pposition. quarters that the reforms are ioo ideologically 
motivated to have been given careful empirical consideration before their 
implementation. 
Hicks (1984) notes that: 
f 
The movement saw itself as part of a 'wider Italian political 
tradition, and was influenced by Marxist ideology in, a way which 
most professionals in the UK would find difficult to grasp.... 
The teams work according to the PD's collecti-vist, non- 
hierarchical principles and seem to have abandoned tradit. ional 
roles to an extent which would send a chill up the spines of many 
of their British counterparts. (17) 
Hicks notes that the collectivist perspective means that social factors take 
precedence over other explanations, and that the emphasis is upon developing 
an ability to live with others rather than upon self-sufficiency. However, 
the attempt to abandon traditional approaches because of their political 
implications have not led to the abandonment of drugs. The problems-facing 
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the reforms are reported as enormous, both in terms of a lack of resources for 
new services and facilities, and the backlash form traditional ly-minded 
psychiatrists,, who are pressurising the government to modify the law, and the 
general public, many of whom will not tolerate the visibility of chronically 
disturbed people in their midst. Hicks notes that even some, 'of, those'most 
intimately involved with the reform process are now disillusioned; for 
example, PD founder. -Giovanni Jervis, who, now regards PD itself as 
institutionalised (Hicks, 1984: 18). 
Perris and Kemali (1985: 10) have lamented that: 
Unfortunately, attention -is paid more on its ideological 
background and on the prescribed closure- of the existing mental 
hospitals than on the fact. that the.; law 180 has definitively 
sanctioned the break of the isolation in which Italian psychiatry 
had operated for longer than half a century, and its complete 
reintegration into a comprehensive National Health Service. 
They warn readers that some of the articles to be presented in the volume 
which they are introducing may be found to be over-loaded with ideological 
statements and political biases by non-Italian readers (Perris' and Kemali 
1985: 13). 
Criticism of the Italian ideology has been expressed also by British theorists 
influenced by the later work of Foucault. Such criticism has, focused directly 
upon Basaglia's-view of community, rather than upon the Marxist underpinnings 
of his thought. Miller (1986) has argued that Basaglia's work constitutes one 
more instance of an ideological commitment to the power-of community to heal 
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mental disorder, which has been the underlying theme of developments in 
psychiatry throughout the second half of the twentieth century. Community has 
come to be regarded as the panacea-which will solve the problem of mental 
disorder in Italy just as it has been in Britain and America, and -the level 
of expectation which has been attached to the policy is unrealis , tic, and d6omed 
to failure. 
Whatever may be said about the situation' in Italy as a whole, the services in 
Trieste are acknowiedged by-many people to be among the best in the world. 
Those who regard these reforms as the result of a false Marxist ideology are 
therefore obliged to explain how a Marxist ideology has 'come to produce such 
an effective system. Commentators have usually pointed to -local advantages . 
which make Trieste much better suited for the provision of such services than 
other cities; for example, the ready availabAlity of housing (interview with 
local National Schizophrenia Fellowship co-ordinator). Jones and Poletti 
(1986) point out that Trieste has advantages which make applying the 
principles of PD simpler than elsewhere, and that the other three cities 
visited on that trip hadn't done nearly so well . Some have argued that even 
Trieste retains some secure services for those" who cannot. be reintegrated., 
which are not much discussed (interview with local NSF co-ordinator). Jones 
and Poletti (1986: 149) ascribe British misconceptions about what has actually 
happened in Trieste to a failure to appreciate the language being used by the 
Italian movement. 
In common parlance, a prison or a mental hospital is merely a 
building, -a physical landmark; but in Marxist sociology, which 
has been very influential in Trieste, it is also a power- 
structure, constraining and controlling the inmates. So San 
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Giovanni is 'Closed' in the sense that the hospital 
administration ceased to exert power over the inmates, ýut it is 
not 'closed' in the sense that some of them continue to live 
there and to receive psychiatric and nursing services. The 
distinction is not a particularly subtle one, but it hA9 led to 
massive misunderstandings. 
Certainly, the failure of the implementation of Law 180 effectively across the 
country indicates that such reforms are not easy to introdu'ce or to maintain 
without a high level of ideological motivation and material resources. Strong 
and supportive communities do not simply happen, but haVe to'be created and 
maintained. Whether the achievements which PD has made can-be expanded, or 
even sustained remains to be seen. -The'existence of widespread support for 
modification of the law suggests that further radical change is unlikely. 
4. The implications of the Italian reforms for individual. liberty. 
A further cause for concern in the Italian services might be expected to stem 
f rom the ir ve ry i nf o rma 1i ty and absence of 1 ega I* cont ro 11tis appa rent f rom 
some writings produced by Italian mental health workers that employees of the 
Italian services expect to take a great deal of responsibility for service 
clients' behaviour and well-being, to the point of feeling responsible for 
supervising patients who are not always co: ýoperative. It must be suspected 
that a large degree of informal coercion operates within the Italian services 
which is not even formally open to scrutiny or regulation by law, and 
therefore goes unchecked and unmonitored. This must cause occasion for some 
concern. An example of such informal coercion is to be*found in Dell'Acqua 
and Mezzina's (1988) description of community serv . ices in Trieste, in which 
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it is made plain that increased client power and autonomy is not to be 
confused with 'calling upon sterile guarantees for defending patients' rights 
as individuals' (64). Dell'Acqua and Mezzina continue: 
Sometimes a user will leave the centre, renewing the ref, dsal -and 
breaking the relationship of trust and friendship which has been 
established. In. this event the workers are obliged to find 'them, 
reestablish contact, and revi61 theiý* demands at the new 
contractual level suggested by breaking the relationship. The 
flexible management structure, as well as the ways of taking 
responsibility described above, does not mean th&t the service 
fails to recognize the need to protect individuals who behave 
alarmingly and who risk being exposed- to sanctions from 
instruments of social control (for..; example, an - ordinary or 
psychiatric prison). (65) 
In all of these situations the centre'assumes responsibility for 
keeping control and providing safeguards for patients, but it 
never uses physical means of restraint or' closed doors ... But the 
work is personalised by the figure of the worker who follows, 
assists and 'accompanies' the patient continually. S/he also 
gives explanations to and motivates the patient by trying to 
create a greater awareness. (66) 
Similarly, del Giudice, Pasquale and Reale (1988; 203) emphasize that 
psychiatrists having lost control of responsibi I ity for custodial confinement 
of their clients ought not to mean psychiatrists abandoning all responsibility 
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for their clients well-being and conduct. 
of psychiatrists who: 
They refer to-a recalcitrant group 
did not see their contribution as a secure alternative- to. 
internment. They did not accept the innumerable proble6is posed 
by the new 'citizens with mental illness', such as refusing care, 
not attending aLt- meetings, devaluing the therapist's role and 
being constrained by social problems. therefore many families 
and citizens who are-concerned with or feel threatened - by 
reintegration or non-care, protest against this irresponsibility 
and neglect of the users by the workers of the psychiatric , 
services. (20a) 
The extreme limit of this practical responsibility concerning the 
user is makinq therapeutic intervention compulsory. This can 
happen both when the person refuses any therapeutic relationship 
at all - because s/he is subject to delirious illusions or to- a 
compulsive vision of a changed world when s/he needs to be 
removed from social or institutional neglect. It is here that 
the real concern of a public service towards an individual can be 
measured. Substantial defence barriers can be put up by 
individuals, and these have to be overcome if the service is to 
succeed in taking responsibility for him/her. (203) 
Del Giudice et al then note that Law 180 does make provision for some 
compulsory treatment where persuasion has failed. Again, the impression is 
created of a system which depends upon a high level of informal persuasion 
bordering upon coercion. There may be a danger of much de -facto -coercion 
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taking place beyond the limits of legal regulation because of the Italian 
movements failure to prioritise individual legal rights. 
Jenner (interview) commented that the Italian system contains a- sizeable 
amount of hidden coercion: 
The Italian system's actually better (than the American]. 
There's no soup kitchen, there's 6ot much'in the way of the down 
and out. There's a lot of hidden coercion of course... I think 
it's unavoidable in a way. 
Jenner (interview) has also suggested that the' Italian services are in many. 
ways less democratic than existing services - in Brit . ain, because -of the 
differences in education between Italian service users and Italian 
psychiatrists. In practice, Italian doctors aire so much better educated than 
the ordinary people, that they find it relatively easy to demolish Jusers" 
arguments and their own approaches prevail. This would appear to be a veryý. 
practical example of a situation where knowledge is power. Although the 
psychiatrists in Italy no longer tend to exert control. through legally 
enforceable coercion, they still exert control through greater, expertise. 
Until doctors and users are able to discuss mental distress and its treatmen't 
from similar educational perspectives, and psychiatric knowledge js more 
evenly distributed through the populatiOn, it seems that the -level of 
democracy in Italy will be limited. Basaglia's reforms seem to, have. produced 
a service which is less adversarial than is indicated by the British 
experience of demands being made by users against professionals. Lovell and 
Scheper-Hughes note that the absence of users from the. Italian movement has 
provoked criticism, but that users in Italy have been more successful in 
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forming alliances with professionals than have patients' rights groups in the 
USA (Lovell and Scheper-Hughes, 1987: 45). 
Conclusion 
overall, it is extremely difficult to reach firm conclusions about the results 
of the Italian reforms, because of the piudity of quantitative data measuring 
change, and the problems of relying on anecdotal evidence. As McCarthy 
(1985: 279) has observed: 
The picture of the Italian mental heal th. servi ces that emorges is 
of substantial varliation across t'he country, with some highly 
innovative services matched by .., some very traditional, 
unsatisfactory ones. The reforms described by Ramon and others 
have- depended on innovations by a minority of pro gressive 
psychiatrists in favourable political circumstances. Jones, on 
the other hand, found poor quality serv-ices, and concluded that 
the reform "has failed". Evidently, the descriptions reflect 
what each visitor wanted to see. 
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McCarthy suggests that the reason why British psychiatrists have been so 
suspicious of the developments in Italy is'because they fear that treatment 
in the community along Italian lines would indicate acceptance of an 
environmental aetiology for mental illness., and a reversal of psychiatry's 
recent and hard-fought integration into mainstream medicine. I would-add to 
these probable reservations the awareness of psychiatrists that the Italian 
reforms are based upon an explicitly political and 'Marxist inte*rpretation of 
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mental health, and appeal most strongly to the Left, for whom the Italian 
democratic approach has become a substitute for the now largely discredited 
and abandoned anti-psychiatry. 
The message of the Italian reforms would appear to be that, ' gi. ven enough 
ideological enthusiasm and enough resources, it is possible to produce a 
community-based psychi. atric service which relies far less on institutional 
coercion than has been the norm in most ýu ropean 'count ri es. However, even at 
its best, such a service cannot completely obviate the. need for some secure 
detention of those patients who pose a serious threat to society, either 
within the mental health system or within the prison system. 
With respect to the poorer parts of Italy, especially in the south of the 
country, it must be viewed as not only utopian, but highly irresponsible, to 
pass legislation removing the existing duty of care for patients before 
ensuring such a service as is found in Trieste is feasibl, e everywhere. PD 
should not have created a situation in which ihe majority of local authorities 
could legitimately abandon responsibility for-their vulnerable members when 
PD was aware that its own enthusiasm and confidence was not shared by the 
majority of their colleagues or the majority of political admin. istratio. ns. 
It appears that PD believed that once the legislation was in place the 
enthusiasm would follow. As is now apparent this was not the case. PD's 
enthusiastic advocacy of its own Marxist ideology proved no substitute for a 
slower and more considered approach to reform, driven by an increasing 
understanding, drawn from empirical evidence, of what was possible. PD have 
claimed that the situation in Italy is not the result of their reform; 'but of 
failure to implement the reform, and they are not therefore responsible. It 
is arguable that PD should have realised that what they were demandi-ng could 
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not be magicked into existence overnight, and was always doomed to failure in 
those areas which did not already support its radical agenda. As Jones 
(1991: 557) has commented: 
If there is a lesson to be learned from the distressing mOddle of 
the Italian mental health situation, it is a very old one: law, 
unfortunately, does not cure patients. 
It is a pity that the group -did not limit its aims to spreading the messadb 
of institutional reform more slowly through professional debate and 
persuasion, rather than attempting to force its own vievis to: be enshrined in 
legislation without the support of many service providers. 
Finally, the wide-ranging abolition of legal.; powers and controls in relation 
to mentally disordered people in Italy has increased greatly the liberty of 
patients who were previously institutional ised. However, the reforms have not 
resulted in the creation of legal powers which would protect individuals from 
improper practice by doctors in case of informal coercion and 'persuasion' 
bordering upon coercion. There is perhaps room for concern at the unknown 
volume of unregulated de facto coercion actually taking place w1thin the 
Italian mental health system. 
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Chapter 7 MIND's Policy and campaigns from the 1970s to the present 
day. 
1. Theoretical underpinnings of MIND's legal campaign. 
The theoretical basis of the MIND campaign can be related both to the 
political cr. itiques of. psychiatry which emerged during the 1960s, ' and to the 
resurgence of support for a legalistic, 'as opposed to therapeutic, approach 
to mental health legislation. 
It has been seen (chapter 2) that the 1959 Mental Health Act (MHA) represented 
a shift away from a legalistic approach to mental health regulation. The 
legalistic approach, embodied most completely -in the Victorian Lunacy Act 
1890, regarded the function of mental health legislation as being the 
protection of individual liberties, in this case the protection of'the f reedoni 
of the sane against the threat of improper incarceration and treatment at the 
hands of psychiatrists. The legislation did not express concern'. for the 
liberties of those who were considered to have been properly hospitalised *as 
lunatics, whose supervision and treatment was . considered to be the medical 
profession's Proper duty. 
The 1959 Mental Health Act represented the culmination of a shift of policy 
in the direction of using mental health Tegislation to ensure therapeutic 
ends. The emphasis of the MHA was on ensuring the right to treatment, rather 
than the right to liberty. Power to administer psychiatric -incarceration and 
treatment passed from the legal profession, the people traditionally concerned 
with the protection of liberties, to the medical profe'ssion, who were now 
considered the people most appropriate to make the kinds oý the-rapeutic 
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decisions envisaged within the new legislation. An important aspect of this 
shift in perceived purpose was the expanded importance given to voluntary 
treatment. Paradoxically, the legislators at the time of the Lunacy Act had 
seen compulsory hospitalisation as a way of defending liberty. As long as the 
only people who could be admitted to psychiatric hospitals werb there at the 
request and authorization of a magistrate, there could be no question of a 
person being held in hospital against his or her will without right of appeal. 
The MHA emphasized the importance of 'patients being allowed to receive 
treatment without - ihe stigma of legal compulsion whereve*r possible. The 
negative side of this enlightened measure is that it involves the presence in 
psychiatric hospitals of persons who are held to be thbre voluntarily, and 
whose treatment is not therefore regulated by any kind of official body. 
Instances of de facto imprisonment. and compulsion aniongst this group of 
patients become problematic precisely becau. se of the absence of regulation 
applying to them, and responsible bodies to enforce regulation. This is 
particularly problematic in a service which does allow for some use of 
compulsion where patients do not cooperate-, and where the threat of legal 
coercion may be used to enlist the cooperation of patients who resist informal 
but de facto coercion. 
Some libertarian concern had been expressed at the time of passing of-the MHA 
(for example,. see chapter 2). However, confidence in the expertise and 
generally benevolent function of the psychiatric profession won the day, and 
the MHA passed into law with the minimum of legal powers of regulation 
included within it, the great majority of decision making power being 
consigned to the hands of doctors. Subsequent7y, it became apparent that the 
MHA was not operating unproblematically, and by the early 1970s not only MIND 
but also the Royal College of Psychiatrists were rbquesting am-'endment. 
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Some of the difficulties arose not out of the principles of the MHA but out 
of its vagueness on certain practical points; for example, sections 25 and 29 
of the 1959 MHA, which dealt with compulsory admission to hospital for 
observation, did not specify whether observation could include the 
administration of treatment without the patient's consent. ', This issue in 
particular needed tq be clarified so that psychiatrists knewwhether they were 
acting illegally and risking legal proceedings, against them, and was the kind 
of issue with which the Royal College of 'Psychia . trists was chiefly concerned. 
The basis of MIND's campaign was a desire to restore to the mental health 
legislation's therapeutic aspects a more legalistic 6onceýn for- negative 
rights. That is to say, MIND wished to reverse the trend towards investing 
power in the medical profession, and reinvest it in law, ýhe institution which 
ought properly to be concerned with issues of liberty and rights. As Blom- 
Cooper and Jefferys (1975: 6-7) stated, in their' foreword to A Human Condition, 
Larry Gostin's critique of the MHA 1959: 
In our view, the willingness to leave so much power in the hands 
of the medical profession was the result of a general wave of 
optimism about the capacity of mankind to solve most of its. age- 
long problems of poverty, ignorance, squalor, disease and 
deviance. In particular, science applied to medicine was thought 
to be making spectacular progress in the treatment and prevention 
of infectious diseases; it seemed equally legitimate to expect 
that pharmacological advances - this was the period of the advent 
of tranquillizers - and discoveries in the physical treatment of 
mental disorders would equip psychiatrists with the means to 
reduce dramatically the number of disturbed individuals who had 
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hitherto had to be physically restrained in padded cells or 
locked wards ... Medicine was almost universally perceived as 
manifestly humane, whereas the. law was seen as subordinating the 
individuals' welfare to the collective good ... Our recent failures 
to achieve the most modest social welfare objectives haýo fqrced 
us to re-examine even those policies and practices that seemed 
least cont rove rsi-al and open to criticism. Optimism'has 'given 
way to scepticism, if not pessimiým. We*'are more aware of the 
complexities , of human behaviour, of the unintended aný unwelcome 
side effects of well-intentioned statutory provision, of the 
differences in interest and outlook that lie behihd an' apparent 
consensus of approach to the treatment of the mentally ill. 
However, MIND's aim was not to reinstate -the kind of legalism which was 
embodied in the Lunacy Act. MIND's was 'a 'new legalism' (Unsworth, 
1987: Chapter 10). It's aim was not to defend the sane against the danger of 
being treated as insane. It was to support the right of the' 'insane' 'to self- 
determination and non-interference even within the context of compulsory 
hospitalisation and treatment. It was a legalfsm which was less a reaction 
against' the provisions of the MHA than a development out of them. The 
provision for voluntary treatment, with the consent of the patient, was seen 
as vitally important, and to be extended rather than reduced. And compulsory 
patients were also to receive as many of the'benef its as possible of voluntary 
patients,. experiencing as little restriction of liberty as could be achieved 
within the broad aim of administering restraint and treatment to those in 
need. The MHA. had affirmed a growing split between the way psychiatry 
regarded its patients and the way the law encouraged, patients to regard 
themselves (see chapter 2). Broadly speaking, mainstream psychiatry had 
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regarded all its patients as hopelessly infantilised beings who required 
expert guidance form the psychiatrist in all aspects of their lives. The MHA 
had allowed that at least some patients were competent enough to arrange for 
admission to hospital, and therefore by implication competent enough to 
determine whether they would accept treatment and which treatments they would 
accept. 
1 The MIND campaign aimed to extend this assumption of competence to 
include formal, nonvoluntary patients. The fault line which the 1959 MHA had 
created between psychiatrists' view of their patients' competence and the view 
enshrined in law was finally dissolving, as all patients were coming to be 
perceived as exercising some level of competence in determining their own 
fate, at the expense of the power of psychiatrists. 
The new legalism... is part of a logic of resistance and is more 
authentically libertarian [than the old legalism]. The 
perception of the mental health services from which it flows 
shares with traditional legalism a common perception that they 
are primarily engaged in a social control function comparable to 
that carried out by the machinery for the management of crime, 
and rejects the medical preference, historically erosive of legal 
protection for patients, for a functional analogy with general 
medical services... 
The intended beneficiaries of this augmentation of patients' 
rights are not the, sane but the mentally disordered themselves, 
and the injection of greater legal machinery into coercive 
psychiatric processes* of commitment, detention, and treatment is 
conceived as part of an attempt to encourage patients to accept 
greater responsibility in decisions affecting their lives and to 
improve their status as citizens. (Unsworth, 1987: 342-3) 
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The shift on the part of MIND towards an emphasis on patients' rights, over 
and above an interest in supporting increased levels of provision, was a 
phenomenon which characterised charitable approaches to welfare provision as 
a whole during the 1970s. As Unsworth states, this was the outcome' of the 
development of the welfare state itself. Prior to the foundatic. n of state 
based welfare provision, charities had perceived their role as being that of 
supplementing whatever., - meagre level of state provision was available. once 
the state had (in theory) accepted sole responsibility for welfare provision, 
charities could turn to supporting the claims of vulnerable groups vis a vis 
state provision. This entailed a growing interest in the rights of clients 
within welfare, and an emerging critique of those aspefts of welfare which 
tended to be paternalistic or oppressive in effect. 
The concept of representing c-lients within the Welfare State, 
rather than merely rendering suppleme. ntary services, has high- 
lighted the issue of 'claimants rights'. The egalitarian and 
paternalistic currents in the movement to create the Welfare 
State produced powerful bureaucratic structures charged with 
considerable administrative discretion and by the 1960s and 1970s 
its clients were increasingly organized in Claimants Unions, 
tenants' associations, and other self-determined structures. to 
challenge aspects of their relationship to the authorities'paying 
out benefits or administering services which they perceived as 
stigmatising and oppressive. (Unsworth, 1987: 337) 
This new emphasis upon clients' rights was perhaps more complicated within 
psychiatry than within other fields of welfare precisely because the 
psychiatric patient is traditionally assumed to be wholly irrational, and 
therefore to have nothing useful to say with respect to his or' . her own fate. 
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The psychiatrist as doctor and scientist is supposed to have some expert and 
objective knowledge not shared by any layperson (let alone a psychiatric 
patient! ) which enables him to make decisions and carry out actions which 
ought not to be subject to legal review, but only to peer group professional 
rev i ew. As was described above, the 1959 MHA's provision for. voluntary 
treatment had seriously disturbed the assumption that all psychiatric patients 
are by their very natu-re wholly incompetent., The political critiques of 
psychiatry dating from the 1960s were hiýhly influential in reducing the lay 
person's respect-fo r what passed for scientific knowledge within psychiatry. 
Thus, whilst MIND never adopted a position which was wholly hostile to 
psychiatry, or called for the psychiatric profession's ab6lition, its attempts 
to limit the profession's power did draw to a large extent on the body of 
literature which was critical of -psychiatric -theorV and practice, and 
suggested that patients were usually in a beýter position to determine their 
own interests than were doctors. 
Unsworth (1987: 344-5) notes that MIND's campaign for legal reform did not draw 
upon the work of the British-based anti -psychi at ri sts around Laing and Cooper. 
These psychiatrists had been interested in theorising the relationship between 
psychiatry, psychiatric disorder, and Western society in a way which was open 
to interpretation as being libertarian, but was firmly situated within the 
cultural and social critique of the New Left, and had little interest in legal 
reform per se. Instead, the legal campaigners drew upon the American 
legalistic approach to mental health legislation and its foundation in the 
work of Thomas Szasz, labelling theorist Thomas Scheff, and sociologist Erving 
Gof f man. Al 1 these theori sts had argued that the term mental i 11 ness ,is, or 
can be, a category mistake, which has been used to legitimate pseudo- 
scientific discourse about simple behavioural deviance. However, the legal 
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campaigners tended to use these theorists not to argue for the nonexistence 
of mental illness, as expressed in the anti -psychi atri c view that 'mental 
illness is a myth' (Proposition 1 of. the anti -psychi atri c attitudes, Chapter 
1). Instead they borrowed from these theorists evidence in support of the 
argument that psychiatry is characteristically incompetent and potentially 
malign, and it ought to be subject to the law. MIND's interest was in 
reducing thp power of medicine over mentally disordered people, 'rather than p 
in arguing for the non-existence of mental illness. It shared the anti- 
psychiatry movement's doubts. as to the benignity and cpmpeience of doctors, 
rather than sharing anti -psychiatry's rejection of the concept of mental 
illness. 
This is the position expressed in an -American Civil Liberties Union Handbook 
entitled The Rights of Mental Patients (Enn. js and Emery, 1978). Ennis and 
Emery (1978: 15-16) are explicit that for their purposes: 
it does not matter whether an individual's problem is defined as 
a. "mental illness, " a "physical illne§s" that causes changes in 
thought and behaviour, or a "problem -in living. " The legal 
rights are the same. But in order to avoid identificition with 
implied endorsement of any particular theory, for the most part 
we have used the inadequate but neutral term "mental disorder. " 
(Italics are mine. ) 
Ennis and Emery use studies such as those by Szasz, Scheff, Goffman and 
Rosenhan to demonstrate the inadequacy of medical expertise ifl the area of 
mental disorder. A similar use is made in the English context by Gostin 
(1975) (with the exception that Gostin does not quote the ultra-libertarian 
Szasz in support of his views). 
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The influence of anti-psychiatry was evident also in the views of many of 
MIND's supporters; for example, Gould (1978), criticising the 1978 White 
Paper, referred to the anti-psychiatric literature and artistic genre. He 
noted appreciatively the showing on BBC 2 in 1978 of Ken Loach, and Tony 
Garnett's film 'Family Life', which uses a fictional case, , to , 
i. 1 1 ustrate 
Laing's theories about psychosis and family dynamics. Gould refers to: 
lunatics (who have only acHieved this status because 
psychiatrists have so. labelled them). 
psychiatrists he regarded as: 
a pretty shaky segment of the medical profession. 
.1 
Therefore, the legal reformers based their dem'ands for reform partially upon 
the liberal objections raised earlier by objectors such as Barbara Wootton, 
that doctors were being empowered to make decisions which were in principle 
non-scientif ic, moral judgements. But for -the most part the legal reformers 
tacitly acknowledged the validity of ascriptio'ns of madness or insanity o. r 
mental illness, and did not oppose all forms of mental health-justified 
coercion. They subscribed in principle to the value judgements which. such 
terms imply. What they argued against was the claim of medicine to have a 
broad base of scientific knowledge which qUalified doctors to deal with such 
conditions. In Friedson's (1970) terms, the legal campaigners were arguing 
that mental illness ought not to be the wholesale concern of doctors, not 
because it isn't illness, but because doctors have only limited expertise in 
this area. This is not to say that mental illnesses do. hot have physical and 
potentially medical aspects. It is to say that we do not as yei* know. to what 
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extent that is the case. This is what distinguishes the new legalism from the 
old. The old legalism was content to ensure that sane persons were not 
wrongfully treated by doctors. The new legalism seeks to ensure that mentally 
disordered persons are subjected only to treatments which the doctor As able 
to justify. 
2. Events of the camp4ign 
Historically, the origins of-MIND's campaign can be found in the early 1970s, 
when both MIND and the National Council for Civil Liberties (NCCL) were 
becoming concerned about the operation of mental health lbgislation,. - In 1974, 
Tony Smythe, formerly of the NCCL, betame Director of MIND. The same year,. 
MIND established a multi . disciplinary working party to" review the MHA 1959 
It was decided that a full-time Legal and Welfare Rights Officer would be 
needed to spearhead the campaign, and American lawyer Larry Gostin was 
employed in this capacity. Gostin had experience of the are. a of mental health 
law reform, having been involved in projectis in the United States which had 
used research and the courts to compel states to bring their mental hospitals 
into order. In 1972, whilst still a law student, Gostin had 6een admitted to 
North Carolina's institution for the criminally insane, under false papers 
accusing him of rape, in order to research conditions in that*institution. 
During his time there, he compiled information upon which a number of law 
suits on behalf of fellow inmates were later based. The law suits were all 
successful, and the state requested that remaining actions be dropped in 
return for a commitment to a review of the legislation. Gost. in himself agreed 
to write a statute for formal admissions and in-patient rights.. (Anon, 
1975a: 13). America tends to be considerably more acqustomed to using the 
legal system to effect political change than is typýical -in Briiain, having a 
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long tradition of upholding individuals' rights enshrined in a written 
constitution. There had been a number of cases in which the courts had been 
used to compel changes in mental health law in various states across America. 
Gostin's contribution was highly influential in determining the -form the 
campaign was to take in Britain. Gostin was also familiar wit, h the Ameeican 
version of anti-psychiatry, based upon the libertarian thought of Szasz, 
rather than. the British left-wing version. (Unsworth, - 1987*: 336ý. From his 
appointment in 1974, Gostin contributed d column' 'to Mind Out which was devoted 
to legal and welfare rights issues. The reform process. was assisted also by 
the role played by David Ennals, the Secretary of State for Health and Social 
Serviceswithin the Labour administration, whowas personially committed to the 
reform of the MHA. 
In 1975, MIND published the first. volume of., Gostin's A Human Condition, his 
assessment of the working of the civil measures of the MHA. A Human Condition 
contained far-reaching demands for reform. It proposed a narrowing of the 
conditions for formal admission to hospital-, and an extension of the rights 
of hospital in-patients in the areas of rights to a driving licence, access 
to courts, censorship of mail, reduction of welfare benefýits, qualification 
for jury service and, in the case of formal patients, rights to refuse 
treatment. The most far-reaching and radical proposals related to patients' 
rights to a hearing upon formal admission to hospital. A Human Condition 
proposed the extension of role of the Mental Health Review Tribunals to 
investigate the circumstances of all detained patients, whether or not the 
patient requested such a review. Tribunals should also operate in a far less 
closed and secretive manner, allowing the patient more information on which 
to base a case, and therefore more chance of succeeding. In addition, MIND 
wished to see the establishment of an independent advocacy system to-ensure 
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the rights of all patients in mental hospitals. (Anon. 1975b; Gostin, 
1975: Chapter 11) 
The same year an Inter-Departmental Committee within central gover-nment was 
appointed to report on the civil aspects of mental health law the light of 
both Gostin's work and a report which had been published by the Royal College 
of Psychiatrists expressing their concerns. A consultati've document was 
publisheý in 1976 as a result of this committee's deliberations followed by 
a white paper. A ýeriod of. heated discussion ensued Oetwýen supporters of 
MIND, who thought the government proposals did not go far enough, and 
supporters of the 1959 MHA, who thought MIND was tryingf to bind psychiatric 
practice within a legal strait-jacket. Martin (1976) wrote of the consultative 
document: 
the whole tone of the document is essentially low-key, with very 
few positive recommendations of any significance. The real shame 
is that in opting broadly in favour of keeping the status quo the 
opportunity for a fundamental re-thihk about the shape of the 
Mental Health Act has been lost. 
Basically things will stay the same as they have f'Or 'nearly 20 
years. Various fundamental assumptions have gone completely 
unchallenged, and any resulting legislation will be the 'poorer 
for that omission. (1262) 
When David Ennals revealed the contents of the white paper, Gostin commented: 
The most controversial aspect of the prospective white paper is 
the issue. of consent to treatment... 
We view the Government's intentions on this issue with grave 
disappointment. Mr Ennals states that "in fairness to'both -to 
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(check) doctors and other professional staff" Parliament must 
clearly "authorise the professionals concerned to treat patients 
- who do not or cannot give -consent". He states, only as an 
afterthought, that patients should have safeguards, but he gives 
no indication of their nature or effectiveness... 
Parliament should not give the doctor the right to treat the 
unwilling patient, even if it is subject, to exceptions. (Gostin, 
1977: 5) 
Following the publication of the White Paper in 1978, MIND swiftly issued. a 
press release condemning it. 
The White Paper is a tidying-up operation in which patients' 
rights are again being swept under the carpet... the White Paper 
reveals a myopic concern with the rights and safety of public and 
staff whilst making only minimal concessions to strengthen the 
rights and safeguard of mental patients. 
Gostin was equally critical, stating: 
the White Paper on the Mental Health Act 1959 fails to alter the 
current use of the Act as a subtle instrument of social control 
and supervision. 
Before the legislation was enacted, the 1979 election resulted in a change of 
government, the Conservatives came into power, and MIND found itself compel led 
to negotiate with an administration less favourably disposed to its viewpoint 
than the Labour Government had been. In fact, the new administration- did not 
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act on the subject of mental health at all until 1982. In 1981, MIND was 
successful in having a case it had taken to the European Court of Human Rights 
decided in its favour (that of Xv The United Kingdom), and Britain's mental 
health law was found to be in breach of Article 5(A) of the- European 
Convention on Human Rights, by failing to provide patients subject to 
restriction orders with effective periodic judicial review. Britain was 
compelled to change its legislation in the. light of this ruling. The 
Conservative administration published it: s intentions in 1981. In the changed 
and less sympathe6c political climate MIND moderated its 'position, and 
expressed its welcoming of such proposals as had been made, stating: 
Patients' rights are considerably strengthened by the- proposals 
of the long-awaited Mental Health (Amendment ) Bill ... but major 
powers of discretion are retained by the medical profession 
Many of the Bill's recommendations are welcomed by MIND, whose 
hard-fought campaign for patients; rights has often 'been 
criticised, especially by psychiatrists. Some of the new Bill? s 
most important proposals are clearly -influenced by, if not taken 
directly from, A Human Condition, the work of MIND's Legal 
Director Larry Gostin. (Anon. 1981: 3) 
In 1982, MIND published The Great Debate in which it laid out its proposals 
for further amendments to the bill. The l6gislation was finally enacted in 
1982 in the form of the Mental Health (Amendment) Act 1982, which was the 
following year consolidated with the existing provisions of the MHA 1959 to 
produce the Mental Health Act 1983. 
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Outcome 
Unsworth (1987: 334) estimates that about two thirds of the proposals enacted 
in the MHA 1983 derived from proposals advanced in Gostin's A Human Condition. 
However, MIND certainly did not achieve all it had wanted, and 'having lost the 
support of the Secretary of State, as David Ennals was replaced by a 
conservative Minister,. MIND probably saw fewer.. of its proposals enacted by the 
Conservatives than would have occurred Under Labour. Broadly speaking, what 
was achieved was that: 
The MHA 1983 narrows and restricts the definition a: nd classification of 
mental disorder for statutory purposes ... these amendments emphasize 
that it is neither the mere ex-iste'nce of mental disequilibrium nor of 
deviant behaviour which activates the provisions of mental health 
legislations, but certain combinations of the two which justify special 
legal powers of psychiatric intervention. (Unsworth, 1987: 317-8) 
Section 3(2)(b) introduces a new test of treatability with respect to 
psychopathic patients, legislating that such patients should only fall within 
the terms of the Act when treatment was deemed necessary to produce an 
improvement or prevent a deterioration in the patient's condition. This 
measure was designed to prevent long-term detention of these patients being 
used solely to avoid their release from custody. 
j Requirements attaching to compulsory admission and. discharge 
under the Mental Health Act have been procedurally weighted in 
favour of the patient's liberty (Unsworth, 1987: 319) 
0 
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Social workers were to be trained and registered as Approved Social Workers 
before being authorised to act within the terms of the Mental Health Act. 
This measure was intended to prevent injustices arising from inadequate 
knowledge of the law. The role of the nearest relative was expanded, *and the 
definition of nearest relative clarified. The duration periodt of 
detention for treatment was halved, increasing opportunities for application 
to a Mental. Health Review Tribunal. The Tribunal's role is also no longer 
restricted to handling applications ft-om patients themselves. Hospital 
managers are now compelled. to send details of cases. where a patient was 
entitled to make an application and did not do so to the Tribunal for 
automatic review. 
of enormous importance are the measures 'introduced to c6ntrol administration 
of treatment. The MHA 1983 confirmed that formal admission for observation 
for 28 days under the Act does authorize administration of treatment. But the 
rules governing the nature of the treatment which was permitted under the Act 
were considerably elaborated. The most draftic forms of intervention, those 
involving psychosurgery or hormonal implants for example, can only be 
administered with both the consent of the patient and a second medical 
gpinion. For less serious treatments, such as long-term medication and 
electro-convulsive therapy, either a second medical opinion or the consent of 
the patient is required. Treatments not deemed serious enough to warrant 
being placed in wither of these categories, may be given without consent or a 
second medical opinion to detained patients. in practice, the psychiatrists' 
authority to treat compulsorily the majority of patients detained for 
observation was. confirmed. 
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S. 139 of the MHA 1983 makes somewhat easier the process of suing medical staff 
for abusive treatment. The franchise was extended to allow informal patients 
to vote. Finally, the Mental Healt4 Act Commission was set up to review the 
functioning of the MHA in practice. The introduction of this body 'was the 
major disappointment of the legislation to MIND. 
for MIND had aligned itself with the more aggressively 
libertarian notion of a legal ly-oriented advocacy system, which 
would have a decentralised structure based on the situation of 
advocates in'' hospitals with regional and nat. ionaýi support. 
(Unsworth, 1987: 329) 
4. Critiques of the campaign 
The legal safeguards included in the MHA 1983 were crit-icised strongly by 
those who regarded any return to legalism as a retrogressive step which simply 
served to hinder psychiatrists and mental health professionals 'from doing 
their jobs by placing a complex series of legal obstacles in their way. 
Christopher Mayhew resigned in 1975 as President of MIND in protest at the 
proposals put forward by Gostin (1975) in the first volu'me of A Human 
condition. Anthony Clare resigned from MIND's team of sympathetic 
practitioners in 1981, writing in an article in Mind Out that year: 
Much of the trouble, if we accept for the moment that there is 
trouble, relates to the fact that'in recent years MIND has 
developed a lusty appetite for legal reform and the issue of 
patients' civil rights that strikes psychiatrists as excessive 
and potentially damaging to the many other activities for whic-h 
MIND is in existence. "The need is not for increased legal 
formalism but for human compassion and professional skili" would 
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make a most apt summary for the orthodox psychiatric position on 
these matters. [Quoting Kathleen Jones] (Clare, 1981b: 17) 
MIND was sensitive to accusations of extreme legalism. In his preface to the 
first volume of A Human Condition, Tony Smythe wrote: 
We do. not feel . that a strictly legalistic approach would in 
itself be relevant to a human condition *which is often complex 
and insufficiently understood and to a public service that is 
hard pressed for resources and adequately trained staff. 
Accordingly, in operating MIND's legal and welfare 'rights service 
we shall seek to integrate the different but complementary skills 
of lawyers, psychiatrists and soci*al workers. (Smythe, 1975) 
.i 
However, after the legislation was passed in '1982 and 1983, limited as its 
effects were in terms of MIND's objectives, some medical practitioners 
retained the view that MIND had damaged rather than promoted the interests of 
its user group. Bluglass (1987) comented: 
When you hear them (members of the National Schizophrenia 
Fellowship] commenting about the idealistic notions of the 
lobbyists at the time of the Bill and now the champions of 
community care, they have a lot to say in strong language because 
it is they who in practice shoulder the burden of community care. 
The rights of patients in terms of their right to liberty has 
been ideologically emphasised in all good faith at the expense of 
the right of treatment. We know what we want when we are 
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patients. We want the right to treatment from a skilled 
physician and his team. (156-7) 
Obviously, MIND's achievements would impress those demanding the -total 
abolition of compulsory treatment only to a limited extent. -Fýom, that ýoint 
of view, the MHA 1983 would merely serve to ameliorate a problem which could 
have been abolished; for example, Szasz believes: 
involuntary mental hospitalization is like slavery. Refining the 
standards for commitment is like prettyfying the slave 
plantations. The problem is not how to improve 'Commi . tment'but 
how to abolish it. (Szaszf 1974: 79) 
I But, even amongst those who would. prof. ess themselves to be radical, but not 
total abolitionists, there was much cynicism about the likely impact of legal 
changes. The patient, X, whose case MIND took to the European Court of Human 
Rights,. was a patient of The Sheffield Professor of Psychiatry Professor 
Jenner, who I have interviewed as a professiopal critical of the psychiatric 
status quo, if not actively opposed to the power which medicine wields. in the 
field of psychiatry. Jenner is well-known for his support of the Italian 
movement, promotion of principles of democracy, criticism of political abuses 
of psychiatry in the Soviet Union and acquaintance with R. D. Laing. Professor 
Jenner and Larry Gostin engaged in an exchange of letters to the Guardian in 
1981. Jenner was highly dismissive of MIND's strategy, stating: - 
I feel bound to emphasise that however great a victory Mr Larry 
Gostin, MIND's American lawyer, and Mr Napier, a local Sheffield 
lawyer, may feel they have achieved; theirs was a legalistic 
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point, not a human one. Even the European Court agreed with the 
man's recall to hospital ... For those in the 
know, the case leaves 
the expensive legal games, as. well as MIND's politics, open to 
criticism. Perhaps the expense of years of legal juggling would 
have been better spent helping people - even that man. ', ' , 
As was made apparent ip-my interview with Professor Jenner, he is critical of 
what he percei ves as the over-emphasi s u0on f ree'Wi 11 and responsi bi 1i ty whi ch 
characterises the vi6rk of the American psychiatric critics such as Szasz. He 
is also critical of Laing to the extent that Laing derived a similar over- 
emphasis upon human freedom from the work of Sartre. 
An example of cynicism about the likely impact of. the legal reforms is found 
also in the work of Rose (1986b), who argue5 that the rights-based strategy 
is an irrelevancy. Rose argues that the conflict between legal regulation of 
mental health interventions and therapeutic regulation is more apparent than. 
real. -In fact, both liberal rights theori-es and psychiatry are the brain 
children of the Enlightenment, and exist. within identical political 
frameworks. Legal regulations postulate the existence of a rational 
4utonomous subject, who has both rights and duties within a liberal society. 
psychiatry exists to take over control of subjectivities in cases' where it ha's 
become overwhelmingly obvious that the subject in question is neither 
autonomous nor rational. Whilst lawyers and psychiatrists may have a vested 
interest in the expansion of their own professional boundaries, which, may lead 
to the impression being given of disputes of real substance taking place, all 
that is in fact taking place is a negotiation of territory between two 
groupings whic h are each dependent upon the other. Fo, r, Rose, this explains 
the failure of rights based strategies to, altdr substantially ý*or the. better 
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the situation of psychiatric patients. Rights campaigners have proceeded by 
positing a set of rights which they claim ought to be defended on behalf of 
patients. These rights have been asserted in a vacuum without proper 
political discussion of how resources ought to be allocated or how p-r iorities 
ought to be established where different individuals' rights coOpete. with one 
another. These rights are, further, expressed in the arcane and complex 
language of the legal profession, thus serving. to provide an increased volume 
of employment for the lawyers required to operate them. Provision for 
mentally disordered people has thus not im proved at all, 
'but has actually 
dwindled whilst discussions in the mental health field revolved around issues 
of rights. 
In addition, Rose believes that the rights strategy has'achieved a reduction 
of available services without paying any attention at all to the needs of the 
majority of patients, the 80% or so who accept treatment voluntarily and 
therefore do not benefit to any great extent from an assertion of. their 
negative rights. These patients and client-s subject themselves voluntarily 
to psychiatrists' techniques of the self, -and because the rights strategy 
regards this as a private decision with which the law cannot interfere, the 
majority of patients experience the power of psychiatry in unregulated form. 
Rose's analysis is drawn from a similar reading of Foucault to that of Gordon 
(1986) (see also chapter 5). However, Gordon reaches somewhat different 
conclusions. Gordon, like Rose, situates psychiatry and liberal. rights theory 
within the same Enlightenment born project of democracy. But Gordon is 
content to accept this paradigm as not inevitable, but preferable to 
alternatives. He wishes to assert that if psychiatry Is theorised as a tool 
of democracy, it must itself be subject. to democ*ratic regul'ation -and not 
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become a threat to democracy. Rose, on the other hand, wishes to reject 
democracy, at least in the Enlightenment sense. He bases his critique on a 
socialist vision of society, in which democracy is divorced from 'bourgeois 
individualism'. He proposes a number of alternative bases for ethics which 
do not involve rights-based discourse: .II 
perhaps framed i. rv a language of duties and obligations, of social 
support given not because it is a'right, *but because it would be 
virtuous to give it,. or politically correct to give it, or 
because it would make the giver a better person. (Rose, 
1986b: 211) 
However these proposals, involving du ties and. obligations, are plainly 
inseparable from a notion of rights. If .1 accept that I have duties and 
obligations towards others, then the objects of those duties and obligations 
must surely be able to argue that they have certain rights With respect. to me. 
We are back in the field of bourgeois individualistic discourse. The notions 
of virtue, political correctness and self-improvement are all similar in that 
all of them involve a view of ethics as essentially altrui. stic and divorce. d 
from sanction for failure to comply. They will only operate effectively if 
all members of a society accept that they want to be virtuous, politically 
correct or a better person. This immediately requires the question, 'why 
would anybody want any of those things? ' Once it has been established that 
there is no reason to assume that people will ever simply want to be virtuous, 
politically correct or a better person, it can be assumed that it is most 
likely that, in. the absence of a preferable ethic, many people will-want to 
be selfish, powerful and rich. We must t. hen accept* that an e1 ement of 
coercion must necessarily enter into our social relations. We must work out 
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what limitations on freedom are necessary to prevent* certain members of 
society becoming permanently disadvantaged in relation to everyone else, and 
what measures are going to be taken to enforce these limitations. And so we 
arrive back in the arena of individual rights, duties and obligatiohs. This 
form of discourse is not preferable to others because it is true in some 
ultimate sense. It is preferable because experience has hitherto indicated 
that the most effective'means of safeguarding people's well-b eing is to value 
them as individuals with rights. 
This is not to detract from what is valuable in Rose's critique of the legal 
reform strategy. It is the case that an emphasis on indi, 'vidual negative 
rights, to the exclusion of debates on resource availability and level of 
provision, has produced unfortunate donsequences in Britain and America. In 
America, 'triumphs' in the arena of negativei rights were used by right-wing 
administrations to legitimate severe, fiscally motivated reductions in service 
availability. This was notoriously the case in California, where Governor 
Reagan 'used the contemporary wave of feeling- against the psychiatric 
profession to close mental institutions withbut: disturbing public opinion, and 
achieve tax cuts in the state. Civil libertarians walked straight into this 
outcome, as they used the notion of 'right to treatment' 'cynically 
themselves, not to attempt to compel hospitals in the States to offer 'real 
treatment, but to compel them to release patients. Similarly, in Britain also 
the programme of hospital closures has attrýcted accusations of cynical cost- 
cutting; for example, Scull (1984). The stress on personal liberty of the 
1970s appears to have distracted attention away from the impending catastrophe 
which would result from underfunded 'community care' policies in the' 1980s. 
This will be dealt with more fully in the next chapter, 
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The criticism of an excessive reliance upon legal strategies for reform need 
not deny such strategies any validity at all. Unsworth (1987: 6-7) has argued 
that legal and medical powers in relation to mental disorder do not exist in 
inevitable tension, but frequently support one another. He points- out that 
the two. professions are united by as many shared interests as apbeaF to di'vide 
them: professional i. sm, conservatism, paternalism, morality. He also affirms 
Foucault's. v. iew that both positions are dependent upon the Enlightenment world 
vi ew: 
Finally, however uneasy their alliance, psychiatry and law are 
intimately interconnected and interdependent in the apparatuses 
of modern criminal justice, a relationship traceable to the 
emergence of a penality based upon the principles of the 
Enlightenment. Psychiatric medicine has been one of the 
principal beneficiaries of what Michel Foucault describes as a 
fragmentation of the legal power to punish. Law and psychiatry 
function as intersecting modalities of judgement and disposition 
in the control of crime. (Unsworth, -1987: 7) 
He has also criticised Rose for failing to appreciate the-difference which 
legal interventions in medical provision have made to psychiatry, i. n-promoting 
less powerful views such as those of social workers and psychologists who 
challenge the dominance of medicine. 
It is perhaps a mistake to hold all legal rights strategies responsible for 
what was the unfortunate tendency for some legal rights strategists, 
particularly in-the United States, to rely over-heavily on the arguments of 
the American 'anti-psychiatrists' such as Szasz. Szasz's theories, as has 
already been demonstrated (Chapter 4) rely on*- the assum'ption - of the 
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universality of free will. It is simply assumed that everyone is in control 
of his or her own life, and therefore ought not only to be free to behave 
according to their wishes, but ought -also to be held responsible for all their 
actions. This is indeed the Enlightenment ideal. However, it is because the 
Enlightenment thinkers also realised that for some people soRle of the time, 
and for some people. all of the time, this degree of freedom is not attainable, 
psychiatry came into existence. There is no, inherent contradiction between 
the promotion of individual rights and the existence of psychiatry. Some 
rights theorists were, 'during the 1970s, tending to err on the side of a 
Szaszian view of free will, according to which any reduction in state 
psychiatric provision was an unequivocally good thing. As the consequences 
in human terms of such a view had -not yet become fully apparent, the existing 
imbalance between the demand for negative liberties and the demand for better 
service provision was yet to be fully appreciated. 
It is now clear that mental health provision must be approached on 
fundamentally the same basis as all other health provision, at least in terms 
of the adequacy to which it is funded and made'available. In addition, - there 
is a good argument for affording psychiatric patients better protection of 
liberties than other patients, precisely because psychiatric patients are by 
the nature of their difficulties more handicapped in the pursuit of their own 
interests than other patients. They may need more assistance in defending 
themselves against professional error th&n the average physical , patient, 
whether their treatment is administered compulsorily or, voluntarily. 
Therefore a legalistic strategy is vindicated. However, because psychiatric 
patients experience real problems which require real intervention-, legal. 
rights must not only be negative rights to non-interference. They must be 
positive rights to proper care and appropriate facilities, as well as to such 
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medical treatment as is helpful. The realisation that law and psychiatry are 
not mutually incompatible alternative viewpoints, but exist within the same 
moral and political framework is invaluable in theorising the balance between 
liberty and therapy. Therapy ought to be working towards an increase in 
liberty. Liberty ought to recognise its own limits. But both liberty' and 
therapy can equally well be theorised in terms of * legally enforceable 
individual-rights. 
I 
The example of Italy, discussed in the previous. chapter, is paradoxically 
illustrative of the limits of both a legal strategy divorced from discussions 
concerning service provision, and a therapeutic strategy'which unde rest i'mates 
the importance of legal safeguards. Law 180. is almost entirely libertarian 
in intention, in theory freeing patients to a great extent from the strictures 
of compulsory psychiatric intervention, but providi, nq for very little 
provision by way of alternatives to existing services. Patients' negative 
rights at least ought therefore to be completely protected. This is far from 
the case. Southern Italy is notorious for its instances of ex-patients who 
are theoretically at liberty but in p-raptice compliant prisoners in 
institutions which are no longer classed as hospitals. Because they are no 
longer classed as hospitals, they are not subject to the level of.. regulation 
which preceded Law 180. Precisely because psychiatric patients are vulnerable 
to coercion, even in the absence of legal structures permitting coercion, they 
tend to become coerced. In Britain, the 1890 Lunacy Act was not passed to 
institute the practice of psychiatric coercion. 
. 
It was passed to regulate 
coercion which was already taking place.. Italy now la'cks any workable 
framework within which to police what forms of coercion are being used. Ex- 
patients negative rights have been effectively reduced, ý'as in the absence of 
proper alternative provision they are more coerced w-ith less regulation 
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outside a legal framework. Further, because no positive regulations have been 
instituted, stipulating what minimum level of service must be available, loss 
of negative liberty does not involve- increase in positive right to treatment. 
Coercion exists purely for reasons of social control. 
In the north of Italy, things are not so bad. Trieste, for example, has a 
highly effective level- of alternative provision, and argues that adequate 
provision within a socialist Marxist ýontext' 'makes individualistic legal 
safeguards unnecessary. However, as chapter 6 suggests, provision which is 
not regulated by law can also introduce elements of unregulated de facto 
coercion, which are not regarded as coercion because they ar'e not 'regulated 
by 1 aw. In conclusion, there are dangers in. assuming that it is law which 
institutes coercion, and if the law-is ended, -the coercion will stop. Law 
frequently steps in to regulate coercion which is already taking place. The 
absence of proper legal provision can then serve to reduce liberties. The 
powers to hospitalise and treat compulsorily have tended to be theorised as 
exclusively negative powers in terms of civi) liberties. This is not. in fact 
the case. Civil powers of compulsion - serve to protect liberties by 
controlling when coercion will be used, by whom, and with what ends in mind. 
5. MIND's campaign platform since 1983. 
Following the passage of the MHA 1983, MIND found itself in need of a new 
platform upon which to base its image and campaigns. It adopted. the promotion 
of user involvement in the provision and management of mental health services 
as a logical next step out of its concern for individual rights. One means 
of ensuring that users rights are respected is to enshrine those rights in 
law. A further possibility is to ensure that users have direct'linput -into the 
282 
process of planning and running services, and that their voices will therefore 
be heard. MIND has thus been involved in promoting user-led initiatives, such 
as the establishment of patient councils and frameworks for user-advocacy in 
psychiatric hospitals and wards. MIND has also been at the forbfront of 
publicising in this country the work of Psichiatria Democratica in Italy (see 
also chapter 6). Within its own structures, the organisation has endeavoured 
to ensure that users a: re both heard and exercise real power. Since 1988, 
MIND's vice-chair has been a service user, Mike Lawson, whose views will be 
discussed in Chapter 9. -More recently, in 1991, MIND has declared a 
commitment to promoting the right of all patients to give full and proper 
consent to treatment, by ensuring that they receive adequate informatton upon 
which to reach a decision. 
Conclusion i 
MIND's campaign for reform has been valuable in clarifying and increasing the 
safeguards which are there to control what may be done to a person in the name 
of treatment. However, some opponents of*MIND's strategy have argued that 
MIND has not always been sufficiently sensitive to the very real positive 
needs of psychiatric patients. In reply to this criticism, it' might be 
pointed out that the rights strategists campaigning with MIND have been'keen 
to promote positive rights to services as well as negative rights to liberty; 
for example, Gostin's (1983) account of The ideology of entitlement'. MIND's 
approach to democracy has been fundamentally different from, that of the 
Italian movement in emphasising negative rights over and against positive 
developments in provision. This has resulted in both positive and nýogative. 
differences between the situation in Britain and Ita ly. MIND has been 
criticised on the grounds that legal change alone produces little material 
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difference in the social situation of psychiatric patients. This is true of 
Italy also, as the situation in the south of that country illustrates. The 
situation in the North of Italy is perhaps one in which it is truer to say 
that provision is quite adequate, but that this alone is not enough to 
guarantee a well-functioning psychiatric service. Legal regulation is 
desirable as well to prevent abuses from taking place. 
Since 1983, attempts to increase the civil liberties of psychiatric patients 
through amendments to the mental health legislation have largely been 
abandoned. The legalistic approach to mental health reform has been focussed 
upon the use of the courts to challenge psychiatrists' interpretation of the 
existing legislation. The major example of this is the case of R v. Hallstrom 
Ppix-P. W No. 2) 1986511 2 All E. R. 306. This case concerned the interpretation 
of s. 3 of the MHA 1983. Some psychiatrists had been using this section to 
enable patients to be released on permanent 'home leave' and recalled to 
hospital whenever medication was due to be administered. In effect, the 
section was being -used as a 'long leash' to secure the compliance of patients 
who would otherwise be likely to cease co-operation with treatment once they 
were released from hospital. In Hallstrom this practice was declared illegal 
(Cavadino, 1991: 483-4). 
One effect of Hallstrom was to provoke demands from the medical profession and 
the National Schizophrenia Fellowship for a 'Community Treatment Order' (CTO) 
to be legislated into existence. A CTO would be a new form of compulsion 
targeted at those patients living in the community who were habitually 
uncooperative and were considered likely to relapse if they were allowed to 
cease taking medication. The order would allow such patients to be removed 
compulsorily to hospital for purposes of treatment if they refused to co- 
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operate. This would constitute a major change in the philosophy underpinning 
mental health legislation at present, providing for some use of compulsion in 
respect of patients who are not under current provisions considered 
sufficiently disturbed to justify compulsory admission to hospital in the 
interests of the health and safety of themselves or others. Legalistically 
minded civil libertarians have most recently been concerned with resisting the 
introduction of CTO's into the legislative framework, rather than campaigning 
for legislative change in their own right (Cavadino, 1991). 
Since 1983, contemporary debate has ceased to be so focused upon legalistic 
strategies for the preservation of negative rights, and become concerned to 
a greater extent with the issues of level and type of provision, from which 
the legal debates around the MHA 1983 distracted attention somewhat. Chapter 
8 will examine the issue of provision in the context of the community care 
debate. Chapter 9 will include discussion of what provision ought to be 
available, and who ought to decide, in the context of the movement for greater 
user participation in running and planning of services. This will involve 
discussion of the problems of encouraging input into policy by a group of 
people whose contributions are likely to be devalued because of the very 
problems which have caused them to become users. In other words, 
professionals are liable to argue that if patients were so capable of 
determining their own interests, they would not be patients. Their 
contributions cannot simply be accepted at face value. Chapter 10 will turn 
to the contemporary claims of psychiatry and psychology as expert discourses, 
and attempt an assessment of the validity of the claims of these disciplines 
to have access to expert knowledge. It will then discuss what the 
relationship between expertise and democracy might be. 
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Footnotes to Chapter 7 
1. It should be noted that whilst many patients who are legally informal can 
be properly termed voluntary, this is not true of all informal patients. A 
patient is admitted to hospital informally by virtue of not having resisted 
attempts to admit her. Informal Patients will therefore include some patients 
who allowed themselves to be admitted, but whose mental state is such as to 
render it meaningless to assume that they volunteered for admission. 
In addition, whilst informal patients are free to refuse any form of medical 
treatment which they do not wish to receivel they are not free to consent to 
any form of treatment at will, and are therefore included to some extent 
within the system of regulation established by the MHA 1983. The MHA 1983 
s. 57 stipulates that highly intrusive and irreversible forms of treatment, 
typified by brain surgery, can only be administered with the consent of the 
patient and the support of two doctors even when the patient's legal status 
is informal. 
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Chapter 8 Care in the Community in Britain 
History of care in community 
Care in. the community is perceived as a relatively recent polfcy associýted 
with the rapid emptying of long-term institutions during the 1980s. However, 
the policy originated An theory several decades before its effects began to 
be noticeable socially. It is also a 'loose term which can be used ina 
variety of different ways to indicate quite different -sorýs of intentions. 
This will become more apparent in the following discussion. 
The roots of care in the community are tR 'be found in, the desire of 
psychiatrists to establish themselves as a bona-fide medical specialism. At 
the turn of the century, psychiatry was being practised almost exclusively 
within large asylums built for the purpose of'housing and incarcerating the 
insane. Whatever therapeutic optimism had once surrounded these institutions 
had long since evaporated, and they had degenerated into huge specialised 
prisons for the incurable mad. They were rega. rded with fear and suspici. on by 
a large proportion of the general public, and the physicians -Who worked withip 
them tended to share the stigmatised status of their patients within -their own 
wider profession. As a renewed sense of therapeutic optimism emerged during 
the twentieth century, and psychiatrists began to develop a sense of their own 
expertise and particular contribution, the desire grew to end the stigmatised 
isolation of psychiatrists and their patients, and to reassert the therapeutic 
role of psychiatry as a medical discipline over and above the custodial 
f unct i on wi th wh i ch it had become assoc i ated. The fi rst stage in th isp rocess 
of transformation was the aim of turning the. asylums into proper hospitals, 
as expressed in the 1930 Mental Treatment Act. This act -began the process of 
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separating psychiatry from its purely custodial function. The more sweepi ng 
changes, however, resulted from the 1959 Mental Health Act. This piece of 
legislation had the two fold aim of separating the therapeutic role of 
psychiatry as far as possible from the custodial role, and effecting the 
integration of psychiatry as closely as possible into the medicýil mainstream. 
This policy involved a shift from institutional care to care in the community 
In two senses. Firstly-, it proposed a removal, of the location of delivery of 
treatment out of the isolated special ised hospitals bui It for that purpose and 
into psychiatric wards within local general hospitals, where treatment would 
be delivered to in-patients on a formal and informal basis, and to out- 
patients who would attend clinics. Thus, care would take place - in the 
community in the same sense that all physical health care takes place in the 
community: that is, inside a general hospital -which. is situated -in the 
community and perceived as being itself a part of the community, as opposed 
to a separate isolated institution. Secondly, care would take place in the 
community in the sense that psychiatry would surrender its responsibility for 
providing straightforward custodial care divorced from treatment. People 
would no longer be admitted to hospitals s-imply because they could not care 
for themselves. They would only be admitted if they were perceived to be 
suffering from an identifiable condition amenable to treatment. They would 
then be discharged from hospital into whatever non-medical form of care was 
deemed appropriate. They would only be re-admitted to hospital as and when 
further medical treatment was considered rtecessary. 
So far, the changes in policy expressed in the 1959 MHA have been presented 
as strategies adopted by doctors in pursuit of professional consolidation, 
enabling psychiatrists to separate their medical function entirely from the 
custodial ones which the old asylums had involved. '- However, -there-was also 
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a growing body of literature which suggested that the changes in policy being 
proposed would be of real benefit to patients also. Patients would benefit 
from increased freedom to request treatment, which would be available to them 
in less undesirable circumstances. They would also benefit from the reduced 
stigma which would attach to treatment within a general hospitýl rather, than 
within a designatpd mental hospital. There was also a body of evidence 
suggesting that long-term custody within a mental hosp ital was itself 
responsible for the condition of many paiients whose behaviour had previously 
been ascribed entirely to their mental illness.. Barton's classic 
Institutional Neurosis was perhaps the best known of a growing body of 
literature condemning the anti-therape, utic nature . of 
'*long-term 
institutional isation. In the light of such studies, it began to be theorised 
that for patients to live in the community would itself be therapeutic. ** Scull 
(1981: 8) has commented upon the extent to which 'these expectations rested 
upon a priori reasoning and not empirical demonstration'. This'theory was 
presented in the form of 'normalisation approaches' (Wolf s*enberger, 1972; Tyne 
and O'Brien, 1981). In addition, new treatments such as the major 
tranquillizers which were becoming available. were expected to. revolutionize 
psychiatry, enabling large numbers of patients who had- previously bee-n 
considered hopeless and incurable to be returned to relatively n&mal lives 
within the community. The view that care in the community was the result of 
revolutionary advances in treatment has, however, been disputed. 
Decarceration had begun before such druýs became widely available, and 
psychotropic medication is not now believed to be as effecti've as was 
initially hoped (Scull, 1984; Busfield, 1986; Goodwin, 1990). 
Following the 1959 MHA, a fairly large number of psychiatric wards were built 
within the grounds of general hospitals, and the population of the Ibng-term 
287 
custodial institutions did begin to fall steadily. As the long-term hospital 
population fell, however, admissions increased. It became apparent fairly 
quickly that what was happening was. the replacement of once for a lifetime 
admission with the 'revolving door' phenomenon. 
In 1979, the Conservatives came to power in Britain committed to a mandate of 
reducing public spending. The Conservative administration is now into its 
fourth consecutive term of government. 'After 1§79, under the leadership of 
Margaret Thatcher, the policy of hospital closure, continued to be pursued, in 
spite of increasing public and medical concern about the inadequate level of 
provision for patients in the community. From the late 1§70s onwards, concern 
was being expressed in America and in Britain, about the desirability of 
deinstitutionalisation as an end in itseif. Clarke (197 has described how: 
Scarcely ten years ago, deinstitutionalisation was an honourable 
word and practice among reformers of all stripes. Reducing the 
populations of large, overcrowded mental hospitals was viewed in 
the same light as minority civil rights issues - few "right- 
thinking" persons could oppose it. - As a result, a political 
movement imbued with almost religious fervour swept-many state 
capitols and hundreds of thousands of hospitalized mental 
patients were "deinstitutionalised. " 
Deinstitutionalization today carries few of these overtones. 
Rose (1979) and many others assess'the practice as, at best, 
merely another ill-advised liberal political movement. of the 
1960s. (p461) 
Gruenberg and Archer (1979) concur with Rose (1979) that'the crisis which has 
resulted from the community care policy: 
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attest(s] to an abandonment of the seriously mentally ill, and 
that community psychiatric services fail to meet the needs of 
many patients discharged from-state mental hospitals. (485) 
Jones (1979) suggested that the state of 'care in the communlýy' in Britain 
is now more critical than that in America, in spite of the view during the 
1960s that Britain was. i-n advance of America in, its provision of mental health 
services integrated within the National'Hdalth Service. 
2. The radical political critique of community policy. 
2.1 Anti-psychiatry and community care. 
The early anti -psychi atri c critiques of psychiatry, emerging out of the work 
of Laing, Cooper, Szasz and Goffman, were uhcritically supportive of the 
community care policy. Anti-psychiatry was focused upon the critique of the 
old-fashioned asylum system, with its ýighly: coercive and physically 
controlling use of incarceration and medical- 'treatment'. Anything which 
reduced the numbers of patients being confined i'n such oppressive conditions, 
and restored them to freedom in the community, was regarded as progressive. 
There was very little concern expressed about the adequacy of arrangements for 
actual care in-the community, although in retrospect it seems quite clear that 
a comprehensive range of facilities could 6ot be provided on the small-scale 
privatised basis of which Kingsley Hall and the Arbours Association. provided 
examples. The willingness of many Left wing activists to, accept an extremely 
anti-psychiatric critique of mental health care must be regarded as at least 
part of the cause of the crisis in mental health prov, i. sion which developed 
through the 1980s. The Conservative government was'-able to just . ify seriously 
289 
underfunding mental health services for several years whilst those people on 
the Left who expressed an interest in mental health were unable to decide 
whether that was actually such a bad thing. 
2.2 The radical reaction against community care. 
The current scenario. -has provoked something of a 'backlash against the 
community care policy. Andrew Scull has*be'en a'particularly fierce critic of 
, care in the community' . -Scull (1984) argued. that -the whole policy of 
decarceration was a cynical money-saving exercise on the part of central 
government. Scull has argued that the motive behind ddinstitutionaligation 
was always fiscal. Large institutions are very 'expensive to run, and once the 
welfare state had made available 'outside relieft for the deserving poor it 
became cheaper to compel such people to rely.. on that form of relief. However, 
this thesis does not hold up to scrutiny. The care in the community policy 
predates the fiscal crisis of the state, which emerged during 'the . 
1970s, 
whereas-the care in the community policy was beginning to emerge during the 
1950s (Goodwin, 1990). Additionally, there has been some transfer of 
resources from the institutions to community 'based out-patient provision., 
albeit of an inadequate quantity. The argument that care in the-community 
became a means of saving money rather than improving the circumstances of 
psychiatric patients during the 1970s and 1980s is more tenable (Busfield, 
1986: 328-9). 
Scull (1989) compared the pub I icity campaign to free patients from the asylums 
to that which, during the 19th century, resulted in their incarceration within 
the asylum. The rhetoric is remarkably similar, albei. t'reversed. 
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For Dix and Shaftesbury, the certain recipe for neglect and abuse 
was to leave the mentally disturbed to the merci. es of the 
community. (Scull, 1989) 
In Scull's opinion, the policy of decarceration has result6a i, n a sl , mple 
failure to care for people who are vulnerable, helpless, and unable to 
contribute to the cost, of their own care and upkeep. 
A more sophisticated Marxist. analysis of the care. in the community policy has 
be. en proposed by Goodwin (1990). Goodwin argues that the form which 
psychiatric services will take under capitalism is a product of the need to 
reconcile three different dimensions of servIpe provision: the service must 
be as cheap as possible, deliver adequate le. vels-of control, and have prima 
0 
facie legitimacy so as not to prompt reaction against its actual and ulterior 
purposes. The shift to care in the community took place because the asylum 
system of psychiatry had lost legitimacy.. However, by 1975 care in the 
community was obviously underfunded, which resulted in a loss of legitimacy, 
and the legitimacy of the control functions of psychiat . ry were under direct 
attack. Goodwin sees the continued existence of the care. in the community 
policy as threatened by its failure to reconcile the three different sorts of 
demands which any mental health policy must meet to satisfy the requirements 
of the capitalist state. He regards the strategy of exerting continuing 
demands on government for better funded ser'vices as doomed to failure, as it 
has never been likely that adequate resources would be made avai'lable for such 
services. His conclusion is that, whilst some individual aspects of current 
policy might command guarded support, we currently lack a strategy 
. 
for. 
achieving better mental health services. 
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Radical critiques of community care have sometimes provoked the criticism from 
more conservative observers that the radicals will criticise whatever is 
suggested, and have no positive suggestions to make at all. Jones (1982) has 
discussedwhat she refers to as Scull's dilemma, which is derived from Scull's 
having written historically based critiques claiming that botA the buil, ding 
of the asylums and. the emptying of the asylums are policies of capitalist 
oppression- 
the dilemma, which he-does not make explicit, but which one can 
only hope will be the subject of another book, is simply this: if 
it is wrong to get patients out of the mental hospital : 
'and wrong 
to keep tem in, what are we to do with. them? (Jones, *1982: 221) 
Jones' criticism, however, fails to. take accotint of more than two alternatives 
for radicals: either to support the asylums or to support their abolition. 
Jones criticisms would actually apply more directly to Goodwin (who does seem 
to conclude that whatever is achieved within the context of capitalism will 
never be sufficient to provide an alternative to capitalism's abolition) than 
to Scull. In fact, most radical commentators want neither the old asylums nor 
the current level of neglect, but rather want to see a proper commitment on 
the part of government to funding adequate provision to enable mentally 
disordered people to live as full a life as possible within the community. 
Indeed, Scull (1989) can evidently envisag6 a third alternative to both the 
current policy and the previous one which would involve more adequate 
provision of care than either. Also, David Hill, who is perhaps the 
professional currently best known for his continued insistence that. 
institutional mainstream psychiatry is damaging, priorit-ises closing the long- 
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term institutions, but emphasises the need to provide their residents with 
satisfactory alternative accommodation. 
2.3 The critique of community care as the transfer of medical control into the 
community. .II 
Ramon (1985) argues against the current policy of care in the community, but 
does so on the grounds that a policy which merely transfers medical control 
of disorder into ihe community is bound to fai, l. She 
ýuggests that our 
current policy of care in the community is a development out of the approach 
which was most systematically theorised in America under the name -Community 
Mental Health (CMH). CMH, as a comprehensive approach to mental health care, 
depends for its coherence on a particula'r concept-ion of' the nature of -mental 
health difficulties. According to Ramon, the assumptions, which must be made 
for the model to make sense include the view that mental illness can be caused 
by a range of factors, internal and external, biological psychological and 
social; - that a person is most vulnerable to mental illness at crisis stages 
in life, but if the crises are successfully negotiated', the result will be 
personality growth; and a range of assumptions which can. be related to a 
humanistic conceptual isation of psychiatric disorder. She concludes that this 
approach involves assumptions which conflict with those which are made. when 
a straightforward clinical-somatic approach to psychiatry is used. In 
particular, the two models disagree about the role of social responsibility, 
the aetiology of mental disorder, intervention methods, the role-of various 
professions, the role of society, and the place of non-professionals within 
the service system. In Britain, the CMH approach was never really considered. 
From the time of the 1959 MHA, it was simply assumed that care in t4q, 
community meant a transfer of the cl inical-somatic.. model, with its existing 
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medical services and medicalised doctor-patient relationships, into t he 
community. 
Ramon wishes to see the CMH approach introduced and developed, - with an 
attendant shift away from the emphasis upon expert opinioý a9d syniptom 
removal, and onto i. ssues of non-professionalised provision of social support, 
with a particular emphasis on self-help support networks: 
This development, together with fem'inisf therapy, has been the 
most radical innovation to emerge since the fifties. It is 
radical because it marks a departure from the majority of 
professional models of practice and understand'ing -, bf mental 
distress. It affirms the value of 'subjective and inter- 
subjective experiences away -from the -cl-inical model . The 
approach is based on the recognition; of the strength of this 
vulnerable sector of the population, of the strength of group vs. 
individualistic approaches to mental distress and on the tacit 
acceptance that "The Community" does not exist. Therefore 
alternative social networks have to- be created to support the 
mentally distressed. How far it ' could/should replace 
professional intervention is open to debate, but it. has 
demonstrated its usefulness in conjunction with such an 
intervention and without it. (Ramon, 1985: 300) 
Ramon's thesis involves a range of assumptions about mainstream medical 
opinion in Britain and in the United States. With respect 'to the US, she is 
assuming that the majority of the support which community care gained there 
was based upon the philosophy which she associates especially with CMH. A 
clinical-somatic version of care in the community would thus amount to an 
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incoherent perversion of the original policy. With respect to Britain, s he 
assumes that the approach which has been adopted to care in the community 
could be described as straightforwardly clinical-somatic. Thus, she is able 
to draw a qualitative contrast between the'policy which she would like to see 
adopted, and the policy which she thinks British psychiatristg are strfving 
to have adopted. The extent to which British psychiatry is based upon a 
completely. c. 1 inical-somatic approach, as opposed to one, which does give proper 
weight to social and psychological fact6rs', will be discussed in chapter 10. 
Finally in relation to Ramon's thesis, Ramon (1985) claims that she is not 
attempting in this book to assess the truthfulness of aný particular model of 
mental illness, be it somatic, psychological-or social. However, she also 
proposes that: 
a set of criteria by which to evaluate the contribution of each 
model will be outlined, based on what the author considers to be 
the essence of mental distress and its social signifipance. . (p7- 
8., italics mine) 
In practice, what the author considers to be the essence of mental illness is 
inseparable from her view of the validity *of the somatic, social and 
psychological models. Her view would appear to be one which. -is fairly 
eclectic, but with rather more emphasis on the social and psychological. than 
on the somatic. Again, the extent to whicti this view of mental disorder is 
qualitatively, rather than quantitatively, different from that -which is 
official Psychiatric policy, will be addressed in Chapter 10.. 
Ramon allies herself with anti-psychiatry in the sense of being broadly anti- 
medical in approach. Both the bl-d institutions and Ahe new policies and 
-t. m, atments can be criticised as hmdically based. '. The -new policies -can -be 
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criticised for simply attempting to transfer the medical model into the 
community, where what is needed is to provide a higher level of social support 
and proper care. To the extent that-'community care' is based solely upon an 
extension of medical power into the community, it is theorised as an -extension 
of surveillance and social control divorced from real care. Thosq who Adopt 
this viewpoint point to repeated attempts on the part of some psychiatrists 
to have a community treatment order legislated into existence as evidence for 
this. Ramon, and others who adopt this &pproach', look typically to Italy for 
the model of this ýorm of care (see also Chapter. 6). 
2.4 The need for a workable policy of care in the community to have considered 
what it means by 'community'. 
A related strategy for criticising contemporary care in the community consists 
of accusing the community care originators as not thinking through carefully 
enough what is meant by 'community' and, as a result, not merely having failed 
to provide a policy of care in the community, but even having failed to 
produce deinstitutionalization in a real sensý. It is pointed out that. quite 
frequently. deinstitutionalisation means transinstitutional. isation (transfer 
from a large public institution to a small private one). Scull (. 1989) notes 
that the board and care facilities which have sprung up in America tend to 
resemble wards in state mental hospitals and are often even staffed by ex- 
mental hospital staff. Deinstitutionalisatlon there has produced a new 'trade 
in lunacy' which resembles that which the nineteenth century reformers sought 
to have abolished. (It is interesting to note the extent to which the radical 
Scull's criticisms of America resemble the conservative Jones, criticisms of 
Southern Italy in this respect. ) Warren (19$1) offers, a similar analysis of 
transinstitutionalisation, pointing out that the* transfer from public to 
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private institutions usually involves also a reduction in regulation of 
conditions in the institutions providing care. The community around which so 
much rhetoric was based and which was expected to provide support at best 
exerts negligent tolerance, at worst negligent intolerance. Care in the 
community, it is argued, must involve ensuring that the paýtienýs and' ex- 
patients now living in the community have as much right and ability to 
participate fully as anyone else. In terms of the principle normal isation, 
this might mean that it is increasinglý acknowledged that for some people 
tnormal life' invoi'ves acknowledging the existence of. special needs exist 
which must be catered for in order for the individual to have any chance of 
being integrated into the community. Such special needs will only rarely be 
met by the provision of better medical treatment, but are more a matter of 
appropriate social provision. 
This argument has been extended by feminist 'critics, who's concern is not 
solely for the patient or client, but for the carers.. It has become 
increasingly apparent that community care generally means care by female 
relatives (Scull, 1989; Holland, 1988). Feminists are increasingly demanding 
b6tter support for carers, and alternatives to Care by relatives, whether o. r 
not such care is primarily medical. 
3. Anti-psychiatry versus pro-democracy in the community care debate. 
All the approaches discussed above continue to involve the implicit assumption 
that social and psychologically based interventions are intrinsically 
preferable to medically based ones. However, closer examination reveals that 
this is not in fact any longer the crux of the argument. The real argument 
is firstly that medical provision is not being sufficiently accompanied by 
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appropriate standards of social and psychological care. Secondly, the 
tmedical model' no longer refers to the provision of particular sorts of 
treatment, which are physiological and accompanied by organicist theories. 
Rather, it refers to a particular sort of relationship between users and 
profess. ionals, which is characterised by a conceptual isation Of Probleffs in 
individualistic terms, authoritarianism on the part of professionals and the 
assumption that users. will simply yield to expert advice. As'both Ramon 
(1985) and Ramon (1988), her comparison of British and Italian services, 
reveal, Ramon is not entirely opposed to medical intervenýion. Indeed, as 
chapter 6 has discussed, service provision in Italy is not anti-medical. 
Ramon identifies herself not as an anti -psychi at ri st, ' but as a- 'radical 
reformist' (Ramon, 1988: xv). 
Margen (1988) presents the issue in_terms of Oether services promote autonomy 
or dependency in patients. Holland (1988) combines a critique of 
medical isation/individual isation of problems with a critique of disempowerment 
of users: 
there is a growing criticism of the 'psy" professions! duplicity 
with the welfare state in reducing public oppression to matters 
of private psychic despair. However, well meaning and identified 
with the. oppressed the mental professionals are, our attempts to 
help will always be sabotaged by the 'recipients' humiliation and 
resentment at having to need help. It is only by finding a 
therapeutic practice which will genuinely empower the 
cpatient/client' that we can honestly reject the accusation that 
we are 'poverty-pimps' enriching ourselves out of 'the anguish of 
others. (135) 
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Towell and Kingsley (1988) argue that: 
Real change in psychiatric provision will only be attained where 
it is possible to achieve new status for people with psychiatric 
disabilities, new roles for staff and new public attiýOdes.. all 
within a single movement for reform. (171) 
Hennally (1988) discusses a strategy of forming 'mental health resource centres 
where explicitly non-medical responses to mental health diificulties will be 
promoted. However, the fundamental basis of these centres is that: 
The experiences of power and powerlessness will be recognised as 
the central elements around which the theory and practice 'Of 
mental health care is constructed. (209) 
and: 
Almost inevitably, for ourselves the greatest tension appears to 
arise with medical-somatic service. fhe slow death of the asylum 
is rendering the ideological conflict between the 'medical model' 
and a 'sociopolitical' model of mental health distress more 
apparent and more widespread. (216) 
Contemporary strategies for radicalised versions of care in the community, 
then, exhibit a continued tendency to express hostility to the 'medical 
model'. However, it is not explicitly apparent which aspects. of the medical 
model are being opposed: whether it is the provision of physical, medical 
treatments per-se, or whether it is the perceived authority of medicine in 
relation to its psychiatric patients. Different commenters appear to draw 
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upon both perspectives to varying degrees without distinguishing clearly 
between them. 
These critiques are also of interest in their insistence that the problem with 
current services is that they are solely medical services whi'ch dp not 6ffer 
anything in terms of social or psychological assistance. Mainstream 
medical ly-oriented cr-itics, however, regard, 'care in the community' as 
entailing the abandonment of the most seriously ill people by medical 
psychiatry, as well as by social and psychological forms of service delivery; 
for example, Gruenberg and Archer (1979). 
4. Poststructuralism and the community care debate. 
particularly interesting is the contribution. of those who have been influenced 
by ideas of poststructuralist origin. Radical' critics who regard themselves 
as mainly proposing extensions of anti-psychiatric thought have tended to 
define their radicalism in terms of a rejection of medicine and- offer of 
alternative, non-medically based provision; As described above, this stance 
is still implicit in many critiques of communi'ty care, although this. is n. o 
longer, perhaps, the 'real' issue. As has been illustrated, post- 
structuralist critiques based upon the work of Foucault reject this division 
into the bad -medical intervention and the good non-medical, and instead 
address the political values and functio6s of all forms of intervention. 
Castel et al (1982) applied this kind of analysis to the American-situation. 
They examined what had happened to medical psychiatry and alternatives to 
medical psychiatry since the critical hey day of the 1960s. -Medical 
psychiatry was portrayed as already being committed. t. 0 a Policy of self- 
legitimization before the 1960s, wishing to disown its reputation for punitive 
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forms of 'therapy'. Alternative 'soft' approaches, such as the therapeutic 
community and other forms of socially and psychologically based intervention, 
were already being developed within- psychiatry before the 1960S. The move 
from hospital provision to community provision was never complete. ' Rather, 
what emerged was a continuation of medical provision being defivered wi . thin 
hospitals and new f. orms of psychological and social treatment being delivered 
within the community. - *The seriously disturbed patients who now live mainly 
in the community are subjected to a regime which alternates between total 
neglect and repressive medical social control. . 'Treatment' in its 
psychological and social forms is reserved for the less seriously disturbed 
middle class patients who the doctors prefer to treat and who form the bulk 
of the patients who attend community mental health centres in America. 
Basically, the community mental health centres do not cater for the same 
patient group which has been ejected form the institutions. This situation 
has been identified in Britain, also, by Busfield (1986: 329-330). 
During the 1960s, counter-cultural experiments were set up outside mainstream 
medical psychiatry. Such experiments involved the creation of free clinics 
and gay and feminist radical therapies. They were also characterized by a 
large measure of deprofessionalisation, the people who delivered the services 
being largely politically motivated and refusing to regard themselves as 
mental health experts in any sense. Castel et al (1982) note that these 
developments did not pose any real threat to psychiatry at all. Rather 
psychiatry co-opted the new ideas and integrated them into its own practices, 
producing a further expansion of psychiatric provision. And-the trend towards 
deprofessionalisation turned out to be short-lived as the new non-profeýssional 
workers changed political commitment into career move. and trained as social 
workers and mental health workers. Further, an unfortunate side-effect-of the 
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counter-culture was the burgeoning of a whole new set of Psychotherapies which 
are deliberately divorced from notions of sickness, and which offer the chance 
of greater self-fulfilment and realization of potential to people who are not 
disturbed in any sense at all. 
The combination of the continuing existence of medical approaches for the most 
seriously disturbed, socio-psychological approaches for the les .s seriously 
disturbed, and self-improvement therapy for everyone else who wants it results 
in a society which *is almost entirely bound up with the 'psy professions. 
There is virtually no-one who is not surrendering some aspect of their life 
to professional management. In Castel et al's (1982) View, `we have created 
a huge and subtle web of forms of discipline which will organise our social 
relationships for us and ensure our continuing- docil ity within the web. 
Castel et al come close to preferring the honest, overtly coercive but limited 
function of traditional institutional based psychiatry to the well-legitimated 
but limitlessly expanding function of community-based psychiatry in both its 
orthodox mainstream and 'radical' forms. 
similar sorts of view point are found in Miller'and Rose (198 . 6), who state in 
their introduction that all the contributors to the book share a concern about 
the established radical analyses of psychiatry: 
Criticisms of psychiatry as a repressive and custodial project 
for the control of social deviance have been influential in the 
move away from the segregation of the mentally distressed, and in 
the proposals that carceral psychiatry be replaced by -a 
prophylactic and therapeutic endeavour co-extqnsive with the 
community itself. Criticisms of psychiatry' for its fai'lure to 
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live up to its promise of alleviating mental troubles have tended 
to identify this failure with excessive reliance upon medical 
expertise, the institution of the hospital and the notion of 
mental illness. Such criticism has supported proposals for -the 
establishment of comprehensive and multidiscipl inarY, * mental- 
health services, and for the development of such services in the 
terr. itory of dai. 1-y existence - the family, the neighboUrhood, the 
school and the workplace. 
Whilst the contributors to this volume have no unitary 
perspective - political, theoretical or practical - they 
nonetheless share a certain unease about such cri . tiques and 'the 
alternatives they propose.. (pl-2) 
These poststructuralist accounts focus atteation upon an aspect of community 
care which other radical critics of the policy have not always made fully 
explicit. This is the tendency for community services not to replace more 
coercive, institutional services, but rathe"r to supplement them. Providers. 
of radical alternatives to contemporary services need to ensure that what they 
are proposing will provide adequate facilities'for the population served by 
existing services, and wi 11 not simply represent an extension of the- inf luence 
of psychiatry spreading out through the community alongside institutional 
services which prove resistant to abolition. 
conclusion 
The roots of the care in the community policy date back to the-. period 
preceding the MHA 1959. In recent years, a" policy of rapid 
deinstitutionalisation unaccompanied by a transfer'. of funding -to services in 
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the community has raised the suspicion that 'care in the community' is driven 
by the fiscal needs of the state rather than the needs of mental health 
service users. The support which -anti -psychiatry lent to the policy of 
deinstitutionalisation, on libertarian grounds, has now faded, as 'radical 
critics have turned their attention away from the critique oj` institution- 
based psychiatry and towards the critique of community-based psychiatry. This 
has provoked the accusation that whatever policy is chosen, the radicals will 
react negatively. However, radical cri'tics of 'community care have offered 
alternative policies. Ramon-, who is also known as a supporter of the Italian 
reforms, has suggested that Britain should adopt explicitly the American 
humanistic philosophy of care which underpinned the dev6lopme'nt of Community 
Health Centres in that country. This would reduce, but not remove, the role 
of medicine in community mental health care, -and emphasise more fully 
psychological aspects of mental health, and issues of social responsibility. 
Another suggestion is that the policy makers need to examine more closely the 
meaning of community, and pay attention to creating community rather than 
simply assuming it to exist. 
It is interesting that although many of these critics regard it as importaný 
that the monopoly of medicine in the care of mental disorder should be reduced 
considerably, they are not arguing that medical services should be abolished 
altogether. The crux of their criticisms seems to relate more closely to the 
kind of relationship which mental health výorkers of all professions should 
have with their clients. This is a relationship which should be. characterised 
by mutual respect and shared power, rather than by the authoritarianism which 
has been characteristic of psychiatry in the past. A final important 
contribution is found in the work of poststructural ist commentators influenced 
by the theories of Foucault. These theorists have'questioned*whether it is 
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possible for medical and institutional services to be entirely replaced by the 
more eclectic services which some critics have proposed. There is a danger 
that coercive institutional services will merely be supplemented by more 
socially and psychologically oriented services, which would have the effect 
of expanding the influence of mental health professions throdghqut sodiety 
without improving the lot of the most vulnerable and coerced individuals. 
"1 
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Chapter 9 The Emerging User Movement 
1. Emergence of the contemporary user movement. 
In a sense, the 'user movement' in mental health has existed as long as 
psychiatry. Throughout the history of psychiatry there have been periodic 
protests by patients at the way they were treated as a result of having 
been identified and treated as insane; for example, the nineteenth century 
Alleged Lunatics Friend Society (ALFS) (Hervey, 1986). The ALFS was 
founded in 1845. Its initial membership was five, of whom four were 
themselves ex-inmates of various asylums and madhouses, and one was a 
relative of persons who were confined as lunatics. These five were all 
middle class men of influence, who were able to make their views heard to 
some extent in government. The most important was John Thomas Perceval, 
the fifth son of the assassinated prime minister and younger brother of 
Spencer Perceval, the Metropolitan Lunacy Commissioner. Between 1845 and 
1863, the ALFS campaigned and lobbied Parliament with some success to 
improve the legislative provisions for the protection of civil liberties of 
persons identified as insane. The ALFS has frequently been regarded as 
narrowly legalistic in its aims, being primarily concerned to prevent the 
improper detention of persons in asylums and madhouses (Jones, 1960). 
However, this view does not reflect adequately the Society's role in 
seeking to influence the way in which lunatics were perceived and treated 
within the asylums; for example, the Society disputed the validity of the 
moral treatment approach, arguing that by implying that the mad needed re- 
education this approach perpetuated the view of lunatics as sharing the 
status of children (Hervey, 1986: 245,254). Thus, although the ALFS was 
primarily concerned with the protection of civil liberties by legalistic 
means, it also shared the interests of anti-psychiatry and the present day 
user movement in questioning contemporary conceptualisations of the nature 
of madness and its correct treatment. Indeed, its more visionary views on 
the care of the insane contributed to its limited influence in terms of 
achieving actual change, as even people sympathetic to the campaign for 
legal safeguards tended to view the Society's views on the treatment of 
insanity as extreme and unreasonable. (Some of these views, such as the 
idea of patients of opposite sexes being encouraged to mix with one - 
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another, do not strike us today as extreme or unreasonable at all! ) The 
ALFS differed from present day user groups in that its greatest impact was 
upon legislation, and its membership consisted largely of middle class 
persons in a position to influence the legislative process. The Society 
did not attract the broad base of support and involvement of ordinary 
patients which characterises the present day user movement throughout 
Britain. 
A further example is Johnson and Dodds' (1958) A Plea for the Silent, a 
collection of accounts of ordinary people's experiences at the hands of 
psychiatry which was published at the time of the debates preceding the MHA 
1959 (see Chapter 2). Johnson, himself an ex-psychiatric patient, 
produced the only speech during the debates which expressed any real 
awareness of or sympathy for the patient's viewpoint. However, the 
formation of organized groups of patients and ex-patients, existing to 
provide mutual support and services and to campaign on issues of 
psychiatric patients' rights is very much a phenomenon of the last two 
decades. 
The reasons for the recent emergence of the user movement in its different 
forms are multiple. Firstly, as has been discussed (Chapter 1), the MHA 
1959 was the first piece of legislation since legislation began to 
acknowledge the capacity of psychiatric patients to exert some control over 
their own lives. The conflict between what the 1959 MHA regarded as the 
legal status of patients in relation to doctors, and the nature of the 
doctor-patient relationship as many patients experienced it, perhaps made 
it inevitable that patients' organisation should be formed in an attempt to 
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compel medicine and society to afford such patients the rights they 
deserved. 
Secondly, the care in the community policy placed many patients at. greater 
liberty than they would have experienced in earlier years, and such liberty 
allowed more organised resistance away from the negative control which 
medical staff would have exerted had their patients begun to form groups 
within the old authoritarian institutiohs. Indeed, their is ample evidence 
in the user moveme6i literature of medical resistance to having organised 
groups of users 'meddling' with medical policy within institutions. 
Campbell (1986: 9) has commented: 
It is one thing to lock people away and treat thdm badly when 
separated from real life. It is another to let people live 
among their peers and then discriminate'against them. 
Thirdly-, recent decades have seen a general- improvement in the level of 
education in the general population. The gul-f between service users and 
service providers, and medically qualified and'non-medica*l. ly qualified 
service providers, is not as great as used to be the case. Some users, at 
least, now feel articulate and confident enough to protest at the treatment 
they receive at the hands of medicine. 
Fourthly, the last two decades have seen a general growth of suspicion at 
the interventions of technological medicine and welfare, and a general 
interest in producing grass-roots, non-paternalistic forms of service 
delivery. Mayer and Timms' (1970) classic study, which revealed the 
perceived irrelevance on the part of social work c'lients of se-*rvices. 
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delivered, marked the beginning of a new interest in researching clients' 
own views about the degree to which the interventions to which they were 
subject were helpful. There is evidence of a mounting willingness on the 
part of welfare agencies to take client views into account; for example 
Sainsbury's (1983) discussion of the importance of client stUcties for 
improving social work practice. Early studies tended to focus upon the 
client's rating of sati-sfaction in respect of, services received. ' However, 
it is increasingly being recognised that 'sati. §faction' is an inappropriate 
measure to use to assess welfare clients attitudes towards services, as, 
realistically, clients are generally involved in welfare provision as a 
result of circumstances beyond their control, and whose*outcbme could never 
appropriately be termed 'satisfacUry'. Fisher (1983) has argued for the 
replacement of the concept of 'satisfaction' with that *of 'moral sanction'. 
Moral sanction indicates that the client, al, though not properly describable 
as tsatisfied', acknowledges that the actions'of the welfare worker were 
reasonable and appropriate. This represents an emerging awareness amongst 
social workers that their client group consists of people who not only have 
valid opinions and information to offer, but often do so from a position of 
relative powerlessness. This is a theme which'will be reýur`ned to below. 
Since the mid-1980s, MIND's platform has been based upon the promotion of 
user involvement in service planning and provision. In addition, the 
Conservative Government which has been in power since 1979 has, as part of 
its general free market strategy, attempted to depaternalise welfare 
delivery, and cast recipients in the role of consumers: a strategy. which 
has met with a mixed response among more radical critics of service 
delivery, as will be discussed below. 
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And fifthly, the radical critiques of the 1960s and 1970s, addressed 
specifically towards psychiatry, have provided a theoretical rationale for 
the user movement's resistance of medical autocracy. 
The early user groups, which emerged at the beginning of the*, 1970s, ard 
characterised by a. similar division to that into which anti-psychiatry had 
by then fallen (see Chapter 4); that is, those who wished to see widespread 0 
availability of psychotherapy, and thosb who aimied a political, usually 
Marxist critique, at the whole therapeutic enterprise.. People Not 
psychiatry (PNP) and the Mental Patients' Union (MPU) provide extreme 
examples of these alternatives. 
PNP was a non-hierarchical support network, begun in L8ndon in 1969, -which 
clearly drew its rationale from the Human Pptential/Growth Movement new 
therapies (Barnett, 1973). Laing, Cooper and-Szasz are quoted by Barnett 
alongside names such as Perls, Maslow, Rogers and the encounter therapists. 
These therapists are all perceived as havin-g rejected the positivist 
'scientism' of conventional psychiatry, psychology and social science. 
Anti-psychiatry is perceived as a rejection of'utilitaria'n. i* sm, and a return 
to the values of wholeness and authenticity. These are expected.. to lead., tO 
a set of values which are 'intrinsic and eternal' (Barnett, 1913: 99). PNP' 
does, therefore, regard a non-oppressive form of psychiatry as possible, 
rooted in the Human Potential or Encounter"Movement, which provides an 
alternative to 'corrective psychiatry' (Barnett, 1973: 12). The advantage 
of these approaches is found in their not being concerned with adjustment 
of the individual to society as it exists, but with: 
the growth of human beings continuously, the rel. ease and 
realization of more and more potential. Thi's will take . them 
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beyond the needs and requirements of their social existences, 
resulting, ultimately, in the formation of a different kind of 
society based on their higher. values. (Barnett, 1973: 152) 
In short, PNP drew heavily upon the values of the counter-culture whic4 II 
were popular at' that time. Its rationale was that individual personal 
development. would lead -to the evolution of a More caring and* equal society. 
The group received the kind of criticism which'Was directed at the Growth 
Movement in general*by more. politically committed opponenti of medical 
psychiatry. Pearson (date unknown: 5) describes PNP as 'Arcadian'. It is 
based upon a romantic longing for a 'Golden Age when pebpl e:, gathered around 
distress as good neighbours'. The organisation will doubtless offer a 
limited amount of help t6 a small number of people, but 'it has no 
political significance'. 
As Pearson indicates, PNP has serious limitations as a viable alternative 
to psychiatric care. Barnett acknowledges that the network encountered 
very few people who had been diagnosed schizophrenic, and that he had 
doubts about their capacity to provide assistance for thesp'people 
(Barnett, 1973: 99). He also described one occurrence when a res. ident at 
one of PNP's houses had become intolerable to his fellow residents because' 
his behaviour was so difficult. The resident in question, Robin 
Farquharson, was finally picked up by police and admitted to hospital 
before the community had finally taken the step of excluding bim, His room 
was then quietly relet to someone else. The impression given by Barnett is 
that this outcome was a source of great relief to all concerned, although 
it ended with Farquharson being returned to the care Of, Positivist and 
corrective psychiatry (Barnett, 1973: 194-6). 
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The MPU was a quite different kind of organisation. The MPU grew out of 
the Paddington Day Hospital, a radical therapeutic community in London. A 
pilot committee of patients and ex-patients met in December 1972 and drew 
up .a pamphlet called 'The need for a mental patients' union'. The- '-. 
committee organised a meeting to be held at Paddington Day H&ýpital on 21 
March 1973. This meeting was attended by 150 people from all over the 
country, of whom more than 100 were patients or ex-patients. This meeting 
decided that only patients or ex-patients would'be accepted as members of 
the Union, but others could be accepted as associate members without voting 
rights. The MPU was to be a national organisation, but local groups should 
be set up which would operate autonomously. A Declaration of Intent-was 
subsequently drawn up and passed at a second General Meeting (Durkin and 
Douieb, no reference available). 
The MPU's stance was informed by a similar Marxist-based social control 
theory to that adopted by professionals described in Chapter 4 (and see 
Proposition 2, Chapter 1). The pamphlet drawn up by the pilot committee in 
late 1972: 
took. the view that 'psychiatry is one of'the most subtle 
methods of repression in advanced capitalist society'. It. 
asserted a direct link between psychiatry and class repression 
'the heavy weapon of psychiatry, like many others, is held at 
the heads of the working class in order to control them. ' 
(Durkin and Douieb, p 177) 
The symptoms of 'mental illness' were theorised as both genuine distress 
which was the product of class based oppression, and political dissent 
which was medicalised in order that its real significance be mystified and 
disguised. The MPU's short-term aims included the*abolition of compu. Isory 
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hospital isation, the abolition of irreversible forms of treatment, rights 
to refuse treatment, to view case notes, to appropriate levels of privacy 
within hospitals etc. However, the-long-term aim of the MPU was total 
reform of capitalist social structures, which was expected to remove the 
need for psychiatry in any form by removing the social oppres, iiop which is 
the root cause of mental disorder. That is, the MPU adhered also to 
Proposition. 3 of those-listed as anti -psychi atri c in Chapter 1. 
We believe that the EVENTUAL ABOLITION Oý'MENTAL HOSPITALS and 
the institution of REPRESSI VE AND MANIPULATIVE PSYCHIATRY is 
possible, but ONLY IF SOCIETY IS RADICALLY CHANGED, for what is 
known as 'MENTAL ILLNESS' IS A SYMPTOM OF A DEFECTIVE. AND SICK- 
SOCIETY. (MPU Declaration-of Intent, quoted in Durkin and 
Douieb) 
Thus, the MPU did not see its role as beingAhe provision of alternatives 
to psychiatric hospitalisation. It did acknowledge that, as long as the 
current social structure remains, people will continue to, suffer distress, 
and proposed that houses should be set up to offer refuge to such people. 
But such houses were not intended to offer-alternative forms. of therapy to 
mainstream provision. They were to be non-hierarchically Managed, run and. 
controlled by patients without divisions into patients and professionals. of 
any kind, including social workers and community workers, and they were 
intended to function as holding operations pending the socialist 
revolution. 
A similar perspective is revealed in an interview with memýers of the 
Hackney MPU (Martin, Roberts, Roberts, and Johnson, date unknown). The 
members of the MPU acknowledged that there may be a need for some forms of 
therapy in the present, viewing it as idealistic to think in ierms of 
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social change without addressing problems as they exist in contemporary 
society (Val Roberts). However, they took the view that therapy cannot 
solve the problems at the root of people's distress, because the true 
causes of distress are social factors such as uninteresting work and poor 
housing (Andrew Roberts). 
Sedgwick (1982: 228-9). has identified the problem with all the user-led 
organisations which emerged at his time both in Britain and in American 
and Europe, as being their absence of proposals for alternative provision. 
He considers that, by failing to offer support to programmes being set up. 
outside the mental hospitals, patients' groups 'condemned týemselvbs'to a 
permanently defensive role within the framework of the institution'. Their 
critiques were unable to address the changing nature of psychiatric 
provision. However, the patients'. groups strategy does make sense if one 
takes into account their belief that all distress is the fault of 
capitalism, and will cease when capitalism ceases. Then commitment can be 
made to'a strategy of supporting the bare minimum'of care, which will 
itself become unnecessary in a socialist socilety. 
The 1970s saw the development of a series of patients' rights groups, 
mainly centred around London, and closely related to one another. 1973 saw 
the foundation of COPE, the Community Organisation for Psychiatric 
Emergencies. COPE appears to have been 16ss explicitly wedded to'a 
Marxist analysis than the MPU, and less enmeshed in the Growth Movement 
than PNP. It regarded itself as a crisis support service which operated on 
a non-professional, non-hierarchical basis, and whose purpose was to'' 
prevent admissions to mental hospitals. It provided cý, telephone help line 
service, a drop-in, and alternative accommodation for people in crisis. 
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Members consisted of both patients and ex-patients and professionals, but 
those professionals who were involved were committed to COPE's non- 
professional principles (COPE Collective, date unknown. ) In the late 
1970s, COPE changed its name to EPOC. In the early 1980s, remaining 
members of EPOC and the MPU combined to form PROMPT (Protecti, 6n 9f. the 
Rights of Mental Patients in Treatment). In 1985, PROMPT became CAPO 
(Campaign Against Psychiatric Oppression) (Ticktin, 1991: 31). 6APO is 
still in existence and currently providing the*most strident voice in the 
user movement as a whole. CAPO continues to adhere to. substantially the 
same Marxist analysis as the MPU, and borrowed parts of its manifesto 
i rect 1yf rom the MPU's ea rIier pamph 1 et and dec 1a rat i ob of *'i ntent-: 
Psychiatry is one of the most subtle methods of repression in 
advanced capitalisf society.. . -The 
"'mental patieni" is a 
sacrifice we make while we serve the -gods of the Capitalist 
Religion. 
The heavy weapon of psychiatry, like many others, is held at 
the heads of the working-class in order to control them... 
Together with other oppressed groups-, v. ictims of psychiatry, 
through an organised Campaign Against Psýchiatric Oppression 
must take COLLECTIVE ACTION and realise their power in the 
class struggle. (CAPO, date unknown) 
Perhaps if the views of these descendants of the MPU have changed at all 
over the years, it is in so far as they aro less confident of the imminence 
of socialist revolution, and therefore their contingency plans are expected 
to last for longer. 
If CAPO represents the continuation of a user-led trad. ition of anti- 
psychiatry dating back to the early 1970s, then there is ample evidence of 
314 
new developments amongst users which owe less to the earlier militancy of 
the MPU. In 1985, the Mental Health 2000 Conference was held at Brighton. 
This was an event at which users from England and Wales were conspicuous by 
their absence, although represents were present from the Dutch patients 
movement and the American patients' rights movement, including Judi 
Chamberlin. Subsequently, several developments were instigated in England. 
Nottingham patients' council was set up, based on the Dutch*mod6l. 
survivors Speak Out (SSO) was set up to' provide' a national co-Ordinating 
body for individual's and groups in England and Wales who wýre interested in 
self-advocacy. In 1987, SSO organised a national conference at Edale in 
Derbyshire. By 1988, the network had a membership of 6bout-200, of whom 
more than two thirds were themselves service users and less than one third 
tallies'. Currently, membership stands'at approximately 300, of which 
rather less than a third are allies. 
The contemporary user groups are larger than the groups of the 1970s and 
constitute a far 'broader church'. Also, their policy is to promote the 
user voice whatever that voice is saying,. rather than to produce a 
universal political manifesto on which to campýtign, as CARO'has done. 
In addition to the user led groups, there are some examples of user- 
professional coalitions. A notable example was the British Network for 
Alternatives to Psychiatry (BNAP), the Brttish branch of the European 
Network for Alternatives of Psychiatry (ENAP) which included David Cooper 
and Franco Basaglia amongst its members. This was primarily a discussion 
and campaigning group. It was an interesting group in terms of the. 
influence of European ideas. The group ceased to exist in the mid-1980s, 
shortly after David Hill joined. Hill subsequently set up thd London 
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Alliance for Mental Health Action (LAMHA), which has taken over BNAP's 
role. 
Also of relevance in the context of user groups is the extension of the 
phenomena to the setting up of support and campaigning groups, to Tepresent 
relatives and carers of people who suffer from mental illness; for example, 
the National. Schizophrenia Fellowship (NSF). The NSF-was founded in 1972 
as the result of a report in the Times Of one OArent's experience of 
attempting to gain effective. support in caring for his son; who had been 
diagnosed schizophrenic. The initial report produced a flood of letters 
from relatives and carers who had had similar experienc6s, and the-NSF was 
established as a support network.. The NSF has been vilified by other 
groups, such as MIND, for its campaigning platform, whilich has been 
perceived as pro-medical model and anti-patients' rights and community 
care. Hostility towards the NSF reached its highest point during 1988-9, 
as a result of the NSF's support of Schizophrenia A Nation. al Emergency 
(SANE). - SANE is a charity which was established in 1986 by journall. st 
Marjorie Wallace, with the financial support of her employers, News 
International, and the Burton Group. The chari'ty is committed to a disease 
model of schizophrenia, and exists to raise funds for biochemical and 
medical research. In 1989, it ran a publicity campaign which ibcluded 
hoardings bear-ing a close up photograph of an unshaven and staring-eyed 
man. over the image was superimposed the caption, 'He thinks he's Jesus. 
you think he's a killer. They think he's fine. ' MIND objected to the 
campaign on the grounds that it represented a stereotypically negative 
image of sufferers of mental illness, and was damaging to them. The.. 
Advertising Standards Authority agreed that the campaign could cause 
offence, and it was withdrawn. It has been report6 d that the"NSF we're as 
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shocked and disturbed by the emotive nature of the campaign as were other" 
mental health organisations (Bartlett, 1989a). However, the NSF and SANE 
have acquired similar reputations amongst more radical commentators within 
MIND. Chris Heginbotham, ex-director of MIND, regarded both the NSFand 
SANE as promoting a view of mentally ill people as dangerous. ', ' David Hill 
has been outspokenly critical of both organisations (Bartlett, 1989a; 
Bartlett, 1U90. At times, debate between members of the N*SF and members 
of MIND has degenerated to the point of'persona'! abuse. However, there is 
some evidence that, to the extent that this predominantly negative 
portrayal of the NSF was ever valid, the organisation is modifying its 
outlook. Bartlett (1989b) reported that the NSF and MIND were attempting 
to work more closely together. 
2. What is the theoretical underpinning of the contemporary user movement? 
Theoretically, the only concern which unites users at present is the desire 
to make-their voices heard and be taken account of when professionals and 
policy makers are determining their fate. -It. -is this concern which 
underpins the strategies of advocacy and promoting user participation in 
pJanning and delivery of services. The emphasis upon individual, personal 
experience, over and above theoretical or political manifestos, is 
reflected in the range of personal accounts of users' experiences of the 
services being published during the last two decades (for example, 
sutherland, 1976; Millett, 1991). 
Within the groups, opinions differ widely as to what innovations ought to 
be made in service provision. Specifically, views differ along two 
dimensions). Firstly, there are differences in terms of the perceived 
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causes of mental illnesses and most appropriate forms of intervention. In 
general, the user movement as a whole tends to regard mental illnesses as 
social and psychological in origin,. and regards psycho-social interventions 
as most appropriate (although this view is not universally representative 
of all users; for example, see Sutherland, 1976). An intere§ýinq example 
is the promotion by a London based user group, Lambeth Link, of the work of 
Dr Marius Rqmme. Dr Romme is a Dutch psychiatrist, who has'come'to believe 
that hallucinations normally associated'with a'diagnosis of schizophrenia 
are not necessarily pathological. Indeed, he has found some evidence that 
there is quite a widespread experience of hearing voices within the 
tnormal' population, which never comes to the attention'of psychiatrists. 
People who hear voices in this fashion, divorced form other forms of 
symptomatology, have usua'lly developed their own-explariatory framework, 
within which they can integrate the voices 1, nto their daily lives in such 
away that they experience no negative effects and may even regard the 
voices as a positive and life enhancing phenomenon. Dr Rqmme has 
hypothesized that it may be possible to use-the insights and coping 
strategies of 'normal' voice hearers to assist 'schizophrenic' voice 
hearers to develop their own coping strategies, rather than adopting the 
traditional medical approach of using medication to control the 
experiences. Lambeth Link organised a conference in London at which Dr 
Romme presented his views. This resulted in publicity in the British media 
for the approach and the establishment of a support network for people who 
hear voices (Anonymous, 1991). 
However, there is a variety of opinions amongst members of user groups 
about the efficacy and overall value of treatments such'as psychoactive 
medication and ECT. 
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At the opposite end of the psycho-social/physiological, the NSF is highly 
committed to the view that schizophrenia will ultimately be revealed to 
result from abnormal brain function. of a relatively gross nature, and is 
therefore properly a medical concern, albeit with psychosocial dimensions. 
Marjorie Wallace is sufficiently convinced of a genetic causat'ion for 
schizophrenia to have suggested that if such faulty genetic material is 
identified,. this would. make possible termination of pregnancy as .a 
preventat ive measure (Wallace, 1986). In accordance with its view that 
schizophrenia is a'predominantly physical disorder, the NSý regards more 
effective medication, regularly administered, as the best hope for 
sufferers (Bartlett, 1989b). These differences of approach, are a major 
basis for disagreement between the NSF and user groups. 
The second dimension along which users' opip, lons vary., and a dimension 
which poses more difficult issues for the unity of the user movement, is 
the extent to which users ought to co-operate with professionals. I have 
identified four different 'ideal types' of dttitude to the user- 
professional relationship, which relate to-attitudes towards psychiatric 
expertise. Firstly, there is the attitude which is usually portrayed as 
the traditional 'medical model' attitude. This attitude is characterised 
by the view that the doctor, or other mental health professional, is the 
acknowledged expert who makes the decisions. The patient/client has 
nothing to contribute and is simply a passive recipient of professýional 
wisdom. This attitude is the one sometimes, perhaps justifiab, ly, believed 
by critics of psychiatry to characterise the average psychiatrists' 
outlook. The extent to which this is in fact the case will be examined in 
chapter 10. H6re it is simply necessary to nate, that this attitude is not, 
by definition, found amongst members of user groups. It is, tiowever,. more 
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characteristic of the NSF. The NSF accept the current ignorance of mental 
health professionals in the face of schizophrenia. However, because they 
assume that this current ignorance will eventually be resolved in the 
direction of a full understanding of schizophrenia in terms of brain 
biochemistry, there is a tendency to approach issues of indiVtdual rights 
and user-control as though it was known that schizophrenia is a brain 
disease, which seriously limits autonomy, and, therefore sufferer .s merit 
paternalistic protection. For example, 'the local NSF co-ordinator 
emphasized the imp6rtance of research, meaning primarily medical research, 
which would ultimately provide the doctors with sufficient technological 
expertise to cure the condition. 
There needs to be more research into the-workingS of people's 
minds and how the brain functions... because if we understand 
exactly ... some of the things that might-have gone wrong with 
the person because of the malfunction say then that can help 
you to understand why the sufferer is-behaving in a certain 
way. 
Their tendency towards paternalism is also the result of their role as 
relatives and carers of peop le, and their intuition that they could perform 
these roles more effectively if they themselves had more power to intervene 
in controlling their distressed relatives', lives. The NSF co-ordinator's 
views were directed towards protection of the patient rather than 
protection of civil liberties. In fact, the implications of her position 
for the civil liberties of individual patients were not clearly developed; 
for example, s he rejected the proposal that large numbers of people would 
be 'locked up' to protect the public, but suggested that they'did need 
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I secure accommodation'. She was then unclear about how 'secure' such , 
accommodation ought to be. 
(They] should be in sheltered accommodation, carefully 
monitored, looked after very nicely, given all the things that 
make people better... But I think [they] have to be monitored. 
Just jn case [you] do maybe have one person who goes berserk 
occasionally... 
I asked whether she thought people in such accommodation should be free to 
come and spend time as they wished, including engaging 'in behaviour -in- 
public which was disturbed and drew attention'to them. 
don't think it's nice for them to d. o that ... What-you're 
really saying is is it better for them-to do that somewhere 
where they're locked up, or is it better for themAo do it- 
outside. I don't know. I don't kno%4 how to resolve that one.. 
In general., the NSF co-ordinator emphasized the need for 'reiatives and 
carers -to be assisted in caring for their dependants rather than the 
patients' rights to non-inteirference. In particular, this relAted-to 
information being passed from professionals to relatives and carers. She 
had herself experienced periods in caring for a disturbed relative- when she 
felt her ability to offer support was undermined by not having been kept 
fully informed by professionals. However,. the NSF is becoming less 
paternalistic in its approach, and has itself recently founded a daughter 
organisation, Voices, to provide a forum for users within the NSF. In 
addition, and differing from NSF national policy, 'the local OF con'. 
321 
ordinator did not support plans for a Community Treatment Order, believin g 
that this did constitute an invasion of personal liberty, although she was 
very concerned about the effects on. individual patients and on public 
opinion of people who did not voluntarily continue taking their med icat. ion. 
The second attitude, which is probably more widespread amongst mental 
health professionals, regards mental health workers as professionals, but 
acknowledges that to do their job effectively requires not only scientific 
expertise, but direct access to the needs and requirements of 
patients/clients. This view regards users as an invaluable resource 1n 
terms of information which will make mental health serv*ices, more effective. 
This is the view of user involvement typically'adopted by the government, 
in its effort to view welfare service recipients-as 'consumers'. Dorrell 
(1990: 6), summarizes the government view. Ponsumer involvement is 
portrayed as being primarily a matter of gathering opinions about what sort 
of provision would be acceptable to users. Provision itself is regarded as 
a matter for professionals, and not somethi-ng in which users will be 
directly involved in either a day-to-day deci-sion-making capacity or as 
actual providers. The differential access to power between 'user' and 
. professional' 
is thus preserved intact. Also significant in terms of 
government pollcy is the fact that 'consumers' includes not only direct 
users of the services, but also carers. The inclusion of carers indicates 
the extent to which this approach is essentially about market research, 
rather than about the redistribution of power. This view is also not 
uncommonly found amongst social work professionals, as was. discussed in 
section 2 above. It also characterises to some extent the outlook of the 
NSF ., although NSF members have tended to regard themse, lves, rather than 
their user-dependents, as the most appropriate providers of information 
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about what kind of care is most helpful. The local NSF co-ordinator 
regarded medicine at present as inadequate to the problem, and relatives as 
the best people to advise as to the. sufferer's treatment, as is illustrated 
by the following exchange: 
NSF Local co-ordinator: The younger generation of GP's ', 
recognise symptoms and signs but only have three months in 
psychiatry. At. the other end, the specialists, -the consultants 
can only go on experience and what they fidve perceived in the 
past. 
Ann Claytor: Do you thinks the average consultant's got more. 
ideas what he's doing than. you have? 
NSF LC: No. He might know the names 9f all the drugs but ... At 
first I would have said that, but not now. 
AC: Why do you think that is? 
NSF LC: Because I spend more time with people. They. only spend 
five minutes with each individual patient. You live with the 
patient on a 24 hour basis, so you get a far greater insfght. 
She also reported a series of incidents in'which she felt that doctors had 
ignored and pathologised her viewpoint, treating it as evidence of a need 
to be over-protective towards her relative. This ended in. her relative 
finally making a suicide attempt which she felt could have been prevented 
if her opinions had been taken seriously. 
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Although the NSF is perhaps changing and becoming more accepting of the 
importance of the view of the service user, it is likely that it will 
continue to be primarily an organization which exists to promote the rights 
of relatives and carers. The NSF local co-ordinators closing comments 
we re: 
What I'd really like to say is that relatives and carers aren't 
lockers up, the. only time our people are put in*hospital is 
when we re desperate and their deýperate, 'and we're not calling 
for the hospitals to be kept open just to lock people up, it's 
until there's something in place. And if you met a lot of our 
relatives, they're just ordinary people, very nice families, who 
are not schizophrenogenic mothers and Vqlre not over-protective 
and I don'ttelieve in Bateson's double bind, none of us 
believe in that, just treat-us in the.; same way they would treat 
the people who are being looked after, With a bit of compassion 
and understanding, because we all need that. 
The third attitude is typified by the rights. -and advocacy approach to 
psychiatry. This approach is highly sceptical of the claims of mental 
health Workers in general, and psychiatrists in particular, to possess any 
real expertise. It assumes that users are by and large the best people to 
determine their own self-interest, and frequently need to be protected form 
the interventions of the psychiatric servibes. The term 'consumer' is 
rejected, as suggesting that users are within the services out of choice, 
rather than necessity. This view probably typifies most user group 
members. An example of a group which adopts this approach is Survivors 
Speak Out (SSO). 'Survivors' refers to members status'both as survivors 
of mental distress and survivors of a psychiatric system which is, 
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frequently, regarded as having made things worse rather than better. SSO 
regards itself as a self-advocacy network; that is, it exists to facilitate 
communication between individuals and groups involved in the promotion of 
self-advocacy in mental health. An SSO self-advocacy 'pack' (Survivors 
Speak Out, date unknown) defines self-advocacy as: 
people speaking and acting for themselves... 
Self-advocacy is-about power - about people regaining'powe*r 
over their own lives. The psychiAtric system in this country 
seems peculiarly designed to deny power to hose who ýnter it 
(or are sent into it) for help. (Survivors Speak Out, date 
unknown: 1) 
clearly, there is a gulf 'between thi-s awareness of traditional psychiatry 
as disempowering, and to be challenged, and., the view that the contribution 
of service users is to enable the professionals to run a better service. 
The difference is that the SSO strategy aims at a redistribution- of power, 
whilst the consumer involvement strategy doles not. Survivors Speak. Out 
(date unknown: 3-4) acknowledges that the acceptance within the NHS of a 
consumerist ethic is desirable, but regards this with somb. cynicism, 
concluding that: 
Just because you are asked to address a group of social Workers 
doesn't. mean the world is at your feet. The power of the 
system we seek to change is immense. - 
However, SSO does recognise the necessity of working with professionals who 
share their aims. They do not adopt a sepa ratist stance, recognising the 
value and necessity of professional support if a comprehensive service is 
to be produced and maintained (Survivors Speak Out, date unkh*own: 15-76). 
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Also, SSO as an organisation has not adopted a Policy on the abolition of 
compulsory treatment, and a charter drawn up by the SSO conference in 1987 
did not include abolition of compulsory treatment amongst its needs and 
demands. That is, SSO as an organisation is not committed to PropositIon 9 
of the anti-psychiatric attitudes, Chapter 1. My interviews', tndi. cated , 
differences of opinion amongst influential members of SSO in this respect, 
Peter Campbqll believing in the need for some, compulsion and' Mike Lawson 
arguing for its abolition. SSO as an otganisation is quite radical In its 
proposals in terms'of its vision of the redistribution. of power within 
services, but does not envisage a situation in which professional mental 
health workers could be abandoned. 
Steve Ticktin Onterviewý thought: 
SSO is not really a campaigning group,, It's more of a sort of 
umbrella group of survivors of the system who are coming 
together and trying to encourage sharing information, mutual 
support, and encouraging development bf what they call self-.. 
advocacy groups in different parts of t-he country... I wouldn't 
call. them anti-psychiatry, and I wouldn't think that. fhey would 
want to be called necessarily anti-psychiatry. Certainly - 
they're critical of psychiatry as it has existed so far. They 
very much want to enforce the user voice in psychiatry. 
Peter Campbell is perhaps the interviewee in my group who best represents 
this picture of SSO. Campbell (1986: 9) is highly critical of the imbalance 
of power which characterizes psychiatric provision, but is not uniformly 
opposed to psychiatric interventions. He writes of dr. ug treatments: 
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Since the drugs revolution of the 1960s and the introduction of 
psychotropic (mood-changing) drugs, it has become more and more 
possible for people with mental health problems - even those 
diagnosed in psychiatric terms as suffering from severe 
psychotic illnesses - to live most of their lives withi, 6 the. 
community. [NB He may have altered his position since then - 
compare interview] 
Campbell (interview) is primarily associated with SSO,. altkough he also has 
links with LAMHA (and before that had links with BNAP) and MINDLINK. He 
identified LAMHA as more politically radical than SSO. *SSO, tended to 
campaign around issues of self-advocacy rather'than particular issues. The 
only issue upon which SS6 has a policy is compulsory týeatment: the 
organization is opposed to the introduction.; of Community Treatment Orders. 
Campbell disagrees with Szasz's views, perceiving him to be overly 
libertarian. However, he acknowledged the influence of Laing, dating back 
to the 1960s, and consisting largely of a perception that Laing appeared to 
be on the side of the person having the unusual experiences. 
Trying to restore some value to the expeHence is his major 
importance for me. to say perhaps the experiences these people 
are having are not totally negative. There's more to them than 
meets the eye and [you] have to listen to get inside the 
experience of the so-called mentallyill. That's his main 
contribution to me. 
Campbell noted that Laing's views were not. unitary, but had changed and 
developed substantially over the years: 
[His] supposed elevation of the experience of th, e'so-called 
mentally ill to some kind of inherent spiritUal value or"some.. 
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kind of superior value, really that the so-called mentally ill 
are actually the sane people, having wonderful valuable 
experiences which other people can't have - that I don't go 
along with really. It tends to give the impression that people 
are having some kind of very positive experience which', is being 
denied them. Actually most people are in a great deal of 
distress and want to be part of society. 
A particularly interesting aspect of Campbell's viewpoint Is that he agrees 
with Szasz's statement that 'mental illness is a myth' (Proposition 1, 
Chapter 1), but: 
[I] don't think necessarily for the reasons that Szasz seems to 
suggest. 
Campbell was familiar with Clare's (1976) discussion of the nature of 
mental illness in 'Psychiatry in Dissent', and also with Sedgwick's (1982) 
arguments. 
(Clare's] discussion about the whole question about illness 
models of mental illness and physical i'llness - and Sedgwick 
too: At seems there is a very complicated argument about what 
exactly illnesses are, and I don't go along with what I take to 
be Szasz's explanation, which I think is a bit simplistic. It 
seems he's saying illness is something to do with the body and 
the mind is not an organ of the body, therefore it can't 
which I think is playing with words. 
However, Campbell continues to refer to 'so-called mental illness'. His 
explanation is that he questions the value of approaching this set of 
problems in terms of illness; that is, in a way whi, ch. e. hcourages a 
physiological, medically-based mode of treatment. 
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(There is] the whole question of what are the results, 
consequences of saying yes, these things are illnesses. It 
seems to me that in a way is separate - obviously not totally 
separate, but in some ways a different concern because whether 
or not there are intellectual or scientific justifications 
saying these things are illnesses, in fact by saying they are 
i 11 neýses therefore it seems to me that, you are sayi ng' tha .t 
mejical solutions are going to prodomina 
. te. It seems to 
I 
me 
that medical 'solutions aren't working. So. I questioý the whole 
idea of mental illness and I do always say so-called mental 
illness or whatever. But I think mental illness bxistt, I mean 
it has a social reality. It's quite clear. But I think that 
part of its reality is to do with'a myth. -Part of its reality-. 
is not scientifically based, it's based on cultural ideas, 
social, all the rest of it. 
In other words, Campbell acknowledges openly what is implicit in the 
thought-of more anti -psychi atri c users and -professionals: handicapping 
psychological states are a reality, and it. is. not improper, in the sehse 
that Szasz thinks it improper, to term them illnesses. The'objection to 
the expression 'mental illness' is not that such states are themselves 
mythical, but that their supposedly ultimately organic nature i's mythical. 
Campbell is identifying himself explicitly with a socio-psychological view 
of aetiology which is implicit in the views of many of the other people 
interviewed by this thesis; for example, Ticktin and Hill. 
Campbell's other views corresponded with his approach to the 
epistemological status of mental illness. He did not believe that 
psychiatry was intentionally a form of social control, although it does 
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certainly have the effect of controlling and oppressing individuals. He 
also regarded institutional psychiatry as coercive even when the patient is 
theoretically and legally in hospital voluntarily, as for even these 
patients the threat of coercion remains. He was, however, aware of recent 
research which suggested that most voluntary patients do not*dxperience, 
hospitalisation as being against their will. In addition, he thought that 
institution4l psychiatry was coercive not just because of the threat of 
compulsion, but because of the imbalanco in perceived authority between 
patient and doctor'and the stigmatising nature of the disoýder itself. 
What I'm saying is someone who has a problem that is 
categorized as being a mental illness problem is ýoing to feel. 
in a particularly negative. way about themselves, going-to feel 
devalued, lacking in humanity,. a 11' these things. Their status 
as a person is called into question cqnsciously or 
unconsciously because of the way we look upon that particular 
experience. So therefore you have a relationship with power 
imbalances, but also one party has fallen from the pedestal of 
humanness, if you like. 
Campbell supported provision of alternative, n6n-medicali'Sed acute 
services, but saw them not as an absolute alternative to medical 
psychiatry, but as existing alongside some kind of medical provision. 
I think I would see a kind of gradation of services. And yes, 
hopefully that... you would have non-medicalised acute services 
available, and maybe you would have to have medicalised, acute 
services, but where those would be I'm not sure. 
plainly, Campbell would prefer even the remaining medicalised services to 
have as little"association as possible with mainstream, physical medical 
services. In accordance with his view that distress is primarily socio- 
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psychological in origin, Campbell believed much distress could be traced 
back to social oppression, and this was obviously so because of the 
particular groups in society who are most prone to distress. 
Campbell did not favour abolition of particular forms of tredýmeqt, such as 
ECT (Propositions 7 and 8, Chapter 1), because that would restrict people's 
choice. Rather, he favoured greater provision of information on the basis 
of which people could make an informed 6hoice. * Neither did he favour 
abolition of compulsory admission, although notably he. disiinguished 
between admission and treatment, being less certain about the propriety of 
compulsory treatment. That is, he was clear that it is*occasionally. 
necessary to restrain people in their own interests, but less clear that he 
would reject Proposition 9, Chapter . 1, which states that compulsory 
treatment should be abolished. 
He did not share Szasz's view that people all to be held responsible for 
their actions at all times (Proposition 11, -Chapter 1). 
In a legal sense and in an ordinary sense, I would say no to 
both. (That) comes from my feeling about how I would wish 
people to respond to things that I've done. Friends and other 
people when I've been in distress. [There's the] question of 
not wanting to deny responsibility, but I also think that I 
would ask friends to make allowance 'for some of the things that 
I may have said and done in regard to them when I was in 
distress, so I think I'm saying on a personal everyday 1 evel 
that I would want people to not put the full burden of 
responsi bility on me. I think in a legal sense probably 
ultimately I would say the same. 
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Campbell had interesting views also about the involvement of doctors in 
treatment of distress, rejecting Proposition 4, Chapter 1: 
[I] would like to see doctors. being involved. I'm not sure 
about psychiatrists... If you actually got rid of psychiatrists* 
and had ... doctors who dealt with the physical side of th'inqs 
and other groups of workers whoý dealt with the other side of 
thing! j, and didn'-t have this group of people who seem to be 
messing around in a whole lot of things.. *. 'a lot of us are very 
interested in things lAke vitamins and nutrition. and herbal 
therapies, all this sort of thing, like Mike Lawson condemns 
psychiatric medication, but takes a lot of remedibs of other- 
kinds. So it's a question of not rejecting the appropriate 
skills of a doctor or expert or whatever. 
An interview with two local members of SSO revealed them also a critical of 
psychiatry as it exists at present, but not pro-abolition. They described 
sS0 as existing to enable people who've been through the system to speak 
out about their experiences and get things-changed. SSO was said to be 
against ECT (Proposition 7, Chapter 1) and the*introduction of a Community. 
Treatment Order. These two members were highly suspicious of the use of 
drugs, believing them to be administered by trial and error, in' ways which 
were potential-ly damaging. In general, they thought more psychological 
approaches preferable. However, they were'not in favour of the total 
abolition of drugs (Proposition 8, Chapter 1). Broadly speaki, ng, they 
protested less about the existence of particular forms of treatment than 
about the tendency of the existing system to administer 'blanket' 
approaches, not properly tailored to the needs of indiyidual patients. 
Similarly, they were not opposed to the use of combulsion (Proposition 9), 
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provided it was used appropriately in the interests of the client. They 
believed it was good that people should be held responsible for their 
actions as far as possible, but would not adhere rigidly to such a position 
(Proposition 11, Chapter 1). They were aware that CAPO had separate'd 
itself from SSO because of differences in outlook. 
In general these two local survivors were less clear and consistent in 
their views than the better known, and ýrobablY*better educated, nationally 
known names. However, their responses were informed by extensive personal 
experience, and were non-ideologically and pragmatically derived. 
This perspective is also that which has been adopted as MIND's official 
policy since its involvement in campaign's for legal reýorm during the early 
1970S. Gostin (1990) reiterated his views on mental health and human 
rights for Open Mind. When Stephen Dorrell outlined the government 
position on consumer involvement in Open Mind (Dorrell, 1990; 6); Vivien 
Lindow replied offering a user-based perspe-ctive,., and argued that, 'if it 
was to consist of more than window-dressing, consumer involvement must 
result in a pronounced change in the status of -consumers wit'hin services. 
(Clommunity Care is transplanting the hierarchy of power, with 
service users powerless at the bottom, straight into the 
community ... Many of us object to the term 'consumer' because we 
are never given choices. (Lindow, 1990: 6) 
MIND has also produced guidelines to assist its own local organisations, 
and other groups, to promote user involvement which will empower users, 
rather than maintain the status quo (Wallcroft, date unknown: 9; Hutchison, 
Linton and Lucas, 1990). 
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A further indication of the difference between the 'consumer' approach and 
the 'survivor' approach is found in the perceived benefits of 
participation The main motive of the consumer- i nvol vement approach is 
gathering of information; however, their may be an added assumption that 
participation is beneficial because it is 'therapeutic'. For'example, 
Brotherton (1988: 799) reports: 
John. Hart, a sppaker at the GLACHC [GreAter London Asýociaýion 
of Community Health Councils] seminar, suggested that it is 
therapeutic for people to be able to express their f6elings 
about the services they use. It is even moee therapeutic, he 
added, if suggestions are acted on. 
MIND's 'user involvement pack', however, cautions against embarking upon a 
pol icy of user involvemerit primari ly. in 'the bel ief that it wi 11 prove 
0 therapeutic: 
To invite people to participate because, you consider the 
exercise to be good for them is a patronising attitude which, 
at best, may not lead to action and, ýtt worst, may alienate 
people. (Hutchison et al, 1990: 4) -- 
BNAP is-also perhaps best placed within this category, as it consi, sts of a 
user/professional alliance, albeit one which is committed to ddmocratising 
services and reducing the power imbalance between users and professionals. 
Interestingly, the BNAP grew out of the ENAP, which was set up with the 
involvement of David Cooper. However, the BNAP does not propqrly belong in 
that category of groups which would abolish psychiatry. Rather, it would 
support a democratised, politicised and de-therapeutised approach al. ong 
Italian lines. Shulamit Ramon, who has been, largely r. esponsible for the 
dissemination of information about the Italia: n reforms in Britain, was a 
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member of BNAP. A related development was the establishment in 1986 of 
Asylum, a magazine for democratic psychiatry, published in Sheffield to 
provide a forum for debate open to both users and professionals. 
The fourth attitude rejects on principle any claim by mental* health 
professionals to exercise expertise in the area of mental distress. This 
attitude reýults in a. rejection of any user/professional relationship, and 
is thus profoundly anti-psychiatric. The Britith group which comes closest 
to embracing this Oew is CAPO. However, individual mqmbeýs of SSO and 
some user representatives within MIND may also be found to express it. 
Mike Lawson is highly opposed to professional therapeutic interventions. 
Lawson has been involved with the anti-psychiatry movement in London since 
the early 1970s, and ack6owledges some influence. from Laing, Cooper,. Szasz 
and Chamberlin. Lawson lived in a Philadelphia Association house for About 
a year between 1983 and 1984. However, he regards even the PA approach as 
overly therapeutic. It was not a desirable place to be merely-less- 
undesirable than a mainstream psychiatric hospital. He is opposed, to any 
professional involvement in the provision of-mental health services. 
Lawson was also a founder member of the MPU, and is curre*n. tly a member of 
PAPO. He emphasized that his views were based largely upon his own 
experience, and not upon intellectual ideas. He adheres to the view that 
mental illness is a myth in strict form; that is, he is not proposing 
merely that mental disorder is psychological rather than physical in 
origin, but that all versions of reality are equally valid. Mental 
patients are society's hostages. All institutional psychiatry is coercive 
by definition, drugs and ECT only cause damage, and all hospitals should be 
closed immediately. Distress is the result of living, in distressing 
conditions, and schizophrenic experience is a valfd form of &perience. 
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The degree of familiarity with the ideas of the original British group of 
anti -psychi atri sts expressed by Mike Lawson is now fairly unusual. Barker 
and Peck (1987: 2), discussing user groups' major concerns, have commented: 
These concerns are only explicitly linked to anti -psychi atry. by 
a limited number of user groups. Many users, while raiging. 
these questions, would like to reject the proposal that they 
are týemselves 4nti-psychiatry, and others would wish'to 
support psychiatric interventions *which they have found 
helpful. 
A sizeable influence in perpetuating the anti-professiohal approach to. -user 
involvement has come from Judi Chamberlin, especially as expressed in her 
book on Our Own. (Chamberl'in, 1988). - Chamberlin is an American user, 
'. -. who 
has attended conferences in Britain, and wh9se work has become highly 
influential since publication by MIND. Her views are worth examining in 
some depth, as they represent a continuation from within the user movement 
of the themes found in social control criti-ques of psychiatry (see Chapter 
4). On Our Own depends heavily upon a Szaszian analysis of psychiatric 
disorder. Chamberlin coined the concept of 'mentalism'. *Me*ntalism 
consists in assuming incompetence in a person by reason of their being 
psychiatrically labelled. 
'Mentalism' or 'sane chauvinism' [is] a set of assumptions 
which most people seemed to hold about mental patients: that 
they were incompetent, unable to do things for themselves, 
constantly in need of supervision and assistance, 
unpredictable, likely to be violent or irrational, and so 
forth. (Chamberlin, 1987: 24) 
336 
Chamberlin's development of an analysis based upon a critique of mentalism 
in psychiatric services soon draws her into a similar contradiction to that 
already associated with the ideas of Szasz (Chapter 4). She extends the 
critique as far as assuming that any distinction between user/patient and 
professional constitutes an example of mentalism. Mentalism clonsists not 
only in unfair and prejudiced assumptions of relative incompetence, but in 
the acknowledgement of. -any difference in levels of competence at all and at 
any time. Any professional involvement 'in serVices is therefore 
necessarily a bad i- dea. Laing is criticised for having maintained too 
great a professional divide between himself and his patients (Chamberlin, 
1986: 21). Truly alternative services must be patient controlled and-resist 
pressures even to set up a hierarchy amongst users which might lead to 
mentalism developing amongst users themselves. GlearlV, the objection to 
this stance, as to all approaches based upon, Szasz's analysis, is that if 
people were truly capable of this level of competence all the time, there 
would be no need for any form of psychiatric service, alte'rnative or 
ptherwise. Chamberlin's insistence upon maintaining equal status resLI.. Its 
in denying the very problems for which assistance might be required. 
Chamberlin's promotion of 'consciousness-raising' as a non-therapeutic and 
very important aspect of the user movement is discussed in Chapter 4. 
Chamberlin never makes explicit the role which she sees 'alternatives' as 
playing within the psychiatric services as a whole. Her sweeping critique 
implies that she wishes to see the abolition of all traditional psychiatry 
and its replacement by humane, user-run alternatives such as the ones with 
which she has been involved, and which she describes in-On Our Own. 
However, their are also implications within her writing that user-run. 
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alternatives might become a supplement to existing sdrvices, and one whose 
position might easily become that of an elite tier within a service 
hierarchy. Chamberlin (1986: 22) comments: 
Of course, someone going through extreme crises can be very 
draining and very demanding. So you need crisis centrev and 
other similar places where people are paid. If you're getting 
everyQne together one evening a week to, help themselves through 
the normal crises of life, you caWt take on someone who is 
extremely freaked out,. really wanting and needing a great deal 
of care and attention. 
A still more sinister comment appears in the same article (Chamberlin, 
1986: 22): 
In our groups we expect people to put. isomething back into the 
group... if we put time and energy into someone for months on 
end and we don't get anything back, then we start talking to 
the person. We say that maybe they dbn't want a self-help 
group, maybe they go want a professiona-1 relationship where it 
all goes one way. 
There is at least an implicit threat in this quote, which says co-operate 
properly with our approach, or we'll send you back to the traditional 
services. Also, as a corollary of Chamberlin's chosen assumptions, there 
is no room for the suggestion that some users may be less able than others. 
Those who do not participate fully are perceived as having chQsen to be 
idle, and therefore 'deserving' the fate of traditional medicine. This is 
quite consonant-with Szasz's view that those patients who are not vi-ctims 
are malingerers. The extremely limited proportion of, patients who might 
find Chamberlin's approach useful is further highTighted by he*r description 
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of projects which she identifies as genuinely falternative' in character, 
which include some which insist that users should cease to use all forms of 
medication upon entering the project, thus excluding immediately all those 
who wish to continue some level of drug use. 
Also in line with Szasz's view is Chamberlin's approach to mentally 
disturbed offenders. She adopts Szasz's argument that criminal 'deviance 
ought to be treated as such, and offendbrs ought to be dealt with by the 
criminal justice system. That is, she agrees fully that 6dividuals ought 
to be held responsible for their behaviour at all times (Proposition 11, 
Chapter 1). 
of these four attitudes, '2 and 3 are th6 most compatible. Many 
0 
professionals are prepared to acknowledge týeir own fallibility, and 
proclaim themselves subject to review by bodies and individuals entrusted 
with protecting individual liberties to some extent. Some level-of 
conflict over the appropriateness of actions in individual cases is, of 
course, inevitable. But equally, some accommodation is possible. And 
whilst many users may emphasize protection of their rights, as a priority, 
they would also acknowledge the advantages of having access to a. system of 
intervention which was to some extent designed in the light of'their own 
wishes. Attitude 1 is incompatible with 2,3 and 4, as it assumes that the 
views of the professional are necessary and sufficient, and user input can 
therefore only be a hindrance. NSF has been referred to in the context of 
both 1 and 2 because of ambiguities about the NSF members self- 
categorisation.. Carers who categorise themselves as experts in the. field 
of mental heafth fall in attitude 1, where they are pýofessionals alongside 
the medical team. Carers. who regard themselves as*service users fall in 
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attitude 2, assuming that professionals need to know the opinions of users 
if they are to offer an adequate service, but that carers are the 
appropriate 'users' to ask. Attitude 4 is logically incompatible with 1,2 
and 3 as it assumes that professionals have nothing to offer, and users' 
own expertise is both necessary and sufficient for provision'df care. 
However, MIND and SSO involve individual users whose personal views tend 
towards total anti -psychiatry, but who also work within the empowering 
framework of these more moderate groups: Some'professionals involved in 
groups such as BNAý*may express opinions which tend to. denigrate their own 
status as professionals, and verge upon anti-psychiatry, but continue to 
offer a professional service. Therefore, the four attitudes do represent 
'ideal types', and individuals mi-ght be expected to shift to some extent 
between them, ancl to bq inconsistent. in 'terms of -their *whole sp(ýctrum of 
opinions at any one time. 
This dimension relates also to Gordon's (1986) conclusion, that psychiatry 
and democracy are, and should be, linked. Attitude 1 is plainly 
undemocratic, relegating moral and political power to experts. Attitude 4 
corresponds to a completely laissez-faire approach to psychiatric disorder, 
based upon Szasz's view that 'mental illness is a myth', and is subject to 
the related criticisms. Attitudes 2 and 3 are compatible with the aim-of 
setting up a democratic psychiatric service. 
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3. Critique of the user movement 
The user movement is currently working from two rather different starting 
points. It is working on the one hand from the belief that mental. 
illnesses are essentially psychosocial rather than medical, Cýhd on the' 
other from the belief that mainstream psychiatry is autocratic and 
authoritaripn. These. are two separate, but related, issues, the first of 
which is empirical and the second political. The relationship between the 
two is either: 
a) the medical/individual approach is based entirely upon a myth, and is 
itself solely intended to keep psychiatry authoritariad and, non-democratic. 
The two beliefs are then directly connected. 
b) the medical/individual approach has Something-to contribute to the 
understanding of psychiatric disorders, but ' ; currently operates within an 
undemocratic framework. What is necessary isý to democratise the 
medical/individual form of delivery, as well as to supplement it with non- 
medical. and social support services, provision of which need not conflict 
with the medical approach. It is not a case-of either/or. 
in Chapter 10,1 shall examine the status of 'expert knowledge' within the 
field of psychiatry, and assess the validity of the anti-psychiatric c. laims 
that psychiatry and psychotherapy have nothing at all to offer mental 
health service users. Here, I shall examtne the limitations of democracy 
within the psychiatric services. For this purpose, I shall assume that the 
Szaszian view (that mental illness is a myth, and all people ought to be 
held responsible for their conduct at all times) has been demonstrated to 
be flawed (see chapter 4). Therefore, theoretical viewpoints associated 
with this stance are also flawed; for example, Judi Chamberli . 6's vi. ews on 
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cmentalism'. Thus, I am here concerned only to address the strictly 
political issues of how, assuming that mental illness is not a myth, but a 
handicapping state, maximum democracy within service provision can be 
ensured. I shall be exploring how democracy may be threatened not-only by 
professionals, but from within the user movement itself. 
A. Professionally imposed limits to democracy, 
The nature of professions 
The extent of democracy within mental health services it limited by the 
extent of psychiatric expertise. . If psychiatrists do possess a sizeable 
body of expert knowledge, which allows them to offer va*luable advice based 
upon this expert knowledge, then it is advi, 5able for users to work within 
the context of that advice. Democracy is then self-limited, as users take 
a reasoned decision to, trust professionals to offer sound. advice, on the 
basis of perceived superior expertise. Cha-pter 10 presents material of 
some relevance here, as that chapter considers the evidence that 
psychiatrists and psychotherapists do have some expertise to offer. 
(ii) Compulsion 
Ultimately, the issue which distinguishes psychiatry from other medical 
disciplines is its legal authority to hospitalise and treat compulsorily 
patients who are perceived by professionals as requiring treatment, but who 
do not cc-operate voluntarily. The issue of compulsory treatment is bound 
up with the issue of the extent of professional knowle, dge, and material 
presented in Chapter 10 is therefore relevant to this discussion. However, 
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the issue Of compulsory detention for those patients who are considered to 
require supervision is not an expert judgement, but a social and political 
one, which it is therefore relevant. to discuss here. 
Firstly, it should be noted that not all user activists are entirely 
opposed in principle to compulsory admission to hospital. Some members of 
more moderate groups have come to acknowledge, that if mental illness exists 
as a real and handicapping state, then that muýt impact upon our 
perceptions of the'disordered individual's responsibility ior his/her 
actions. For example, Peter Campbell (interview) would not always wish to 
be held entirely responsible for his actions. 
Given that there is not total opposition to compulsion amongst users.. 
campaigning for democratised services, it is necessary to ask to what 
extent and by what means might a process as prima facie authoritarian as 
compulsory admission to hospital be democratised? Part of the answer to 
this might be by increasing legal rights, s-uch as: right to appeal, to 
refuse treatment, to be represented by patients' councils etc. Also, 
advocacy services would go a long way towards 6nsuring that the 
individual's interests were represented at times when he/she was. 
handicapped in pursuing them him/herself. Users might be more'widely 
consulted as to what aspects of admission to hospital by section were found 
to be most distressing and could be modified. However, it must be. 
acknowledged that compulsory treatment involves some degree of 
professionally imposed limitation upon the. extent of democracy in service 
provision, in so far as it inevitably involves a reduction in the 
individual's freedom to choose her own interests. 
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B. Limitations imposed by the nature of the user movement. 
The major problem which has been identified with the user movement as it 
exists at present is the questionable validity of its claim to represent a 
cross-section of users' views. Campbell (1986: 9), writing froln within the II 
user movement, has identified as an issue the diversity and universality of 
demands which different- groups are making: 
Whi'le some groups are campaigning I specifically in their l'ocal 
area for conc ,r. ete changes in provision, others are aivocating 
the national abolition of Electric Convulsive Therapy and the 
provision of adequate support for people wishing to withdraw 
from using major tranquillizers ... The position of mental health 
workers within exisiing groups-is . an issue-which, *while 
recognised, has not been resolved. 
In addition, Campbell notes that the proportion of recipients actually 
involved in the user movement is quite small. 
Berry (1987 Guardian) recognises that SSO's strength is that it has no 
agenda beyond promoting user-involvement in plAnning decisjo*ns. But: 
This very strength could turn out to be a weakness when awkward 
choices have to be made at local health meetings and the unity 
of patient representatives dissolves. 
Mental health professionals have expressed concern not at the, conflicting 
and inconsistent diversity of views contained within the user movement, but 
at the views apparently not being represented at all. Referring to the 
acrimonious exchanges between MIND and NSF, which were, published in 
Community Care, Pearson and Hughes (1990) have asked: 
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Why have ... moderate views been overwhelmed by the larger 
publicity devoted to the more extreme viewpoints? ... 
In this distorted debate some voices are being consistently 
ignored. 
Pearson and Hughes identify those being marginalised as peoplq'suffering 
from long-term disorders and their relatives. They suggest that the user 
movement could become as entrenched as the psychiatric system it, opposes, 
as a result of the undue influence of aetitulate users who deny the reality 
of mental illness by 'dabbling in semantics'. 
Similar criticisms have been addressed to Asylum. Shields (1990a: 31) 
commented: 
I wonder though whether ASYLUM-app'eals to a wide 'enough 
audience to make a real impact. It seems to particularly 
represent the anti-psychiatry lobby, the hard-done-by left-wing 
who are embittered and reject psychiatry altogether.. 
User groups have countered by emphasizing that they do not claim to be the 
voice of users in Great Britain, or to represent anyone except themselves. 
However, the demands being made are frequently ones which would Influence 
all users if implemented, and therefore the question of representativeness 
must be raised. This is particularly the case when some of the most vocal 
and articulate voicesý in the user movement'have tended to produce some of 
the most extreme demands. There is little information availahle about the 
perceptions of users as a group of the services they receive and how they 
could be improved, but what evidence exists suggests that users as a-group 
are less dissatisfied and less radical than user group$'might suggest. 
Cavadino's (1989) research on the functioning of the 1959 MHA*suggested 
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that the majority of patients were not radically critical of their 
treatment in hospital. Vicente (1988) in a comparative study investigating 
professionals and users' perceptions. of services in Sheffield, Trieste 
(Italy) and Concepcion (Chile) found users in all three countries on*the 
whole very satisfied. Shields (1990b), in a comparatively small survey-of 
just 30 subjects, concluded that services ought to be planned with greater 
consultation, of users.. - However, the demands which users in 'Shields sample 
made were relatively modest, and includdd 'items 'such as more co unselling 
and a client-centre'd service. Interestingly, these 30. users mentioned the 
importance of expert help/treatment 24 times, which suggests that the 
majority of this group of users did not share the extrerhe anti-psychiatric 
rejection of expert advice. There are problems with this kind of 
attitudinal research, in ierms of how people's r esponse's to questionnaires 
and interviews ought to be understood. As Fjisher (1983: 40) indicated, 
surveys of client satisfaction in social work tend to demonstrate 
consistently that two-thirds of clients are satisfied, and one fifth 
dissatisfied, whatever aspect of the servicb is being rated. Certai. nly, 
ratings of perceptions of services received need to be interpreted in the 
light of respondents beliefs about what extra And alternativ'e services are 
and ought to be available. Vicente's research in particular needs-reading 
from this perspective, given the high satisfaction ratings of patients in 
Chile, whose psychiatric services were by most British people's standards 
quite appalling. But more of this kind of*systematic research is needed 
into user opinions as a whole before any firm conclusions can, be reached 
about the representativeness of the contemporary user movement. 
one important improvement might be the development of distinctions between 
different kinds of users; that is, a shift away from the view'that ! users 
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of the psychiatric services' constitute a meaningful group. Intuitively, 
one would not expect young patients with periodic acute psychiatric 
difficulties to share the needs of elderly chronic psychiatric patients, 
and there is no reason to assume that young patients have any insight into 
the needs of elderly patients purely by virtue of being themsOlves 
psychiatric patients. Equally, one might predict that the needs of 
patients being treated -primarily as out-patients for depression and self- 
harm would be very different from those'of patients being treated for 
psychotic reactions However, this approach would necessiiate users 
acknowledging that psychiatric labels and categories do have some utility 
in separating patients out according to particular type*s of need. (This 
need not involve assuming that diagnostic categories have medical validity 
in the sense of being identifiable disease states but"would involve 
accepting that such categories do have social meaning in terms of 
indicating particular types of need). 
Having offered these criticisms, I would wi-Sh to. emphasize that I do not 
believe this invalidates in any way the practical work which user groups 
throughout the country are doing and the achieýements which have been made. 
There are many examples of user-led and user-involved projects which show 
great awareness of the necessity, and difficulty, of involving'all users, 
and address this issue on a day-to-day basis. I would wish merely to keep 
to the forefront the question of who may rot be being consulted or involved 
in decisions which may affect their lives. This is an issue not only of 
the protection of users who are particularly handicapped and in need of 
much support, but of users who do not wish to become involved in the time- 
consuming and collective kinds of approach favoured by the user movement. 
There is a large group of users who simply do not 'like joining 
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organisations and engaging in collective action. Their-needs and rights 
must be addressed also. Certainly, this will involve a large measure of 
professional input. David Brandon has suggested ways in which individual 
users could be more involved in actively choosing the services they 
receive, without needing to become involved in group activitic's (servico 
brokerage). However, it is unclear how practical such approaches might be 
In practice, A greater danger is that this kind of approach is simply 
ignored because it does not correspond to the collectivist strategy of many 
user groups. 
A further risk which the more extreme users take is that of antagonising 
professionals and funders by making demands which are perceived as 
unreasonable and impracti'cal. User-involvement is, inevitably, going to be 
about a process of negotiation and compromi. ýe between service users and 
providers. Dogmatic anti-professionalism may cause professionals and 
funders to close ranks and exclude any level of reform. Pearson and Hughes 
(1990) have suggested that: 
The radical lobby could be in danger-of thrusting a damaging 
wedge between those in need of services And those who seek to 
provide them. 
Certainly, there has been a feeling in recent years that MIND has to some 
extent lost the support of the government by promoting policies which have 
been perceived as impractical and hostile towards psychiatry. MIND's loss 
has been the NSF and SANE's gain in this respect, and the NSF, has been 
rapidly moving to forefront in the politics of mental health, aided by 
large amounts of private funding and the wave of public dissatisfaction 
with the policy of 'care in the community'. 
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Conclusion 
The emergence of the. -uspr movement during the 1980s and 1990s is the result 
pf a variety of factors, including changes in legal status introduced by 
the MHA 1959, care in the coinmunity, shifts amongst prof essionals and 
government in approaches to delivery of welfare, higher levels of education 
generally, and the impact of the anti-psychiatric critique of the 1960s and 
1970s. These factors have seen the increased impact upon service delivery 
not only of service users themselves, but also of carers and relatives of 
users. 
. 
Groups representing carers and relatives have sometimes existed in 
a state of tension and. hostility towards the more radical and critical 
abolitionist user groups. The users themselves can be placed upon a 
dimension according to their level of hostility towards mental health 
professionals. The most radical, hostile and anti-psychiatric positions, 
which tend-to be influenced by, or at least to resemble, the ideas of 
Szasz, are probably not. representative of the needs and views of the 
V- 
majority of service users and risk alienating otherwise potentially 
sympathetic prof 6ssional. s... The extent of demodracy within psychiatry is to 
s. ome extent limited also by the nature of psychiatric disorder, 
specifically the periodic necessity for the use of compulsion, altKI 
some measures can be taken towards democratising even this aspect. ThQý 
user movement* as a whole does tend to adopt a psychoýýocial approach towards 
mental. disorder, and to . regard the extent of real medical knowl-edge in this 
area as'extremely limited. The issue of the Justice of this judgement will 
be addressed in chapter 10. 
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Chapter 10 Current critiques of medical treatment in psychiatry 
'Anti-psychiatric' critics of psychiatry have traditionally rejected 
medically-based theories and forms of treatments as inappropriate to the true 
nature of mental disorder. Medical diagnoses have been presented as labels 
empty Of content, and medical treatments as mystifying forms of social 
control, at best useless and at worst seriously damaging; for example, Hill 
(1983) has argued that the concept of schizophrenia is invalid, and that the 
major tranquillizers are the root cause of an epidemic of brain damage, and 
ought to be abolished. Some critics, for example Masson and Chamberlin, have 
taken the argument still further, and argued that psychotherapy is also 
dangerous and to be avoided, because it encourages people to believe that 
their problems can be taken to 'experts in living' to be solved, and 
encourages 'mentalist attitudes'. In addition, aside from criticisms of the 
epistemological basis of their theories and the efficacy of their treatments, 
psychiatrists and other mental health professionals working within the 
framework of positivist science have been accused of being autocratic and 
authoritarian in their relationships with their clients. Masson (1990) has 
argued that authoritarianism is inherent in the very concept of the mental 
health expert, who supposedly has some expert insight into how people ought 
to live their lives not shared by ordinary people. 
This chapter will address three issues. Firstly, I shall present material 
suggesting that psychiatrists typically demonstrate a high level of awareness 
and understanding in relation to the debate around the concept of illness and 
mental illness. Secondly, I shall present evidence that psychiatrists do have 
some valid, albeit limited, medically-based understanding of serious disorders 
such as schizophrenia, and that medical treatments such as drugs do have some 
demonstrated efficacy. Thirdly, I shall present the evidence in favour of the 
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view that psychotherapy can be an effective means of treating some forms of 
psychiatric disorder. 
The evidence presented in this chapter will strengthen the argument in favour 
of abandoning anti-psychiatry as the basis for a political critique of 
psychiatry, and instead adopting a critique based upon an analysis of the 
problem of democracy. 
It should be noted that this chapter is not intended to constitute a 
comprehensive account or defence of contemporary psychiatric practice. This 
is an enormous topic beyond the scope of this thesis. My aim is limited to 
addressing the validity of some of the best known criticisms of some forms of 
psychiatric practice. 
1. The concept of illness in psychiatry. 
One factor which produced the emergence of anti-psychiatry during the 1960s 
was the predominance of positivist philosophies of science in psychiatry and 
general medicine (Chapter 1). Anti-psychiatry drew upon non-positivist forms 
of philosophy for its theoretical underpinning (Chapter 2). Critics of 
psychiatry tend often to assume that little has changed within psychiatry 
since the specialism came into being, and psychiatrists in the 1990s are every 
bit as positivist in outlook as they were in the 1950s. However, one 
important and positive effect of Szasz's (1960,1972) critique of 'the myth 
of mental illness' has been to compel psychiatrists to examine their practices 
and question the use of the word 'illness' in relation to many of the problems 
which their patients bring to them. Many psychiatrists are now therefore far 
more sophisticated in their views about mental disorder than would have been 
the case forty years ago; for example, Clare (1976) considered the problem of 
the nature of illness in psychiatric terms, and was led to propose a view of 
psychiatric practice which was largely not theoretical ly-based at all, but 
driven by pragmatism, and included social and psychological factors as well 
as physical ones. He concluded that the concept of illness was not logically 
tied to organic impairment, as argued by Szasz, but could and should be 
extended to involve the person as a mental and bodily whole. Clare's views 
have been highly influential. 
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2. a. Diagnosis in medical psychiatry. 
There is insufficient space in this thesis to present a comprehensive coverage 
of the arguments of all the people who have argued that psychiatric diagnosis 
has no validity at all with respect to any condition. I shall ý6stýict myself 
largely to examining debate around the diagnosis which has probably been the 
cause of most controversy since the beginning of the anti -psychi atri c debate: 
schizophrenia. Szasz (1976) described khizophrenia as the 'sacred symbol' 
of both psychiatry and anti -psychiatry. Hill (1983) has published a lengthy 
critique of the concept of schizophrenia, arguing that the diagnosis has no 
reliability or validity, and ought to cease to be the sUbject of research. 
Adopting a classically ýzaszian anti-psychiatric cri tique, Hill regards 
schizophreniaas a condition which was notdiscovered byBleuler and Kraepelin 
so much as invented by them. He reviewed studies purporting to be researching 
the nature of schizophrenia, and concluded that the condition does not exist. 
it is no more than a 'rag-bag' of unacceptable and incomprehensible forms of 
social behaviour. He amassed a wealth- of evidence from the research 
literature in support of his thesis; for example, Zubin (1967) concluded that 
the diagnosis of schizophrenia could be agreed upon in only 37% of cases, 
which represents a remarkably low level of inter-rater reliability. Copeland 
et al (1971) found huge differences in diagnosis between British and American 
psychiatrists. Hill notesthat the responsErof psychiatrists to such findings 
has been to attempt to improve reliability of diagnosis. Beck et al (1962) 
managed to raise agreement to 54%. However, Hill criticises attempts to 
demonstrate improved reliability on two grounds. Firstly, the studies do not 
constitute rea listic attempts to estimate diagnosis as it takes place in 
actual clinical settings. Secondly, the statistical analyses u'sed to measure 
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reliability have been frequently inadequate; for example, they artificially 
inflate the reliability figures by failing to calculate correctly the baseline 
which could be predicted by chance alone. Hill offers three types of 
alternative explanation for the unreliability of the concept of schizophrenia 
to that favoured by psychiatrists: 
First, it has been suggested that application of *a me*dical 
paradigm to the psychological pr6blems bf individuals who are 
not, -for the '. most part, organically impaired was 
destined to 
failure from the beginning, especially in the area of 
categorization. Second, some have argued, in related fashion, 
that human behaviour is simply too complex, and individual 
differences too great, to be classi'fied in the manner familiar to 
the natural sciences. Third, there are those who suggest that 
psychiatric classification is futile because it ignores such 
socio-political issues as deviancy and the control thereof.. 
(Hill, 1983: 181). 
Next, Hill turns to the validity of the concept 6f schizophrenia. Reliability 
consists of measures of the extent to which a diagnosis of schizophrenia can 
be agreed upon by independent observers. Validity is the extent to which the 
construct actually is what its proponents claim it to be. Here, Hill argues 
that the concept of schizophrenia is simply a meaningless collection of 
various forms of social deviance, rule-breaking and incomprehensible 
behaviour, with no internal cohesion or theme. 
since the concept of schizophrenia is both invalid and, unreliable, studies 
purporting to investigate its etiology are likewise'. meaningless; ' for example, 
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Hill has taken up Opposition to studies which purport to demonstrate a genetic 
basis for schizophrenia. In interview, he told me he believed there to be no 
basis to almost all the physiological and genetic theories of schizophrenia. 
They will never find a genetic basis to schizophrenia' for one 
very simple reason ... such a heterogenous concept, it is like 
looking for a geneti c predisposition to being a member of the 
Labour Party or a member of the Chutch of England ... schizophrenia 
involves very , nearly every broken social norm that. is ýot covered 
by the law ... the current research which claims to have 
demonstrated genetic predisposition simply does hot. And the 
methodology of it has been -demonstrated to be so inadequate so 
many times that If. i. nd it stagge ring that'it's still taught in 
psychiatric text books as if there is s, ome sort of credibility to 
a genetic predisposition. (Hill, interview) 
Hill concludes that virtually all of the behaviour labelled as schizophrenia 
is a response to poverty and oppression which are widespread in capitalist 
societies. Ultimately, the only solution to*the problems we describe as 
s. chizophrenia is widespread and revolutionary changes in social structures. 
Hi 1 l's views have brought criticism f rom medical researchers in the f ield of 
schizophrenia, whose research Hill has been quick to criticise, apparently 
without verifying his comments before committing them to print., In 1990, The 
_Guardian 
carried an item concerning research conducted by Professor Robin 
murray, which indicated that schizophrenic patients had experienced changes 
in brain structure (Schoon, 1990). Hill (1990) responded that the research 
was invalid, as it had been proven that such brain* changes wer'e* the. product 
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of anti-psychotic medication, and that such research was damaging to people 
struggling to come to terms with their problems. Responding to Hill's 
comments, Hugh Freeman, editor of the British Journal of Psychiatry, wrote 
that: 
All research of this kind controls for extraneous facto'rs that 
could affect the results; medication is the most obvious of 
these,. and the distinguished team at the, Institute of Psych'iatry 
does not make such elementary err6rs. (Freeman, 1990) 
The author of the study in question, Robin Murray, also responded: 
over 60 scientific studies have addressed the question of the 
origins of these changes, and have concluded that they are not 
caused by drug treatment... I would like. *.. to invite Dr Hill to 
visit my research *unit to see what we are do Ing to try to 
understand and alleviate this illness,; and also suggest ways in 
which we might put any of his own ideas to the scientific test. 
(Murray, 1990) 
Hi 11 is also cl inging to an analysis which most- academic critics of psychiatry 
have ceased to find credible; for example, Rose (1989a; 1990) has also 
criticised attempts to explain behaviour genetically, and argued-that the 
optimism surrounding recent apparent breakthroughs in the *genetics of 
schizophrenia -is premature. However, Rose is not arguing for a complete 
rejection of the notion of a genetic contribution to mental disorder, as 
Graham (1989) suggested. Rose (1989b) replied: 
It would have helped if Philip Graham... had read what I wrote 
before cri-ticising me for perpetuating "the old, tired either/or 
myth in the roles of genes and -environment in depression and 
schizophrenia", as my entire article was devoted to demoný'trating 
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this was indeed a myth, despite the claims of many geneticists 
and the residue of the anti-psychiatry movement. 
A new type of approach is suggested by Allen (1986) in her- feminist 
contribution to Miller and Rose's collection of poststructuralist-influ6nced 
critiques of psych. iatry. Allen is prepared to concede an astonishing amount 
of territory to psychiatry in adopting a stance which she fully acknowledges 
is 'a reformist pol itics' (Al len, 1986: 111). She argues that feminists cannot 
continue to cling dogmatically to a position which depends on women being no 
more constitutionally vulnerable to disorder than men, when research evidence 
suggests strongly that this position is wrong. She comments -of the 
established feminist approach to-psychiatry: 
Not only has it resulted in a more-or-less overi resistance to 
evidence of alternative causal or cont. ributory factors in women's 
pathology (such as the embarrassinqly persuasive mass of evidence 
for a genetic component in schizophrenia), but also, and more 
importantly, has led to a near total inattention to those areas 
of psychiatry such as senile dementia, where- social and 
psychodynamic explanations of the pathology have Uttle grip. 
(Allen, 1986: 109. Italics mine) 
The concept of schizophrenia has been rejected as invalid by Bentall , Jackson 
and Pilgrim (1988), whose critique of the reliability and validity of the 
concept resembles that of Hill (1983), to whose work Bentall et al refer. 
Bentall et al's conclusions are somewhat similar to Hi 11's in that they 
conclude that the current conceptual isation of schizophrenia serves a- purpose 
for medical psychiatrists, in justifying them in continuing to regard 
schizophrenia as a disease entity, and therefore properly a concern for their 
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profession rather than any other. (Bentall et al are writing as clinical 
psychologists. ) However, unlike Hill, Bentall et al do not reject the 
possibility of any form of diagnosis or labelling in relation to people 
currently diagnosed schizophrenic. 
Acceptance of this argument does not imply that pýychotic 
behaviour cannot be understood, that biological variables are of 
no importance, or that disturbed individuals and their'families 
shýuld not be helped by psychologists and their colleagues in 
other professions. (Bentall et al, 1988: 314-5) 
They propose two alternative research strategies: firstly, that res'earch 
should investigate empirical ly-based alternative ways of 'classifying abnormal 
behaviour which abandon the use of the schizophrenia concept, and secondly 
that researchers should investigate individual symptoms, *such as delusions and 
hallucinations, rather than global disease .. poncepts such as schizophrenia. 
Bentall et al evidently envisage that such a strategy will facilitate a more 
psychological approach to understanding the problems and deficits associated 
with psychosis, and reduce the current concentration upon a crudely biological 
approach. However, agai n unl i ke Hi 11 , they do not suggest that thei r approach 
will prove that most disorder is ultimately s0dio-political in origin. 
Bentall et al's proposals hav*e been criticised by Wing (1988), 'largely upon 
the grounds that researchers are already engaged in the kinds of activities 
which Bentall et al envisage, and what is emerging as a result is something 
very like the traditional concept of schizophrenia. Further,, to break the 
investigation of schizophrenia down into study of its individual symptom 
romponents would not clarify the situation: 
It is clear that 'delusion', 'hallucination'. and 'thought 
disorder' are complex categories rather thah discrete ýymptoms 
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and that to investigate them scientifically involves the same 
problems of reliability as do broader 'disorders'. (Wing, 
1988: 326) 
Thus, although criticism of the concept of schizophrenia is widespread, the 
majority of this criticism does not assume that the diagnosis is entirely 
meaningless, only that it probably requires quite fundamental refinements. 
Hill (1983) is very much alone in arguing that the concept Is completely 
lacking in reliability, validity or usefulness. The majority of psychiatrists 
believe that schizophrenia will continue to be a useful concept for diagnosis 
and research in some form for the foreseeable future. It seems that the 
diagnosis of schizophrenia will certainly not fall out of usage until and 
unless a more powerful alternative has been produced. 
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The material presented in this section does not, of course, prove that Hill 
is wrong and that schizophrenia is a proper medical diagnosis. It would be 
extremely difficult to prove that given the vast output of research Into 
schizophrenia published each year which would have to be scrutinised and 
evaluated. However, two conclusions can be reached on the', bas. is of *this 
section. Firstly, Hill is very much alone amongst mental health researchers 
in adopting the view-that schizophrenia is a construct I with no merit 
whatsoever. Other radical critics of psychiatry, such as Allen, find 
themselves increasingly unable to resist the volume of research indicating 
that the diagnosis schizophrenia is identifying something which exists, 
however ill-defined and open to misperception that 'something' is. Secondly, 
Hill perceives schizophrenia as. a term which psychiatrists attach in a 
dogmatic fashion to patients whose behaviour they do not 'Understand and cannot 
explain. This is an oversimplification. Both researchers and practising 
psychiatrists are on the whole aware of the inadequacy of the diagnosis. They 
hope and expect that as research progresses diagnosis will become more 
sophisticated and useful in assisting them- to treat their patients. They. 
continue to use schizophrenia as a diagnosis in the broad and general fashion 
they do only because it is the best they have at'present, a'heipful hypothesis 
rather than the end-point of the debate. 
2. b. Treatments in medical psychiatry. 
Hill and other critics have not only argued against medical/organic 
explanations for psychiatric disorder, but have opposed medically-based 
treatments, such as drugs and ECT. It has been argued that such treatments 
do not exert a specific therapeutic effect, but simply dampen down aspects of 
general functioning. Also, they cause permanent *brain damage of a degree 
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sufficient to justify their abolition. (Hill, 1983; Breggin, 1983,1979) The 
issues surrounding evaluation of medical treatments, as opposed to medical 
theories, are somewhat different. Medically based theories are, in the final 
analysis, either true or false, and must be judged on the merits -of the 
argument. Medical treatments are frequently used in spito of limited 
knowledge about their effects. There are two separate issues to be considered 
here. Firstly, do medical treatments producq demonstrable 'improvements in 
patients' disorder? Secondly, are the negative side effects of the treatments 
sufficiently severe - that they ought not to be used in spit6 of any positive 
benefits they may produce? 
The only three forms of treatment. which are truly medical, in so far as they 
are necessarily authorised and prescr-ibed by medically qUalified doctors, are 
drug therapies, electro-convulsive therapy (ýCT) and psycho-surgery. Psycho- 
surgery is now extremely rare, and its use is highly restricted. I will not 
discuss it here, as it is not a common treatment within -mainstream 
contemporary psychiatry. 
1 
(i) ECT 
ECT is the most crude and drastic 'therapeutic' technique commonly, in use 
within contemporary psychiatry. The treatment consists in passing an electric 
current through the brain of the patient of sufficient voltage to induce an 
epileptic fit. It is used as a 'last resort' treatment for depressive 
illnesses and related conditions, but is no longer recommended for 
schizophrenic patients. Early applications of ECT frequently resulted in 
broken bones owing to the violence of the fits. More recently, ECT has been 
administered under local anaesthetic and accompaMed by muscle re. laxants, 
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which have reduced the level of bodily injury associated with the patient, and 
to a some extent reduced the negative subjective experience also. However, 
the therapeutic efficacy of ECT and. the side effects of the treatment both 
continue to be widely debated. ECT is probably the most controversial 
therapeutic technique commonly used by contemporary psychiatri'sts. 
The most entbusiastic proponents of the technique hail it as a measure advance 
in the treatment of depression; for exarhple, Rollin (1981): 
I regard ECT as the most important advance. in treatment in our 
time. I fail to see, in fact, how we could carry out effective 
psychiatric practice, especially in the treatment bf psychiatric 
emergencies, without it. 
Research evidence suggests that such an eýxtremely Positive view of the 
benefits of ECT is rather optimistic, but that ECT does seem to have some 
value in the treatment of some depressed patients. Double-blind studies have 
indicated that ECT is more effective in reli-eving -depression than a placebo; 
for example, Freeman et al (1978). Other studi. es have suggested that although 
ECT is of some effect, the effect is smal. ler than at first. 6elieved,, and by 
one month after ending treatment, differences between patients treated with 
'real' ECT and those who received a placebo treatment have' disappeared 
(Johnstone et-al., 1980). It has been suggested that ECT is particularly 
useful in circumstances where a patient's life is in danger through risk of 
suicide, and a highly effective immediate remedy to depression. is therefore 
required. Jenner and Vlissides (1986: 18) argue: 
In puerpal, depression ... when the mother and baby's life can be at 
stake, we consider it can be the treatment of choice. In the 
elderly, who are sometimes starving themselves and dehydrated,. 
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and either unable or unwilling to communicate, it can be very 
successful. 
Baldessarini (1977) regarded ECT as especially useful during the period which 
it takes for antidepressant drugs to take effect, and believed that it has 
undoubtedly saved the lives of many patients. 
opponents of ECT dispwte the claim that the treatment has any therapeutic 
effect at all. In support of their dla*im, they point to instances when 
equipment used to administer ECT has been found. to have 6een faulty for 
number of months, and no shock has been administered, and medical stafý have 
failed to notice any reduction in therapeutic efficacy (Lawson, 1989: 18). In 
addition a wealth of anecdotal evidence exists *provided by patients who have 
found ECT unhelpful (although there is also a body of eN ýidence from patients 
who claim to have benefited from the treatmont). 
opponents also argue that, whatever small effect ECT may exert upon the mood 
of some-patients, its side effects are so ha-rmful as to outweigh any r'l aim to 
therapeutic usefulness. Again, the nature and. extent of the side effects are 
controversial issues. The two most common And serious accusations made 
against the treatment are that it causes memory loss, and that it causes brain 
damage. 
Evidence that ECT damages brain tissue waspresented by Friedburg (1977), a 
neurologist and member of Network Against Psychiatric Assault., His, evidence 
was based upon animal studies, results of human autopsies, evidence of 
electro-encephalogram changes following treatment with ECT, and personal 
accounts from patients. However, Friedburg's data has, been criticised on a 
number of grounds (Frankel, 1977). The animal studies"involved the 
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administration of atypically high levels of current. The human autopsy 
evidence was based upon the brains of patients who had not received ECT for 
sometime beforedeath, orwhosuffered from identifiable organic pathological 
brain conditions. Reports by patients of negative effects of -ECT Were 
acquired by advertising in the newspaper under the heading 'S, hock treatment 
is not good for your brain'. 
more rece ntly Hill (1983) and Breggin (1'979) have taken up the argument that 
ECT causes brain damage. 
Fraser (1982: 46) reviewing the evidence concluded that: ' 
Statistically, ECT is a 'safe' treatment. The risks-of severe 
brain or cardiac damage, and *of fractures, have become 
increasingly remote with the introduction of muscle relaxation 
and the development of anaesthesia as a speciality in its own 
right. 
The body of evidence that ECT impairs memory is more 'persuasive than the 
evidence in favour of brain damage. Proving or'disproving -loss of memory is 
Complicated by the negative effect which depression itself exerts upon memory. 
But it seems now clear that ECT does have some impact as well. 'Research has 
been carried out with respect to two types of memory: anterograde and 
retrograde. Anterograde memory refers to the capacity to store new items in 
memory after treatment, and retrieve them at will. Results in. this-area are 
inconsistent. Some studies show anterograde memory returning to normal 
quickly after a-series of treatments, others suggest that problems -persist 
several weeks after treatment has ended (Fraser, 1982: 49). Retrograde memory 
refers to the capacity to retrieve from memory items and events stored there 
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before the treatment. There is clearer evidence that ECT does result in 
retrograde amnesia, particularly for events which occurred only a short time 
before the administration of the shock (Squire et al 1981). Squire et al 
(1981) found that television programmes viewed 1-3 years before -ECT were 
forgotten, but ones viewed 4-17 years previously tended to be 'remembered as 
clearly as before treatment. However, research has suggested that such memory 
impairment is not permanent, and memory tends to be restored by 6-7 months 
after treatment ends (Weeks et al, 1980, ' Johnstone et al, 1980). 
Critics of ECT believe that researchers studying amnesia amongst recipients 
of ECT fail to appreciate the impact which memory losg has, upon patients. 
Bi gwood. and George (1986: 19), replyi ng to Jenner'and Vl i ssides' (1986) def ence 
of ECT, comment: 
Jenner and Vlissides say the main problem of using shock is a 
temporary forgetting. This is rather A'bland description of an 
untheorised assault on a person's brain, which rath. er seems to 
turn them into temporary zombies. 
In conclusion, evidence for both the therapeutic effect. of ECT and the 
existence of serious side effects remains inconsistent. However, - it seems 
fairly certain that ECT does exert some therapeutic effect upon depression, 
albeit of a short-term nature. Evidence for the existence of brain damage 
resulting from ECT is inadequate. Evidence for memory impairment is more 
clear cut, but opinions differ as to the real significance of memory loss in 
terms of patients lives. Some of those people who have received ECT believe 
themselves to have been damaged in a way which outweighed even the distress 
caused by their original depression. Others have found. the treatment helpful 
at times when all else failed, and continue to request ECT when they perceive 
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it to be necessary. Until evidence exists which indicates that ECT is more 
harmful than is at present believed, and as long as some patients request the 
treatment, it seems that a total . ban upon the treatment would not be 
justif ied. It is a separate question whether the treatment is indeed 
suffici. ently controversial to support the view that it odglit not t6 be 
prescribed under the provisions of mental health legislation for patients who 
have refused consent.. - 
(ii) Drug treatments 
i 
Drug treatments in psychiatry Jall into four broad categories: minor 
tranquillizers, major tranquillizersi anti -depressants a*nd lithium carbonate. 
It is possible to object to any of these , 
drugs, and to ECT also, on the 
grounds that they offer symptom relief and do not treat causes. Symptom 
relief and treatment of causes are not necessarily alternatives to' be opposed 
to one another, but practices which ought to-continue in parallel both within 
psychiatry and throughout medicine in general However, It- can be argued that 
drug therapies have been used to maintain functi6ning in untenable situations, 
where the situation itself has not been addressed, and this pract. ice is open 
to criticism. Here I shall examine the evidence for and against the continued 
use of the three most controversial drug groups: minor tranquillizers, major 
tranqillizers, and lithium carbonate. 
Minor tranquillizers 
This is the group of drugs which is perhaps most open t9 the charge of having 
been used to damp down symptoms which were social in -origin, rather than 
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addressing the causes of distress. Valium and other benzodiazepines have been 
used notoriously as 'housewives' drugs', offered to women trapped in domestic 
situations to help them cope with their role, rather than addressing the 
issues related to that role per se. This misuse has been compounded by. the 
fact, of which doctors were not initially aware, that benzodiazepinesý are 
addictive. There has been a recent upsurge of support groups such as CITA 
(Council for Involuntary Tranquillizer Addiction) in Liverpool, which offer 
help to people wishing to wean themselve§ off minor tranquillizers. In 1990, 
3,000 people were suing Roche Products Ltd and John Wyeth Laboratories Ltd, 
manufacturers of Valium and Ativan, on the grounds that they were not warned 
when the drugs were prescribed that they are addictive *or that side effects 
include anxiety, agoraphobia, loss of memory and concentration (Neustatter, 
1991). A report of the Institute for the Study- of Drug Dependence (1989) 
identified: 
About 1,250,000 chronic benzodiazepine users in the UK, people 
who take tranquillisers every day. Of these, two-thirds are 
women, mostly aged 50 and above. Some have 'taken tranqui 11 i sers 
for 10 or 20 years. 
Hill commented (interview): 
I think it is now fairly well accepted by most GP's that those 
drugs are fairly unhelpful in terms of the addiction that they 
cause. And like the major tranquillizers they do nothing to 
address the causes of whether it's the anxiety, or the more 
extreme so-called symptoms of schizophrenia. In my view all of 
those causes fall into a broad psychosocial [category]. 
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The medical profession has indeed acknowledged that benzodiazepines have been 
grossly misused in the past. The Committee on the Review of Medicines (198o) 
supported by the Royal College of Psychiatrists (1988) now recommend that the 
drugs ought to be prescribed for a maximum of four weeks with the proviso that 
this be viewed only as a last resort measure of treatment. The' case of Minor 
tranquillizers does provide support for the views of those who express concern 
at the willjngness of. the medical professionto dispense substances sold to 
them by the pharmaceuticals industry with littl'6 real knowledge of the long- 
term impact of those substances. 
Lithium 
Lithium is prescribed specifically for patients diagnosed as suffering from 
a manic-depressive disorder, and is regarded by the medical profession as 
useful in controlling mood swings. Evidence from double-blind trials supports 
the view that lithium is an effective treatment for manic depressive disorder 
(Shopsin et al, 1975). Lithium is thought io be particularly effective used 
as a prophylactic, to prevent future episodes of mania and depression (Gerbino 
et al, 1978). The drug is commonly regarded by psychiatrists as a highly 
Specific treatment, significantly more effective than other treatments for 
manic-depressive disorder and of little relevance itself in the treatment of 
other forms of psychiatric disorder. The specificity of the treatment has 
been used to bolster the view that mani t-depressive disorder is clearly 
distinguishable from other forms of psychosis (Davidson and Neale, 1982: 83). 
This widely accepted view of lithium has been challenged by Breggin. (1983). 
Breggin reports that the specificity -of the action . of 
lithium has been 
exaggerated. In fact, patients admitted to hosp*ital with a*diagnosis of 
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manic-depressive disorder are commonly treated initially with both lithium and 
a phenothiazine (major tranquillizer). ThQ justification for this is that 
lithium does not take effect until 2ý3 weeks after treatment commences. The 
more rapidly acting major tranquillizers are used during this period-, and are 
highly effective in ending mania. Lithium is then given in ord6r to maintain 
the stabilised mood. However, there is doubt also with relation to the 
efficacy of -lithium as. a prophylactic. 
Research by Prien et al (1974) found 
that the relapse over two years of patidnts on a maintenance dose of lithium 
was 50%. Lithium did seem to reduce relapse amongst patients with a history 
of infrequent attacks. But amongst those with a high frequency of past manic 
episodes, all patients eventually relapsed. This evidehce leads Breggin to 
reject the view that lithium hasany specificity at all in the treatment of 
manic-depressive disorder. Instead, -he attributes the Impact of the drug to 
its 'brain-disabling' effects. In addition to its effectiveness in the 
treatment of manic-depressive disorder, lithium has been greeted with 
enthusiasm by psychiatrists because of its apparent lack of unpleasant side 
effects; Breggin argues that the drug's benignity has been over-estimated, 
and that in fact the side effects it does p-roduce might explain its apparent 
therapeutic efficacy in relation to mania. 
The view that lithium has no significant side effects is based largely-upon 
research conductedby Schou et al (1968). However, Breggin has access to data 
which Schou and his colleagues did not pubTish, including subjective reports 
of their own experiences after one week on lithium, which included: 
transient nausea, diarrhoea, slight tremor of the hands ... A 
feeling of muscular weakness or heaviness was prominent in al-I 
the subjects. They had to overcome a certain resistance against 
rising and moving ano a1so had a feeling that mental e0ort was 
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needed to undertake any physical task. (Schou et al , unpublished 
report quoted in Breggin, 1983: 204) 
In addition to these physical . symptoms, subjects reported reduced 
responsiveness to environmental stimuli, a feeling of indifference and -general 
malaise and passivity. Small (1972) studied normal volunteerg' response to 
lithium over three weeks. The 11 subjects experienced varying degrees of 
toxic reaction, some q-uite severe. Breggin, concludes that the view that 
lithium has no side effects is based upoh compadson with the side effects of 
the major tranquilfizers, which are far more severe. , 
This comparison has 
caused researchers to neglect quite significant toxic effects. 
Further evidence for the view that lithium acts by dampening down general 
brain function, rather than acting specifically upon thd symptoms of mania is 
provided by the use of the drug in prisons tQ, control aggression in prisoners 
(Breggin, 1983). 
Therefore, evidence suggests that lithium i-s of some use in controlling the 
symptoms of manic-depressive disorder. However, the mechanism by which it 
achieves this effect is unknown, and its specif ibity is open. to question. The 
view that lithium has no psychological effects other than upon manic 
symptomatology is optimistic, as evidence is emerging of quite subtle but. very 
real changes in subjective experience associated with the drug. 
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Phenothiazines, or major tranquillizers 
Major tranquillizers or phenothiazines, such as chlorpromazine, are currently 
considered the treatment of choice for schizophrenia. As a result, these are 
the drugs most often prescribed for administration without the patient's 
consent, under sections of the MHA 1983. There is some evidence that major 
tranquillizers have a specific effect upon the occurrence of schizophrenic 
symptomatology, such as delusions and hallucinations. This effect has been 
used to support the 'dopamind' theory of schizophrenia, which argues that 
psychotic symptoms are the result of dopamine over-activity. Major 
tranquillizers have been held to 'work' because they block dopamine receptors 
in the brain. However, there is no logical reason to assume that the cause 
of a disorder can be deduced from the actions of medication used to treat the 
disorder; for example, aspirin cures the symptom of a headache, but headaches 
are not the result of 'aspirin deficiency'. 
Hill (1983) has disputed the claim that the effects of major tranquillizers 
are specific and has claimed that they are effective as a result of a general 
dampening down of brain activity. He has suggested that they produce an 
effect similar to that of a frontal lobotomy. Breggin (1983) has likewise 
classed the major tranquillizers as 'brain disabling', and argued that any 
'therapeutic' impact is the result of disabled brain processes. 
Recent research has cast doubt upon the usefulness of the major tranquil 1 izers 
for long-term maintenance of schizophrenic patients. Crow, MacMillan, Johnson 
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and Johnstone (1986) found that over a two year period 42 per cent of patients 
taking phenothiazines and 62 percent of patients taking placebos relapsed. 
This suggests that only 20 percent of schizophrenic patients actually benefit 
from long-term use of the drugs. Actuarially corrected, the figures suggest 
that 58% of subjects maintained on phenothiazines relapse, comWqd with 70% 
on placebo, reducing the percentage who can be said to have benefited from 
medication even further to 12%. In addition, it has been suggested that 
patients who relapse following discontihuation of anti-psychotic medication 
may be suffering from withdrawal of the medication, rather than a resumption 
of the schizophrenic disorder. It appears that the major tranquillizers may 
cause patients to develop a supersensitivity to normallý occurring dopamine 
levels within their own brains,. which triggers a psychotic episode when 
medication is discontinued (Jenner, - 198§; Chouin-ard and Jones, 1980; Hi 11 , 
interview). Hennelly (date unknown) has pointed out that if this is the case, 
then the 12% of patients who 'relapsed' when their phenothiazines were 
withdrawn may have been suffering symptoms of drug withdrawal, ratherthan a 
genuine-relapse. A methodologically valid ýest of the phenothiazines would 
have to compare patients continuing medication with patients using placebos 
and who had never received phenothiazine treatment. Such. a study might be 
expected to find the difference in relapse rate between the groups to be even 
further reduced. 
Assuming that major tranquillizers do have'some beneficial effects to offer, 
the question must still be asked whether the drugs have negative. side effects, 
and whether these side effects are sufficiently severe to justify the drugs' 
abolition. Anecdotal reports testify to the unpleasantness of the experience 
of these drugs Patients taking them are generally a_l. so placed on a course 
of drugs to control side effects, but this is not wholly effect*i've. The most 
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alarming side effect is tardive dyskinesia. This is a condition characterised 
by loss of voluntary muscle control comparable to that seen in Parkinsons' 
di sease. Like Parkinson's disease, the condition is thought to result from 
damage to the dopaminergic system within the brain, which is the* neuro- 
transmitter system primarily affected by major tranquillizers. 'Many patfents 
suffer from these symptoms at some stage whilst taking major tranquill1zers. 
For a sizeable minori, ty the symptoms may become permanent. Hill (1985) 
reviewed studies investigating the prevalence of tardive dyskinesia. Studies 
placed the prevalence of tardive dyskinesia at between 25.7% (Jeste and Wyatt, 
1981) and up to 40% (Crane and Smith, 1980) of major tranquillizer users. 
Hill concludes that approximately 38.5m people world'-wide are currently 
suffering from tardive dyskinesia.. Hill (interview) referred to 'a world-wide 
epidemic of irreversible brain damage of 40-50M people'. 
Finally, a little discussed, but important? phenomenon, is neuroleptic 
malignant syndrome, a reaction to neuroleptic medication consisting of very 
high temperature, catatonic-type rigidity, and, according to Hill (interview) 
death in 20-30% of cases. The syndrome -affects 1/2 - 11/2% of users of 
neuroleptic medication. 
Defenders of major tranquillizers argue that, despite their problems, the 
major tranquillizers have produced a revolution in the treatment of 
schizophrenia, and until they are replaced by more effective and less harmful 
treatments, they are the best option psychiatry has to offer. However, 
evidence suggests that their impact may have been over-rated, and that they 
are best used with caution, in the lowest possible dosage and general-ly as a 
short-term remedy rather than as the major therapeutic. tool. 
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sumary 
This brief overview of the physical treatments commonly used by contemporary 
psychiatry must be cautious in its conclusions. Much is still not understood 
about the way in which psychiatric treatments impact upon the cehtral nerVous, 
and the processes by which they achieve their positive and negative effects. 
Conclusions-can therefore be expressed only in the broadest''terms, but some 
conclusions do seem to be indicated by the research evidence. 
Firstly, there are at present no theoretically based medical treatments for 
psychiatric disorders; that is, none of the treatments cOrrently on -offer has 
been developed as a result of theoretical consideration of the likely causes 
of psychiatric disorders. All are the result of a-pragmatic process of trial 
and error. If anything, rather than treatments developing out of theoretical 
understanding, theories and hypotheses about the nature of *psychiatric 
disorder tend to grow out of speculation about the mechanisms which underpin 
the latest treatments. 
However, secondly, for all their pragmatic basis there is evidence that 
all the'treatments reviewed here have some impact upon psychiatric disorder 
in that all seem to alleviate the symptoms of some disorders to a (limited) 
extent in either the short-term or the long-term. None has lived up to the 
excitement with which all have been greete*d upon their first introductions, 
but all display some merit in the control and treatment of psychiatric 
symptomatology. 
Thirdly, all medical psychiatric treatments are effectiye at a price. All the 
treatments reviewed here involve serious side effects which mu-st, be balanced 
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against their therapeutic effects. ECT impairs memory, and is often 
experienced as very unpleasant by patients who undergo it. Minor 
tranquil 1 izers are a highly addictive 'solution' to a groupof problemswhich, 
of all forms of psychiatric disorder, are most plausibly psycho-sdcial in 
origin. Lithium is highly toxic at only slightly above the th*0apputic dose, 
and is no longer thought to be wholly free of side 'effects. The major 
tranquillizers are associated with the most devastating side effects of all, 
involving irreversible brain damage for'many users. 
It seems that at present it would be unwise to abolish entirely any of the 
major forms of psychiatric treatment, as all play some role in, ''managing rather 
than curing the symptoms of serious psychiatri6 disorder. However, medical 
treatments may justifiably be approached with great caution, their benefits 
and drawbacks being very finely balanced. The imposition of such treatments 
under mental health legislation upon patients'who are actively resisting is 
not a situationý which can be endorsed lightly. 
3. psychotherapy and other non-medical professional approaches. 
Sections 1 and 2 above have discussed evidence for the positive *and negative 
effects of mainstream medical interventions on psychiatric disorder. This 
section will examine the efficacy of psychbtherap eutic approaches. 
The more extreme user viewpoints have rejected all professional input into 
mental health, arguing that any distinction between 'professional' and tuser' 
in terms of expertise or skills results in 'mentalism' (Chamberlin, 1988) or 
undesirable uses of power in the name of 'expertiseý (Masson, 1'9'go) (. see also 
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Chapters 4 and 9). Masson (1990) has provided a lengthy description of the 
abuses which have been carried out in the name of therapy. However, his 
conclusion is not that abuses ought. to be prevented, but that psychotherapy 
is itself abusive and ought to be abolished. I have already discussed. the 
problems related to Masson's libertarian rejection of 'expert*ý'in. l, ivinj' in 
Chapter 4. My purpose here is to present the research evidence in support of 
the efficacy of psychotherapy. 
Systematic evidence that psychotherapy is an effective treatment for some 
forms of psychiatric disorder has been accumulating for several decades, 
generally through the work of psychologists rather than' psyphiatrists. ' Two 
distinct types of psychotherapy. have been commonly studied: cognitive- 
behavioural psychotherapies and psychodynamic psychoth6rapies. 
I 
cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT) has been found particularly useful in the 
treatment of phobias and related anxiety states. In this context, therapy 
takes the form of systematic desensitisation by a process of controlled 
exposure of the patient to the feared object or situation. - The exposure may 
be imaginary, the patient being asked to imagifie various degrees of contact 
With the object of fear, or in vivo, the patient being exposed in reality. 
Exposure may take the form of gradually increasing the degree of exposure to 
the feared object, thus learning to cope gradually with higher and higher 
levels of anxiety, or it may take the form of immediate immersion in a highly 
feared situation, known as 'flooding'. Researchers have conflicting views as 
to the mechanism which causes this form of therapy to be. so effective in 
treating phobic -states. Some researchers emphasize the importance of -actual 
exposure to the feared object; for example, Marshall et al (1977). Others 
emphasize the role of relaxation in assisting the patient to confront the 
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feared object in a context in which anxiety is not allowed to reach 
unmanageable levels; for example, Levin and Gross (1984). However, whatever 
explanation is preferred, the method has demonstrated efficacy in the 
treatment of phobic anxiety states (Rachman and Wilson, 1980). 
i3oth cognitive-behavioural and psychodynamic forms of psychotherapy have been 
found effective in the. treatment of disorders of mood, such as depression and 
generalized anxiety disorders. An advante in the evaluation of psychotherapy 
was made in 1977, when Smith and Glass introduced the concept of 'meta- 
analysis' into the field. Meta-analysis is a statistical technique which 
allows results from different studies to be combined* so ýthat an overall 
measure of effectiveness of a particular treatment can be taken. On the basis 
of their meta-analysis, ýmith and Glass 'concluded that: * 
a the average client receiving therapy was better off than 75% of 
the untreated controls. (Smith and Glass, 1977: 754) 
Smith and Glass's technique drew criticism on the grounds that their analysis 
was only reliable if it was assumed that all the studies included in the 
analysis were methodologically sound (Eysenck, 1978). landman and Dawes 
(1982) replicated Smith and Glass's analysis, having first. removed from the 
sample 'of studies all those that did not meet certain methodological 
standards, such as the use of control groups for comparison, and preferably 
the use of a placebo condition. Their findings supported Smith and Glass's 
conclusions. The most recent meta-analysis of outcome studies in 
psychotherapy has been provided by Robinson et al (1990). Studies reviewed 
compared psychotherapy with either no treatment or another form of treatment 
for patients suffering from depression. The authors concluded that: 
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0 
depressed clients benefit substantially from psychotherapy, and 
these gains appear comparable to those observed with 
pharmacotherapy. 
Much recent research has focussed upon the task of comparing different types 
of psychotherapy with one, another and with other forms of therapy such as 
drugs. Kendall and Lipman (1991) reviewed studies which com . pared cognitive- 
behavioural therapies and pharmacologibal th6eapies for the treatment of 
depressioný They n-6te that,. in terms of swiftness of patient response, it is 
frequently assumed that pharmacological therapy is preferable. Research does 
support this view in the treatment of the more seriouslý depressed -(E. Ikin et 
al, 1989), but Blackburn et al (1981) found that a combination of cognitive- 
behavioural therapy and . pharmacological therapy prov'ided more rapid and 
0 substantial improvement than either therapy., used alone. Kendall and Lipman 
(1991) reviewed also research which examined relapse rates following the two 
kinds of treatment. Blackburn et al (1986) found that depressed patients 
treated. with either cognitive-behavioural- therapy or CBT combined with 
pharmacotherapy were less likely to have relapsed at two year follow-up than 
were those treated with pharmacotherapy alone. ' However, Kendal and Lipman 
recommend caution in evaluating relapse rate outcomes, as it is possible that 
the higher rate of relapse amongst patients reliant upon pharmacology may in 
fact be due to sudden withdrawal from the medication rather than 'genuine' 
relapse. 
Elkin et al (1989) compared two brief psychotherapies, one interpersonal 
(psychodynamic) and one cognitive behavioural (CBT), with pharmacatherapy and 
a placebo. The psychotherapies proved equally effective in reducing 
depressive symptoms and improving functioning. *Pharmacothe'rapy was more 
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effective than both forms of psychotherapy, but not significantly so. All 
three therapies were more effective than the placebo treatment. These 
differences emerged more clearly when the analysis was restricted to the most 
seriously depressed patients within the sample. 
4. Relationship between medical psychiatry and other practitioners. 
So far, this chapter has presented evidence in favour of the involvement of 
medically qualified practitioners in mental health care and evidence has also 
been presented for the efficacy of other, non-medical psychotherapeutic 
approaches in treating mental disorders. A final issue for discussion is what 
ought to be the relationship between medically qualified and non-Medically 
qualified practitioners, such as psychotherapists, social workers and 
psychologists. Psychiatrists have been keen to acknowledge the value of non- 
somatic forms of therapy and intervention for their patients; for example, 
Clare (1976). There is increasing recognition that the medical practitioner 
is only one member of an inter-disciplinary team, and not the member who has 
the largest quantity of contact with the patient. 
However, in spite of many psychiatrists' willingness to acknowledge their own 
limitations and the input of other professionals, it remains the case that 
overall responsibility for, and legal authority over, the patient are largely 
in the hands of the psychiatrist. In particular, power to treat under the 
Mental Health Act 1983 is vested entirely in the hands of doctors, and the 
medical profession also exerts a sizeable influence over decisions to detain 
patients under that legislation. In this sense, at least, medicine retains 
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a degree of influence in mental health care which is arguably not warranted 
by its range of expertise. 
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5. Implications of effectiveness of medical and psychological treatments for 
the politics of the user movement. 
Chapter 9 discussed a number of users' views of the role of users within the 
service. Some users wished to end entirely the input of me4iciýe intd the 
treatment of psychiatric disorder. Others wished to end the input of all 'so- 
called experts', both. medical and psychological, and set up s. ervices managed 
entirely be users and ex-users of the seevices. ' Others again wished to retain 
both medical and psychological experts, but for these experts to be more 
firmly held within the democratic control of the people receiving the service. 
This chapter has reviewed three kinds of evidence: mateeial s4hich cha-llenges 
the view of psychiatrists as proponents of crude positivist ýand reductionist 
theories of psychiatric d. isorder; resear'ch which suggesis that psychiatrists 
do have some valuable although limited know3edge relating to the causes and 
treatment of psychiatric disorder; and research which demonstrates that 
psychotherapies also have an important role to play in. the treatment of 
psychiatric disorder. On thisevidence, it seems reasonable finally to reject 
both the 'anti-medical' and the 'anti-expert' -view of user- involvement. This 
leaves tho. question of how users are to achieve a higher level of control ovqr 
$ervices which include acknowledged professional experts in the. areas. of 
medicine and clinical psychoiogy. This issue was touched upon al'so at the en'd 
of Chapter 9. It is likely to remain a central issue for debate and 
experimentation for the foreseeable future. It is to be desired that 
developments in this important area are not hindered by continuing acrimonious 
arguments between the proponents of medicine and other forms of therapy and 
abolitionists. 
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Footnotes to Chapter 10 
1. Verkaik (1991) suggests that psychosurgery may be increasing in usage, due 
to the work of the Brook Hospital, London's, Geoffrey Knight National Unit for 
Affective Disorders. This unit carnies out the highest number of lobotomies 
in Europe. The treatment is used on patients diagnosed as suffering. from 
severe resistant depression, obsessional neurosis, anxiety neurosis, -and manic 
depression. 
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Chapter 11: Summary and Conclusion- 
Chapter Summary 
Chapter 1. Introduction 
The aim of this thesis has been to trace the emergence and devýdlopment of that 
set of ideas labelled anti-psychiatry ovdr the 30'odd years since 1960. Anti- 
psychiatry was assumed to. be an identifiable. constellation of ideas, 
associated with the following beliefs: 
1.1 Mental illness is a mythical-. concept, invented by doctors as a pseudo- 
scientific basis for the control and-coe'rcion of-deviarft people. 
9 
.i 
1.2 Psychiatry is a form of social control which perpetuates the social and 
political status quo, and is therefore pernicious. 
1.3 Mental distress is caused by social oppres. sion, rather than by biological 
or psychological malfunction within the individual. 
1.4 Mental distress should not be treated by doctors, because it has no 
physiological basis. 
1.5 A schizophrenic experience can be a useful process of self-discovery, and 
people should be assisted through the experience rather than have their 
symptoms suppressed by medical forms of intervention. 
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1.6 All psychiatric hospitals should be closed as soon as-possible, ending t he 
compulsory hospitalisation of patients, and breaking the influence of the 
medical profession over the provision of mental health care. 
1.7 Electro-convulsive therapy (ECT) should be abolished, bec'qbse, it is 'both 
harmful and fails to address the causes of distress. 
1.8 Psychotropic medication should be abolished*, because it is both harmful 
and fails to address the causes of distress. 
1.9 Compulsory treatment ought to be abolished, becaus6 individuals. should 
never be compelled to receive medical treatment against their will. 
6 1.10 All institutional psychiatry is coerci. ve, because until the threat of 
compulsion is removed from people who choose hot to co-operate, no patients 
can be said to be in receipt of treatment as a result of genuine free choice. 
. 11 Individuals should 
be held responsible for their actions 
-at 
all times, 
even if they are mentally disordered, because to regard. a person as not 
responsible for their actions is to deprive that person of a fundamental 
aspect of their humanity. 
This constellation of 'anti -psychi atri c' idoas was taken to be associated with 
the work of Laing, Cooper, Szasz, Scheff, Goffman and Foucault. 
The thesis set out to answer two questions: 
1. Why did this set of ideas emerge at this particular, point in the history 
of psychiatry? 
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2. How influential are these ideas amongst mental health professionals and 
service users today? 
Firstly, it is necessary to point out that 'anti -psychiatry' in the 'clear cut 
form presented above has, in fact never existed. The anti -psýchj atri sf s do 
not form a unified. or coherent group, sharing one clearly defined viewpoint. 
Certainly, Laing, Cooper, Szasz, Scheff, Goffman and Fouca . ult have never 
shared the above constell at ion of views, * The constell at ion of ideas described 
above emerged during the early 1970s, and were not. supported in their entirety 
by any of the named theorists then or at any other time, although they did 
become identified as the core of anti -psychi atri c ideas' at that time; 
Chapter 2 Psychiatry by the 1960s. 
This chapter considered the nature of mainstream psychiatry as the specialism 
had developed by the 1960s. Mainstream hospital-based psychiatry was seen to 
be primarily organicist in outlook. However, theinfluence of nonýorganic 
factors upon mental health was a focus of. -attention for some medically 
oriented psychiatrists in the form of the critique of the institution. Non7 
medical approaches to mental health were also expanding in influence and 
number, particularly through the influence of psychoanalytic theory- and 
behaviourism. The expansion of welfare services, based around an individual 
case work approach, was further facilitdting the expansion of the 'psy 
professions' (Castel et al, 1982) through society, through the media of the 
education and penal systems and the workplace. Thus it is incorrect to view 
psychiatry as overwhelmingly organicist in outlook during this period. - Rather 
than being united by medical theories, mental health professionals were during 
this period united to some extent by an adherence to Positivism, a philosophy 
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of science which demands that human behaviour should be studied in the same 
way as the phenomena of natural science are studied. This had three 
unfortunate types of impact upon psychiatry: 
a) The concepts of free choice and responsibility were frequently regarded as 
unscientific and therefore meaningless, causing the distiýcti. on between 
psychiatric disorder and social deviance to be neglected. 
b) Because. positivism ýdictated that science must be value-neutral, important 
debates about the values embodied in various concepts of mental disorder were 
not addressed. 
C) Psychiatrists and other mental health professionals tended to treat their 
patients and clients as objects for scientific scrutiny,: 'whose- personal 
viewpoints and experiences were of no interest to science -and ought to be 
ignored. 
I 
13y the early 1960s, psychiatry was viewed by'many educated lay people as a 
benign and scientifically based medical discipline, which no longer presented 
any serious threat to civil liberties. The absence of critical appraisal of 
the claims of psychiatrists is evidenced by contributions to the parliamentary 
debates preceding passing of the Mental Health Act (MHA)'1459. Concern t. o 
hear or understand the perspective of those people who would.. be on the 
receiving end of the legislative changes is noticeably absent, with the 
exception of the contribution of Dr Donald Johnson, himself an ex-patient. 
In particular, there is an absence of awarreness of the tensions likely to 
arise between patients who viewed themselves as informal and, voluntary 
residents in hospital, and doctors who viewed their patients as infantilised 
beings regardless of their legal status. 
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The willingness of the legislators to place great power and authority in the 
hands of the medical profession must be viewed within the context of the 
politics of the era. The MHA 1959 constituted the final building block in the 
welfare state reforms. The welfare state as a whole had been built around the 
theory that welfare provision could be rationally planned and' delivered in 
such a way that the interests of individuals as individuals and the interests 
of the natio. n as a whole would both be served. This had resulted in a general 
lowering of vigilance in relation to the rights of individuals over and 
against the state. '. At the time, there was cross-party poiitical consensus 
about the desirability of the welfare state reforms, which were 'being 
introduced at a time of affluence and comparative social harmony. However, 
the period of consensus would shortly end with the slowing of the post World 
War II economic boom, ana psychiatry would find Jtselý at the forefront of 
attacks upon the theoretical underpinningq, of the welfare state and the 
'affluent society' as a whole. The cultural forms upon which the youth 
cultures and counter-cultures of the 1960s would be based were already growing 
in popularity by the late 1950s. 
Chapter 3. The emergence of new approaches within psychiatry- 
By the early 1960s, approaches to psychiatry were emerging which did not share 
the positivist outlook of the approaches described in Chapter 2. Maxwe 11 
Jones' Social Psychiatry adopted an explicitly political approach to mental 
health based upon democratic, anti-Fascist principles. The theory of the 
therapeutic community (TC), for which he is best known, proposed that 
psychiatric hospitals ought to be organized in a democratic, non-authoritarian 
manner, and that these values ought to be promoted in-the wider community 
also. However, in practice staff working in TCs . retained a 
'high 
-level of 
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control over patients. Also becoming popular at this time were non-positivist 
approaches to psychotherapy, which were influenced by existentialism; for 
example, the work of the 'Growth Movement' , including Rogers, Perls and 
maslow. By the early 1960s, Szasz was publishing his critique of the' concept 
of mental illness. Szasz is the main originator of the anti-psychiitric 
attitudes expressed in Propositions 1,2,9 and 11. The sociological 
critiques of psychiatry usually referred to, as 'labelling theories', and 
associated with Becker, Lemert, Scheff ýnd Goffman, were becoming well-known 
by the mid-1960s. 
The British-based group of anti -psychi atri sts began to pu . bl ishý during the late 
1950s and early 1960s. Laing's early work is.. characterised -by an attempt to . 
marry psychoanalysis to existentialism, and the promotion of less controlled 
and more truly democratic Ws. Laing's earl, y work is not 'anti -psychi atri c' 
in that until the mid-1960s he appears to have been reluctant to give up 
, entirely the notion of genuinely pathological psychological states. However, 
the contradictions in Laing's work between the existentialist view of the 
person as a free agent, and the psychoanalytic view of the person as 
controlled. by unconscious motivations tended to be increasingly resolved i. n 
favour of the existentialist emphasis upon free will. The effect. of this. is 
to push Laing into a 'conspiratorial' theory of schizophrenia, in which the 
behaviour of the 'patient' is entirely rational and comprehensib. le, and 
problems only result for the patient as a rebult of her family's (unconscious) 
conspiracy against her. 
After 1964, Laing and Cooper began to produce the work which is most -dlearly. 
identifiable as anti-psychiatric. Laing promoted a romantic view of psychosis 
as a 'voyage of self discovery' , which traditional psychiatry mistakes for the 
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symptoms of an i1 lness and arrests (Proposition 5). Cooper viewed madness not 
as a route to sanity, but certainly as closer to sanity than that which passes 
for normality in contemporary society. At this time, Laing and Cooper were 
at the centre of the New Left counter-cultural political circles of* the era, 
whose politics were based around the celebration of personal *6xperience' and 
subjectivity. But their romanticisation of psychosis had little of practical 
use to say about the oraanisation of mental health services, and they were not 
really promoting the politicisation of th .e menta 1 health debate. Rather,. they 
were supporting a libertarian view of politics, in which psychosis was the 
ultimate symbol of individual freedom and rebellion. 
Chapter 4 Developments in British-and American Anti -psychiatry, 1970 onwards. 
By the early 1970s, the counter-cultural view., of politics had fallen into some 
disrepute, and a division had re-emerged between those who wished to produce 
fundamental changes in the structures of society, and those who were merely 
interested in promoting freedom of subjectivity., By this time also, the 
13ritish-based anti -psychi atri sts as a group were receiving heavy criticism. 
Much of the criticism focused upon the contradictions within Laing and 
C. ooper's own arguments. Specifically, they were accused of having. claimed to 
disbelieve in mental illness, but having then invented what were, de facto, 
therapies for a form of mental disorder. A particularly venomous form of this 
attack originated from the pen of Szasz '(1976). What is of particular 
interest is the British-based group's various responses to this attack. 
Laing, the remaining PA members and Berke's newly founded Arbours Association 
distanced themselves from Marxist critiques of the concept of mental illness. 
They claimed that, in stating that mental illnesses weee myths, they meant 
only to deny that such conditions were primarily orgý nic in orig'i'n. They were 
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opposed to organicist psychiatry, but not to some forms of psychotherapy. 
They were reserved even in criticising the use of compulsion on occasions when 
they felt it might be necessary. David Cooper broke with the majority of his 
colleagues at this time and adopted a wholly Marxist critique of psychiatry, 
including a rejection of psychotherapy, in which he insisted that all problems 
are ultimately political. Thus the British-based group evaded the 
contradiction, Cooper by renouncing all forms of therapy and 'the remaining PA 
members by adopting a new understanding'of what it means for mental Illness 
to be a 'myth'. 
A similar split is to be found at this time amongst the broader group of 
mental health professionals interested in the politics of mental health. Some 
professionals promoted new, 'radical' forms of - psych6therapy, which they 
argued did not share the social control functions associated with traditional 
forms of psychotherapy. Others denounced all forms of therapy, and reserved 
pa ticular contempt for those therapists who professed to. be radical. This 
wholly -anti-therapy view has its descendants in the contemporary era. 
However, in recent years socialists have lost-faith in the imminence of the 
revolution, and Marxists who argue that the only solution -to the problem of 
mental disorder is social change tend to concede that there is a need for some 
psychotherapy services in the present; for example, David Hill. Anti-therapy 
campaigners such as Masson and Chamberlin are straightforwardly libertarian 
in their insistence that all therapy is simply social control. However, they 
also wish to see some service provision, albeit of a 'non-therapeutic' nature. 
Typically, such provision falls within the category of 'paratherapeutic' 
(Ussher, 1991 for example, 'consciousness-raising' . It seems that-however. 
the anti-therapy lobby approaches the problem of abolishing therapy, therapy 
tends to reappear in the new system under a different name. 
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This problem is associated with the reliance of anti-therapy campaigners upon 
Szasz's critique of the concept of mental illness. Szasz's 'critique is flawed 
on at least three grounds: 
a) It fails to take account of the role of value judgements in *gen. eral 
medicine as well as psychiatry. 
b) It is dualistic. 
c) It place$ too much, emphasis on free will. 
More recently, political critiques of psychiatry. have beguý to emerge which 
do not rely upon Szasz's flawed distinction between physical and mental 
1 ness. Coulter (1973) approached psychiatry fr&n the viewpoint of 
questioning the source of the discipline's judgements of cultural competence 
and rationality. Ingleby (1981). suggested the aýoption of Lacanian 
psychoanalysis as a tool for sepa rating issues of meaning and rat iona I ity from 
issues of freewill, thus remedying the stagnation of the debate in simplistic 
oppositions of'-free will and determinism. 
Chapter 5 The Impact of Structuralism and po. ýt-structuralism on Anti- 
psychiatry,. 
The Lacanian psychoanalysiý referred to by Ingleby (1981) is an example of 
structural ist thought. Structuralism and post-structuralism both emerged out 
of the interest of French academics in langoage, and the way in which language 
embodies and reproduces the values of particular cultures. During the early 
1960s, structuralism was regarded as reactionary and pro-establ ishment by the 
French 'gauchistes', who, like the British and American counter-culture, 
favoured Sartrean humanistic existential ism.. However, , 
foi lowing the f ai lure 
of the events of May-June 1968 to trigger a. proces6 of majbr s'O*cio-pol itical 
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change in France, the French Left became more sympathetic towards an approach 
which could help them theorise the process by which societal values come to 
be internalised by individuals. 
Lacan questions our view of ourselves as predominantly ratioh, dl beings. ' He 
argues that the ego is a far weaker and more deceptive structure than we can 
consciously. appreciate-, being almost wholly, at the mercy' 'of 'unconscious 
irrational desires. He emphasizes alsb the i'mportance of language as the 
symbolic system through which values are created. and perpeiuated. His work 
has been used by Deleuze and Guattari (1977) to present a highly romanticised 
view of psychotic 'pre-Oedipal' experience. However, i. t has . also beeh'used 
as the basis for critiques of the value system' which underpins contemporary 
society and much psychiatric intervention. A notable instance is Mitchell's 
(1975) use of psychoanalysis to. examine -the meaning. s which have become 
attached to gender differences in Western societies. 
Foucault also questions our standards of raýionality, examining and exposing 
the value systems which underpin judgements of what is to be called rational 
and what is to be called irrational. Foucault'*s early work 
6961,1967) was 
at first regarded as supportive of anti -psychiatry, calling for the clos, ing 
of the asylums. However, his interests developed in a qui te different 
direction, as, he became increasingly concerned to demonstrate the ways in 
which deviance and pathology are identifiiýd and separated from 'normality' 
according to standards which contemporary society creates and enforces. His 
major contribution was to demonstrate that power is not merely repressive. 
Medicine does not operate solely by preventing its patients from experiencing 
the 'true selves' which are suppressed by medication, ýCT and incarceration. 
Rather, medicine is active in a positive way throughout. the whole of -society, 
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using its power to produce the individuals which the values of contemporary 
society demands. Thus, this critique can be used to address the questions 
'what values does psychiatry enforce? ' and 'what values should psychiatry 
enforce? ' A beginning has been made by Castel et al (1982), who question. the 
desirability of the spread of the 'psy' professions throu*gkout , American 
society, and Mill@r and Rose (1986) who question the wisdom of anti- 
psychiatry's focus upon*opposing medicine and the mental hospital in Britain. 
of particular interest is Gordon (1986j, who argues that the invention of 
psychiatry and the rise of -democracy are inextricably. linked. Psychiatry 
ought to be subject to the interests of democracy, and look to democracy for 
its values. Democracy ought not to become subject to psychi'atry. 
Chapter 6 The Italian Experience 
.J 
Critics of psychiatry looking for alternatives to anti-psychiatry have also 
been influenced by the Democratic Psychiatry approach of Italy, inspired by 
the work of Franco Basaglia. Basaglia's maip influence was the democratic 
philosophy of the therapeutic community, as created by Maxwell Jones. 
Basaglia was not influenced at all by the work of Szasz. He did not'adopt the 
argument that psychiatric patients ought to be released because mental, illness 
was a myth. He was, however, influenced by Foucault's structuralist critique 
of the separation of Reason and Unreason it the time of the Enlightenment. 
This led him to argue that psychiatric patients ought to be rel-eased because 
madness ought to be returned to the societies to which it belonged, and dealt 
with by those societies as communities. Like Szasz, Basaglia bpposed . 
compulsory hospitalization and treatment. However, his. reasons for doing so, 
were quite different. Basaglia believed that in psychiatry a therapeutic 
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endeavour and a policing function had become confused. He merely wished to 
see them separated. He did not oppose the provision of psychiatric care 
within the prisons, he merely opposed- incarceration within the hospitals. His 
aims were not libertarian, but Marxist structural ist. He wished to eeturn the 
sufferi. ng people whom he regarded as the products and rejects, of capitalism 
to the society from. which they had come, and which would have to find new ways 
to care for-them. 
Basaglia was largely responsible for the drafting of Law 180, which limited 
to a great extent the level of compulsion which Italian psychiatrists were 
able to use. The effects of the legislation have been the subject of intense 
controversy, both in Italy and in Britain. Those who supoort. the Italian 
reforms point to the services in the North of ItalY, particularly Trieste, as 
models of good modern psychiatric. care. HoWever, Jones and Poletti (1984, 
1985,1986) have pointed out that provision in the South of the country, where 
professionals and local government do not share Basaglla! s enthusiasm and 
commitment or his Marxist analysis, is far from adequate. In the South, many 
patients' legal status has changed in name bnl'y, and thei r- living conditions 
have changed only in that they have become more squalid and less. well-r 
regulated. In both the North and the South it is impossible to estimate how 
much de facto coercion occurs without regulation. Miller (1986) has 
criticised Basaglia for sharing the uncritical faith in the power of community 
which has resulted in poorly planned and disastrous shifts to care in the 
community in other countries in Europe and America. 
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Chapter 7 MIND's Policy and Campaigns from the 1970S to the present day. 
The Italian Law 180 was passed in 1978. During the 1970s, -MIND embarked upon 
a concerted campaign to persuade Government to revise the British' mental 
health legislation to offer greater protection to the rigýts . of mental 
patients. MIND's. stance was never overtly anti -psychi atri c, but the 
organisation was influenced by the growing body of literature criticising the 
quality of psychiatric theory and practice, and drew upon it to give its 
arguments strength. The MIND campaign was based upon the argument that 
psychiatry is far too primitive and uncertain a science to be allowed to wield 
so much power in respect of individuals' lives and perso6s. The MHA 1959 was 
the result of an over-optimistic estimation of the amount of progress 
psychiatry had made during the twentieth century, -and did not offer adequate 
protection of civil liberties to those who., fourid themselves being treated 
compulsorily under its powers. Legal reform finally took place in 1982 under 
the Conservative administration. Many changes which were made did derive from 
MIND's report and recommendations, A Human Condition (Gostin, 1975)-,. but the 
changes were comparatively limited compared with the demands which MIND had 
made 
The British legal changes differed from the Italian reforms, in that-MIND 
aimed to strengthen the rights of patients through use of the law. Basaglia 
had hoped to remove mental health from the legal framework entirely, and base 
provision upon Marxist collectivist principles. This reflects a-difference 
in the conceptual isation of democracy between Italy and England and Wales. 
The Italian reformers hoped that democratic psychiatry would be achieved by. 
removing legal restraint, and hoping that adequate service provision would 
result in the needs of all people being met. The MIND campaign assumed that 
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democracy would best be achieved by enshrining negative rights to civil 
liberty in law. The experience of both countries suggests that these two 
strategies need to be pursued in tandem to ensure a genuinely democratic 
service. Positive provision of services is vital, but it is also-important 
that positive provision should be balanced by guarantees', of individual 
liberties. 
Since 1982, MIND has based its campaigning platform around the issue of user 
involvement and emp . owerment. in management and delivery ofý services. Most 
recently, the organisation has been campaigning around the issue of properly 
informed consent to treatment by patients within psychiýatry. 
Chapter 8 Care in the Community in Britain. 
I 
The care in the community policy originated during the 1950s in response to 
the critique of the institution which reached its apex at. that time. Since 
the early 1980s, Conservative governments in America and Britain have been 
seen to be using the policy of care in the -community for fiscal convenience, 
regarding hospital closures as opportunities to ýeduce public spending. Rapid 
deinstitutionalisation in the absence of provision of alternative, care has 
produced a crisis for both psychiatry and anti -psychi at ry. As Mi Iler and Rose 
have pointed out, both psychiatry and anti-psychiatry placed their faith in 
the community. Psychiatry believed that closing the institutions would 
liberate the curative power of psychiatry. Anti-psychiatry believed that 
closure would liberate the patients. Neither of these scenarios has occurred. 
Radical critics- of psychiatry have had to find ways of coping with this 
outcome. This has been a factor of immense importapce in the declining 
support for anti-psychiatry. 
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Radicals have argued that care in the community is failing because the policy 
makers have sought merely to transpose a medically-based model of service 
delivery into the community, when what is needed is to produce an entirely new 
model of -mental 
health care, which allows proper weight to social and 
psychological factors as well as medical ones. Ramon (1985) his 4rgued that 
Britain should have adopted the philosophy which accompanied the setting up 
of community. mental health centres in the United States. Ramon (1988) is also 
a proponent of the Italian model of democratic psychiatry. Others have argued 
that the problem is that policy makers have failed to theorise adequately what 
they mean by 'the community', simply assuming that the community into which 
patients are to be moved actually exists. Because this community'does not 
exist, but needs to be created, 'deinstitutionalisation' has frequently meant 
Itransinstitutionalisation' , patients being moved from large unpleasant state- 
managed institutions into small unpleasant privately managed institutions. 
Miller and Rose (1986), writing from a post-structura I ist perspective, suggest 
that the Italian reforms are based upon the same rhetoric as that which has 
accompanied the British care in the community policy. Immense faith is bei*ng 
placed in the community as a panacea, but the community wi 11 -never be adequate 
the demands placed upon it. Carefully planned provision of.. care will 
always be necessary. Here, Miller and Rose provide an instance of the use of 
post-structuralism to question the values underpinning the rhetoric which 
accompanies the introduction of 'progressiQe' new policies. 
Chapter 9 The Emerging User Movement 
A major contribution to the mental health debate at pre. sent is being provided 
by the various elements of the user movement. As was noted in chapter 2, the 
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MHA 1959 created a conflict between the expectations of an voluntary, informal 
patient as to how they should be treated by hospital staff, and. the 
expectation of the staff as to what qualifies as appropriate patient behaviour 
in a psychiatric hospital. By the early 1970s, this conflict had resulted in 
the formation of groups of patients and ex-patients demanding that their views 
be heard. The early user groups were especially very much influenced by the 
anti-psychiatrists. -PNP reflects a radical therapy, counter-cultural 
viewpoint which is not currently very popular. The MPU represents a more 
Marxist, anti-therapy approach. The MPU no longer exists, but its descendant, 
CAPO, continues to represent this form of critique amongst users. 
More recently formed groups have- presented a pragmatic approach to mental 
health, based less upon knowledge of the anti -psychi atri c literature and more 
upon their own experience. Attit. udes of contemporary user groups towards 
psychiatry can be placed upon two dimensions: 
a) The first dimension indicates the extent to which psychiatric disorder is 
treated-as a. medical versus a psychosocial matter. Traditionally, anti- 
psychiatry has rejected the medical model., in favour of some form of 
psychosocial paradigm. 
b) However, groups can also be categorised on a second dimension, which 
indicates the extent to which it is believed that psychiatric decisions ought 
to be made by experts, versus the extent to which they ought to be made by 
users. Anti -psychi atri c groups have tendea increasingly to reject any form 
of expertise alongside the medical model. More recently a pragmatic ýstrategy 
has emerged of wishing to retain experts, with all the benefits that expertise 
can bring, whilst wishing to democratise the way in which professional's work, 
so that their expertise can be used without users. becoming subject to their 
power. In the words of Peter Campbell, 'We want professionals to be-on tap, 
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not on top'. Groups such as Survivors Speak Out recognise both the need for 
services to be provided with whatever professional support is necessary, but 
also for users to have an input into these services, how they are delivered 
and whether they are delivered. A workable relationship is being forged 
between mental health expertise and users' demands to be prop6rly involved. 
concepts such as ýdvocacy and self-advocacy are being explored as ways of 
promoting the user viewpoint and empowering users. MIND has pursued a policy 
of involving users both in executive decisions as national level, and by 
forming its own user network within the main organisation. 
The post-structuralist critiques of psychiatry are complex and highly academic 
and not understood or read by the majority of the user movement. However, the . 
more moderate groups within the user movement- are evo . Iving strategies not 
inconsistent with the poststructuralist form of critique, in that they are 
addressing themselves less towards the truth a-bout psychiatric disorder, and 
more towards issues of democracy and power within services. 
The increased confidence and influence of seývice users has been matcýed 'by 
an increase in influence of groups represent ing relatives and carers of 
service'users. Groups such as the NSF have promoted the view that the serious 
forms of disorder which are categorised schizophrenia are in fact biochemical 
brain disorders. Paradoxically, they promote the view that service users are 
in need of expert medical assistance, and kmetimes expert medical* control, 
whilst proclaiming themselves the true experts in serious psychiatric 
disorder. The NSF has frequently found itself in public conflict with the 
rnore radical and. anti -psychi atri c user groups and individual users. There is 
room for concern that the views of the most handicapped"and needy users are 
excluded from this debate between extreme ideological viewpoints If the user 
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viewpoint is to Increase, rather than reduce, democracy In mental health 
service delivery, then it is vital that the views of all users are 
represented. 
Chapter 10 The nature and extent of psychiatric expertise. 
The final chapter of the thesis examined the claims of mental health 
professionals to possess a substantial body of real knowledge and therapeutic 
expertise in relation to psychiatric disorder. The adherende of psychiatrists 
to positivist methodologies was examined. It was suggested that contemporary 
psychiatrists are far more sophisticated in their awareness of the problematic 
nature of the concept of illness than anti-psychiatric critics have given them 
credit for. (And perhaps rather more sophisticated in their treatment of some 
of the issues than the anti -psydhi atri sts themselves, most psychiatrists 
having identified the flaws in the views of Szasz. ) In relation to issues of 
diagnosis and labelling, the epistemological basis of the diagnosis of 
schizophrenia was examined by reference to Hill's (1983) critique. It was 
acknowledged that the concept does have flaws, and many psychiatrists hope and 
believe that it will be replaced eventually by a more sophisticated system of 
classification. Researchers such as Bentall et al (1988) are already 
proposing possible bases for new forms of categorisation. However, Hill was 
found to be completely isolated amongst academic researchers in believing that 
the concept of schizophrenia would be abandoned in the absence of a more 
viable replacement. The overwhelming opinion is that the diagnosis of 
schizophrenia is indeed crude and imprecise. But should it fall into disuse 
this will be because it has been superseded by something better, not because 
researchers have finally acknowledged that the object of their research does 
not exist. 
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In relation to medical treatments for psychiatric disorder, it must be 
acknowledged that the expertise of psychiatrists is extremely limited. There 
are no theoretically based forms of psychiatric treatment. All treatments 
currently in use have evolved through a pragmatic process of persevering with 
whatever seems to produce results. Research suggests that medical treatments 
currently in use, such as ECT and the various types of medication commonly 
prescribed, do have some impact on the symptoms of psychiatric disorder. 
However, this impact is quite limited, and such positive benefits as are 
endowed have to be evaluated with reference to the traumatic physical and 
psychological side effects which also result from treatment. Psychiatrists 
have frequently been slow to acknowledge the negative effects of their 
treatments; for example, the problem of dependency which is posed by the use 
of benzodiazepines. With respect to non-medical forms of treatment, research 
into psychotherapy has consistently shown this form of treatment to be of 
benefit to a range of patients, both used alone and in tandem with medical 
forms of treatment. 
In light of this evidence, it was concluded that medicine does have some 
useful expertise in relation to the understanding and treatment of psychiatric 
disorder. However, this knowledge and expertise is limited, and the input of 
non-medical psychosocial forms of therapy and management is essential. It is 
most probably true that the medical profession exerts more power and control 
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in the area of mental health than is warranted by the profession's level of 
knowledge and expertise. 
Conclusions. 
This thesis set out to answer two questions: 
a. Why did anti-psychiatry emerge durinj the late 1960s and early 1970s? 
The thesis has demonstrated that 'anti -psychiatry' as a single, wholly 
coherent set of ideas did not emerge at all. Rather, f r6m the 1960s- onwards, 
a series of critiques of psychiatry emerged whibh shared a basic attitude of 
mistrust towards mainstream medical organicist- psych*iatry, but diverged 
greatly beyond that. The earliest critiques were principally reactions 
against positivism in psychiatry and social science. The labelling theorists, 
including Scheff and Goffman, did not place themselves in direct'opposition 
to all physiological theories of mental illn-ess, but argued that psychiatry 
was quite possibly creating a large proport-ion of the distress which it 
claimed to . 
'discover' and treat. These theorists questioned the objectivity 
clf the concepts with which psychiatry worked. Szasz represents-a-reaction 
against the Progressive Liberalism of welfare state Pol. itics and the belief 
in a perfectly -planned and harmonious social environment. Laing's early work 
aimed to demonstrate that much of the sympt*6matology which psychiatry sought 
to explain in causal terms could be regarded as meaningful behaviour if placed 
in proper social context. All these theorists can be regarded as attempting 
to restore some -degree of agency to the individual, where positivist-social 
scientists and psychiatrists had tended to adopt a. 'fawlty machine' view of 
humanitY. 
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Laing and Cooper's later and more truly 'anti -psychi atri c' thought emerged in 
parallel with the counter-cultural politics of subjectivity of the late 1960s. 
Their work at this time shows an unfortunate tendency to romanticize psychotic 
experience, portraying it as a form of mystical experience, in the 'case of 
Laing, or a form of political activism, in the case of', Coo. per. The 
disillusionment of. the New Left with the counter-culture, which took place 
during the early 197.0s, led to a definitive split amongst critics of 
psychiatry at that time. Laing and thb major'i . ty of his colleagues in the 
Philadelphia Association adopted a 'radical therapy' position, and from then 
onwards devoted themselves to the provision of fringe forms of psychotherapy. 
They continued to argue that 'mental illness is a myth' '(Proposition 1)-, but 
only in the weak form which asserts that pathological mental states do not 
have an organic basis. Cooper became' more overtly '"and uncompromisingly 
Marxist, promoting mass socio-political change as the only way to alleviate 
distress, and denouncing psychiatric diagnosis and treatment as mystifying 
forms of social control operating in the interests of the capitalist status 
quo. He continued to regard mental illness-as a myth in the strong sense of 
asserting that pathological mental states -are themselves mythical concepts 
created for socio-political purposes. 
b. How influential has anti-psychiatry been during the 1980s and 1990s? 
The Marxist anti-psychiatry which became faIrly popular during the 1970s still 
exists and is visible in the views of David Hill. A non-Marxist, libertarian 
view is found in the work of Masson and Chamberlin. All these theorists claim 
to be essentially opposed to all therapeutic approaches to mental di-sorder. 
However, as the possibility of a socialist Britain looks, i ncreasi ngl y distant, 
Hill is compelled to offer some assistance to those people *he regards as 
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victims of capitalism in the present, and justifies provision of psychotherapy 
services on that basis. Masson and Chamberlin purport to have rejected all 
forms of therapy, but continue to promote alternatives to psychiatry which 
might be termed 'paratherapeutic'. Thus, those who continue to-argue in 
favour of the abolition of psychiatry invariably find them, gelves in* the 
position of having. to propose a preferable alternative for the large number 
of seriously disordered people. The expression 'mental illness' can be 
abolished by fiat, but the problem, unf6rtunately, cannot. 
Anti -psychi atri c critiques of psychiatry continue to carry some sway in the 
user movement, particularly amongst its most influential : and articulate 
speakers. Chamberlin is a leadin-g voice in the American user movement, and 
her views have been widely publicised in gritain (ChambeHin, 1988). Lawson, 
MIND's vice-chai r, adopts a straightforwardly anti-psychiatric critique. The 
user group Campaign Against Psychiatric Oppression bases its platform upon a 
form of anti-psychiatry which resembles very closely that adopted by the 
Mental Patients' Union during the early 1976s. 
However, for a variety of reasons, anti-psychiatry has largely ceased to be 
viewed as a credible critique of psychiatry. Academic critic. ism of the 
content and internal contradictions of anti -psychiatry, particula, rly the views 
of Szasz, has reduced the stance's credibility. The reality of carp in the 
community as the policy has been implemented by right wing governments in 
America and Britain has largely silenced demands that mental health -services 
be reduced, and focused attention upon the. problem of lack. of provision for 
both chronically and acutely disturbed patients. In the present climate, 
radical critics of psychiatry have begun to seek alter. n. ative political views 
to those provideq by anti-psychiatry. The work of*Basaglia and Psichiatria 
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Democratica in Italy has been identified as a useful model for emulation. 
MIND has shown great interest in the Italian reforms. However, the Italian 
Law 180 has also received criticism from those who have argued that, 
throughout the country as a whole, provision in Italy is certainly no better 
than that in Britain or America. Miller (1986) views Italy as *s'lmp. ly one 'more 
Instance of the belief in 'community as panacea' which has characterised 
psychiatry. during the. second half of the twentieth century. 
However the Italian model does illustrate the new basis for political critique 
which is overtaking anti -psychiatry. This is a critique rooted in the theoýy 
of democracy. Gordon (1976) argued that psychiatry' and democracy are 
intimately related, both being products of the Enlightenment. The two are 
conceptually related also. Democracy demands high levels of rationality and 
autonomy in its subjects. Psychiatry exists to promote the development of 
rationality and autonomy where they are absent. Psychiatry is the servant of 
democracy. The basis for a political critique of psychiatry is to be. found 
in ensuring that psychiatry remains the tool -of democracy, and does not become 
its ruler. Basaglia attempted to promote democracy -in psychiatry by 
emphasizing the subjective needs of psychiatric patients, and attempti. ng to. r 
restore*them to the communities from which they have been excl. uded. His 
attempt was only very partially successful, as he failed to guarantee-both 
positive rights to provision, enshrined in law, and negative rights to civil 
liberty adequately enshrined in law. 
In this country, democracy is also the basis of MIND's policies. During the 
1970s, MIND devoted its energies to improving the civil liberties a\rAilable 
to patients under mental health legislation. Since' then, it has been 
primarily concerned to promote the voice of both formal .. and informal 
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a 
psychiatric patients throughout the mental health services. Its campaign for 
consent to treatment is the latest instance of its promotion of the principles 
of democracy. Amongst the user groups, Survivors Speak Out does not campaign 
for the abolition of psychiatry, but promotes the users' own v-iowpoints 
through the provision of advocacy. The views of Peter CamOVell, refle*ct a 
concern for democracy and empowerment, rather than a simplistic demand for the 
abolition of psychiatry. 
Democratic -psychiairy has largely overtaken anti. -psychiatýy as the radical 
campaigning Platform in the area of mental health. Anti-psychiatry was 
perhaps helpful in raising and publicising important ýuesdons during the 
1960s and 1970s, particularly in relation to the meaning -of 'illness' in 
psychiatry, and the role of medicine in the treatment of 'mental illness'. 
However, the answers which anti-psychiatry offered to these questions were not 
adequate to the problem of mental disorder. The emerging campaigns for 
democracy in psychiatry are more likely to provide some solutions. However, 
the promotion of democracy in psychiatry is fraught with difficulties. because 
of the nature of the problem which mental- health services exist to serve. 
Democratisation is likely to be frustrated by factors within psychiatry 
itself, -including psychiatrists' status as professionals, and the. continuing 
operation of the sections of the MHA 1983 which permit some compulsory 
treatment. In addition, the user movement may itself become a threat to 
democracy, if it fails to promote the views of the most vulnerable and 
handicapped users, and over-emphasises the more articulate and strident voices 
of those who continue to oppose outright the provision of psychiatric 
services. However, the issue of democracy within mental health -service. 
provision is likely to remain an issue-for the foreseeable future. 
409 
References 
H. Allen (1986) 'Psychiatry and the construction of the feminine' in P. Miller 
and N. Rose (eds) 'The power of psychiatry' Polity: Cambridge' 
L. Althusser (1964-5) 'Freud et Lacan' La Nouvelle Critique, 161-2, December- 
January. 
B. Angri st, H. K. Lee and S. Gershon (1974) 'The antagoni sm of ampMýami. ne-i nd'uced 
Symptor6atology by a neuroleptic' American Journal of Psychiatry, 131,817-819 
T. Ayllon and N. H. Airin (1966) 'The token economy: a motivational. system for 
therapy and rehabilitat-ion' Appleton-Century7Crof ts: New York. 
Anonymous (1972) 'The getsmart prayer' Rough Times, 3 (3) 7 
Anonymous (. 1975a) , What you. in for boy? ' Mind Out, 11 
Anonymous (1975b) 'A human condition' Mind Out, 14 
Anonymous (1981) 'New Mental Health Bill welcomed by MIND: - but*campaign 
continues over consent to treatment' Mind Out', November 
Anonymous (1991) 'Hearing. voices' Openmind, june/July, . 
51,8 
A. J. Ayer (1971) 'Language, truth and logic' Penguin: Harmondsworth. 
A. J. Ayer (1976) 'The central quest'ions of philosophy' P'enguin: Harmondsworth 
R. J. Baldesserini (1977) 'Chemotherapy in psychiatry' Harvard: Cambridge 
University Press 
I. Barker and E. Peck (1987) 'Power in strange places: user empowerment in 
mental health services' Good Practices in Mental Health: London 
H. Barnes and J. Berke (1973) 'Mary -Barnes: two accounts of. a jo'urney through 
madness' Penguin: Harmondsworth 
1ýarnett*(1973) 'People not psychiatry' Allen Unwin: London 
N. Bartlett (1989a) 'The power to persuade' Community Care, 13 July 
N. Bartlett (1989b) 'Agreeing to differ' Community Care, 20 July 
R. Barton (1959) 'Institutional neurosis' John Wright: Bristol 
G. Baruch and A. Treacher (1978) 'Psychiatry observed' Routledge -and Kegan 
Paul: London 
F. Basaglia (1980) 'Problems of law and psychiatry: the Italian experience' 
International Journal of Law and Psychiatry, 3,17-37 
F. Basaglia (1968) 'Italian psychiatric reform as a reflection of society' in 
S. Ramon (ed) 'Psychiatry in transition: the British and' Italian experience' 
pluto: London 
410 
F. Basaglia and F. Basaglia (1987) 'Madness/delirium' in A. Lovell and N. Scheper- 
Hughes (eds) 'Psychiatry inside out: selected writings of Franco Basaglia' 
Columbia University Press: New York 
F. Basaglia and R. D. Laing (1987) 'A dialogue with R. D. Laing' in A. M. Lovell and 
N. Scheper-Hughes (eds) 'Psychiatry inside out: selected writings of Franco 
Basaglia' Columbia University Press: New York 
G. Bateson, D. D. Jackson, J. Haley and J. Weakland (1956) 'Towaýrd a theory of 
schizo0hrenia' Behavioural Science, 1,251 
1 
Z. Bauman (1988) 'I's thera--a- postmodern sociology? ' in M. Feathe 
, 
rstone (ed) 
'Postmodernism' Theoryi Culture and Society, 5 (2-3) 217-37 Sage: London. 
A. T. Beck, C. H. Ward, M. Mendelson, J. E. Mocl\, and J* 'K. Erbaugh (1962) 'Reliability 
of psychiatric diagnoses: 2. a study of consistency of cl. inical judgements 
and ratings' American Journal of Psychiatry, 119,351-357 
T-Becker (1985) "Psychiatric reform in Italy - how does it work in Piedmont? ' 
British Journal of Psychiatry, 147,254-60 
R. P. Bentall, H. F. Jackson, and D. Pilgrim (1988) 'Abandoning the concept of 
t schizophrenia': some implications of validity arguments for psychological 
research into psychotic pýenomena' British Jou*rna-I of Clinical Psychology, 27, 
303-24 
J. Berke (19T4) 'Radical psychology' (Book rpview) Arbours Network News, T 
J. Berke (1976) letter in 'Anti-psychiatry: a debate' New Society offprint 
J. Berke (1979) '1 haven't had to go mad here: the psychotic's journey from 
dependence to autonomy' Penguin: Harmondsworth 
J. Berke (1987) 'The Arbours, 15+ years' British Journal of Psychotherapy, 4 
(1) 72 
J. Berke (1987) 'Arriving, settling-in, settling-down, leaving and following- 
up: stages of stay at the Arbours Centre' British Journal of Medical 
psychology, 60,181-188 
D. Berry (1987) 'A vision for the better' Guardian, 16 September 
L. Bigwood and P. George (1986) 'Against shock: a reply to Professor F. A. Jenner 
and Dr D. N. Vlissides' Asylum 1 (2) 19-21 
M. Birchwood, S. Hallett and M. Preston (1988) 'Schizophrenia: an integrated 
approach to research and treatment' Longman: Harlow 
I. M. Blackburn, S. Bishop, A. I. M. Glen, L. J. Whalley and J. E. Christie (1981) 'The 
efficacy of cognitive therapy in depression: -a treatment trial using cognitive 
therapy and pharmacotherpay, each alone and in combination' British-Journal 
of psychiatry,, 139,181-89 
I. m. Blackburn, K. M. Eunson and S. Bishop (1986) 'A two yeAr naturalistic follow- 
up of depressed patients treated with cognitive therapy, pharmacotherapy, and 
a combination of both' Journal of Affective Disorders, 10,67-75 
411 
.0 
L. Blom-Cooper and Jefferys (1975) 'Foreword' in L. Gostin 'A Human Condition: 
vol. 1' MIND: London 
R. Bluglass (1987) 'The Mental Health Act 1983 in practice' Medico-Legal 
Journal, 55,151-163 
V. Bogdanor and L. Skidelsky (1970) (eds) 'The age of affluence 1-951-1964' 
Macmillan: LQndon and Basingstoke 
p. Bollini and R. F. Mollica (1989) 'Surviv , 
ing without the asylu , m: ýn overview 
if studies on the Italian reform movement' Journal of Nervous and Mental 
Disease, 177,607-615 
M. Bowie (1991) 'Lacan' Fontana: London 
B. Boynton and S. Young (date unknown) 
psychology-Magazin6,8,24-28 
'Red. 'therapy' Humpty Dumpty Radical 
D. Brandon (1977) 'Human being human: a social worker's journey through 
encounter and sensitivity groups' Quaesitor Press: London 
P. Breggin (1979) 'Electro-shock: its brain-disabling effects''Springer: New 
York 
P. Breggin (1983) 'PsychiAric drugs: - hazýrds to the braln' Springer: New York 
M. Brierley (1961) 'The divided self: a study of sanity and madness' 
International Journal of Psycho-analys'is, 42,288 
P. Brotherton (1988) 'Putting consumers first' The Health Service Journal, 14 
July, 799 
J. A. C. Brown (1961) 'Freud and the post-Freudians'. Penguin: Harmondsworth. 
P. Brown (1973) 'Radical Psychology' Tavistock.: London 
P. Brown (1973a) 'Review: recent anti-psychiatry books' Rough'Times, 3 (5) 19 
A. Bryman (1988) 'Quantity and quality in social research' Unwin: ýOndon 
G. Bucalo (1989) 'Living without psychiatry' Asylum 4 (1) 10-11' 
J. Busfield (1986) 'Managing madness' Unwin Hyman: London 
J. L. Cameron, R. D. Laing and A. McGhie (1955) 'Effects of environmental changes 
in the care of chronic-schizophrenics' The Lancet, 1384 
p. Campbell (1986) 'The "mentally-ill" speak out' Peace News, 1 August, 9 
CAPO (date unknown) 'Campaign Against Psychiatric Oppression: introduction, 
manifesto, demands' CAPO 
A. Carlsson and M. Lindquist (1963) 'Effect of chlorpromazine or haloperidol on 
formation of 3-methoxytyramine and normetanephrihe in mouse' brai-n! Acta 
pharmacologica et Toxicologia, 20,140-144 
412 
F. Castel, R. Castel and A. Lovell (1982j 'The psychiatric society' Columbia 
University Press: New York 
M. Cavadino (1989) 'Doctor's order's: mental health Iýw in context' 
Dartmouth: Aldershot 
J. Chamberlin (1986) 'Power to the patients' Broadsheet, June, 20-22. ' 
J. Chamberlin (1988) 'On our own' MIND: London 
p. Chesler (1972) 'Women and madness' Doubleday: New York 
G. Chouinard . and 
B. D.. Jones (1980) 'Neuroleptic-induced supersensitivity 
psychosis: chemical and pharmacological characteristics' American 'Journal of 
psychiatry, 137: 16-21 
A. Clare (1976) 'Psychiatry in dissent' Tavistock: London 
A. Clare and S. Thompson (1981a) 'Let's talk about me: a critical examin*ation 
of the new psychotherapies' BBC: London 
A-Clare (1981b) 'Can the law reform psychiatric careV Mind: Out', April 
A-Clare (1989) 'A divided. -view of madness' Guardian 25 August 
D. H. Clark (1964) 'Administrative therapy' Tavistock: London 
G. Clarke (1979) 'In defense of deinstitutionAlization' Milbank Memorial Fund 
Quarterly, 57 (4) 461 
J. Clarke, S. Hall, T. Jefferson and B. Roberts (1975) 'Subcultures, cultures and 
class' Cultural Studies 7/8: resistence through rituals, University of 
Birmingham: Birmingham. 
Committee on the Review of Medicines (1-980) 'Systematic review of the 
benzodiazepines' British Medical Journal, 29,910-2 
D. Cooper (1968) (ed) 'The dialectics of liberation' Penguin: Harmondsworth 
1). Cooper (1970) 'Psychiatry 4nd anti-psychiatry' Paladin: St. Alb. ans 
1). Cooper (1972) 'The death of the family' Penguin: Harmondsworth 
Cooper (1970) 'Looking back on anger" in Bogdanor and Skidelsky (eds) 'The age 
of affluence' Macmillan: London and Basingstoke 
COPE Collective (date unknown) 'How we saw COPE 3 months ago' An Copeman 1, 
3-4 
J. R. M. Copeland, J. E. Cooper, R. E. Kendell and, 'A. J. Gourlay (1971) 'Differences 
in usage of diagnostic labels amongst psychiatrists in the British-. Isles' 
13ritish Journal of Psychiatry, 11S, 62, &ýO 
j,. Coult, er (1973) 'Approaches to insanity' i4artin 'Robertson: Londoh 
413 
T. K. J. Craig (1991) [comments on Palermo, 19911 in K. Jones, G. Wilkinson and 
T. K. J. Craig 'The 1978 Italian Mental Health Law -a personal evaluation' 
British Journal of Psychiatry, 159,556-561 
G. E. Crane and R. C. Smith (1980) 'The prevalence of tardive dyskinesia' in 
W. Fann et al (eds) 'Tardive dyskinesia: research and treatment' Spectrum: New 
York 
P. Crepet (1990) 'A transition period in psychiatric care in Italy,. ten Years 
after the reform' British Journal of Psychiatry, . 
156,27-36 
Crow, Macmillan, J6hnson and Johnstone (1986) Relapse rates on-phenothiazines 
M. Daly (1979) 'Gyn\Ecology' Women's Press: Lonýon 
A. Davis (1988) 'Users' perspec-tives' in., S. Ramon (ed). 'Psychiatry in 
transition: the Briiish and. Italian experiences' Pluto; London 
K. Davis (1938) 'Mental hygiene and the class structure' Psychiatry 1, 
55-65 
G. C. Davison and J. M. Neale (1982) 'Abnormal psychology' John'Wil'ey 
G. DeGirolama (1985) 'Misunderstanding the Italian experience' British. Journal 
of Psychiatry, 147,451-ý 
G. Deleuze and F. Guattari (1977) 'Anti-Oedipq s: capitalism and schizophrenia' 
viking: New York 
G. Del Giudice, E. Pasquale and M. Reale (1988) 'How can mental hospitals be 
phased outV in S. Ramon (ed) 'Psychiatry in transition:, the British and 
Italian experiences' Pluto: London 
G. Dell'Acqua and R. Mezzina (1988) 'Approaching mental distress' in S. Ramon 
(ed) 'Psychiatry in transition: the British -and Italian experiences' 
pluto: London 
H. V. Dicks (1970) 'Fifty years of the Tavistock Clinic' Routledge and Kegin 
Paul: London 
J. Donald (1991) 'Psychoanalysis and cultural theory' Macmillan: 'Hampshire 
S. Dorrell (1990) 'Consuming interests - whose choice: the government's view' 
Openmind, October/November 47,6 
E. [)urkheim (1951) 'Suicide' Free Press: New York 
L. Durkin and B. Douieb (date unknown) 'The Mental Patients. ' Union reference 
unknown 
Ehrman (1970) 'Structuralism' Penguin: Harmondsworth 
I. Elkin, M. T. Shea, J. T. Watkins, S. D. Imber, S. M. Sotsky, J, F. Collins, D. R. Glass, 
P. A. Pilkonis, W. R. Leber, J. P. Docherty, J. P. Fiester and M. B. Parloff. . 
(1989) 
, t4IMH treatment of depression collaborative reseaech programme: 1. - general 
effectiveness of treatments' Archives of General 
Psychiatry, 46i 971-982 
414 
B. Ennis and R. Emery (1978) 'The rights of mental patients' Avon: New York 
S. Ernst (1981) 'In our own hands: a book of self-help therapy' The Women's 
Press: London - 
A. Esterson (1972) 'The leaves of spring' Penguin: Harmondsworth 
A. Esterson (1976) letter in 'Anti -psychiatry: a debate' New Society offprint 
H. J. Eygenck (1978) 'An exercise in meta-silliness'. American Psychologist, 33, 
517 
M. Featherst(? ne (1988) (ed) 'Postmodernism' Theory, Culture and Soc . iety 5 (2-3) 
Sage: London 
M. Fisher (1983) 'The meaning of client satisfaction' in M. Fisher (ed) 
'Speaking of clienýs' University of Sheffield: Sheffield 
P. Fonagy and A. Higgitt (1984) 'Personality theory and clinical practice' 
Methuen: London 
m. Foucault (1961) 'Histoire de la folie' Librairie Plon 
M. Foucault (1966) 'Les mots et les choses' 
0 
M. Foucault (1967) 'Madness and civilization: a history of insanity in the age 
of reason' Tavistock: London 
M. Foucault (1970) 'The order of things: an archaeology of the human sciences' 
Random House: New York 
M. Foucault (1972) 'The archaeology of knowledge' Harper and Row: New York 
M. Foucault (1975) 'Surveiller et punir: naissancb de la prison' Editions 
Gallimard 
M. Foucault. (1977) 'Discipline and punish: the birth of the prison' Allen Lan@ 
F. Frankel (1977) 'Current perspectives on ECT: a discussion, American Journal 
of Psychiatry, 134,1014-19 
M. Fraser (1982) 'ECT: a clinical guide' Wiley 
C. P. L. Freeman, J. V. Basson and A. Crichton (1978) 'Double-b I ind controlled tri al 
of electro-convulsive therapy (ECT) and simblated ECT in depressive- illness' 
The Lancet, 738 
H. Freeman (1990) 'The cause of schizophrenia' letter, Guardian, 29 August 
T. Freeman (1961) 'The divided self' British Journal of Medical Psychology, 34, 
79 
s. Freud (1976) 'The interpretation of dreams' Penguin: Harmondsworth 
S. Freud (1976) 'Jokes and their relation to the 
penguin: Harmondsworth 
415 
B. Friedan (1963) 'The feminine mystique' Dell: New York- 
J. Friedberg (1977) 'Shock treatment, brain damage and memory loss: a 
neurological -perspective' American Journal of Psychiatry, i34,1010-14 
E. Z. Friedenberg (1973) 'Laing' Fontana: London 
E. Friedson (1970) 'Profession of medicine' Harper and Row: New York 
L. Gerbino, M. Oleshansky and S. Gershon (1978) 'Clinical use and mode of action 
of lithium' in M. A. Lipton, A. DiMascio and F. K. Killam (eds) 
lpsychopharmacologý: a generation of progress' Raven Press: New York 
M. G. Giannichedda (1988a) "Crisis and identity: extracts from the'theory of 
Franco Basagl ia' in S. Ramon 'Psychiatry in trans'i . tion: the British and Italian 
, experiences' Pluto: London 
M. G. Giannichedda (1988b) 'A future of social invisibility' in S. Ramon (ed) 
, psychiatry in transition: the British and Italian experiences' Pluto: London 
M. G. Giannichedda (1989) 'Italy - 10 years of law refor6' Asylum 3, (3)'10-14 
B. G. Glaser and A. L. Strauss (1968) 'The d. i. s'covery of grounded theory' 
Aldine: Chicago 
E. Goffman (1962) 'Asylums: essays on the social situation of mental p atients 
and other inmates' Aldine: Chicago 
L. Goodison (1981) 'Self-help therapy: what does it offer you? ' Mind Out March, 
11-13 
S. Goodwin (1990) 'Community care and the future of mental health service 
provision' Avebury 
C. Gordon (1986) 'Psychiatry and the problem -of democracy' in P. Mille. r and 
N. Rose (eds) 'The power of psychiatry' Polity: Cambridge 
L. Gostin (1975) 'A Human Condition: *vol. 1' MIND: London 
L. Gostin (1977) 'MIND repli. es to White Paper hints' Communi. ty Care, 1.2 
october, 5 
L. Gostin (1978) 'In two minds' Guardian, 28 September 
L. Gostin (1983) 'The ideology of entitlement' in P. Bean (ed) 'Mental- illness: 
changes and trends' John Wiley: Chichester 
L. Gostin (1990) 'The rights stuff' Openmind, October/November-47,12-13 
p. Graham (1990) 'Mixed messages' letter, NeW Society, 23 June 
E. M. Gruenberg and J. Archer (1979) 'Abandonment of responsibility for 'the 
seriously mentally ill' Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly, 57,485-506 
D. GoUld (1978) 'Psychiatrist... heal thyself' Guardian, 3 October 
416 
J. Habermas (1981) 'Modernity versus postmodernity' New German Critique, 22, 
3-14 
J. Habermas (1986) 'Taking aim at the heart of the presýent' in D. C. Hoy 
'Foucault: a critical reader' Blackwell: Oxford 
C. Hanvey (1978) 'Italy and the rise of democratic psychiatry' Community Care, 
25 October, 22-24 
Harris (1955) 'The contribution of psychological medicine to qeýerai 'medicine' 
1955, Journal of Mental Science, 101,1-11 
P. Hays (1964) 'New perspectives in psychiatry, ' Penguin: Harmondsw . orth. 
R. Hennelly (1988) 'Mental health resourcd centre's" in S. Ramon (ed) 'Psychiatry 
in transition: the. British and Italian expeiences' Pluto: Lgndon 
R. Hennelly (date unknown) 'Mythmaking and the major tranquillizers' IAMHW 
Bulletin, 8,5 
D. Heptinstall (1984) 'Psichiatria Democratica' Community*Care, 1 March., 17-19 
C. Hicks (1984) 'The Italian exper-ience' Nursiný Times, 21 March, 16-18 
D. Hi 11 (1983) 'The politics of - schizophrenia' University Press of 
Ame ri ca: Lanham 
D. Hill (1985) 'The problem wiih major' tranquilli'zers' Openmind 13, 
February/March, 14 
D. Hill (1990) 'Causes of schizophrenia'letter, Guardian, 2.7 August 
S. Holland (1988) 'Defining and experimenting- with prevention' in S. Ramon (ed) 
, psychiatry in transition: the British and Italian-experience' Pluto: London 
M. Hutchison, Linton and Lucas (1990) 'User involvement pack' MIND: London 
A. Huxley (1932) 'Brave new world' Chatto, and Windus 
I. nstitute for the Study of Drug Dependence (ISDD) (1989) 'Tranquillizers' 
ISDD: London 
I. Illich (1975) 'Medical nemesis: the expropriation of health' Calder and 
Boyars: London 
D-Ingleby (1981) 'Understanding 'mental illness" in D. Ingleby (ed) 'Critical 
psychiatry: the politics of mental health' Penguin: Harmondswor. th 
F. A. Jenner (1981) 'Why MIND's victory rings hollow in human terms' letter, 
Guardian, 13 November 
F. A. Jenner (1986) 'Italy and the legitimation of psychiatry' Asylum 1 (1) 
F. A. Jenner (1988) 'Marginal ization of users and P"roviders in Britain' in 
S. Ramon (ed) 'Psychiatry in transition: the -Britisti and Italian' exper . iences' 
pluto: London 
417 
F. A. Jenner (1989) 'Democracy and ECT' Asylum 3 (4) 25-26 
F. A. Jenner and D. N. Vlissides (1986) 'The case for ECT' Asylum 1 (2) 18-19 
D. V. Jeste and R. J. Wyatt (1981) 'Changing epidemiology of tardive dyskinesia' 
138,297-309 
D. M. Johnson and Dodds N. (eds) (1958) 'A plea for the silent' C. Johnson: London 
E. C. Johnstone, J. F. W. Deakin, P. Lawler, C, D. Frith,. M. Stevens, ý. Mcýherson and 
T. J. Crow (1980) 'The Northwick Park electro-convulsive therapy trial' The 
Lancet, 1317 
K. Jones (1972) 'A history of mental health services' Routledge -and Kegan 
Paul: London 
K-Jones (1979) 'Deinstitutionalisation in context' Mi. llbank Memorial Fund 
Quarterly, 57,552-569 
K. Jones (1982) 'Scull's dilemma' British Journal of Psychiatry, 141,221-226 
K. Jones (1991) [comments, on Palermo, 19911' in K. Jones, 'G. Wilkinson- and 
T. K. J. Craig 'The 1978 Italian Mental Health LAw -a personal evaluation: a 
review' British Journal of Psychiatry, 159,656-561 
K. Jones and A. Poletti (1984) 'The mirage of a reform' New Society, 4 October 
K-Jones and A-Poletti (1985) 'Unde*rstanding'the Italian experience' British 
journal of Psychiatry, 146,341-7 
K. Jones and A. Poletti (1986) 'The "Italian experience" reconsidered, British 
journal of Psychiaty, 148,144-50 
M. Jones (1968) 'Social psychiatry in practice' Penguin: Harmondsworth 
m. jones (1956) 'The concept of a therapeutic'community' American Journal of 
psychiatry, 112 
Q. Kellner (1988) 'Postmodernism as social theory: some chal.. lenges and 
problems' in M-Featherstone (ed) 'Postmodernism' Theory, Culture'and Society 
5,239-69 Sage: London. 
p. C. Kendall and A. J. Lipman (1991) 'Psychological and pharmacological therapy: 
methods and modes for comparative outcome research' Journal of Consulting and 
Clinical Psychology, 59,78-87 
M. Kesey (1962) 'One flew over the cuckoo's nest' Methuen: Great Britain. 
T. S. Kuhn (1962) 'The structure of scientific revolutions' University of 
Chicago Press: Chicago 
J. Lacan (1966), 'Au-dela du principe de realite' in J. Lacan 'Ecrits' Seull 
J. Lacan (1966) 'Le stade du miroir comme formateur de' Ya fonction du Je' in 
J. Lacan 'Ecrits'. Seuil 
. 418 
J. Lacan (1966) 'Fonction et champ de la parole et du langage en psychanalyse' 
in J. Lacan 'Ecrits' Seuil 
J. Lacan (1966) 'L'instance de la lettre dans Vinconscient ou la raison depuis 
Freud' in J. Lacan 'Ecrits' Seuil 
R. D. Laing (1957) 'An examination of Tillich's theory of anxiety and -neurosisi 
British Journal of Medical Psychology, 30,88-91 
R. D. Laing (1959) 'The divided self' Tavi. stock: London 
R. D. Laing (1961) 'The self --and others' Tavi stock: London 
R. D. Laing (1962) 'Series and nexus in the family' New Left Review, 15 
R. D. Laing (1964) 'What is schizophrenia? ' Now Left Review 28,63 
R. D. Laing (1965) 'Massacre of the innocents' Peace News, 1491 
R. D. Laing (1965) 'Transcendental experience in relation to religion and 
psychosis' Psychedelic Review, 6 
R. D. Laing (1965) 'The divided self' Penguin: Harmondsworth 
R. D. Laing (1967) 'The pblitics of -exp . erience and the bird of paradise' 
Penguin: Harmondsworth 
0 
R. D. Laing (1971) 'Self and others' Penguin: Harmondsworth 
R. D. Laing (1972) 'Knots' Penguin: Harmondsworth 
R. D. Laing (1977) 'The facts of life' PengLiin: Harmondswort6 
R. D. Laing (1986) 'Wisdom, madness and folly: the making of a psychiatrist' 
Macmillan: London 
R. D. Laing 
.. 
and A. Esterson (1964) 'Sanity, ' madness 'ana the family. ' 
Tavistock: London 
R. D. Laing and A. Esterson 
. 
(1970) 'Sanity, madness and the family' 
penguin: Harmondsworth 
J. T. Landman and R. M. Dawes (1982) 'Smith and Glass' conclusions stand up under 
scrutiny' American Psychologist, 37, ' 504 
M. Lawson (1989) 'ECT - statement in debate in Nottingham' Asylum 4 (1) 17-19 
E. Lemert (1951) 'Social pathology' McGraw Hill: Ndw York 
R. B. Levin and A. M. Gross (1985) 'The role of relaxation in systematic 
desensitization' Behaviour Research and Therapy, 23,187 
V. Lindow (1996) 'Consuming interests - whose choice.: - a consumer's view' 
Openmind, October/November 47,6 
419 
A,. M. Lovell and N. Scheper-Hughes (eds) (i987) I Psychiatry- inside out: selected 
writings of Franco Basaglia' Columbia University Press: New York 
J. E. Macdonald- (1955) 'The concept of responsibility' Journal of Mental 
science, 101,704 
J. Macquarrie (1973) 'Existentialism' Penguin: Harmondsworth 
S. Margen (1988) 'Dependency or autonomy' in S. Ramon 'Psychiatry, in transition: 
the British and Italian experience' Pluto: London. 
W. L. Marshal 1, J. Gduthier,. - M. M. Christie, D. W. Currie and A. Gordon (1977) 
'Flooding týerapy: effectiveness, stimulus characteristics, 'and ihe value of 
brief in vivo exposure' Behaviour Research and Therapy, 15,79-87- 
J. Martin, V. Roberts, A. Roberts and A. Johnson. *(date unknown) . 
'Mental -Patients' 
Union' in Humpty Dumpty 6-7,. 6-10 
A. J. Martin (1976) 'Reviewing the Act' Nursing Times 19 August, 1262 
J. Masson (1990) 'Against therapy' Fontana: London 
R. Matthews (1989) 'Reflections on recent developments in 'social control" 
unpublished paper presented at British criminology conference, Bristol, July 
R. May, E. Angel and H. F. Ellenberger (1958) (eds) 'Existence: a new dimension 
in psychiatry and psychology' Basic Books: Nqw York 
J. E. Mayer and N. Timms (1970) 'The client -speaks' Routledge and Kegan 
Paul: London 
M. McCarthy (1985) 'Psychiatric care in Britai-n: evidence and assertion' Health 
Services Review, 11,278-80 
J. G. Merquior (1991) 'Foucault' Fontana: London- 
p. Miller 0,986) 'Critical sociologies of madness" in P. Miller and N. Rose (eds) 
'The power of psychiatry' Polity Press: Cambridge 
ý. miller and N. Rose (1986) (ýds) 'The power of psychiatry' Polity: Cambridge 
K. Millett (1991) 'The loony bin trip" Virago: London 
MIND Manchester (1988) 'Developing an alternative community mental health 
service' in S-Ramon (ed) 'Psychiatry in transition: the British and Italian 
experiences' Pluto: London 
j. mitchell (1974) 'Psychoanalysis and feminism' Allen Lane: London 
j. mitchell (1975) 'Psychoanalysis and femintsm' Penguin: Harmondsworth 
R. M. Murray (19.90) 'Schizophrenics not weil served by squabbles' letter, 
Guardian, 30 August 
A. Neustatter (1991) 'Give and take' Guardian, 2 ApHl 
420 
S. Orbach and L. Eichenbaum (date unknown) 'Women's Therapy Centre' Humpty 
Dumpty Radical Psychology Magazine, 8,3-8 
G. Orwell (1949) '1984' Secker and Warburg 
j. 0sborne (1960) 'Look Back in Anger' Faber: London 
G. B. Palermo (1991) 'The 1978 Italian mental health law -a personal 
evaluation: a review' Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine, ', 8.4,99-102 
G. Pearson (1975) 'The deviant imagination' Macmillan: London 
'Alternative psychiatries' Humpty 6*mpt' G. Pearson (date unknow. n. u y, 6-7,2-6 
Y. Pearson and P. Hughes (1990) 'Seen but not''heard' Community Care, 15 
February, 12 
H-Penn (date unknown) 'Letter' Humpty Dumpty Radical Psychology Magazipe, 8 
C. Perris and D. Kemali (1985) (eds) 'Focus on the Italian psychiatric reform' 
Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavica Supplementum, 316 
R. F. Prien, E. M. Caffey and J. C. Klett (1974) 'Factors associated with treatment 
success in lithium carbonate prophylaxis' Archives of General Psychiatry, 31, 
189-192 
S. J. Rachman and G. T. Wilson (1980). 'The effects of psychological therapy' 
Pergamon: Elmsford, New York 
S. Ramon (1983) 'Psichiatria Democratica: a case study of an Ita-lian community 
mental health service' International Journal of Health services, '13, $07-24 
S. Ramon-(1985) "Psychiatry in Britain' Croom- Heln: Beckenham 
S. Ramon (1985b) 'Understanding the Italian experience' British Journal 'of 
psychiatry, 147,208-9 
S. Ramon (1988) (ed) 'Psychiatry in transition: - the British and Italian 
eXperiences' Pluto: London 
R. N. Rapoport (1960) 'The community as doctor' Tavistock. Publicaýions: London 
L. Redler (1976) letter in 'Anti-psychiatry: a debate' New Society offprint 
D. Reed (1977) 'Anna' Penguin: Harmondsworth" 
Report of the Royal Commission on the Law Relat. ing to Mental Illness and 
Mental Deficiency. Cmnd. 169,1957. 
L. A. Robinson, J. S. Berman and R. A. Neimeyer *(1990) 'Psychotherapy for the 
treamtment of depression: a comprehensive review of controlled outcome 
research' Psychological Bulletin, 108,30-49 
H. R. Rollin (1981) 'The impact of ECT' in R. L. Palmer. --(ed)' 'ECT: an'appraisal' 
oxford University Press: Oxford 
421 
G. Rose (1982) 'The deciphering of sociological research' MacMillan: Basingstoke 
N. Rose (1986a) 'The discipline of mental health' in P. Miller and N. Rose (eds) 
'The power of-psychiatry' Polity Press: Cambridge 
N. Rose (1986b) 'Law, rights and psychiatry' in P. Miller and N. Rose (eds). 'The 
power of psychiatry' Polity Press: Cambridge 
S. Rose (1989a) 'Mixed messages' New Society, 2 June 
S. Rose (1989b) 'Schizophrenia' letter, New Society, 7 July 
S. Rose (1990) 'The euphoria fades' Guardian, ?0 July 
S. M. Rose (1979) 'Deciphering deinstitutionalizAtion: complexities in policy 
and program analysis' Milbank Memorial Fund. *Quarterly, 57,. 429-460 
Rough Times Collective (1972) 'RT position paper' Rough Times, 3 (3) 2 
Royal College of Psychiatrists (1988) 'Benzodiazepines and dependence: *a 
college statement' Bulletin of the Royal College of Psychiatrists, 1.2,. 107-13 
M. Ryan (1988) 'Postmodern politics' in M. Featherstone (ed) 'Postmodernism' 
Theory, Culture and Society 5,559-576 Sage: L6ndon. 
E. Sainsbury (1983) 'Client studies and social policy' in M. Fisher (ed) 
'Speaking of clients' University of Sheffiel, d: Sheffield 
T. Scheff (1966) 'Being mentally ill: a sociological identity' AlcQne: Chicago 
T. Scheff (1975) 'Reply to Chauncey and Gove' ASL (Annals of Sociological 
Research? ] 
T. Scheff (1984) 'Being mentally ill' (2nd edition)-Aldine: New York 
N. Schoon (1990) 'Illness during pregnancy may cause schizophre'nia in c"hild, 
Guardian, ý3 August 
M. Schou, A. Amdiser and K. Thomsen (1968) 'The effect of lithium on the normal 
mind' in P. Baudis, E. Peterova and V. P. Sedivac (eds) 'De 'P*sychiatr*ia 
Progrediente' 2 
A-SCul 1 (1981). 'Deinstitutional isation and the rights of the deviant '. Journal 
of Social Issues, 37 (3) 6 
A-Scull (1982) 'Museums of madness' Penguin: Harmondsworth 
A-Scull (1984) 'Decarceration: community treatment and the deviant' 
polity: Cambridge 
A-Scull (1989) 'Social order\mental disorder: Anglo-American psychiatry in 
historical perspective' Routledge: London 
p. Sedgwick (1972) 'R. D. Laing: self, symptom and society' in R. Boyers and 
R. Orrill (eds) 'Laing and anti-psychiatry' PenguiniHarmondswoýih 
422 
P. Sedgwick (1981) 'Psychiatry and liberation' paper, Leeds University - 
P. Sedgwick (1982) 'Psycho politics, Pluto: London 
A. Sheridan (1977) (ed) 'Ecrits: a selection' Tavi stock: London 
A. Sheridan (1990) 'Foucault: the will to truth' Rout I edge: London 
P. Shields (1990a) Letter, Asylum 4 (3) 31 
P. Shields (1990b) 'What do consumers want? ' Asylum 4 (3) 12-14 
B. Shopsin,. S. Gershon, 
, 
R. Thompson and P. Collin4 (1975)-Psych'oactive drugs in 
mania' Archives of General Psychiatry, 32,34-42 
E. Showalter (1985) 'The female malady' Virago: London 
M. Siegler, H. Osmond and H. Mann (1972) 'Laing's models of madness' in R. Boyers 
and R. Orill (eds) 'Laing and Anti -Psychiatry' Penguin: Harmondsworth. 
B. F. Skinner (1948) 'Walden two' Macmillan: New York 
J. G. Small, V. Milstein, H. C. Perez., I. F. Small and D. F. Moore. (1972) EEG and 
neurophysiological studies of lithium in 4iormal volunteers' Biological 
psychiatry 5,65-77,197f 
M. I. Smith and G. V. Glass (1977) tMeta-anal, ysis of psychotherapy outcome 
studies' American Psychologist, 32ý, 75ý-60 
T. Smythe (1975) 'Preface' in L. Gostin 'A human condition vol. 4' MIND: London 
L. R. Squire, P. C. Slater and P. M. Chace (1981)' 'Retrograde amnesia and bilateral 
electro-convulsive therapy' Science, 187,77-9 
D. Stafford-Clark (1963) 'Psychiatry today'. Penguin: Harmondsworth 
C. steiner (1975) Issues in Radical Therapy 3 (4) 4 Issues 'in 'Radical Therapy 
Collective, Berkeley California 
6. Steiner and S. Meighan 'R. D. Laing: an interview' Issues in Radic . al Therapy., 
3 (4) 3-9 Issues in Radical therapy Collective, Berkeley California 
Survivors Speak Out (date unknown) 'Self-advocacy action pack' Survivors Speak 
out: London 
S. sutherland (1976) 'Breakdown' Paladin: St Albans 
T. SZasz (1960) 'The myth of mental illness'. American Psychologist, 15,113 
T. Szasz (1972) 'The myth of mental iI Iness', Paladin: London 
T. Szasz (1973). 'The manufacture of madness' Paladin: London 
T. szasz (1974) 'The second sin' Routledge and Kegan PAu'I: London 
423 
T. Szasz (1976) 'Anti-psychiatry: the paradigm of the plundered mind' in 'Anti- 
psychiatry: a debate' New Society offprint 
T. Szasz (1979) 'Schizophrenia: the sacred symbol of psychiatry' OUP: Oxford 
M. Tansella (1985) 'Mis-understanding the Italian experience' British. Journal 
of Psychiatry, 147,450-1 
M. Tansella (1991) 'Community based psychiatry: long-term patte, rns. of carb in 
South Verona' Psychological Medicine, suppl. 19 - 
M. Tansella and P. Williams (1987) 'The Italian experience and its implications' 
psychologica. 1 Medicine, - 17 283-289 
Taylor (1970) 'The campaign for nucle7ar disarmament' in V. Bogdanor and 
R. Skidelsky (eds) 'The Age of affluence' Macmi 1 Ian: London and Basingstoke 
S. Ticktin (1986) 'Brother beast: a personal memoir of David Cooper' Asylum 1 
(3) 14 
s. Ticktin (1991) 'The users' voice in mental health s6rvices - towards a 
democratic psychiatry' Asylum 5 (3) 30-33 
D. Towell and S-Kingsley (1.988) 'Changing psychiatric services in Britain' in 
S. Ramon (ed) 'Psychiatry in transition: the British andItalian experiences' 
pluto: London 
p. Tranchina, G-Archi and M. Ferrara (1981) 'The new legislation in Italian 
psychiatry' International Journal of Law and Psychiatry, 4,181-90 
Tyne and O'Brien (1981) normalization: ref. in N. Malin (ed) Reassessing 
Community Care, (1987) Croom Helm 
S. Turkle (1979) 'Psychoanalytic politics: Jacques -Lacan and Freud's French 
revolution' Burnett Books: London 
c. Unsworth . 
(1987) 'The politics of mental health legislationý OUP: Oxford 
j.. Ussher (1991) tWomen's madness: misogyny or mental illness? ' Harverster 
Wheatsheaf: Hertfordshire 
B. de la Cruz Vicente Parada (1988) tAn international comparison of attitudes 
to psychiatry and mental health services' unpublished Phd dissertation, 
University of Sheffield 
J. Wain (1953) 'Hurry on down' 
M. Wallace (1986) Times, 20 January 
C. Warren (1979) 'The myth of deinstitutionalization' American Behavioural 
Scientist 24 (6). 724-740 
D. Weeds, C. P. L. Freeman and R. E. Kendell (1980) 'ECT: 3.: enduring cognitive 
effects' British Journal of Psychiatry, 137,26-37. 
424 
G. Wikinson f1991) [comments on Palermo, 1991] in K. Jones, G. Wilkinson and 
T. K. J. Craig 'The Italian Mental health law -a personal evaluation: a review' 
British Journal of Psychiatry, 159,556-561 
C. Wilson (1956) 'The outsider' 
C. Wilson (1958) 'Religion and the rebel' 
J. K. Wing (1988) 'Abandoning whatV British Journal of Clinical Psychology, 27, 
325-328 
W. wolfsenberger (1972) Normalization 
J. Zubin (1967) 'Classification of the behaviour disorders' Annual Review of 
psychology, 18,373-406 
Additional References: 
M. Cavadino (1991) 'Community control' Journal of Social Welfare ýnd Family 
Law, 6,482-493 
N. Hervey (1986) 'Advocacy or folly: the Alleged Lunatics' Friend Society, 
1845-63' Medical History, 30,245-275 
K. Jones (1960) 'Mental health and social policy 1845-1959' Routledge and Kegan 
paul: London 
I. Taylor, P. Walton and J. Young (1973) 'The new criminology' Routledge and 
Kegan Paul: London 
425 
Appendix I Interview Schedules - 
1. Interview Schedule for Interviews with 'Radical' service Users and 
Professionals-. 
1.1 Are you familiar with Laing and Cooper's work? 
1.2 Would you say that you are influenced by the ideas of any other authors; 
for example, Szasz? 
1.3 Do you agree with Szasz's opinion that mental illness is a myth? 
1.4 Do you think that psychiatry is just a form of social control? 
1.5 Do you think that all institutional psychiatry is coercive? 
1.6- Do you think 6at compulsory treatment should be abolished? 
1.7 Do you think that all psychiatric hospitals should be closed as soon as 
possible? 
1.8 Do you think that mental distress should'not be treated by doctors? 
1 .9 Do you 
think that a schizophrenic experience can be a useful process of 
self-discovery? 
f 1.10 Do you think that mental dist. ress is c4used by social oppression? 
1.11 Do You think electro-convulsive therapy should be abolished? 
1.12 Do you think psychotropic medication should be abolished? 
1.13 Do-you think users should run their own- services? 
1.14 Do you think people should be regarded as fully responsible for their 
actions, even if they are mentally distressed? 
2. Interview Schedule for Interviews with 'Mainstream Psychiatrists' 
2.1 Do you think that doctors are the best people to treat people who suffer 
from serious mental illnesses; for example, schizophrenia? 
2.2 Do you think that serious mental illTiesses such as schizophrenia are 
actually brain diseases? 
2.3 Do you think that researchers are close to finding an organic or 
biochemical explanation for serious mental illnesses such as schizophrenia? 
2.4 Do YOU think the category 'schizophrenic' will continue to be meaningful 
for psychiatrists in the future? 
2.5 Do * 
you think the major tranquillizers work by correcting identifiable 
biochemical imbalances? 
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2.6 Do you think that serious mental illnesses such as schizophrenia are 
entirely or mainly genetically predetermined? 
2.7 Do you th1nk that social factors play any part in the onset of serious 
mental illnesses such as schizophrenia? 
2.8 What is the relationship between social causes and organic causes? 
2.9 Do you feel confident that you can recognize serious mdn'tal illnesses 
such asý schizophrenia in patients of different cultural backgrounds to you 
own? 
2.10 Do you distinguish- between serious mental illnesses which you feel sure 
are mainly physiological in origin and less serious ones you feel sure are 
psychologi. cal in origin? 
2.11 How do you make this distinction? 
2.12 Does it make a difference to how you treat the patient? 
2.13 Do you think doctors are the best people to treat Pdople who suffer from 
less serious mental illnesses? 
2.14 Do you think that yo. u views are typical of most psychiatrists? 
2.15 How many psychiatrists do you think believe that serious mental illnesses 
do not have organic causes? 
2.16 Why' do you think that some Psychiatrists think this? 
2.17 Do you think their views are reasonable? 
2.18 Do-you think anti-psychiatry has been helpful to Psychiatrists and their 
patients at all? 
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